

PLUTARCH'S  
*Advice to the Bride and Groom*  
AND  
*A Consolation to His Wife*

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ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS, COMMENTARY,  
INTERPRETIVE ESSAYS, AND BIBLIOGRAPHY



EDITED BY  
*Sarah B. Pomeroy*

This book is a collection of essays with commentary and evaluative bibliography on Plutarch, *Advice to the Bride and Groom* and *Consolation to His Wife*, along with Greek texts and English translations. It is designed to help readers understand and appreciate two important documents for the study of gender and the family in the Greco-Roman world and in later Western history.

Sarah Pomeroy has assembled a team of experts on Plutarch, the Hellenistic world, religion, cultural studies, and the family and gender. Using various historical and theoretical approaches, they discuss the wide range of issues and questions raised by these texts. For example, what does one mean by "Roman" or "Greek" marriage in a Hellenistic context when Greeks and Romans were mutually influential? To begin to answer this question, it is imperative to take notice of Greek traditions, the Roman imperial context, and the changing views of the family in Greek philosophy and early Christianity. Furthermore, for an understanding of the *Consolation to His Wife*, it is necessary to understand Roman demography and to examine contemporary Latin consolatory literature. Though Plutarch addressed both these essays to individual Greeks whom he knew personally, he had a much wider audience in mind.

This book therefore is written for both a scholarly and a general audience. The commentary, essays, and bibliography are designed for those who are reading the English translation. The Greek text, which is not otherwise easily accessible, is included for the convenience of readers who can read Greek.

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and *A Consolation to His Wife*

*English Translations, Commentary,  
Interpretive Essays, and  
Bibliography*

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New York Oxford  
Oxford University Press  
1999

HQ  
731  
P58  
1999

Oxford University Press

Oxford New York

Athens Auckland Bangkok Bogotá Buenos Aires Calcutta  
Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul  
Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai  
Nairobi Paris São Paulo Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto Warsaw

and associated companies in  
Berlin Ibadan

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198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data  
Plutarch's Advice to the bride and groom, and A consolation to his wife :  
English translations, commentary, interpretive essays,  
and bibliography / edited by Sarah B. Pomeroy.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-19-512023-X

1. Marriage—Early works to 1800. 2. Children—Death—Early works to 1800.
3. Consolation—Early works to 1800. 4. Plutarch. *Conjugalia Praecepta*.
5. Plutarch. *Consolatio ad uxorem*. I. Pomeroy, Sarah B. II. Plutarch.  
*Conjugalia praecepta*. English. III. Plutarch. *Consolatio ad uxorem*. English.

HQ731.P58 1999  
306.81—dc21 98-27968

1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2

Printed in the United States of America  
on acid-free paper

## Preface

After talking with Dr. Lin Foxhall in London in January 1996, I decided to publish this book. Though one of us teaches in Great Britain and the other in the United States, Dr. Foxhall and I both assign Plutarch's *Advice to the Bride and Groom* and *Consolation to His Wife* to be read by undergraduate and graduate students in classics and ancient history courses dealing with women, gender, and the family. When we were together in London we lamented the lack of historical commentary on these works because although they are central to our teaching, it has been difficult to decide how to treat them in the classroom, and there is little "further reading" to recommend. Since I had just completed a commentary on a related text, Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* (a treatise which was quite influential on Plutarch), the Plutarch volume seemed a natural sequel.

A glance at *L'Année philologique* will confirm that among professional classicists and ancient historians there is substantial interest in Plutarch nowadays, though recent scholarship does not take sufficient cognizance of the *Advice to the Bride and Groom* and the *Consolation to His Wife*. Because of the dearth of scholarly discussion of Plutarch's works on the family, and the desirability of publishing this volume as soon as possible, it seemed best to assemble a team of experts who would use a wide range of historical and theoretical approaches in discussing the issues and questions raised by these texts and who would investigate and describe various aspects of Plutarch's world. For example, what does one mean by "Roman" or "Greek" marriage in a Hellenistic context when Greeks and Romans were mutually influential? (Nevertheless, Susan Treggiari refers to Plutarch on only one page—p. 314—of *Roman Marriage*.) To begin to answer this question, it is imperative to take notice of Greek traditions, the Roman Imperial context, and the changing views of the family in Greek philosophy and early Christianity. Furthermore, for an understanding of the *Consolation to His Wife* it is necessary to study Roman demography and to examine contemporary Latin consolatory literature. Inasmuch as the Romans had conquered the Greeks, one would expect the former to exercise more influence upon the latter than vice versa. But an examination of the tradition of philosophical consolatory literature shows that Romans adopted Greek precedents. Although

Plutarch addressed the *Advice to the Bride and Groom* and the *Consolation to His Wife* to individual Greeks whom he knew personally, he had a much wider audience in mind. Romans as well as Greeks must have read the essays. For these reasons, I have not imposed a uniform appellation for the chronological and geographical context in which Plutarch wrote. "Hellenistic Greece," "Imperial Greece," and "Roman Greece" all refer to the same time and place, though the choice of phrase indicates the writer's frame of reference.

Plutarch has always been one of the most popular of ancient authors, for his works are readable, accessible, and interesting. The intended audience for this book includes students, teachers, and general readers of classics, ancient history, and European family history. Furthermore, historians of gender and sexuality will doubtless find much of value, as the *Advice to the Bride and Groom* is the central text in Michel Foucault's widely discussed *Care of the Self*. Our aim here is also to introduce Plutarch's texts on marriage and gender relations to general readers and to provide the historical information necessary for understanding and appreciating these works and gauging whether his ideas and attitudes are typical or representative of his time.

All the essays in this volume are new, with two minor exceptions. Cynthia Patterson previously published an essay on the *Advice to the Bride and Groom*, but for this collection she has revised, to some extent, her original study of traditional Greek marriage as reflected in Plutarch. The other exception, Lisette Goessler's dissertation *Plutarchs Gedanken über die Ehe*, is the only modern full-length study devoted to Plutarch's views on marriage. The present volume includes a new translation of selected sections that should be of interest to most readers. Because Goessler's work was published in 1962 before the development of the new fields of family history, history of childhood, feminist and gender theory, and speech/act analysis (examples of which can be found in the present volume), it offers contemporary readers an opportunity to study the historiography of social history in the second half of the twentieth century.

Readers should begin by reading the translations and commentaries. The commentaries refer to the essays when they treat the same topics at greater length. Simon Swain's contribution includes a review of Plutarch's life and works and gives general information that provides a useful foundation for the detailed studies in the other essays. Swain brings in for comparison and contrast Plutarch's contemporary, Dio of Prusa, who also wrote about women and children. Richard Hawley examines Plutarch's views of women against the background of Greek literary traditions. Lin Foxhall examines the political and legal situation in Plutarch's Greece and compares it with earlier Greek written law and actual practice. Jo Ann McNamara's pioneer study uses gender theory in her comparison of Plutarch's ideas about marriage with those in the writings and behavior of early Christians. Next, Emma J. Stafford elucidates some of the allegorical figures in Greek religion that figure prominently in Plutarch's writings on personal and familial conduct. Philip A. Stadter discusses not only the educated women in Plutarch's circle, but also the ideas about women expressed elsewhere in the *Moralia* and in the *Lives*. Finally, Keith Bradley makes an important contribution to the history of childhood in his wide-ranging study of the demography of the ancient world and of the ways Greek and Roman parents grappled with the deaths of infants and children.

The Greek texts are reprinted from the Teubner version. Readers who wish to study the Greek will thus have the original text at hand. The translations by Donald Russell are reprinted from the Oxford World's Classics edition of *Plutarch: Selected Essays and Dialogues*. They are recent translations by a leading scholar on Plutarch who also happens to be a gifted writer. Russell based his translation on both the Budé and Teubner texts of Plutarch, but relied mostly on the Teubner. The translation printed here includes occasional deviations from Russell's version (due mainly to David Harvey) to express more accurately the concepts as they are discussed in the present volume. For example, in the opening paragraph of the *Advice* "persuasion" has been capitalized and written as "Persuasion" to convey the notion that the concept is also allegorized and treated as a goddess, like the Graces who are mentioned in the succeeding phrase. The commentaries are keyed to the translations. They are not narrowly philological but deal with historical, social, philosophical, and religious matters deemed to be of interest to the majority of readers. Cross references to other works of Plutarch and to philosophical works by other authors have been kept to a minimum. Readers interested in such parallels can find them abundantly cited elsewhere (see Bibliography).

*Advice to the Bride and Groom* and *A Consolation to His Wife* are cited respectively as *Advice* and *Consolation*. Except for the introductory paragraph of the *Advice*, sections of *Advice* and *Consolation* are referred to by paragraph numbers in parentheses, not by the continuous *Moralia* numbers. Every attempt has been made to make this work accessible to non-classicists. Works of Plutarch are referred to by the English titles given by Russell (pp. xxiii–xxix). Otherwise, standard abbreviations are used for all works. With a few obvious exceptions, journal titles are abbreviated according to the form in *L'Année philologique*. Accepted abbreviations will be used for standard works. Lists of such abbreviations can be found in reference books such as the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (3d edn.), and in the major Greek and Latin dictionaries.

Proper names, like Roman Greece itself, are often hybrid. These have been Latinized. Readability, rather than consistency, has been the goal. Familiar names like Thucydides are given in their best-known orthography. "Pseudo-" preceding an author's name indicates that scholars have cast doubt upon the attribution of a literary work to a particular author; it does not imply a modern forgery. Thus a work attributed to Pseudo-Plutarch was probably written by one of Plutarch's less gifted contemporaries.

I am grateful to Donald Russell for friendly advice since the inception of this project, and to the Family History Reading Group for reviewing this project at several stages. I am also pleased to have the opportunity to thank all those who contributed essays for also serving as internal referees for contributions by other authors. Thanks are due as well to Lawrence Tritle, President of the International Plutarch Society, North American Section, for organizing a panel to discuss this volume at the 1997 annual meeting of the American Philological Association in Chicago and to Cynthia Patterson and Anthony Podlecki for their comments at this session. Finally, it is a pleasure to acknowledge the gracious and tactful editorial help of Angela Blackburn.

# Acknowledgments

“Coniugalia Praecepta” reprinted with permission from *Plutarchus Moralia*, vol. I, ed. W.R. Paton, I. Wegehaupt, M. Pohlenz, and H. Gärtner, 2d edition, pp. 283–299. © 1993 by B.G. Teubner, Leipzig.

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Cynthia Patterson, “Plutarch’s ‘Advice on Marriage’: Traditional Wisdom through a Philosophic Lens,” in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt / Rise and Decline of the Roman World (ANRW)*, edited by Wolfgang Haase and Hildegard Temporini, vol. II, 33.5, edited by Wolfgang Haase (London and New York: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1991), pp. 4709–4723. With permission by the editors.

The translation of Lisette Goessler, *Plutarchs Gedanken über die Ehe* (Zurich 1962), pp. 44–69, appears by kind permission of Lisette Bruderer-Goessler.

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Plutarch's  
*Advice to the Bride and Groom*  
and *A Consolation to His Wife*

TRANSLATIONS, TEXTS, AND  
COMMENTARIES

# Advice to the Bride and Groom

## For Pollianus and Eurydice

After the traditional ordinance, which the priestess of Demeter laid upon you when you were shut up in your wedding chamber together, it may be that words (*logos*) also will touch you and contribute to your wedding in a way that is both useful and in harmony with the custom.<sup>1</sup> In music, there was a tune for the pipe called "The Rampant Stallion," designed, it seems, to urge the stallion to cover the mare. In philosophy too there are many fine subjects of discourse, but none more important than this discourse of marriage, whereby philosophy charms those who come together to share their lives, and makes them gentle and amenable to each other. I have therefore put together in the form of some brief similitudes, so that they are the more easily remembered, the main points of the teaching you have often heard in the course of your education in philosophy. These I send as a gift to you both, praying that the Muses may assist Aphrodite in her work; for it is less their duty to tune lyre or cithara than it is to ensure the tunefulness of marriage and home by discourse, harmony, and philosophy. The ancients set Hermes at Aphrodite's side, knowing that the pleasure of marriage needed his word more than anything, and with them they set Persuasion and the Graces, that married couples might gratify their desire with each other by persuasion, not in conflict or quarrelsomeness.

[1] Solon ordered that the bride should eat some quince before retiring to bed with the bridegroom. He meant to suggest (I suppose) that the first favor of lip and voice should be harmonious and sweet. 138

[2] In Boeotia, when they veil the bride, they give her a garland of asparagus. This is a plant that gives the sweetest fruit from the sharpest thorn, just as the bride will give a life of calm and sweetness to the man who does not shrink from, or feel distaste for, the first harsh and disagreeable impressions. Men who cannot put up

<sup>1</sup> *Nomos* means "custom," "convention," and "melody." This ambiguity explains the transition or sequence of thought between the first two sentences.

with a young girl's first quarrels are like people who leave the ripe bunch to others because the unripe grape was tart. Many newly married girls also show distaste for their bridegrooms because of the first experience; they are like people who put up with the bee's sting but let the honeycomb go.

[3] It is especially at the start that married couples should beware of differences and disputes. They should observe that jointed articles are easily broken at first by quite trivial accidents, whereas once the joints have become firm over time they can hardly be parted by fire or iron.

[4] As fire is easily kindled in chaff or tinder or rabbit fur, but also easily extinguished unless it takes hold of some other material capable of protecting and feeding it, so one must realize that the love of the newly married, blazing up quickly out of physical attraction, is not persistent or secure unless it settles in the character, lays hold of the mind, and acquires a life of its own.

139 [5] Poisoned bait catches fish quickly and easily, but makes them nasty and inedible. Similarly, women who contrive potions and charms to entice men and win them over by pleasure find they have unreliable, foolish, and spoiled partners in life. Circe had no profit from the victims of her potions, for she could not use them for anything when they became pigs or asses; it was Odysseus, the man of sense, who consorted wisely with her, whom she loved so much.

[6] Women who prefer to dominate fools rather than obey men of sense are like people who would rather guide the blind on the road than follow the sighted man who knows the way.

[7] Women do not believe that Pasiphae fell in love with a bull when she lived with a king. Yet they see some women finding strict and moral husbands a burden, and preferring to go with men who have the intemperate, pleasure-loving natures of dogs or goats.

[8] Persons whose weakness or feebleness does not allow them to leap on to a horse teach the horse to kneel and lower itself. Similarly, some men who take rich or highly born wives do not improve themselves, but diminish their wives; they think they will rule them better if they are brought low. But, as with the horse, it is the curb you need to use, paying attention to the greatness and prestige of the lady.

[9] We see the moon bright and conspicuous when she is far from the sun; when near, she vanishes and is hidden. A good woman, on the other hand, should be seen most when she is with her husband, and stay at home and be hidden when he is away.

[10] Herodotus was wrong to say that a woman doffs her modesty when she doffs her clothes. The opposite is true: a good woman wears modesty in place of clothes, and the sign of great love is great modesty towards each other.

[11] When two notes are struck together, the melody belongs to the lower note. Similarly, every action performed in a good household is done by the agreement of the partners, but displays the leadership and decision of the husband.

[12] The sun beat the north wind! The wind blew hard and tried to strip off the man's cloak; but he gripped it tight and held the folds together. After the wind, the sun was warm; and the man, feeling first warm and then hot, took off not only his cloak but his shirt. This is how most women behave. When their husbands take away

their luxuries and extravagances, they fight and quarrel; but if they are persuaded by reason, they lay them aside without complaint and behave with moderation.

[13] Cato expelled from the Senate the man who kissed his wife in their daughter's presence. That was perhaps somewhat extreme; but if it is disgraceful (as indeed it is) to kiss and embrace in the presence of others, is it not more disgraceful to quarrel and abuse each other before others, or to treat your love and affection for your wife as a secret, while exposing your frank reproaches and fault finding to the open light of day?

[14] There is no usefulness in a mirror ornamented with gold and jewels, unless it shows a likeness. Similarly, there is no profit in a rich wife, unless she makes her life and character resemble and harmonize with her husband's. If a mirror shows a scowling image of a happy face, or a cheery, grinning image of an angry sullen face, it is faulty and worthless. And so, if a wife puts on a glum look when her husband wants to be playful and affectionate, or if she laughs and jokes when he is serious, she is a poor wife, and has no sense of occasion; she proves herself in the first case disagreeable, in the second insensitive. Mathematicians tell us that lines and surfaces do not move on their own, but only in conjunction with bodies. Similarly, a wife should have no feelings of her own, but share her husband's seriousness and sport, his anxiety and his laughter.

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[15] Husbands who do not like to see their wives eating with them thereby teach them to stuff themselves in private. Similarly, men who do not converse cheerfully with their wives or share their play and laughter thereby teach them to seek private pleasures without them.

[16] When Persian kings dine, their legal wives sit beside them and share the feast. But if they want to amuse themselves or get drunk, they send their wives away, and summon the singing-girls and the concubines. And they are quite right not to share their drunken orgies with their wives. So, if a private citizen, intemperate and tasteless in his pleasures, commits an offense with a mistress or a maidservant, his wife ought not to be angry or annoyed, but reflect that it is his respect for her that makes her husband share his intemperance or violent behavior with another woman.

[17] Kings who love music produce many musicians, scholarly kings scholars, athletic kings athletes. Similarly, a husband who loves the body produces a wife who adorns her person; a lover of pleasure, one who is free and immoral; and a lover of goodness and honor a chaste and sober wife.

[18] A Spartan girl, when asked if she had yet come to her husband, replied, "No, but he has come to me." This is how the true housewife should be; she does not avoid or show displeasure with such things, if her husband takes the initiative, but neither does she take the initiative herself; the latter would be forward and more like a mistress than a wife, the former shows arrogance and lack of affection.

[19] A wife ought not to have friends of her own, but use her husband's as their common stock. And the first and most important of our friends are the gods. A married woman should therefore worship and recognize the gods whom her husband holds dear, and these alone. The door must be closed to strange cults and foreign superstitions. No god takes pleasure in cult performed furtively and in secret by a woman.

[20] Plato says that the happy and blessed city is one in which the words “mine” and “not mine” are least to be heard, because the citizens treat everything of importance, so far as possible, as their common property. Even more firmly should these words be banished from a marriage. Doctors tell us that an injury on the left side refers the sensation to the right. Similarly, it is good for a wife to share her husband’s feelings, and a husband his wife’s, so that, just as ropes gain strength from the twisting of the strands, so their communion may be the better preserved by their joint efforts, through mutual exchanges of goodwill. Nature joins you together in your bodies, so that she may take a part of each, and by mixing them together give you a child that belongs to you both, such that neither of you can say what is his or her own, and what the other’s. Community of resources also is particularly appropriate for the married; they should pour everything into one fund, mix it all together, and not think of one part as belonging to one and another to the other, but of the whole as their own, and none of it anyone else’s. We call our mixed drink “wine,” though there is more water than wine in it; similarly, the property and the house should be called the husband’s even if the wife contributes the greater part.

[21] Helen loved wealth, Paris loved pleasure. Odysseus was wise, Penelope was prudent. The latter pair had a happy and enviable marriage; the marriage of the  
141 others brought an Iliad of disaster on Greeks and barbarians.

[22] The Roman who was reproached by his friends for divorcing his chaste, rich, and beautiful wife, replied by holding up his shoe. “This shoe,” he said, “is new and beautiful, but no one knows where it pinches me.” A wife should not rely on her dowry, her birth, or her beauty, but ensure by her conversation, manners, and behavior, which are the points that most touch a husband, that there is nothing in their daily life harsh or hurtful, but only painless and harmonious affection. Doctors are more alarmed by fevers that come from obscure and gradually developing causes than they are by those that have an obvious and conspicuous origin. Similarly, repeated, trivial daily annoyances that go unnoticed cause more damage and disruption to the joint life of husband and wife.

[23] King Philip loved a Thessalian lady, who was charged with giving him a love potion. Queen Olympias was anxious to get the woman into her power. But when she appeared, and was seen to be beautiful, and conversed very properly and intelligently with the queen, Olympias said, “We can forget the accusations; you have your charms in yourself.” Thus a lawful, wedded wife is invincible, if she has everything in herself—dowry, birth, potions, Aphrodite’s magic belt—and wins goodwill by her character and virtue.

[24] It was Olympias again who, when a young courtier married a beautiful woman with a bad reputation, observed, “He has no sense, or he would not have married with his eyes.” Indeed, one must not marry with the eyes, nor yet with the fingers, as those do who calculate how much money their intended will bring, not how she will turn out as a companion in life.

[25] Socrates’ advice to young men who looked at themselves in the mirror, if they were ugly, was to compensate for their looks by virtue; if they were handsome, not to mar their beauty by vice. So when the housewife has her mirror in her hand, she should say to herself, if she is plain, “But what does it matter if I am chaste?” and if she is handsome, “But what does it matter if I am also chaste?” For it is an honor

to the plain woman to be loved for her character, and to the beauty to be loved also for her character.

[26] The tyrant of Sicily sent expensive cloaks and necklaces to Lysander's daughters. Lysander refused them, saying, "These ornaments will disfigure me more than they will adorn my daughters." Sophocles anticipated Lysander's thought:

there's no adornment here to see, you wretch,  
but lack of adornment, and your heart's blind folly.<sup>2</sup>

"Adornment," said Crates, "is what adorns"; and what adorns a woman is what makes her better ordered—not gold nor emerald nor scarlet, but whatever gives an impression of dignity, discipline, and modesty.

[27] In the sacrifice to Hera, as goddess of marriage, they do not consecrate the gallbladder with the rest of the victim, but take it out and throw it away by the altar. The inventor of this practice thereby intimates enigmatically that there should never be any gall or anger in a marriage. The sharpness of the housewife, like that of wine, should be profitable and pleasant—not bitter and poisonous, like aloes.

[28] Plato advised Xenocrates, who was a man of excellent character but of rather too grave a manner, that he should sacrifice to the Graces. So also the chaste wife needs graces in handling her husband, so as to enjoy living with him and not "feel angry because she is chaste," as Metrodorus said. A woman of simple tastes should not neglect cleanliness, nor one who loves her husband neglect expressions of affection. Bad temper makes a woman's good behavior disagreeable, and dirtiness does the same for simplicity. 142

[29] A wife who is afraid to laugh and joke with her husband, for fear of seeming bold and forward, is no different from one who uses no oil for fear of seeming to have perfumed her head, or does not wash for fear of seeming to use makeup. We note that poets and orators who avoid vulgar, cheap affectations of language cultivate the art of influencing and affecting their audiences by subject, arrangement, and character. Thus the mistress of the house also, because she is right to avoid and reject all meretricious and ostentatious display, has nonetheless to cultivate the art of handling her husband by charms of character and daily life, training him in good ways with pleasure. If she is naturally stern, austere, and without charm, her husband must be indulgent. When Antipater ordered Phocion to do something that was neither honorable nor decent, Phocion replied, "You cannot have me both as a friend and as a flatterer." Similarly, the husband of a modest and austere wife must reflect, "I cannot have her both as a wife and as a *hetaira*."

[30] According to the old custom, Egyptian women did not wear shoes; this was so that they should spend all day at home. With most women, if you take away their gilded shoes and bracelets and anklets, their purple dresses and their pearls, they too will stay at home.

[31] Theano once exposed her hand as she was arranging her cloak. "What a beautiful arm," said someone. "But not public property," she replied. Not only the

<sup>2</sup> *Kosmos*, translated here as "adornment," can also mean "order," and *akosmia*, translated here as "lack of adornment," can mean "disorder."

arms but the words of a modest woman must never be public property. She should be shy with her speech as with her body, and guard it against strangers. Feelings, character, and disposition can all be seen in a woman's talk.

[32] Phidias's statue of Aphrodite at Elis has her foot resting on a turtle, to symbolize homekeeping and silence. A wife should speak only to her husband or through her husband, and should not feel aggrieved if, like a piper, she makes nobler music through another's tongue.

[33] Rich men and kings who honor philosophers adorn both themselves and their beneficiaries; but philosophers courting the rich do nothing to increase the reputation of these people, but merely diminish their own. It is the same with wives. If they submit to their husbands, they are praised. If they try to rule them, they cut a worse figure than their subjects. But the husband should rule the wife, not as a master rules a slave, but as the soul rules the body, sharing her feelings and growing together with her in affection. That is the just way. One can care for one's body without being a slave to its pleasures and desires; and one can rule a wife while giving her enjoyment and kindness.

[34] Philosophers distinguish three classes of bodies: those made up of separate units, like a fleet or an army; those made of units connected together, like a house or a ship; and those which have a natural unity, such as animals have. A marriage between lovers has this natural unity; a marriage for money or children is made of units connected together; a marriage based simply on the pleasure of sleeping together is made of separate units, and should be called cohabitation rather than a shared life.

143 Scientists tell us that liquids mix completely: so should the bodies, resources, friends, and connections of a married couple. The Roman lawgiver forbade married couples to give or receive presents from each other. This was not to stop them sharing, but to make them think everything their common property.

[35] In the African city of Leptis, the custom is for the bride, the day after her marriage, to send a message to her husband's mother, asking for a pot. The mother-in-law refuses, and says she does not have one. This is to ensure that the bride knows from the start the stepmotherliness of a mother-in-law, and so is not angry or upset if something worse follows later. Recognizing this, the wife must seek to palliate the cause. This is a mother's jealous rivalry for her son's love. The only way to cure this is to secure the husband's love privately, but not attempt to loosen or weaken his love for his mother.

[36] Mothers seem to prefer sons because sons can help them, while fathers prefer daughters because daughters need their help. It may perhaps be that it is out of respect for each other that each parent wants to be seen to welcome and love that which is close to the other. This perhaps matters little: what is good is for a wife to be seen to honor her husband's parents more than her own, and refer to them if she is hurt, keeping her own parents in ignorance. To be seen to trust makes you trusted; to be seen to love makes you loved.

[37] Cyrus's Greek troops were ordered by their generals to receive the enemy attack in silence if the enemy advanced shouting, and to shout if the enemy was silent. Sensible wives keep quiet when their husbands shout in anger, but speak and try to calm them down if their anger is silent.

[38] Euripides was right to condemn the use of the lyre over our wine. Music should be invoked to ease anger or grief rather than to give further relaxation at times of pleasure. So you should reflect that it is wrong to sleep together for pleasure while sleeping apart when you are angry or have a difference; for that is especially the time to call in Aphrodite, who is the best doctor for such troubles. Homer teaches this lesson, when he makes Hera say:

I'll end this endless quarrel,  
letting him come to me in love to bed.

[39] A wife must always and everywhere avoid offending her husband, and a husband his wife. It is particularly important to be careful about this in sleeping together. The woman in labor, much distressed, said to those who were helping her to bed, "How can the bed cure what I got in bed?" Yet disputes, quarrels, and angry passions bred in bed cannot easily be resolved at any other time or place.

[40] Hermione is thought to have said a true word when she said "Visits of evil women ruined me." But the ruin does not happen just like that, but when a difference or jealous quarrel with a husband opens not only doors but also ears to women of that kind. The wise wife will close her ears, and guard against whispers, so as not to heap fire on fire. She will keep in mind the story of Philip. He was being incited to anger by friends who pointed out that the Greeks had done well at his hands but spoke ill of him in return. "And what will happen," he replied, "if we treat them badly?" So when scandalmongering women say, "Your husband is hurting you, though you love him and are faithful," the answer is, "And what will happen if I start to hate and wrong him?" 144

[41] A man saw a runaway slave, after a long search. He gave chase, and the slave ran into a mill. "And where else would I have rather found you?" said the master. So let a jealous woman, writing a notice of divorce and extremely angry, say to herself, "And where would my rival be better pleased to see me? What would she rather find me doing than grieving and quarreling with my husband, and deliberately throwing away my household and my marriage?"

[42] The Athenians have three Sacred Plowings: one at Sciron, a memorial to the earliest sowing of a field; one at Raria; and one under the Acropolis, called the "Ox-Yoking." But holiest of all is the sowing and plowing in marriage for the procreation of children. Sophocles well called Aphrodite "fruitful Cytherea." Husband and wife must go about this piously, keeping themselves pure of any unholy or lawless intercourse with others, or not sowing where they do not wish the crop to grow, and where they are ashamed if the fruit comes, and seek to hide it.

[43] When the orator Gorgias read out a speech at Olympia to the Greeks on the subject of concord, Melanthius commented: "Does this man advise us on concord when he can't persuade three individuals in his private life—himself, his wife, and the maid—to agree together?" Gorgias is supposed to have been in love with the maid, and his wife to have been jealous. A man who proposes to produce harmony in the city or in the marketplace or among his own friends, must have harmony at home. Wrongs committed by wives are more often overlooked than wrongs done to them.

[44] Cats, we are told, are disturbed and maddened by the smell of perfume. Now if it were the case that women were made wild and distraught in the same way, it would be a dreadful thing if men did not abstain from using perfume, but let their wives suffer for the sake of their own momentary pleasure. But what does drive women mad is not their husbands' use of perfume, but their association with other women. It is therefore wrong to cause such pain and disturbance to wives for the sake of a little pleasure. Better to treat a wife as we treat bees, which are believed to become angry and pugnacious towards those who have just had sexual relations with a woman, and so keep yourself pure and clean of intercourse with others when you go to your wife's bed.

[45] One does not wear bright clothes when approaching elephants, or red clothes with bulls: these animals are put into a rage by these colors in particular. Tigers, on the other hand, are (we are told) sent into a complete frenzy by the beating of drums around them, and tear themselves to pieces. Now some men cannot bear scarlet or purple clothes, and others hate drums and cymbals. What is wrong, then, in women therefore avoiding these things, and not irritating or angering their husbands, but consorting with them quietly and patiently?

[46] A woman said to Philip, when he tried to lay hands on her against her will, "Let go: every woman is the same when the lamp is taken away." This was a good rejoinder to a vicious adulterer; but for a married woman, it is precisely when the lamp has been removed that she needs to be different from ordinary women; when her body is not seen, her chastity, her faithfulness, her discipline, and her affection must be apparent to her husband.

[47] Plato advised old men to be particularly respectful of the young, so that the young should respect them in turn. Where the old are shameless, he says, there is no modesty or reverence in the young. A husband should keep this in mind, and respect no one more than he does his wife. The bedroom will be her school of discipline or immorality. A husband who enjoys pleasures which he prohibits in his wife is like a man who tells his wife to fight the enemy to whom he has himself surrendered.

[48] Eurydice, I would have you read what Timoxena wrote to Aristylla about the love of ornament, and try to memorize it. As for you, Pollianus, do not think that your wife will avoid extravagance and expense if she sees that you do not despise it in other matters, but take pleasure yourself in gilt cups, painted rooms, or elaborate collars for your horses and mules. If extravagance is abroad in the men's quarters, it cannot be driven out of the women's. You are old enough now to study philosophy; use its demonstrations and arguments to improve your character, conversing and associating with those who can help you. Gather whatever is valuable from every quarter, like a bee; carry it within yourself, share it with your wife, discuss it with her, making the best arguments her friends and familiars. You are her "father" and her "lady mother" and her "brother"; but it is just as honorable to hear a wife say, "Husband, you are my guide and philosopher, my teacher of the noblest and divinest lessons." Such studies, in the first place, keep women away from absurd behavior: a woman who understands mathematics will be ashamed to dance; if she hears the magic of Plato's or Xenophon's words, she will not let the magic of witchcraft into

her life. If a witch undertakes to pull down the moon, she will laugh at the ignorance and folly of women who believe such things, for she will know something of astronomy, and will have heard of Aglaonice, the daughter of Hegetor the Thessalian, who understood about full-moon eclipses and could forecast the time when the moon is caught in the shadow, and so deceived the other women into believing that she was bringing the moon down by her own efforts.

No woman can make a child without the part played by a man; the shapeless, fleshy masses formed in the womb as a result of corruption are called "moles." One must take precautions against such developments in women's minds also. If they do not receive the seeds of good words or share their husband's education, they conceive many strange and evil schemes and feelings on their own. Familiarize yourself, Eurydice, in particular with the sayings of good and wise men. Always have on your lips the remarks you learned with me as a girl. That will please your husband and earn you the admiration of other women, because you will be so splendidly and grandly adorned at no expense. This rich woman's pearls, this foreigner's silks, cannot be acquired or worn save at a great price; but the ornaments that adorned Theano and Cleobulina, and Gorgo the wife of Leonidas, and Timoclea the sister of Theagenes, and Claudia of old, and Cornelia the daughter of Scipio, and all the other marvelous famous women—these can be worn as jewelry at no expense, and they will give you a life of honor and happiness. If Sappho was proud enough of her beautiful songs to write to a rich lady, 146

When you are dead, there shall you lie,  
and there will be no memory  
of you, who have no share  
in roses that the Muses bear,

will you not be able to have proud and splendid thoughts of yourself, if you have a share not in the roses, but actually in the fruit the Muses bear, and which they lavish upon those who admire education and philosophy?

# ΓΑΜΙΚΑ ΠΑΡΑΓΓΕΛΜΑΤΑ

138

(Plan. 34)

ΠΛΟΤΤΑΡΧΟΣ ΠΟΛΛΙΑΝΩΙ ΚΑΙ ΕΤΡΤΔΙΚΗΙ  
ΕΤ ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ

Μετὰ τὸν πάτριον θεσμόν, ὃν ὑμῖν ἡ τῆς Ἀθήνητρος ἱέρεια Β  
συνειργυνμένοις ἐφήρμοσεν, οἶμαι καὶ τὸν λόγον ὁμοῦ συν- 10  
εφαπτόμενον ὑμῶν καὶ συννυμεναιοῦντα χρήσιμον ἂν τι ποιῆσαι  
καὶ τῷ νόμῳ προσωδόν. ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς μουσικοῖς ἓνα τῶν  
αὐλητικῶν νόμων ἱππόθορον ἐκάλουν μέλος τι τοῖς ἵπποις ὁρ-  
μῆς ἐπεγερετικὸν ὥς ἔοικεν ἐνδιδόντα πρὸς τὰς ὀχέας· φιλο-  
σοφία δὲ πολλῶν λόγων καὶ καλῶν ἐνόντων, οὐδενὸς ἥττον 15  
ἄξιος σπουδῆς ὁ γαμήλιός ἐστιν οὗτος, ᾧ κατάδουσα τοὺς ἐπὶ  
βίου κοινωνίᾳ συνιόντας εἰς ταὐτὸ πρᾶους τε παρέχει καὶ χει-  
ροῖς αἰσθητοῖς. ὧν οὖν ἀκηκόατε πολλάκις ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ C  
παρατρεφόμενοι κεφάλαια συντάξας ἐν τισιν ὁμοιότησι βρα-  
χείαις, ὥς εὐμνημόνευτα μᾶλλον εἶη, κοινὸν ἀμφοτέροις πέμπω 20  
δῶρον, εὐχόμενος τῇ Ἀφροδίτῃ τὰς Μούσας παρεῖναι καὶ συν-  
εργεῖν, ὥς μήτε λύραν τινὰ μήτε κιθάραν μᾶλλον αὐταῖς ἢ  
τὴν περὶ γάμον καὶ οἶκον ἐμμέλειαν ἡρμοσμένην παρέχειν διὰ  
λόγου καὶ ἁρμονίας καὶ φιλοσοφίας προσήκον. καὶ γὰρ οἱ πα-  
λαιοὶ τῇ Ἀφροδίτῃ τὸν Ἑρμῆν συγκαθίδρυσαν, ὥς τῆς περὶ 25  
τὸν γάμον ἡδονῆς μάλιστα λόγου δεομένης, τήν τε Πειθὸν καὶ

Cat. Lampr. 115. Codd.: OJSvαAEZvb. Π = αAE, Θ = Zvb.  
Ald.<sup>3</sup> = lectiones Leonici in margine Aldinae Hamburgensis  
13 cf. 704 f

2 κτῆσιν α<sup>2</sup>A<sup>2</sup>E πτῆξιν Z γνῶσιν OJvb πτῶσιν Rvα<sup>1</sup>A<sup>1</sup>  
3 del. Ha. 5 γυναικῶν ἀρσεται inscr. falso α<sup>2</sup> 14 πρὸς Re.  
περὶ Ω 16 καταδέουσα vΠ καταδύουσα O 17 κοινωνίαν  
vΠZv συνόντας Zv

τὰς Χάριτας, ἵνα πείθοντες διαπράττωνται παρ' ἀλλήλων ἃ  
D βούλονται, μὴ μαχόμενοι μηδὲ φιλονεικοῦντες.

1. Ὁ Σόλων ἐκέλευε τὴν νύμφην τῷ νυμφίῳ συγκατακλί-  
νεσθαι μήλου κυδωνίου κατατραγοῦσαν, αἰνιττόμενος ὡς ἔοικεν  
5 ὅτι δεῖ τὴν <πρώτην> ἀπὸ στόματος καὶ φωνῆς χάριν εὐάρ-  
μοστον εἶναι [πρώτην] καὶ ἡδεῖαν.

2. Ἐν Βοιωτίᾳ τὴν νύμφην κατακαλύψαντες ἀσφαραγωνιᾷ  
στεφανοῦσιν· ἐκείνη τε γὰρ ἥδιστον ἐκ τραχυτάτης ἀκάνθης  
καρπὸν ἀναδίδωσιν, ἥ τε νύμφη τῷ μὴ φυγόντι μηδὲ δυσχερά-  
10 ναντι τὴν πρώτην χαλεπότητα καὶ ἀηδίαν αὐτῆς ἤμερον καὶ  
γλυκεῖαν παρέξει συμβίωσιν. οἱ δὲ τὰς πρώτας τῶν παρθένων  
E διαφορὰς μὴ ὑπομείναντες οὐδὲν ἀπολείπουσι τῶν διὰ τὸν  
ὁμφακα τὴν σταφυλὴν ἐτέροις προειμένων. πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν  
νεογάμων δυσχεράνασαι διὰ τὰ πρῶτα τοὺς νυμφίους ὅμοιον  
15 ἔπαθον πάθος τοῖς τὴν μὲν πληγὴν τῆς μελίττης ὑπομείνασαι,  
τὸ δὲ κηρίον προεμένοις.

3. Ἐν ἀρχῇ μάλιστα δεῖ τὰς διαφορὰς καὶ τὰς προσκρού-  
σεις φυλάττεσθαι τοὺς γεγαμηκότας, ὁρῶντας ὅτι καὶ τὰ συν-  
αρμοσθέντα τῶν σκευῶν κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν ὑπὸ τῆς τυχοῦσης  
20 ῥαδίως διασπᾶται προφάσεως, χρόνον δὲ τῶν ἀρμῶν σύμπηξιν  
λαβόντων μόγις ὑπὸ πυρὸς καὶ σιδήρου διαλύεται.

F 4. Ὡς περὶ τὸ πῦρ ἐξάπτεται μὲν εὐχερῶς ἐν ἀχύροις καὶ  
θρυαλλίδι καὶ θριξὶ λαγῶναις, σβέννυται δὲ τάχιον, ἂν μὴ τινας  
ἐτέρου δυναμένου στέγειν ἕμα καὶ τρέφειν ἐπιλάβηται, οὕτω  
25 τὸν ἀπὸ σώματος καὶ ὥρας ὀξὺν ἔρωτα τῶν νεογάμων ἀνα-  
φλεγόμενον δεῖ μὴ διαρκῆ μηδὲ βέβαιον νομίζειν, ἂν μὴ  
περὶ τὸ ἥθος ἰδρυθεῖς καὶ τοῦ φρονοῦντος ἀψάμενος ἔμψυχον  
λάβῃ διάθεσιν.

139 5. Ἡ διὰ τῶν φαρμάκων θήρα ταχὺ μὲν αἶρεῖ καὶ λαμβά-

3 cf. 279 f v. Sol. 20 22 cf. 454 e

5 add. Hch. ex 6 6 πρῶτον Ὀν del. Hch. 7 καταλείψαν-  
τες v καταλύσαντες αA<sup>1</sup> 9 μηδὲ Sauppe μήτε Ω 16 προῖε-  
μένοις SAE 20 σύντηξιν Sb<sup>1</sup> σύνταξιν J 22/23 κ. θρυαλλίδι  
om. vII 26 διαρκεῖν II

νει ῥαδίως τὸν ἰχθύν, ἄβρωτον δὲ ποιεῖ καὶ φαῦλον· οὕτως αἱ φίλτρα τινὰ καὶ γοητείας ἐπιτεχνώμεναι τοῖς ῥνδράσι καὶ χειρούμεναι δι' ἡδονῆς αὐτοὺς ἐμπλήκτοις καὶ ἀνοήτοις καὶ διεφθαρμένοις συμβιοῦσιν. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν Κίρκην ὤνησαν οἱ καταφαρμακευθέντες, οὐδ' ἐχρήσατο πρὸς οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς ὕσι 5 καὶ ὄνοις γενομένοις, τὸν δ' Ὀδυσσεύς νοῦν ἔχοντα καὶ συνόντα φρονίμως ὑπερηγάτησεν.

6. Αἱ βουλόμεναι μᾶλλον ἀνοήτων κρατεῖν ἀνδρῶν ἢ φρονίμων ἀκούειν εἰκάσι τοῖς ἐν ὁδῷ βουλομένοις μᾶλλον ὁδηγεῖν τυφλοὺς ἢ τοῖς γινώσκουσιν ἀκολουθεῖν καὶ βλέπουσι. 10

7. Τὴν Πασιφάην ἀπιστοῦσι βοὸς ἐρασθῆναι βασιλεῖ συν- οὔσαν, ἐνίας ὀρῶσαι τοὺς μὲν αὐστηροὺς καὶ σῶφρονας βαρ- Β νομένους, τοῖς δ' ἐξ ἀκρασίας καὶ φιληδονίας κεκραμένοις ὥσπερ κυσὶν ἢ τράγοις ἥδιον συνοῦσας.

8. Οἱ τοῖς ἵπποις ἐφάλλεσθαι μὴ δυνάμενοι δι' ἀσθένειαν 15 ἢ μαλακίαν αὐτοὺς ἐκείνους δικάζειν καὶ ὑποπίπτειν διδάσκουσιν· οὕτως ἔνιοι τῶν λαβόντων εὐγενεῖς ἢ πλουσίας γυναικας οὐχ ἑαυτοὺς ποιοῦσι βελτίους ἀλλ' ἐκείνας περικολούουσιν, ὥς μᾶλλον ἄρξοντες ταπεινῶν γενομένων. δεῖ δ' ὥσπερ ἵππου τὸ μέγεθος φυλάττοντα καὶ τὸ ἀξίωμα τῆς γυναικὸς χρῆσθαι τῷ 20 χαλινῷ.

9. Τὴν σελήνην, ὅταν ἀποστῇ τοῦ ἡλίου, περιφανῇ καὶ C λαμπρὰν ὀρῶμεν, ἀφανίζεται δὲ καὶ κρύπτεται πλησίον γενο- μένη· τὴν δὲ σῶφρονα γυναικᾶ δεῖ τοῦναντίον ὀρᾶσθαι μά- λιστα μετὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς οὔσαν, οἰκουρεῖν δὲ καὶ κρύπτεσθαι μὴ 25 παρόντος.

10. Οὐκ ὀρθῶς Ἡρόδοτος εἶπεν (I 8) ὅτι ἡ γυνὴ ἅμα τῷ 30 χιτῶνι ἐκδύεται καὶ τὴν αἰδῶ· τοῦναντίον γὰρ ἡ σῶφρων ἀν- ενδύεται τὴν αἰδῶ, καὶ τοῦ μάλιστα φιλεῖν τῷ μάλιστα αἰ- δεῖσθαι συμβόλῳ χρῶνται πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

8 αἰ—10 βλέπουσι Stob. IV p. 678, 12 27 cf. 37 c

10 τυφλοὺς O Stob. τυφλοῖς O 13 κεκραμένοις OναΑΘ κε-  
κρατημένοις Coraes 27 ὁ ἡρόδοτος OE 29 τοῦ Z<sup>2</sup> τῷ O  
τῷ O τὸ O

11. Ὡςπερ, ἂν φθόγγοι δύο σύμφωνοι ληφθῶσι, τοῦ βαρυτέρου γίνεται τὸ μέλος, οὕτω πᾶσα πράξις ἐν οἰκίᾳ σωφρονούσῃ πράττεται μὲν ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων ὁμονοούντων, ἐπιφαίνει δὲ τὴν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἡγεμονίαν καὶ προαίρεσιν.

5 12. Ὁ ἥλιος τὸν βορέαν ἐνίκησεν. ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ μὲν ἀνέμου βιαζομένου τὸ ἱμάτιον ἀφελέσθαι καὶ λαμπρὸν καταπνέοντος μᾶλλον ἔσφιγγε καὶ συνεῖχε τὴν περιβολήν· τοῦ δ' ἡλίου μετὰ τὸ πνεῦμα θερμοῦ γενομένου θαλπόμενος εἴτα καυματιζόμενος καὶ τὸν χιτῶνα τῷ ἱματίῳ προσαπεδύσατο.

10 τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν αἱ πλεῖσται γυναῖκες· ἀφαιρουμένοις τοῖς ἀνδράσι βίᾳ τὴν τρυφήν καὶ τὴν πολυτέλειαν διαμάχονται καὶ χαλεπαίνουσιν· ἂν δὲ πείθωνται μετὰ λόγου, πρῶτος ἀποτίθεται καὶ μετριάξουσιν.

E 13. Ὁ Κάτων ἐξέβαλε τῆς βουλῆς τὸν φιλήσαντα τὴν ξαντοῦ γυναῖκα τῆς θυγατρὸς παρούσης. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἵσως σφοδρότερον· εἰ δ' αἰσχροὺν ἐστίν, ὥςπερ ἐστίν, ἐτέρων παρόντων ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ περιβάλλειν ἀλλήλους, πῶς οὐκ αἴσχιον ἐτέρων παρόντων λοιδορεῖσθαι καὶ διαφέρεισθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ τὰς μὲν ἐντεύξεις καὶ φιλοφροσύνας ἀπορορήτους

20 πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα ποιεῖσθαι, νουθεσίᾳ δὲ καὶ μέμψει (σὺν) παρρησίᾳ χρῆσθαι φανεροῦ καὶ ἀναπεπταμένη;

14. Ὡςπερ ἐσόπτρου κατεσκευασμένου χρυσῷ καὶ λίθοις ὄφελος οὐδὲν ἐστίν, εἰ μὴ δείκνυσιν τὴν μορφὴν ὁμοίαν, οὕτως F οὐδὲ πλουσίας γαμετῆς ὄνησις, εἰ μὴ παρέχει τὸν βλόν ὅμοιον

25 τῷ ἀνδρὶ καὶ σύμφωνον τὸ ἦθος. εἰ (γὰρ) χαίροντος μὲν εἰκόνα σκυθρωπὴν ἀποδίδωσι τὸ ἔσοπτρον, ἀχθομένου δὲ καὶ σκυθρωπάξοντος ἱλαρὰν καὶ σεσηρυῖαν, ἡμαρτημένον ἐστὶ καὶ φαῦλον· οὐκοῦν καὶ γυνὴ φαῦλος καὶ ἄκαιρος ἢ παίζειν μὲν ὠρμημένου καὶ φιλοφρονεῖσθαι τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐσκυθρωπακυνῶ,

5 ss. fab. Aesop. 82 H. Athen. 604 f 14 ss. v. Cat. Mai. 17  
22 ὥςπερ—25 ἦθος cit. Stob. IV p. 549, 5

11 βίᾳ om. vΠ 19 καὶ pr. Xyl. δεῖ AEΘ om. O 20 πέμψει  
SvEb add. Wil. καὶ Mez. 24 παρέχοι OJΘ 25 add. Si.

σπουδάζοντος δὲ παίζουσα καὶ γελῶσα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀηδίας, τὸ δ' ὀλιγωρίας. | δεῖ δέ, ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι λέγουσι τὰς γραμ- 140  
μὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπιφανείας οὐ κινεῖσθαι καθ' ἑαυτὰς ἀλλὰ συγ-  
κινεῖσθαι τοῖς σώμασιν, οὕτω τὴν γυναῖκα μὴδὲν ἴδιον πάθος  
ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ κοινωνεῖν τῷ ἀνδρὶ καὶ σπουδῆς καὶ παιδιᾶς καὶ 5  
συννοίας καὶ γέλωτος.

15. Οἱ τὰς γυναῖκας μὴ ἡδέως βλέποντες ἐσθιούσας μετ'  
αὐτῶν διδάσκουσιν ἐμπίπασθαι μόνας γενομένας. οὕτως οἱ  
μὴ συνόντες ἱλαρῶς ταῖς γυναιξὶ μὴδὲ παιδιᾶς κοινωνοῦντες  
αὐταῖς καὶ γέλωτος ἰδίας ἡδονὰς χωρὶς αὐτῶν ζητεῖν διδά- 10  
σκουσιν.

16. Τοῖς τῶν Περσῶν βασιλεῦσιν αἱ γνήσiai γυναῖκες  
παρακάθηνται δειπνοῦσι καὶ συνεστιῶνται βουλόμενοι δὲ B  
παίζειν καὶ μεθύσκεσθαι ταύτας μὲν ἀποπέμπουσι, τὰς δὲ  
μουσουργοὺς καὶ παλλακίδας καλοῦσιν, ὁρθῶς τοῦτό γ' αὐτὸ 15  
ποιοῦντες, ὅτι τοῦ συνακολασταίνειν καὶ παροινεῖν οὐ μετα-  
διδόασι ταῖς γαμεταῖς. ἂν οὖν ἰδιώτης ἀνὴρ, ἀκρατὴς δὲ περὶ  
τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ἀνάγωγος, ἐξαμάρτη τι πρὸς ἑταῖραν ἢ θερα-  
παινίδα, δεῖ τὴν γαμετὴν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν μὴδὲ χαλεπαίνειν,  
λογιζομένην ὅτι παροινίας καὶ ἀκολασίας καὶ ὕβρεως αἰδού- 20  
μενος αὐτὴν ἐτέρᾳ μεταδίδωσιν.

17. Οἱ φιλόμουσοι τῶν βασιλέων πολλοὺς μουσικοὺς ποι-  
οῦσιν, οἱ φιλόλογοι λόγιους, οἱ φιλαθληταὶ γυμναστικούς. οὕ- C  
τως ἀνὴρ φιλοσώματος καλλωπίστριαν γυναῖκα ποιεῖ, φιλή-  
δονος ἑταιρικὴν καὶ ἀκόλαστον, φιλάγαθος καὶ φιλόκαλος σώ- 25  
φρονα καὶ κοσμίαν.

18. Λάκαινα παιδίσκη, πυνθανομένου τινὸς εἰ ἤδη ἀνδρὶ  
προσελήλυθεν 'οὐκ ἔγωγ' εἶπεν 'ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ ἐκείνος'. οὗτος ὁ  
τρόπος, οἶμαι, τῆς οἰκοδεσποίνης, μήτε φεύγειν μήτε δυσχεραί-

2 ss. cf. 63 c    12 ss. cf. 613 a    24 ἀνὴρ — 26 κοσμίαν Stob.  
IV p. 678, 17    27 ss. cf. 242 c

7 ἐσθ. καὶ πινούσας II    8 αὐ. καὶ πινούσας Zb    14 τὰς]  
τοὺς να<sup>1</sup>    15 αὐτὸ om. vII    16 τοῦ OJ<sup>2</sup> τὸ O    25 ἔρωτι-  
κὴν Stob.

νειν τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀρχομένου μήτ' αὐτὴν κατάρχεσθαι·  
τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔταιρικόν καὶ ἱταμόν, τὸ δ' ὑπερέφανεον καὶ ἀφι-  
λόστοργον.

19. Ἰδίους οὐ δεῖ φίλους κτᾶσθαι τὴν γυναῖκα, κοινοῖς δὲ  
5 χρῆσθαι τοῖς τοῦ ἀνδρὸς· οἱ δὲ θεοὶ φίλοι πρῶτοι καὶ μέγ-  
D στοι. διὸ καὶ θεοὺς οὓς ὁ ἀνὴρ νομίζει σέβεσθαι τῇ γαμετῇ  
καὶ γιννώσκειν μόνους προσήκει, περιέργοις δὲ θρησκείαις καὶ  
ξέναις δεισιδαιμονίαις ἀποκεκλείσθαι τὴν αὐλειον. οὐδενὶ γὰρ  
θεῶν ἱερὰ κλεπτόμενα καὶ λανθάνοντα δρᾶται κεχαρισμένως  
10 ὑπὸ γυναικός.

20. Ὁ Πλάτων φησὶν (Rep. 462c) εὐδαίμονα καὶ μακαρίαν  
εἶναι πόλιν, ἐν ᾗ 'τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἐμὸν' ἥκιστα φθειργο-  
μένων ἀκούουσι διὰ τὸ κοινοῖς ὥς ἐνὶ μάλιστα χρῆσθαι τοῖς  
ἀξίοις σπουδῆς τοὺς πολίτας. πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐκ γάμου δεῖ  
15 τὴν τοιαύτην φωνὴν ἀνῆρῃσθαι. πλὴν ὥσπερ οἱ ἱατροὶ λέγουσι  
τὰς τῶν εὐδυνύμων πληγὰς τὴν αἰσθησιν ἐν τοῖς δεξιόις ἀνα-  
E φέρειν, οὕτω τὴν γυναῖκα τοῖς τοῦ ἀνδρὸς συμπαθεῖν καλὸν  
καὶ τὸν ἄνδρα τοῖς τῆς γυναικός, ἢν' ὥσπερ οἱ δεσμοὶ κατὰ  
τὴν ἐπάλλαξιν ἰσχὺν δι' ἀλλήλων λαμβάνουσιν, οὕτως ἐκατέ-  
20 ρον τὴν εὐνοίαν ἀντίστροφον ἀποδιδόντος ἡ κοινωνία σφύζεται  
δι' ἀμφοῖν. καὶ γὰρ ἡ φύσις μίγνυσθαι διὰ τῶν σωμάτων ἡμᾶς,  
ἢν' ἐξ ἐκατέρων μέρος λαβοῦσα καὶ συγχέασα κοινὸν ἀμφοτέ-  
ροις ἀποδῶ τὸ γεννώμενον, ὥστε μηδέτερον διορίσαι μηδὲ  
διακρίναι τὸ ἴδιον ἢ τὸ ἀλλότριον. τοιαύτη τοίνυν καὶ χρημά-  
35 των κοινωνία προσήκει μάλιστα τοῖς γαμοῦσιν εἰς μίαν οὐσίαν  
F πάντα καταχεαμένους καὶ ἀναμείξασθαι μὴ τὸ μέρος ἴδιον καὶ τὸ  
μέρος ἀλλότριον ἀλλὰ πᾶν ἴδιον ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ μηδὲν ἀλλότριον.  
ὥσπερ <γὰρ> τὸ κρᾶμα καίτοι ὕδατος μετέχον πλείονος οἶνον

11 ὁ—15 ἀνῆρῃσθαι Stob. IV p. 582, 15 12 cf. 484 b 767 d

24 τοιαύτη—p. 289, 2 συμβάλλεται Stob. IV p. 583, 4

4 ἰδίους om. II 9 θεῶ vΠ κρηπτόμενα II 12 τὸ<sup>1</sup> Stob.  
om. Ω 17 καλὸν Wy. μᾶλλον O μᾶλλον δὲ JS 19 ἐπαλξιν  
OZb 23 γεννώμενον Ob γενόμενον Zn γινόμενον O 24 αὐτῇ  
Ω corr. Stegmann 28 add. Hch. μ. ὅ. Bern. propter hiatum  
(vol. I p. LXV) οἶνον] ὕδωρ JS

καλοῦμεν, οὕτω τὴν οὐσίαν δεῖ καὶ τὸν οἶκον τοῦ ἀνδρὸς λέγεσθαι, κἂν ἡ γυνὴ πλείονα συμβάλληται.

**21.** Φιλόπλουτος ἡ Ἑλένη, φιλήδονος ὁ Πάρις· φρόνιμος ὁ Ὀδυσσεύς, σώφρων ἡ Πηνελόπη. διὰ τοῦτο μακάριος γάμος <sup>4</sup> ὁ τούτων καὶ ζηλωτός, ὁ δ' ἐκείνων Ἰλιάδα | κακῶν Ἑλληνσι **141** καὶ βαρβάρους ἐποίησεν.

**22.** Ὁ Ῥωμαῖος ὑπὸ τῶν φίλων νουθετούμενος ὅτι σώφρονα γυναῖκα καὶ πλουσίαν καὶ ὥραϊαν ἀπεπέμψατο, τὸν κάλτιον αὐτοῖς προτείνας· καὶ γὰρ οὗτος· ἔφη· καλὸς ἰδεῖν καὶ καινός, ἀλλ' οὐδεὶς οἶδεν ὅπου με θλίβει'. δεῖ τοίνυν μὴ <sup>10</sup> προικὶ μηδὲ γένει μηδὲ κάλλει τὴν γυναῖκα πιστεύειν, ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς ἄπτεται μάλιστα τοῦ ἀνδρὸς, ὁμιλίᾳ τε καὶ ἡθελίᾳ καὶ συμπεριφορᾷ, ταῦτα μὴ σκληρὰ μηδ' ἀνιῶντα καθ' ἡμέραν ἀλλ' εὐάρμοστα καὶ ἄλυπα καὶ προσφιλῆ παρέχειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ <sup>15</sup> ἰατροὶ τοὺς ἐξ αἰτιῶν ἀδύλων καὶ κατὰ μικρὸν συλλεγομένων γεννωμένους πυρετοὺς μᾶλλον δεδοίκασιν ἢ τοὺς ἐμφανεῖς B καὶ μεγάλας προφάσεις ἔχοντας, οὕτω τὰ λανθάνοντα τοὺς πολλοὺς μικρὰ καὶ συνεχῆ καὶ καθημερινὰ προσκρούματα γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρὸς μᾶλλον δύνστησι καὶ λυμαίνεται τὴν <sup>20</sup> σὺν.

**23.** Ὁ βασιλεὺς Φίλιππος ἦρα Θεσσαλῆς γυναικὸς αἰτίαν ἐχούσης καταφαρμακεύειν αὐτόν. ἐπονούδασεν οὖν ἡ Ὀλυμπιάς λαβεῖν τὴν ἄνθρωπον ὑποχείριον. ὥς δ' εἰς ὅψιν ἐλθοῦσα τό <sup>25</sup> τ' εἶδος εὐπρεπὲς ἐφάνη καὶ διελέχθη πρὸς αὐτὴν οὐκ ἀγεννῶς οὐδ' ἀσυνέτως, 'χαιρέτωσαν' εἶπεν ἡ Ὀλυμπιάς· αἱ διαβολαί· σὺ γὰρ ἐν σεαυτῇ τὰ φάρμακα ἔχεις'. ἄμαχον οὖν τι γίνεταί· πρᾶγμα γαμετὴ γυνὴ καὶ νόμιμος, ἂν ἐν αὐτῇ πάντα C

7 ὁ — 14 παρέχειν Stob. IV p. 583, 12 7 ss. v. Aem. P. 5  
14 ὥσπερ — 19 συμβίωσιν Stob. IV p. 584, 1 21 ss. de Hystaspis  
uxore narratur in Satyri Vita Euripidea Ox. Pap. IX Col. XIV 1  
26 ἄμαχον — p. 290, 2 εὐνοίαν Stob. IV p. 584, 8

2 συμβάλληται JSAEΘ 9 κάλτιον OS<sup>1</sup> καλτίκιον O καλλίγιον  
Stob. corr. Heh. cf. Po. GGA 1918 p. 335 18 προσκρούσματα  
OmPZu cf. p. 282, 6 26 ἄμαχον] ἀμήχανον Stob. 27 γυνή  
om. vA

22 BT Plut. mor. 1

θεμένη, καὶ προῖκα καὶ γένος καὶ φάρμακα καὶ τὸν κεστὸν αὐτόν, ἥθει καὶ ἄρετῇ κατεργάσεται τὴν εὐνοίαν.

24. Πάλιν ἡ Ὀλυμπιάς, αὐλικοῦ τινος νεανίσκου γήμαντος εὐπρεπῇ γυναικί κακῶς ἀκούουσιν, 'οὗτος' εἶπεν 'οὐκ ἔχει λογισμόν' οὐ γὰρ ἂν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἔγρημε'. δεῖ δὲ μὴ τοῖς ὅμμασι γαμεῖν μηδὲ τοῖς δακτύλοις, ὥσπερ ἔνιοι ψηφίσαντες πόσα φέρουσιν λαμβάνουσιν, οὐ κρίναντες πῶς συμβιωσόμενην.

9 25. Ὁ Σωκράτης ἐκέλευε τῶν ἔσοπτριζομένων νεανίσκων D τοὺς μὲν αἰσχροὺς ἐπανορθοῦσθαι τῇ ἄρετῇ, τοὺς δὲ καλοὺς μὴ καταισχύνειν τῇ κακίᾳ τὸ εἶδος. καλὸν οὖν καὶ τὴν οἰκοδέσποιναν, ὅταν ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἔχη τὸ ἔσοπτρον, αὐτὴν ἐν ἑαυτῇ διαλαλεῖν, τὴν μὲν αἰσχράν 'τί οὖν, ἂν μὴ σώφρων γένωμαι;' τὴν δὲ καλὴν 'τί οὖν, ἂν καὶ σώφρων γένωμαι;' τῇ 15 γὰρ αἰσχροῦ σεμνὸν εἰ φιλεῖται διὰ τὸ ἥθος <μᾶλλον> ἢ τὸ κάλλος \* \* \*

26. Ταῖς Λυσάνδρου θυγατρᾶσιν ὁ τύραννος ὁ Σικελικός ἱμάτια καὶ πλόκια τῶν πολυτελῶν ἔπεμψεν· ὁ δὲ Λύσανδρος οὐκ ἔλαβεν εἰπὼν 'ταῦτα τὰ κόσμια καταισχυνεῖ μου μᾶλλον 20 ἢ κοσμήσει τὰς θυγατέρας'. πρότερος δὲ Λυσάνδρου Σοφοκλῆς τοῦτ' εἶπεν (fr. 762)

E 'οὐ κόσμος, οὐκ, ὦ τλήμων, ἀλλ' ἀκοσμία φαίνοιτ' ἂν εἶναι σὼν τε μαργότης φρενῶν'.

'κόσμος γὰρ ἐστίν', ὥς ἔλεγε Κράτης, 'τὸ κοσμοῦν'. κοσμεῖ δὲ 25 τὸ κοσμιωτέραν τὴν γυναῖκα ποιοῦν. ποιεῖ δὲ τοιαύτην οὔτε χρυσὸς οὔτε σμάραγδος οὔτε κόκκος, ἀλλ' ὅσα σεμνότητος εὐταξίας αἰδοῦς ἔμφρασιν περιτίθῃσιν.

3 ss. Athen. 609 c 9 ss. Diog. Laert. II 5, 16 17 ss. cf. 190 e 229 a; v. Lys. 2; de Archidamo narratur 218 e 24 κόσμος—27 περιτίθῃσιν Stob. IV p. 584, 13

3 καὶ γήμ. JS (in ras.) vII 10 αἰσχρο.] ὀρθοῦς JSΘ οὐκ ὀρθοῦς ναA 14 καὶ O om. O 15 add. Ald.<sup>3</sup> (lac. 6 litt. in Paris. B 1676) <τῇ καλῇ δ' εἰ μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ ἥθος> Wil. aliquid excidisse de pulchra uxore vidit Wy. 20 τὴν θυγατέρα vII 25 τὴν om. OJSva<sup>1</sup>E Stob. τοιαύτην O Stob. ταύτην O οὔτε χρυσὸς OStob. οὐ χρυσὸς O

27. Οἱ τῇ γαμηλίᾳ θύοντες Ἦρα τὴν χολὴν οὐ συγκαθα-  
ρίζουσι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἱεροῖς, ἀλλ' ἐξελόντες ἔρριψαν παρὰ τὸν  
βωμόν, αἰνιτομένου τοῦ νομοθέτου τὸ μηδέποτε δεῖν χολὴν  
μηδ' ὀργὴν γάμῳ παρεῖναι. δεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τῆς οἰκοδεσποίνης 4  
ὥσπερ οἴνου τὸ αὐστηρὸν ὠφέλιμον καὶ ἡδύ, μὴ πικρὸν ὥσπερ F  
ἀλόγῃς μηδὲ φαρμακῶδες.

28. Ὁ Πλάτων τῷ Ξενοκράτει βαρύτερον τὸ ἦθος ὄντι τᾶλλα  
δὲ καλῶ κἀγαθῶ παρεκελεύετο θύειν ταῖς Χάρισιν. οἶμαι δὴ  
καὶ τῇ σώφρονι μάλιστα δεῖν πρὸς τὸν ἄνδρα χαρίτων, ἔν', 9  
ὥς ἔλεγε Μητροδόωρος (fr. 36 Koerte), | ἡδέως συνοικῇ καὶ 142  
'μὴ ὀργιζομένη ὅτι σωφρονεῖ'. δεῖ γὰρ μήτε τὴν εὐτελεῇ  
καθαριότητος ἀμελεῖν μήτε τὴν φίλανδρον φιλοφροσύνης·  
ποιεῖ γὰρ ἡ χαλεπότης ἀηδῇ τὴν εὐταξίαν τῆς γυναικός, ὥσπερ  
ἡ ὑπαρξία τὴν ἀφέλειαν.

29. Ἡ φοβουμένη γελάσαι πρὸς τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ παιζαί τι, 15  
μὴ φανῇ θρασεῖα καὶ ἀκόλαστος, οὐδὲν διαφέρει τῆς ἵνα μὴ  
δοκῇ μυρρίζεσθαι τὴν κεφαλὴν μηδ' ἀλειφομένης, καὶ ἵνα μὴ  
φυκοῦσθαι τὸ πρόσωπον μηδὲ νιπτομένης. ὀρῶμεν δὲ καὶ  
ποιητὰς καὶ ῥήτορας, ὅσοι φεύγουσι τὸ περὶ τὴν λέξιν ὀγκλὸν  
καὶ ἀνελεύθερον καὶ κακόζηλον, τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ ταῖς οἰκο- 30  
νομίαις καὶ τοῖς ἥθεσιν ἄγειν καὶ κινεῖν τὸν ἀκροατὴν φιλο-  
τεχνοῦντας. διὸ δεῖ καὶ τὴν οἰκοδέσποιναν ὅτι πᾶν τὸ περιτ- B  
τὸν καὶ ἔταιρικὸν καὶ πανηγυρικὸν εὖ ποιοῦσα φεύγει καὶ  
παρατεῖται, μᾶλλον φιλοτεχνεῖν ἐν ταῖς ἡθικαῖς καὶ βιωτικαῖς  
χάρισι πρὸς τὸν ἄνδρα, τῷ καλῷ μεθ' ἡδονῆς συνεθίζουσιν 25  
αὐτόν. ἂν δ' ἄρα φύσει τις αὐστηρὰ καὶ ἔκκρατος γένηται καὶ

1ss. cf. ἐκ τοῦ περὶ τῶν ἐν Πλαταιαῖς δαιδάλων c. 2 (VII  
44, 7 Bern.) 4ss. cf. 769 d; v. Marii 2 10 cf. 753 c

1 γαμηλίῳ OvaA 2 ὥρυξαν ci. Si. cf. test. supr. cit. παρὰ]  
περὶ vaZ ἐπὶ JS 5 μὴ, πικρὸν] μικρὸν JS 15 παῖσαι Ω  
corr. Wy. 16 ἀκόλαστος] εὐτολμος Zb 21 καὶ κηλεῖν b  
22 ὅτι om. vΠΘ 23 ποιοῦσαν vΠw φεύγειν καὶ παρατεῖσθαι  
vΠΘ 24 μᾶλλον δὲ vΠΘ

ἀνήδυντος, εὐγνωμονεῖν δεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα, καὶ καθάπερ ὁ Φωκίων, τοῦ Ἀντιπάτρου πρᾶξιν αὐτῷ προστάττοντος οὐ καλὴν οὐδὲ πρέπουσαν, εἶπεν 'οὐ δύνασαι μοι καὶ φίλῳ χρῆσθαι καὶ <sup>4</sup> κόλακί', οὕτω λογίζεσθαι περὶ τῆς σώφρονος καὶ αὐστηρᾶς C γυναικὸς 'οὐ δύναμαι τῇ αὐτῇ καὶ ὡς γαμετῇ καὶ ὡς ἐταίρᾳ συνεῖναι'.

**30.** Ταῖς Αἰγυπτίαις ὑποδήμασι χρῆσθαι πάτριον οὐκ ἦν, ὅπως ἐν οἴκῳ διημερεύουσι. τῶν δὲ πλείστων γυναικῶν ἂν ὑποδήματα διάχρυσα περιέλης καὶ ψέλια καὶ περισκελίδας καὶ <sup>10</sup> πορφύραν καὶ μαργαρίτας, ἔνδον μενούσιν.

**31.** Ἡ Θεανὼ παρέφηνε τὴν χεῖρα περιβαλλομένη τὸ ἱμάτιον. εἰπόντος δὲ τινος 'καλὸς ὁ πῆχυς', 'ἀλλ' οὐ δημόσιος' ἔφη. δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον τὸν πῆχυν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν λόγον δη- <sup>15</sup> μόσιον εἶναι τῆς σώφρονος, καὶ τὴν φωνὴν ὥς ἀπογυμνῶσιν D αὐτῇ καὶ πάθος καὶ ἦθος καὶ διάθεσις λαλούσης.

**32.** Τὴν Ἡλείων ὁ Φειδίας Ἀφροδίτῃν ἐποίησε χελώνην πατοῦσαν, οἰκουρίας σύμβολον ταῖς γυναιξὶ καὶ σιωπῆς. δεῖ γὰρ ἢ πρὸς τὸν ἄνδρα λαλεῖν ἢ διὰ τοῦ ἀνδρός, μὴ δυσχεραί- <sup>20</sup> νουσιν εἰ δι' ἄλλοτριᾶς γλώσσης ὥσπερ ἀύλητῆς φθέγγεται σεμνότερον.

**33.** Οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ οἱ βασιλεῖς τιμῶντες τοὺς φιλοσόφους αὐτούς τε κοσμοῦσι καὶ κείνους, οἱ δὲ φιλόσοφοι τοὺς πλουσίους θεραπεύοντες οὐκ ἐκείνους ποιοῦσιν ἐνδόξους ἀλλ' αὐτοὺς ἀδο- <sup>25</sup> ξοτέρους. τοῦτο συμβαίνει καὶ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας. ὑποτάττου- σαι μὲν γὰρ ἑαυτὰς τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἐπαινοῦνται, κρατεῖν δὲ E βουλόμεναι μᾶλλον τῶν κρατουμένων ἀσχημονοῦσι. κρατεῖν δὲ τὸν ἄνδρα τῆς γυναικὸς οὐχ ὥς δεσπότην κτήματος ἀλλ' ὥς

1 καθάπερ — 6 συνεῖναι Stob. IV p. 584, 18 1 ss. cf. 64 c 188 f 532 f; v. Phoc. 30, 3 v. Agid. 2, 4 11 ἢ — 20 φθέγγεται Stob. IV p. 585, 1 17 ss. cf. 381 e; Paus. VI 25, 2

8 προσεῖναι vΠ 10 μένουσιν Ω corr. Duebner 12 ε. δ. τ. Stob. τ. δ. ε. Ω 14 καὶ τὴν O Stob. ἀλλὰ τὴν O ὡς om. OJSΘ ἀπογυμνώσειν OJSΘ 22 οἱ<sup>2</sup> om. vA 26 δὲ δεῖ vΠΘ

ψυχὴν σώματος συμπαθοῦντα καὶ συμπεφυκότα τῇ εὐνοίᾳ δίκαιόν ἐστιν. ὥσπερ οὖν σώματος ἔστι κήδεσθαι μὴ δουλεύοντα ταῖς ἡδοναῖς αὐτοῦ καὶ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις, οὕτω γυναικὸς ἄρχειν εὐφραίνοντα καὶ χαριζόμενον.

34. Τῶν σωμάτων οἱ φιλόσοφοι τὰ μὲν ἐκ διεστώτων λέ- 5  
γουσιν εἶναι καθάπερ στόλον καὶ στρατόπεδον, τὰ δ' ἐκ συναπτομένων ὡς οἰκίαν καὶ ναῦν, τὰ δ' ἡνωμένα καὶ συμφυῇ καθάπερ ἐστὶ τῶν ζώων ἕκαστον. σχεδὸν οὖν καὶ γάμος ὁ μὲν τῶν ἐρώντων ἡνωμένος καὶ συμφυῆς ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ τῶν διὰ προῖ- F  
κας ἢ τέκνα γαμούντων ἐκ συναπτομένων, ὁ δὲ τῶν <ἡδονῆς 10  
ἐνεκα> συγκαθευδόντων ἐκ διεστώτων, οὗς συνοικεῖν ἂν τις ἀλλήλοις οὐ συμβοῦν νομίσειε. δεῖ δέ, ὥσπερ οἱ φυσικοὶ τῶν ὕγρων λέγουσι δι' ὕλων γενέσθαι τὴν κρᾶσιν, οὕτω τῶν γαμούντων | καὶ σώματα καὶ χρήματα καὶ φίλους καὶ οἰκείους 14B  
ἀναμιχθῆναι δι' ἀλλήλων. καὶ γὰρ ὁ Ῥωμαῖος νομοθέτης ἐκώ- 15  
λυσε δῶρα διδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν παρ' ἀλλήλων τοὺς γεγαμηκότας, οὐχ ἵνα μηδενὸς μεταλαμβάνωσιν, ἀλλ' ἵνα πάντα κοινὰ νομίζωσιν.

35. Ἐν Αἰπτῷ τῆς Λιβύης πόλει πάτριόν ἐστι τῇ μετὰ τὸν γάμον ἡμέρᾳ τὴν νύμφην πρὸς τὴν τοῦ νυμφίου μητέρα 20  
πέμψασαν αἰτεῖσθαι χύτραν· ἢ δ' οὐ δίδωσιν οὐδέ φησιν ἔχειν, ὅπως ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἐπισταμένη τὸ τῆς ἐκυρᾶς μητρειῶδες, ἣν ὕστερόν τι συμβαίνει τραχύτερον, μὴ ἀγανακτῇ μηδὲ δυσκο-  
λαίνει. τοῦτο δεῖ γινώσκουσιν τὴν γυναῖκα θεραπεύειν τὴν πρόφασιν· ἔστι δὲ ζηλοτυπία τῆς μητρὸς ὑπὲρ εὐνοίας πρὸς 25  
αὐτήν. Θεραπεία δὲ μία τοῦ πάθους ἰδίᾳ μὲν εὐνοία· τῷ ἄν- B  
δρὶ ποιεῖν πρὸς ἑαυτήν, τὴν δὲ τῆς μητρὸς μὴ περισπᾶν μηδ' ἐλαττοῦν.

36. Τοὺς υἱοὺς δοκοῦσι μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾶν αἱ μητέρες ὥς δυναμένους αὐταῖς βοηθεῖν, οἱ δὲ πατέρες τὰς θυγατέρας ὥς 30

5 ss. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. VII 102. cf. 426 a; St. V. Fr. II 366  
12 ss. cf. 769 f      15 καὶ—18 νομίζωσιν Stob. IV p. 585, 15;  
cf. 265 e

1/2 δ. ζ. om. vΠ      10 add. Hch.      24 δεῖ edd. δὴ Ω

δεομένους αὐτῶν βοηθοῦντων· ἴσως δὲ καὶ τιμῇ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλή-  
 λους ὁ ἕτερος τὸ μᾶλλον οἰκεῖον τῷ ἑτέρῳ βούλεται μᾶλλον  
 ἀσπαζόμενος καὶ ἀγαπῶν φανερὸς εἶναι. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἴσως  
 ἀδιάφορόν ἐστιν, ἐκεῖνο δ' ἀστείον, ἂν ἡ γυνὴ μᾶλλον ἀπο-  
 5 κλίνασα τῇ τιμῇ πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἢ τοὺς ἑαυτῆς  
 C βλέπεται, ἅν τι λυπῇται, πρὸς ἐκείνους ἀναφέρουσα, τοὺς δ'  
 ἑαυτῆς λανθάνουσα. ποιεῖ γὰρ καὶ τὸ πιστεύειν δοκεῖν πι-  
 στεῦσθαι καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν φιλεῖσθαι.

37. Τοῖς περὶ τὸν Κῦρον Ἑλλήσι παρήγγειλαν οἱ στρατη-  
 10 γοὶ τοὺς πολεμίους, ἂν μὲν βοῶντες ἐπίωσι, δέχεσθαι μετὰ  
 σιωπῆς, ἂν δ' ἐκείνοι σιωπῶσιν, αὐτοὺς μετὰ βοῆς ἀντεξελεύ-  
 νειν. αἱ δὲ νοῦν ἔχουσαι γυναῖκες ἐν ταῖς ὁργαῖς τῶν ἀνδρῶν  
 κεκραγῶτων μὲν ἡσυχάζουσι, σιωπῶντας δὲ προσλαλοῦσαι καὶ  
 παραμυθούμεναι καταπραῦνουσιν.

15 38. Ὁρθῶς ὁ Εὐριπίδης (Med. 190 ss.) αἰτιάται τοὺς τῇ  
 λύρᾳ χρωμένους παρ' οἶνον· ἔδει γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰς ὁργὰς καὶ τὰ  
 D πένθι μᾶλλον τὴν μουσικὴν παρακαλεῖν ἢ προσεκλίνειν τοὺς  
 ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ὄντας. νομίζετε οὖν ὑμεῖς ἀμαρτάνειν τοὺς  
 ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα συγκαθεύδοντας ἀλλήλοις, ὅταν δ' ἐν ὁργῇ τινι  
 20 γένωνται καὶ διαφορᾷ χωρὶς ἀναπαυομένους καὶ μὴ τότε μά-  
 λιστα τὴν Ἀφροδίτην παρακαλοῦντας ἰατρὸν οὔσαν τῶν τοιού-  
 των ἀρίστην. ὥς πον καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς διδάσκει τὴν Ἥραν ποιῶν  
 λέγουσαν (Ξ 205. 209)

καὶ σφ' ἄκριτα νείκεα λύσω

25 εἰς εὐνὴν ἀνέσασα ὁμωθῆναι φιλότῃτι'.

39. Αἰὲ μὲν δεῖ καὶ πανταχοῦ φεύγειν τὸ προσκροῦειν τῷ  
 H ἀνδρὶ τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ τῇ γυναικὶ τὸν ἄνδρα, μάλιστα δὲ φυ-  
 λάττεσθαι τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ συναναπαύεσθαι καὶ συγκαθεύ-  
 δεῖν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὠδίνουσα καὶ δυσφοροῦσα πρὸς τοὺς κατα-  
 30 κλίνοντας αὐτὴν ἔλεγε 'πῶς δ' ἂν ἡ κλίνῃ ταῦτα θεραπεύσειεν

9 τοῖς—14 καταπραῦνουσιν Stob. IV p. 585, 20 15 cf. 710 ef

4 διάφορον Ω corr. Mez. 11 μετὰ βοῆς] μέγα βοήσαντας  
 Stob. 18 ταῖς om. vII 25 ἀνείσα O

οἷς ἐπὶ τῆς κλίνης περιέπεσον; ὥς δ' ἡ κλίνη γεννᾷ διαφορὰς  
καὶ λοιδορίας καὶ ὀργάς, οὐ δ' ἄξιόν ἐστιν ἐν ἄλλῳ τόπῳ καὶ  
χρόνῳ διαλυθῆναι.

40. Ἡ Ἑρμιόνη δοκεῖ τι λέγειν ἀληθὲς λέγουσα (Eur.  
Andr. 930)

5

ῥακῶν γυναικῶν εἴσοδοί μ' ἀπώλεσαν.

τοῦτο δ' οὐχ ἀπλῶς γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὅταν αἱ πρὸς τοὺς  
ἄνδρας διαφοραὶ καὶ ζηλοτυπία ταῖς τοιαύταις γυναιξὶ μὴ  
τὰς θύρας μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἀκοὰς ἀνοίγωσι. τότε οὖν δεῖ F  
μάλιστα τὴν νοῦν ἔχουσαν ἀποκλείειν τὰ ὧτα καὶ φυλάττεσθαι 10  
τὸν ψιθυρισμόν, ἵνα μὴ πῦρ ἐπὶ πῦρ γένηται, καὶ πρόχειρον  
ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ Φιλίππου. λέγεται γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ὑπὸ τῶν φίλων  
παροξυνόμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ὥς εὖ πάσχοντας καὶ κακῶς  
αὐτὸν λέγοντας εἰπεῖν 'τί οὖν, ἂν [καὶ] κακῶς ποιῶμεν αὐτούς;'  
ὅταν οὖν αἱ διαβάλλουσαι λέγωσιν ὅτι 'λυπεῖ σε φιλοῦσαν ὁ 15  
ἄνθρωπος καὶ σωφρονοῦσαν', | 'τί οὖν, ἂν καὶ μισεῖν αὐτὸν ἔρ- 144  
ξῶμαι καὶ ἀδικεῖν;'

41. Ὁ τὸν δραπετήν ἰδὼν διὰ χρόνου καὶ διώκων, ὥς  
κατέφυγε φθάσας εἰς μυλῶνα, 'ποῦ δ' ἂν' ἔφη 'σὲ μᾶλλον  
εὐρεῖν ἐβουλήθην ἢ ἐνταῦθα;' γυνὴ τολύην διὰ ζηλοτυπίαν 20  
ἀπόλειψιν γράφουσα καὶ χαλεπῶς ἔχουσα λεγέτω πρὸς ἑαυτήν  
'ποῦ δ' ἂν ἡ ζηλοῦσά με μᾶλλον ἡσθεῖη θεασαμένη καὶ τί  
ποιοῦσαν ἢ λυπούμενην καὶ στασιάζουσαν πρὸς τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ  
τὸν οἶκον αὐτὴν καὶ τὸν θάλαμον προῖεμένην;'

42. Ἀθηναῖοι τρεῖς ἀρότους ἱεροὺς ἄγουσι, πρῶτον ἐπὶ 25  
Σκίρῳ, τοῦ παλαιοτάτου τῶν σπόρων ὑπόμνημα, δεύτερον ἐν  
τῇ Ῥαρίᾳ, τρίτον ὑπὸ πόλιν τὸν καλούμενον Βουζύγιον. τού- B

4 ἡ—17 ἀδικεῖν Stob. IV p. 586, 5 11 Plat. Legg. 666 a;  
cf. 61 a 123 e 610 c 919 d; v. Art. 28, 1 12 ss. cf. 179 a 457 f;  
de Pausania narrantur 230 d 18 ss. similia narrantur de Pho-  
cione 188 a; v. Phoc. 10, 9

1 περιέπεσεν Q corr. edd. 9 δεῖ om. αA<sup>1</sup> 11 ἐπὶ πυρὶ C  
14 del. Hch. 21 ἀπολείψην JZ ἀπολείψεις vΠ ἀπολείψοι S  
24 αὐτὸν Q corr. Wil. προσέμενην OJSvα<sup>1</sup>Θ 25 λέγουσι S<sup>4</sup>vΠ  
27 πέλιν Q corr. Xyl. cf. Preller-Robert, Griech. Mythol. I\* 771 n. 3

των δὲ πάντων ἱερώτατός ἐστιν ὁ γαμήλιος σπόρος καὶ ἄροτος ἐπὶ παίδων τεκνώσει· <καὶ> καλῶς τὴν Ἀφροδίτην ὁ Σοφοκλῆς (fr. 763) ἑὺκαρπον Κυθήρειαν προσηγόρευσε. διὸ δεῖ μάλιστα τούτῳ χρησθαι μετ' εὐλαβείας τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα  
 5 τῶν ἀνέρων καὶ παρὰ νόμων πρὸς ἐτέρους ἀγνεύοντας ὁμιλιῶν, καὶ μὴ σπείροντας ἐξ ὧν οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς φύεσθαι θέλουσιν ἀλλὰ κἄν γένηται καρπὸς αἰσχύνονται καὶ ἀποκρύπτουσι.

43. Γοργίου τοῦ ῥήτορος ἀναγνόντος ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ λόγον  
 10 περὶ ὁμονοίας τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ὁ Μελάνθιος ὁ οὗτος ἡμῖν ἔφη ἑσβουονλεύει περὶ ὁμονοίας, ὅς αὐτὸν καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ  
 C τὴν θεράπαιναν ἰδίᾳ τρεῖς ὄντας ὁμονοεῖν οὐ πέπεικεν; ἦν γὰρ ὡς ἔοικέ τις ἔρως τοῦ Γοργίου καὶ ζηλοτυπία τῆς γυναί-  
 κὸς πρὸς τὸ θεραπαινίδιον. εὖ τοίνυν ἡρμωσμένον τὸν οἶκον  
 15 εἶναι δεῖ τῷ μέλλοντι ἡρμώζεσθαι πόλιν καὶ ἀγορὰν καὶ φίλους· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἔοικε τὰ τῶν γυναικῶν ἢ τὰ πρὸς γυναῖκας ἀμαρτήματα λανθάνειν τοὺς πολλούς.

44. Εἰ καθάπερ τὸν αἴλουρον ὁσμὴ μύρων ἐκταράττεσθαι καὶ μαίνεσθαι λέγουσιν, οὕτω τὰς γυναῖκας ἀγριαίνειν καὶ  
 20 παραφρονεῖν ὑπὸ μύρων συνέβαινε, δεινὸν ἦν μὴ ἀπέχεσθαι μύρου τοὺς ἄνδρας, ἀλλὰ δι' ἡδονὴν αὐτῶν βραχεῖαν οὕτω κακονόμενας περιορᾶν. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ταῦτα πάσχουσιν οὐ μυριζο-  
 D μένων τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀλλὰ συγγιγνομένων ἐτέραις, ἄδικόν ἐστιν ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα μικρᾶς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο λυπεῖν καὶ συνταράττειν  
 25 τὰς γυναῖκας καὶ μή, καθάπερ ταῖς μελίτταις (ὅτι δοκοῦσι δυσχεραίνειν καὶ μάχεσθαι τοῖς μετὰ γυναικῶν γενομένοις), ἄγνοὺς καὶ καθαρεύοντας ἐτέρων συνουσίας προσιέναι ταῖς γυναιξίν.

45. Οἱ προσιόντες ἐλέφασιν ἐσθῆτα λαμπρὰν οὐ λαμβά-

6 Plat. Legg. 839 a 29 cf. 330 b

2 παιδοτεκνώσει JS καὶ add. Wil. 10 μέλανθος Ω corr. Xyl.  
 13 τοῦ γοργίου om. OJS 15 πόλιν O om. O 18 εἰ καθάπερ v  
 ai καὶ καθάπερ O om. O ὁσμὴ Ω corr. edd. 19 οὕτως εἰ α' A Θ  
 γυναῖκας εἰ OJS 23 ἐταίραις Θ 24 τοσοῦτω Ω corr. Re.

νουσιν οὐδὲ φοινικίδας οἱ ταύροις· διαγοραίνεται γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν χρωμάτων τούτων μάλιστα τὰ ζῶα· τὰς δὲ τίγρεις φασὶ περιτυμπανιζομένας ἐκμαίνεσθαι παντάπασι καὶ διαόπᾶν ἑαυτάς. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν οἱ μὲν ἐσθῆτας κοκκίνας <sup>4</sup> καὶ πορφυρεῶς ὀρῶντες δυσανασχετοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ κυμβάλοις καὶ Ε τυμπάνοις ἄχθονται, τί δεινὸν ἀπέχεσθαι τούτων τὰς γυναικάς καὶ μὴ ταράττειν μηδὲ παροξύνειν τοὺς ἄνδρας, ἀλλὰ συνεῖναι μετ' εὐσταθείας καὶ πραότητος;

**46.** Γυνή τις πρὸς τὸν Φίλιππον ἄκουσαν ἐφελκόμενον αὐτήν 'ἄφες μ' εἶπε· 'πᾶσα γυνή τοῦ λύχνου ἀρθέντος ἢ <sup>10</sup> αὐτὴ ἐστι.' τοῦτο πρὸς τοὺς μοιχικοὺς καὶ ἀκολάστους εἴρηται καλῶς, τὴν δὲ γαμετὴν δεῖ μάλιστα τοῦ φωτὸς ἀρθέντος εἶναι μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν ταῖς τυχοῦσαις γυναιξίν, ἀλλὰ φαίνεσθαι τοῦ σώματος μὴ βλεπομένου τὸ σῶφρον αὐτῆς καὶ ἴδιον τῷ ἀνδρὶ καὶ <τὸ> τεταγμένον καὶ φιλόστοργον. <sup>15</sup>

**47.** Ὁ Πλάτων τοῖς πρεσβύταις μᾶλλον παρήγει αἰσχύνεσθαι F τοὺς νέους, ὥνα κἀκεῖνοι πρὸς αὐτοὺς αἰδημόνως ἔχωσιν· ὅπου γὰρ ἀναίσχυντοῦσι γέροντες (Legg. 729 b), οὐδεμίαν αἰδῶ τοῖς νέοις οὐδ' εὐλάβειαν ἐγγίγνεσθαι. τοῦτον δεῖ μεμνημένον τὸν <sup>19</sup> ἄνδρα μηδένα μᾶλλον αἰδεῖσθαι τῆς γυναικός, | ὥς τὸν θά- **145** λαμον αὐτῇ διδασκαλεῖον εὐταξίας ἢ ἀκολασίας γενησόμενον· ὁ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἡδονῶν αὐτὸς μὲν ἀπολαύων ἐκείνην δ' ἀποτρέπων οὐδὲν διαφέρει τοῦ κελεύοντος διαμάχεσθαι τὴν γυναικα πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, οἷς αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν παρέδωκε.

**48.** Περί δὲ φιλοκοσμίας σὺ μὲν, ὦ Εὐρυδίκη, τὰ πρὸς <sup>15</sup> Ἀρίστυλλαν ὑπὸ Τιμοξένας γεγραμμένα ἀναγνοῦσα πειρῶ διαμνημονεύειν· σὺ δέ, ὦ Πολλιανέ, μὴ νόμιζε περιεργίας ἀφ᾽έξεσθαι τὴν γυναικα καὶ πολυτελείας, ἂν ὀρᾷ σε μὴ καταφρονοῦντα τούτων ἐν ἑτέροις, ἀλλὰ καὶ χαίροντα χρυσώσεσιν

2 cf. 167 c      12 cf. 716 d      18 cf. 14 b 272 c

3 τυμπανιζομένας OJS      15 add. Wil.      19 γίνεσθαι ναΑ  
γενέσθαι E      τοῦτο OJS      20 τοῦ θαλάμου . . . διδασκαλίον . . .  
γενησόμενον v<sup>1</sup>b      23/4 τ. γυν. del. Ha.      28 ὀρᾷς μὴ O

ἐκπωμάτων καὶ γραφαῖς οἰκηματίων καὶ χλιδῶσιν ἡμιόνων  
 B καὶ ἵππων περιδεραίοις. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐξελάσαι τῆς γυναικονί-  
 τιδος ἐν μέσῃ τῇ ἀνδρῶν τιτῇ τὴν πολυτέλειαν ἀναστρεφομένην.  
 Καὶ σὺ μὲν ὥραν ἔχων ἥδη φιλοσοφεῖν τοῖς μετ' ἀποδεί-  
 5 ξεως καὶ κατασκευῆς λεγομένοις ἐπικόσμει τὸ ἦθος, ἐντυγχά-  
 νων καὶ πλησιάζων τοῖς ὠφελοῦσι· τῇ δὲ γυναικὶ πανταχόθεν  
 τὸ χρήσιμον συνάγων ὥσπερ αἱ μέλιται καὶ φέρων αὐτὸς ἐν  
 σεαντῷ μεταδίδου καὶ προσδιαλέγου, φίλους αὐτῇ ποιῶν καὶ  
 συνήθεις τῶν λόγων τοὺς ἀρίστους. πατὴρ μὲν γάρ 'ἔσσι'  
 10 αὐτῇ 'καὶ πότνια μήτηρ ἣδὲ κασιγνήτος' (Z 429)· οὐχ ἥττον  
 δὲ σεμνὸν ἀκοῦσαι γαμετῆς λεγούσης 'ἄνερ, 'ἀτὰρ σὺ μοί  
 C 'ἔσσι' καθηγητῆς καὶ φιλόσοφος καὶ διδάσκαλος τῶν καλλίστων  
 καὶ θειοτάτων'. τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα μαθήματα πρῶτον ἀφίστησι  
 τῶν ἀτόπων τὰς γυναικάς· αἰσχυνθήσεται γὰρ ὀρχεῖσθαι γυνή  
 15 γεωμετερεῖν μανθάνουσα, καὶ φαρμάκων ἐπωδὰς οὐ προσδέξε-  
 ται τοῖς Πλάτωνος ἐπαδομένη λόγοις καὶ τοῖς Ξενοφώντος. ἂν  
 δέ τις ἐπαγγέλληται καθαιρεῖν τὴν σελήνην, γελᾶσεται τὴν  
 ἁμαθίαν καὶ τὴν ἀβελτερίαν τῶν ταῦτα πειθομένων γυναικῶν,  
 ἀστρολογία μὴ ἀνηκόως ἔχουσα καὶ περὶ Ἀγλαονίκης ἀκηκοῦσα  
 20 τῆς Ἠγήτορος τοῦ Θεσσαλοῦ θυγατρὸς ὅτι τῶν ἐκλειπτικῶν  
 D ἔμπειρος οὕσα πανσελήνων καὶ προειδύια τὸν χρόνον, ἐν ᾧ  
 συμβαίνει τὴν σελήνην ὑπὸ τῆς σκιᾶς ἀλίσκεσθαι, παρεκρούετο  
 καὶ συνέπειθε τὰς γυναικάς ὥς αὐτὴ καθαιρουσα τὴν σελή-  
 νην. παιδίον μὲν γὰρ οὐδεμία ποτὲ λέγεται ποιῆσαι δίχα  
 25 κοινωνίας ἀνδρός, τὰ δ' ἄμορφα κινήματα καὶ σαρκοειδῆ καὶ  
 σύστασιν ἐν ἑαντοῖς ἐκ διαφθορᾶς λαμβάνοντα μύλας καλοῦσι.  
 τοῦτο δὲ φυλακτέον ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς γίνεσθαι τῶν γυναικῶν.

19 ss. Ar. Nub. 749 Plat. Gorg. 513 a Σ Ap. Rhod. IV 59;  
 cf. 416 f

1 χλιδώσεσιν Ω corr. Stephanus 2 περιδεραίοις E περιδε-  
 ραίοις O 6 κ. π. om. vaA 9 ἔστιν Ω corr. Leonicius in α  
 19 post ἔχουσα lac. in Zu ἀγανίης Ω corr. Re. ἀκήκοα  
 OJS 24 ποτὲ γυνή vΠΘ 26 διαφορᾶς OJva<sup>1</sup>Θ 27 δὴ]  
 δὲ Oα<sup>1</sup>(?)

ἂν γὰρ λόγων χρηστῶν σπέρματα μὴ δέχωνται μηδὲ κοινωνῶσι  
 παιδείας τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, αὐταὶ καθ' αὐτὰς ἄτοπα πολλὰ καὶ  
 φανῶλα βουλευμάτων καὶ πάθη κύνουσι. σὺ δ' ὦ Εὐσθόδικη μά- E  
 λιστα πειρῶ τοῖς τῶν σοφῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἀποφθέγμασιν ὁμι-  
 λεῖν καὶ διὰ στόματος ἀεὶ τὰς φωνὰς ἔχειν ἐκείνας ὧν καὶ 5  
 παρθένος οὕσα παρ' ἡμῖν ἀνελάμβανες, ὅπως εὐφραίνης μὲν  
 τὸν ἄνδρα, θαυμάζῃ δ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων γυναικῶν, οὕτω  
 κοσμουμένη περιττῶς καὶ σεμνῶς ἀπὸ μηδενός. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ  
 τῆσδε τῆς πλουσίας μαργαρίτας καὶ τὰ τῆσδε τῆς ξένης σηρικὰ  
 λαβεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ περιτέσθαι μὴ πολλοῦ πριμένην, τὰ 10  
 δὲ Θεανοῦς κόσμια καὶ Κλεοβουλίνης καὶ Γοργοῦς τῆς Λεω-  
 νίδου γυναικὸς καὶ Τιμοκλείας τῆς Θεογένους ἀδελφῆς καὶ  
 Κλανδίας τῆς παλαιᾶς καὶ Κορνηλίας τῆς Σικιπίωνος καὶ ὅσαι  
 ἐγένοντο θαυμασταὶ καὶ περιβόητοι, ταῦτα δ' ἔξῃστι περικει- F  
 μένην προῖκα καὶ κοσμουμένην αὐτοῖς ἐνδόξως ἅμα βιοῦν 15  
 καὶ μακαρίως. εἰ γὰρ ἡ Σαπφὼ διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι καλ-  
 λιγραφίαν ἐφρόνει τηλικούτον | ὥστε γράψαι πρὸς τινα πλου- 146  
 σίαν (fr. 68)

ἑκατθανοῖσα δὲ κείσεται, οὐδέ τις μνημοσύνα σέθεν

ἔσεται· οὐ γὰρ πεδέχεις ῥόδων

20

τῶν ἐκ Πιερίας,

πῶς οὐχί σοι μᾶλλον ἔξῃσται μέγα φρονεῖν ἐφ' ἑαυτῇ καὶ  
 λαμπρόν, ἂν μὴ τῶν ῥόδων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν καρπῶν μετέχῃς,  
 ὧν αἱ Μοῦσαι φέρουσι καὶ χαρίζονται τοῖς παιδεῖαν καὶ φι-  
 λοσοφίαν θαυμάζουσιν;

25

19 cf. 646 f

1 χρηστὰ vΠ 4 ἀγαθῶν γυναικῶν v<sup>1</sup>Π 6 μετελάμβανες  
 Ha. εὐφράνης vΠΖυ 12 θαγένους vΠ 19 κατθανοῖσα libri  
 646 f κατθανοῖσα OJSΘ καὶ θανοῖσα O μνημόσυνα JSvΠ  
 20 πεδέχης 646 f (Vindob. 148) μετέχης O παῖδ' ἔχεις O ῥόδον  
 vΠ 21 περιέρης OJSΘ 23 καὶ om. SvΠΖυ 24 φέρονται vΠ



# Reflections on Plutarch, *Advice to the Bride and Groom*

*Something Old, Something New,  
Something Borrowed*

Plutarch's *Advice to the Bride and Groom* is written in the form of an epistle containing wisdom literature consisting of forty-eight brief lessons on the creation of a philosophical marriage.<sup>1</sup> Plutarch was an antiquarian and the text is replete with analogies and quotations from earlier literature and from famous men and women of Greek antiquity. The eminent Plutarch scholar D.A. Russell has characterized him as the voice of the first Greek Renaissance.<sup>2</sup>

In the Commentary below, quotations and allusions to earlier Greek and Latin literature are identified. Furthermore, the *Advice* is examined against the background of the history of Greek gender relations and the changes in the Greek family and in values and behavior in response to the Hellenistic world.

A text that clearly influenced the *Advice*, and also provides us with a classical standard against which to measure change over time, is Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* (*Discourse on the Skill of Estate Management*). Although Xenophon wrote his treatise around 370 B.C., and Plutarch wrote approximately five hundred years later, A.D. 100–100, when Greece was a province of the Roman Empire,<sup>3</sup> nevertheless the texts are commensurable: both are didactic and both treat much the same subject matter. Both may appear simple and commonplace, but are actually sophisticated, at times innovative, at other times conservative.<sup>4</sup> Both treatises are anomalous in the mass of misogynistic Greek prose about women and marriage, for they are prescriptive works

An earlier version of this introductory essay was presented at the conference on Gendering History sponsored by the Royal Historical Society, University of York, U.K., September 28, 1996. I am grateful to David Harvey, Jorgen Mejer, and Philip Stadter for their advice on the two commentaries.

*Plutarch* (New York 1973), 3, and *Plutarch: Selected Essays and Dialogues* (World's Classics, Oxford 1993), 21.

For the date, see C. Jones, "Towards a Chronology of Plutarch's Works," *JRS* 56 (1966), 61–74, esp. 71. See Hawley and Patterson, this volume.

which assume that marriage can be a source of intense pleasure and of moral and material improvement.

In the *Oeconomicus*, Xenophon describes the functioning of two upper-class families.<sup>5</sup> The first, Critobulus's, is problematic: he scarcely talks with his wife, and has not shown her how to manage his *oikos* (a word which can mean "household," "family," or "estate"). Yet he himself has been diverted from family responsibilities by immature amorous interests and has left his wife in charge of very serious matters. The consequence is that he is always short of funds. As a positive model, Xenophon describes in greater detail another family in which the husband, Ischomachus, has developed a loving relationship with his wife, and relates how he has educated her to be such a fine administrator that eventually she manages the entire *oikos* and he is free to devote himself to affairs of state, to keep in top physical condition, and to manage his agricultural property. His *oikos* is a financial success largely because it is a partnership of husband and wife. The picture of Ischomachus and his wife is idealized; most Athenian husbands would not turn over valuable estates to be managed by their wives, and they would not give them the run of the house and take orders from them. Furthermore, inasmuch as respectable women were invisible in the larger male society, husbands would not voluntarily divulge intimate details about their wives to men who were not kinsmen. Nevertheless, the treatise, which is written in the form of a Socratic dialogue, conveys a great deal of information about Greek views concerning intrafamilial relations and the economic foundations of the *oikos*.

Like most Greek literature, the *Oeconomicus* and the *Advice* are addressed to elite upper-class audiences. Because some women, including Ischomachus's wife, were literate, it is possible that a few women read the *Oeconomicus*. In contrast, Plutarch wrote his conjugal precepts for a wife and husband who are named specifically as its readers. They have been identified by additional evidence as Pollianus, the son of one of Plutarch's friends, and Eurydice. Both were Plutarch's pupils, who remained closely connected with him after they married (see [138A]). Plutarch dedicated the *Virtues in Women* and the erudite *Isis and Osiris*<sup>6</sup> to a certain Clea, who was perhaps their daughter or more likely Eurydice's mother (see below on Dedication). He clearly enjoyed the company of educated women. In fact, his own wife wrote a treatise "On Adornment." Such women were educated and could understand and identify the Greek and Latin historical and literary allusions with which Plutarch's writings are infused.<sup>7</sup> In *Advice* and *Consolation* he quotes the tragic poets (especially Euripides), Plato, Homer, Sappho, Theognis, and Herodotus, and makes many other allusions to earlier literature (see Commentary). Twenty-five famous men of the past are mentioned by name<sup>8</sup> and there are two more

<sup>5</sup> For extensive discussion of the chapters in the *Oeconomicus* that are mentioned in the present essay, see Sarah B. Pomeroy, *Xenophon Oeconomicus: A Social and Historical Commentary* (Oxford 1994).

<sup>6</sup> Or perhaps to her grandmother: see Stadter, this volume.

<sup>7</sup> On women's literacy see William V. Harris, *Ancient Literacy* (Cambridge, Mass. 1989), 275.

<sup>8</sup> Solon, Herodotus, Cato, Plato, Paris, Odysseus, Philip, Socrates, Lysander, Sophocles, Crates, Xenocrates, Metrodorus, Antipater, Phocion, Phidias, Cyrus, Euripides, Gorgias, Melanthius, Xenophon, Hegesias, Leonidas, Theagenes, and Scipio.

whose identity can be readily ascertained.<sup>9</sup> The vast majority of the men are Greeks, three are Roman, the Persian Cyrus is a figure from Greek history, and the Trojan Paris is from both Greek and Roman epic. Twelve women of the past are named<sup>10</sup> and the identity of one more can be deduced.<sup>11</sup> Of the twelve, two are Roman. Though eleven of the men date from the classical period, the Spartan queen Gorgo, Theano, and Timoclea are the only Greek women who do. The other women are all either archaic or Hellenistic. This discrepancy is a reflection of the invisibility of women, especially Athenians (in contrast to male Athenians), in the classical period, for Plutarch himself does not hesitate to use women's names.<sup>12</sup>

Inasmuch as the women in Plutarch's circle had time to read and write moral treatises, they were not totally involved in household management like their counterparts in classical Athens. Furthermore, since Eurydice studied philosophy with Plutarch, who was not her kinsman, she was not secluded and may have even met her future husband during these lessons. We do not know the exact ages of Eurydice and Pollianus. Eurydice's study of philosophy before marriage suggests that she was probably older than the brides in Xenophon's era, who were not quite fifteen when they married husbands who were nearly twice their age.<sup>13</sup> Nevertheless, in both Xenophon and Plutarch the husband is portrayed as the wife's teacher.

The brides are virgins, and of course their husbands are their instructors in sexual matters. The exposition is arranged chronologically, beginning with the early days of marriage. Both Xenophon and Plutarch trace the evolution of the conjugal relationship from the early awkward days, through the time when love bursts into flame, to the period when patterns become set. No other Greek authors treat this material in detail. That is why Michel Foucault used the *Oeconomicus* and the *Advice* as central texts in volumes II and III of his *History of Sexuality*.<sup>14</sup> Feminist scholars and others have justifiably criticized Foucault's interpretations as male oriented,<sup>15</sup> but the original texts of Xenophon and Plutarch are not one-sided. Like

<sup>9</sup> The Roman (ch. 22) and the tyrant of Sicily (ch. 26).

<sup>10</sup> Helen, Penelope, Olympias, Theano, Hermione, Aglaonice, Cleobulina, Gorgo, Timoclea, Claudia, Cornelia, and Sappho.

<sup>11</sup> Thessalian lady (ch. 23).

<sup>12</sup> Unless they are his intimates: cf. *Consolation* ch. 9, "Timoxena." See also J. Bremmer, "Plutarch and the Naming of Greek Women," *AJP* 102 (1981), 425–7, and see most recently Sarah B. Pomeroy, *Families in Classical and Hellenistic Greece: Representations and Realities* (Oxford 1997), 14, 18, 67, 82, 164, 227.

<sup>13</sup> The normal age at first marriage for elite women in imperial Greece has not been established. According to Breley Shaw, "The Age of Roman Girls at Marriage: Some Reconsiderations," *JRS* 77 (1987), 30–46, though elite women in the city of Rome married young (around puberty like classical Athenians), the majority of women in Italy and the Empire married later. Roger S. Bagnall and Bruce W. Frier, *The Demography of Roman Egypt* (Cambridge 1994), 114, also found that most women married in their late teens.

<sup>14</sup> Michel Foucault, *Histoire de la sexualité*, II: *L'Usage des plaisirs* (Paris 1984), trans. by R. Hurley as *The Use of Pleasure* (New York 1985), 152–65, and *Histoire de la sexualité*, III: *Le Souci de soi* (Paris 1984), trans. by R. Hurley as *The Care of the Self* (New York 1986), 180–4, 193.

<sup>15</sup> For example, Lesley Dean-Jones, "The Politics of Pleasure: Female Sexual Appetite in the Hippocratic Corpus," in Domna C. Stanton (ed.), *Discourses of Sexuality from Aristotle to Aids* (Ann Arbor 1992), 48–77.

Plato, Xenophon was a disciple of Socrates, and Plutarch was a Platonist. Despite Platonism, Plutarch declares that heterosexual and conjugal love is superior to other kinds of sexual connection, for it provides companionship, produces children, and is morally elevating (*Advice* ch. 32, see also *Eroticus*). Xenophon also favors heterosexual and conjugal intercourse, though less unambiguously than Plutarch. These preferences are typical of the times in which these authors lived. As we learn from Plato's *Symposium*, a work that was roughly contemporaneous with the *Oeconomicus*, Aphrodite was endowed with a dual nature: one heavenly, the other common or vulgar. The heavenly goddess had no mother: she arose from the sea after the castration of Uranus. The vulgar version was born of the heterosexual intercourse of Zeus and Dione. According to classical Platonic doctrine, the heavenly Aphrodite presided over spiritual love between two males that created an intellectual product, while the vulgar goddess was concerned with heterosexual intercourse that resulted in the birth of children. By Plutarch's day, however, the heavenly Aphrodite had been domesticated and had become a goddess of marriage. He notes in the *Advice* (ch. 32) that Phidias sculpted an Aphrodite stepping on a turtle to be a symbol for women of staying home and keeping silent. The turtle is an attribute of the heavenly Aphrodite, born from the sea. Aphrodite's transformation in the Hellenistic period indicates that a wife could now be considered a spiritual partner of her husband, and the two were capable of producing not only human children, but also spiritual offspring.<sup>16</sup>

Xenophon touches delicately on the sexual aspect of marriage. Although in the classical period a marriage was arranged by the bride's parents and the groom or his father, and the couple may have never set eyes on each other before the ceremony, in Xenophon their sexual relationship evolves as a pleasurable experience in which both partners enthusiastically participate. Xenophon mentions the mutual physical attractiveness of husband and wife (*Oec.* 10). They are joined to be partners in one another's bodies and they confide their physical preferences to each other. The husband expects to be sexually aroused by his wife's appearance. He tells her that he does not think that platform shoes and cosmetics enhance a woman's looks, for when she gets out of bed in the morning her actual appearance is obvious. These feelings are shared by husband and wife, for the wife admits that she would not want her husband to deceive her by wearing makeup, or with counterfeit money, or with costume jewelry that looks like genuine gold, or with inferior clothes that masquerade as luxurious garments. The wife says that she loves her husband with all her heart, and he perceives that she is willing to engage in intercourse. Nevertheless, she is more modest than her husband in speaking of these matters, for example, when he asks her forthrightly, "Wife, were we not joined in marriage to share our bodies in intercourse with each another?" she responds coyly, "That's what people say" (*Oec.* 10.4).

Xenophon's discussion of conjugal sex seems prudish in comparison to Plutarch's explicit instructions. The knowledge that the dedicatees are alive and well known and that Plutarch surely published his work for a wider audience than these

<sup>16</sup> Sarah B. Pomeroy, *Women in Hellenistic Egypt from Alexander to Cleopatra* (New York 1984; pbk. with new foreword 1990), 32–4.

two makes his frankness in discussing intimate sexual matters startling even to a modern reader. Private matters are made public. Plutarch's second sentence refers to music, but not the traditional hymeneal or bridal song. Rather, he mentions "The Rampant Stallion," which was played to encourage the stallion to cover the mare. In chapter 2 he urges the bride not to harbor feelings of resentment against her husband in the early days of marriage as a result of her loss of virginity; but if she does, her husband should be patient with her until she matures. Then he goes on to discuss the love that blazes up between the newlyweds as a result of physical attraction. He encourages the bride to take off her clothes, saying that when a woman is naked she is dressed in modesty (ch. 10). He also recommends that at night a woman should display her virtue, her affection, and her steadfast and exclusive devotion to her husband. Plutarch enforces this advice by placing a moral value on sexual intercourse, sanctifying the couple's bedroom (the *thalamos*). The bed is a sacred place. Marital intercourse for procreation is a holy rite. If they have been quarreling, husband and wife ought to end their dispute in bed and let Aphrodite mend their differences (chs. 38 and 39).

Both Xenophon (*Oec.* 7.32–5) and Plutarch (*Advice* chs. 2, 44) compare the wife to a bee. The analogy between the good wife and the bee can be traced as far back in Greek literature as the archaic poet Semonides (fr. 7 West). Ischomachus tells his wife she is like a queen bee because she is to stay indoors, care for the young, supervise the workers, and oversee the transformation of raw materials such as wool into manufactured products. The bee was famous for purity and abstinence. Greeks thought that bees reproduced asexually; therefore they associated this insect with chastity. But chastity was not the same as virginity. According to Semonides, the wife who is like a bee is so uninterested in sex that she does not even like to sit and listen to other women when they gossip about it. Nevertheless, she does make her husband happy and does produce offspring. Bees were also reported to be censorious about the sexual exploits of human beings.

The analogy to bees was not uniformly applied, for neither Xenophon nor Plutarch revokes the double standard concerning human adultery. Ischomachus refers to the availability of slaves as sexual partners. He acknowledges that slaves are less desirable, for they come to the master's bed by compulsion. He declares that he prefers to have intercourse with his wife, especially because she is willing and cleaner (*Oec.* 10.12–3, cf. below on ch. 28). In the *Oeconomicus* the husband's willingness to exploit alternative sexual outlets imparts a coercive quality to the marital relationship. If the wife is unwilling to please her husband, she forfeits his undivided attention. In the Hellenistic period there was slightly less tolerance of a husband's philandering. Plutarch advises both husband and wife to abstain from extramarital intercourse, but in case the husband does indulge, he recommends discretion. In the *Advice* (ch. 44) he states that bees behave in a hostile manner towards men who have been with women, and wives do likewise. He therefore urges husbands not to have intercourse with other women immediately before they approach their wives. He also notes (ch. 43) the dissension Gorgias caused in his own home because of his relationship with a female slave.

Inasmuch as respectable women in classical Athens were secluded and not likely to meet men who were not kinsmen, Xenophon does not need to be overly

concerned about the wife's potential adultery. In contrast, despite Plutarch's recommendation (ch. 32) that women stay in their homes like turtles and, like the wife in the *Oeconomicus*, talk only to their husbands or through them, upper-class women in Hellenistic Greece were not secluded and were subject to extramarital temptations. Before her marriage Eurydice had studied with Plutarch, who was not her kinsman. Inconsistently with his injunction to the wife to stay at home, Plutarch also states that a wife should be seen in public only with her husband, and she ought not to make friends of her own, but enjoy her husband's friends together with him (chs. 9, 19; see also *Consolation* ch. 5 for the wife's presence in public). Thus Plutarch presents a version of woman as sexual being that differs from the lustful stereotypes of the classical period. In this version, the woman is not at the mercy of her sexual appetite. Plutarch describes some women as cold and solemn, and not interested in pleasures of any sort (ch. 28), and he cautions Eurydice against such dour, cheerless behavior, but he also urges a husband to be indulgent if he has such a wife. He discusses wives who prefer to be with men who are more fun and more licentious than their own severe husbands. According to Plutarch, a woman is capable of making choices, of enjoying the company of men who are not her kinsmen, of avoiding adultery, and of learning to enjoy conjugal intercourse, or at least learning to submit to it in good humor in the expectation of creating a good marriage.

Both Xenophon and Plutarch accept the constraints of patriarchal society in which the double standard of sexual conduct is in force and in which a wife's power must be delegated to her by her husband, subject to ongoing negotiation.<sup>17</sup> Yet within this framework a woman may exercise moral autonomy and prove to be superior to a man in important areas of knowledge and conduct. As Socrates had taught, the soul has no sex; therefore a woman's potential is qualitatively the same as a man's (*Oec.* 7.7, 26–73). Women are teachable. In Xenophon, Ischomachus taught his wife how to converse with him, how to manage his estate, how to behave in bed, and much more. Plutarch was Eurydice's teacher before she married, and he directs that her instruction be continued through the medium of her husband, who is to pass on to his wife what he learns (*Advice* ch. 48). Both Xenophon and Plutarch invoke the *topos* of the idle, wealthy, extravagant woman. Xenophon declares that such a wife deceives her husband by wearing cosmetics, and Plutarch states that most women will remain at home if they cannot wear gold-embroidered shoes, bracelets, anklets, purple clothing, and pearls. For Xenophon, the cure for indolence is work and exercise, a program in many ways analogous to the daily regime of the husband, which he describes in detail as well. For the wife, the exercise involved in housework will produce a good complexion. According to Plutarch (*Advice* ch. 48), the study of philosophy is a bulwark against female vice and ignorant superstition: "a woman who understands mathematics will be ashamed to dance; if she hears the magic of Plato's or Xenophon's words, she will not let the magic of witchcraft into her life." Furthermore, if Eurydice would not only read, but memorize, the treatise Plutarch's wife wrote on adornment, she would eschew the use of cosmetics (ch. 48).

<sup>17</sup> See Foxhall and Stafford, this volume.

Xenophon is particularly interested in marriage as an economic partnership. Ischomachus tells his wife that they should not consider who brought more wealth to the marriage, but that they should regard their property as common to both (*Oec.* 7.11–3). In his day, marriage was virilocal, and sons inherited at least three times as much as daughters received as dowry. Therefore, it is likely that even when the spouses came from families of equal economic status—as was usually the case—the husband's economic contribution at the beginning of a marriage far exceeded the wife's and was continually visible in the house in which the couple resided. Plutarch, in contrast, is concerned about wealthy wives, and states that the property, though combined, should be said to be the husband's, even if the wife contributed the larger share (*Advice* ch. 28). He disapproves of wives who assume that their wealth gives them the right to dominate their husbands. Clearly, women in Plutarch's day enjoyed more autonomy than their classical counterparts. For example, Plutarch alludes to a jealous wife who initiates a divorce (*Advice* ch. 41). In contrast, in the classical period, a wife who was mistreated had no recourse but to ask a male relative to seek a divorce in her behalf (see, e.g., Plut. *Alcibiades* 8.5 and also 4.14).

There are other major differences between the classical and the late Hellenistic periods with regard to gender relations. In the earlier period the sexes were segregated. Xenophon describes the sexual division of labor that led to spatial segregation (*Oec.* 7.20–5). Men spent the day outdoors; women indoors. Even in a small house with only two rooms, one upstairs and the other on the ground floor, the upper room was normally the women's quarters (*gynaikonitis*) and the lower room the men's (*andron*). The women in the household, both free and slave, slept in the women's quarters. They also worked there, though in warm weather they might move their looms into the courtyard and work outdoors, protected by the surrounding walls of the house. Men slept downstairs, and they dined and entertained male guests at symposia (drinking parties) in the *andron*. The visitor to a Greek house would meet only male members of the family; when strangers were in the house, female members would withdraw to the secluded part and not even be mentioned by name. We may wonder if a married couple regularly dined together and, if so, where in the house they did so. The sources are remarkably reticent on this point; perhaps a shared meal was too banal an event to report, or perhaps it rarely occurred. Xenophon describes the eating pattern of a healthy Athenian gentleman who comes home for lunch, and depicts a married couple who communicate well with one another, but although he reports their daily routines and affirms that marriage is a partnership consisting of far more than sleeping together, he does not indicate that they dine together.<sup>18</sup> In contrast, Plutarch advocates a companionate marriage in which dining together is essential for moral improvement. The wife should laugh and joke with her husband, and they should have the same friends (*Advice* chs. 15, 34).

Although Xenophon wrote in the classical period and Plutarch late in the Hellenistic, this relationship to their time is complicated, on the one hand, by

<sup>18</sup> Pomeroy, *Families in Classical and Hellenistic Greece*, 30.

Xenophon's affinities with the Hellenistic age,<sup>19</sup> and on the other, by Plutarch's nostalgia for the classical. Xenophon delegates authority to the wife so that she manages the domestic economy of one of the most affluent estates in Athens. Unlike her classical counterparts, but like upper-class women in the Hellenistic period, in fact (if not in law) she acts autonomously and has great wealth at her disposal. Although she stays within the house, she is not confined to the women's quarters, and even enters the men's dormitory to care for slaves who are ill (*Oec.* 7–9). In contrast, Plutarch looks back, citing examples of women who were proverbial for their wisdom, courage, and virtue, including Cleobulina from the archaic period, Gorgo, Theano, and Timoclea from the classical period, and the Romans Claudia Quinta and Cornelia from the second century B.C. (*Advice* ch. 48). Plutarch idealizes and exploits the past as propaganda with the intention of changing the behavior of contemporary women. He was not the first to use history as an agent for moral reform. In the same way, on a larger scale, Livy had created a mythology around the virtuous women of the early Roman Republic as a means of criticizing the women of his own time. In the late Republic, when the women of his own day were not behaving like Claudia Quinta and Cornelia, he wrote about these paragons and many other heroines of the past. When viewed in their own historical contexts, both Livy and Plutarch are seen to be social conservatives. Of the forty-eight chapters in the *Advice*, nine are addressed to both bride and groom, eleven to the groom, and twenty-eight, or more than half the total, to the bride alone. Like Xenophon, Plutarch finds less to criticize and fewer potential problems in the husband's behavior.<sup>20</sup> Both authors concentrate their advice on training the wife to be a congenial and productive marital partner who is willing to accommodate herself to her husband's wishes.

We must conclude that in the area of marital relations Plutarch was not an original thinker, but rather an industrious and eclectic one. An obvious, though hitherto unstudied, source for the *Advice* were Neopythagorean treatises on marriage. These treatises, which were written between the fourth century B.C. and the second century A.D., constituted the largest corpus of Greek prose literature giving detailed instructions for the proper behavior of the wife, counseling her to live for her husband, to tolerate his vices, to think no private thoughts, and to avoid adultery, considering the marriage bed as sacrosanct.<sup>21</sup> The husband, in turn, was urged, though not obliged, to be sexually monogamous. The treatises were written in the Hellenistic period, and some were attributed to female authors. In fact, of all the Greek philosophical schools, Pythagoreanism provided the largest number of examples of female philosophers, and we note that Plutarch was advising Eurydice

<sup>19</sup> See further Pomeroy, *Xenophon Oeconomicus*, 32, 69.

<sup>20</sup> Anastasios G. Nikolaidis, "Plutarch on Women and Marriage," *WS* 110 (1997), 27–88, esp. 73, argues that the wife would simply need to comport herself in conformity with Greek traditions, but that the husband would need to make greater changes. If, however, Plutarch's advice to the bride was so obvious, why would he have bothered writing it?

<sup>21</sup> See further Pomeroy, *Women in Hellenistic Egypt*, 61–71, and below [31].

to behave like a philosopher.<sup>22</sup> Middle Comedy lampooned Pythagorean women, and many anecdotes were told about them. The veracity of these anecdotes need not concern us. The fact that they were told at all confirms that there were female Pythagoreans. Women were intimately involved in Pythagoreanism from its founding in the sixth century B.C., far longer than they were connected with any other Greek philosophical school. Pythagoras, the founder, included women among his disciples. Many quotations are attributed to his wife Theano and to his daughter Myia. Tradition connected Platonism to Pythagoreanism through a female link, Plato's mother Perictione, who was said to have studied with Pythagoras in order to learn frugality. Both Pythagoreanism and Platonism emphasized mathematics as having not merely a material but also a spiritual value, and music was an audible expression of mathematical relationships. Thus Plutarch notes that "a woman who understands mathematics will be ashamed to dance" (ch. 48), and refers in his Introduction (138B) to "the tunefulness of marriage and home" and to "discourse, harmony, and philosophy." Pythagoreanism was a particularly appropriate model for Plutarch's view of marriage, for its tenets applied to the daily lives of married couples; though, of course, wives rather than husbands were obliged to make the majority of the accommodations necessary for a harmonious marriage.

Plutarch was not a historian, but a biographer and moral philosopher. He has little sense of change over time, and therefore does not hesitate to refer to female moral exemplars from earlier periods of Greek history in his advice to Eurydice, a wealthy, educated young woman, who without Plutarch's advice probably would not have been comparable to a turtle who stays at home and lets her husband speak for her. Inconsistently, Plutarch includes as positive examples pithy quotations from women like Sappho, Gorgo, and Olympias who spoke for themselves. Without urging by Plutarch and other authorities, women like Eurydice were not likely to follow the example of Theano, wife of Pythagoras, who lived in the fifth century B.C. in an austere philosophical community and was concerned lest her arms be seen by strangers (*Advice* ch. 31). In his warnings to Eurydice, Plutarch paints a contradictory picture of the wife who can reject her strict and moral husband in favor of a pleasure-loving man. She can initiate a divorce. She may use magic and aphrodisiacs, and can, like Circe in the *Odyssey*, subdue and transform her husband into an animal. She can rule over him, especially if she has a large dowry. With these possibilities in mind, Plutarch's advice appears to be on a level with telling a respectable upper-class woman in the twentieth century to behave like a respectable woman according to the Victorian stereotype.

Nostalgia was not confined to individuals such as Plutarch. In the Chaeronea of Plutarch's day there were magistrates titled *gynaiikonomoi*, or "regulators of women," who enforced sumptuary and behavioral standards that Plutarch claims

<sup>22</sup> Gilles Ménage names twenty-six female Pythagoreans, while women affiliated with all other schools, including Platonists, Dialecticians, Cynics, Epicureans, Stoics, and others, total only twenty-four: *The History of Women Philosophers* (Lanham, Md. 1984), 93–5 (trans. by Beatrice H. Zedler of *Historia Mulierum Philosopharum* [1692]).

were originated by Solon (*Solon* 21.5). Greece under the Romans was not only a museum of art, but a shrine to Greek traditions, some of which had existed only in legend. For example, in imperial Sparta, the training of boys was harsher than it had ever been in the days of Sparta's greatness.<sup>23</sup> Thus Plutarch's wish to distinguish Greek people and practices from Roman, demonstrating that the former were at least as good as the latter, is pervasive in his writings. In the first century A.D. there were women in both Greece and Rome who were wealthy and educated and who could in fact, though not necessarily in law, initiate their own divorces and choose their sexual partners.<sup>24</sup> Plutarch, Eurydice, and Pollianus were certainly aware of the status and practices of Roman women, for these were described in both Greek and Latin literature. Furthermore, Plutarch had traveled to Rome, and Roman women, including wives of government officials, settlers, and entrepreneurs, and wealthy tourists, were highly visible when they visited Greece. Plutarch's negative admonitions echo misogynistic or moralistic Roman literature about women who use aphrodisiacs and magic, who wear costly adornment, who prefer licentious lovers to serious husbands, and who dominate their husbands by threatening to divorce them and take their large dowries away with them.<sup>25</sup> Yet at no time in Roman history was the Roman matron required to stay at home and speak only to or through her husband. To cite two of Plutarch's exemplars, Claudia Quinta played a highly public role as a Vestal, and Cornelia, when widowed, was involved in politics and used her home as a meeting place for male intellectuals. Therefore to make a distinction between Greek and Roman women, Plutarch must hark back to the archaic and classical periods when women's behavior had no counterpart at any time in Roman history. A diachronic rather than a synchronic approach to the *Advice* reveals that it is a fascinating but discordant pastiche of something old, something new, and something borrowed.

## Commentary

(138A) [Dedication] **Eurydice**. Memmia Eurydice was the daughter of Clea, who was a friend of Plutarch. Clea was a leader of a Dionysian *thyias* ("sacred group") and perhaps also a priestess at Delphi (*Isis and Osiris* 364E, cf. 351, 352C). Flavia Clea, Eurydice's daughter, who was a priestess as well, dedicated a statue in her mother's honor at Delphi (*Klio* 17 [1921], 169, no. 154, corrected in *Klio* 18 (1923), 339–40 = SEG 1.159, and see further B. Puech, "Prosopographie des amis de Plutarque," ANRW 2.36.6 [Berlin 1992], 4879–83, 4849, and Stadter, this volume). That the name of Eurydice's father is not known, but her mother's name is attested, is evidence of the high status and public visibility of a wealthy priestess in a major sanctuary in imperial Greece. On wealthy women in general see Riet van Bremen,

<sup>23</sup> Nigel M. Kennell, *The Gymnasium of Virtue* (Chapel Hill 1995), 27, 79, 147–8, etc.

<sup>24</sup> Foxhall, this volume, and see further E. Fantham, H.P. Foley, N. Kampen, S.B. Pomeroy, and H.A. Shapiro, *Women in the Classical World: Image and Text* (New York 1994), chs. 9–11.


<sup>25</sup> See further McNamara, this volume.

*The Limits of Participation: Women and Civic Life in the Greek East in the Hellenistic and Roman Periods* (Amsterdam 1996).

**Pollianus.** Lucius Flavius Pollianus Aristion. The first three names of the bridegroom are Roman. Plutarch chooses to address him by his Roman name in the same paragraph where he calls Eurydice by her Greek name (ch. 48). This practice reflects the greater assimilation of men than women to the ruling class.<sup>26</sup> The marriage of Pollianus and Eurydice united two of the most powerful families at Delphi. Pollianus's father, Soclarus of Tithora, was also a friend of Plutarch. Soclarus held two magistracies (archon and epimeletes) at Delphi when Plutarch was priest of Apollo. With his father and brother Agias, Pollianus dedicated a statue in honor of the emperor Nerva at Tithora (IG IX.1.90; and see further Puech, "Prosopographie des amis de Plutarque," 4873, 4879–83). His kinsmen's activities at Delphi can be traced to the end of the second century.

The marriage of Eurydice and Pollianus produced three children whose names are attested (see further B. Puech, "Soklaros de Tithorée, ami de Plutarque, et ses descendants," REG 94 [1981], 186–92, esp. 189).

The names Flavius and Flavia (abbrev. Fl.) indicate persons who were awarded citizenship by the Flavian emperors. See the following chart.



**[Introduction]** The *Advice* is distributed in forty-eight chapters: the arrangement is chronological, beginning with the wedding night. The principal themes in the Introduction and chapters 1 and 2 are sexual love (Eros) and fertility.

**Demeter.** Demeter, a goddess of fertility, was of great importance in Boeotia and elsewhere in the Greek world. Damatrius, the eleventh month in the Boeotian calendar, was named for her (see Dittenberger, s.v. "Damatrios," RE, no. 9 [Stuttgart 1900], 2052–3). According to Plutarch (*Isis and Osiris* 378E), this was the month of seeding. The Thesmophoria, celebrated in honor of Demeter, are attested for Boeotia in the fourth century B.C. by both Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.2.29) and Plutarch (*Pelop.* 5 [280B–C]). The use of the epithet "Thesmophoros" in the second century A.D. indicates that the festival survived at least until then (see Albert Schachter, *Cults of Boiotia*, I: *Acheloos to Hera* [London 1981], 168).

<sup>26</sup> For a comparable phenomenon in Ptolemaic Egypt where men were more Hellenized and women more Egyptianized see Pomeroy, *Women in Hellenistic Egypt*, 124.

**Priestess.** Several Boeotian inscriptions mention priestesses of Demeter. We know of at least three priestesses of Demeter who were members of families with whom Plutarch was friendly. Two of these were mature women who had apparently been married for many years and were mothers of adult sons at the time when Pollianus and Eurydice were married. Flavia Archela Timoxena, priestess of Demeter Achaia ("The Sorrowful"), lived in Thespieae ca. A.D. 50–90 (IG VII.1867; see C.P. Jones, "A Leading Family of Roman Thespieae," *HSCP* 74 [1970], 223–55, esp. 230–2). Flavia Laodamia was priestess of Demeter and Persephone at Eleusis from ca. A.D. 80 (see Puech, "Prosopographie des amis de Plutarque," 4887–8). We may speculate that one of these, more likely the Boeotian, was Eurydice's advisor. Other possibilities include Eupraxis, who was Flavia Archela's kinswoman, possibly her granddaughter, and was a priestess of Demeter (SEG 19.369–70). She would have been closer in age to Eurydice. Finally, IG VII.2148, Roman period, mentions another priestess of Demeter who was perhaps Flavia's granddaughter (see stemma in Jones, "A Leading Family of Roman Thespieae," 236, and see further Schachter, *Cults of Boiotia*, I.170, n. 1).

**Rampant Stallion.** Mention of Demeter suggests the stallion. Demeter changed into a mare to avoid being raped by Poseidon. He, in response, became a stallion and had intercourse with her (Paus. 8.25.4–5, see also 42.1.4). In some parts of Greece, the goddess was represented as a woman with a horse's head and hair (Paus. 8.42.1). L. Farnell (*The Cults of the Greek States*, III [Oxford 1906; repr. 1977], 50, 56–62) argues that the horse-headed female figure originated in Boeotia. Schachter (*Cults of Boiotia*, I.164) is uncertain as to whether the original myth was Boeotian or Arcadian.

Aelian (*On the Nature of Animals* 12.44) describes the *hippotheron* as flute music played for horses as an aphrodisiac. This is the first of many references to music in the *Advice*. In the *Moralia* Plutarch frequently refers to music. Two treatises on music (*The Creation of the Soul in Plato's Timaeus* and *Music*) are included in his works, but it is generally agreed that these are not genuine works of Plutarch.

**I . . . you have often heard.** Scholars generally assume that Plutarch's own marriage was similar to the harmonious ideal he describes in the *Advice*.<sup>27</sup> This assumption is based chiefly on autobiographical allusions in the *Consolation* and the *Eroticus* (ch. 2). Of course, the modern reader is constantly aware that we do not have his wife's assessment of their relationship. In any event, in the *Advice* Plutarch does not cite his own experience as a model, although the addressees were familiar with Plutarch's household, since they were his students and friends, and he speaks quite intimately to them.

**less their duty to tune lyre or cithara.** The lyre and cithara were the chief stringed instruments of ancient Greece. The lyre was made of turtle or tortoise shell or a similarly shaped piece of wood, with oxhide stretched across the concave side (see below, "Hermes"). The strings were of equal length. The cithara was similar to the

<sup>27</sup> For example, most recently, *Plutarch: Essays*, trans. Robin Waterfield, introduced and annotated by Ian Kidd (London 1992), 360, 363.

lyre, but larger and more complicated (see further Solon Michaelides, *The Music of Ancient Greece: An Encyclopaedia* [London 1978], 168–9, 189–92). In chapter 38 Plutarch also questions the power of song and the appropriateness of its use.

**Muses.** Goddesses of the liberal arts, including history, astronomy, philosophy, dancing, and various genres of poetry. In the Hellenistic period Museums (dedicated to the cult of the Muses) were centers of intellectual activity. Hesiod opens the *Theogony* with a tribute to the Muses of Mount Helicon in Boeotia who inspired him while he was herding his sheep there. There were many cults of the Muses throughout Greece, but they had a major sanctuary in the valley of the Muses west of Thespieae (see Schachter, *Cults of Boiotia*, II: *Herakles to Poseidon* [London 1986], 147–53). Pausanias (31.3, see also Plut. *Eroticus* 748) writes that the Thespians celebrate two festivals, the Musaea, and games in honor of Eros, the latter including prizes not only for the musical arts but also for athletics. The Musaea were celebrated as late as the third century A.D. (see J.G. Frazer, *Pausanias's Description of Greece*, V [London 1913], 156–7). Pausanias's association of the realms of Aphrodite and the Muses may not be fortuitous. Aphrodite is also associated with the Muses in the Homeric *Hymn to Pythian Apollo* (189–95) where the Muses dance with the Graces, the Seasons, Hebe, Aphrodite, and Harmonia (for the latter two see further just below).

**Aphrodite.** Goddess of love and marriage (see [32]). In the context of a discussion of conjugal relations, Plutarch (*Eroticus* ch. 23) observes that the Delphians called Aphrodite “Harmonia” (see next note).

**harmony.** This word has many connotations, especially in the realms of music and in human relations, both public and private. The Greeks personified the concept as Harmonia, a Boeotian goddess, the wife of Cadmus, king of Thebes (Plut. *Pelop.* 19; Paus. 9.16.3; and see further Farnell, *The Cults of the Greek States*, II.620, 658, who suggests that there was a cult of Harmonia at Thebes). Two myths about the genealogy of Harmonia refer to her dual nature. According to Hesiod (*Theogony* 937), Aphrodite and Ares were her parents. Writing more allegorically, Euripides (*Medea* 831–2) states that the nine Muses were responsible for her creation.<sup>28</sup> Both Neopythagoreans and Neoplatonists used the term to refer to cosmic harmony (see F. Jouan, “Harmonia,” in J. Duchemin [ed.], *Mythe et personnification: actes du colloque du Grand Palais* [Paris], 7–8 mai 1977 [Paris 1980], 113–21, esp. 719).

**Hermes.** The lyre brings to mind Hermes who created the instrument from the shell of a turtle (*chelys*). The story is told in the *Hom. Hymn to Hermes* 5.39–54. According to Richard Janko (*Homer, Hesiod and the Hymns: Diachronic Development in Epic Diction* [Cambridge 1982], 149–50), this hymn was written by a Boeotian poet in the late sixth century B.C. In chapter 32 Plutarch refers to the turtle and Aphrodite.

**Persuasion.** The modern reader might best understand Plutarch as advising the husband to use persuasiveness on his wife. See further Stafford, this volume.

<sup>28</sup> The lines may also be interpreted as stating that Harmonia gave birth to the Muses.



FIGURE 1. Harmonia with Aphrodite and the Muses. New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art 37.11.23. 420–410 B.C. Inscriptions: Harmonia, Peitho, Pothos. H. 18  $\frac{7}{8}$  in. (48 cm.). Whole. Courtesy of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, Samuel D. Lee Fund, 1937.

Red-figure pelike by the Meidias painter. Center, the singer Musaeus and his wife and son, surrounded by four Muses: Melpomene, Erato, Calliope, and Terpsichore. On the left, Pothos (Desire) leans on Calliope's shoulder. Peitho (Persuasion) and Terpsichore regard one another. Aphrodite, seated right with Eros hovering above her. Next to Aphrodite at the extreme upper right, Harmonia, shown from the waist up. (See further H.A. Shapiro, *Personifications in Greek Art: The Representation of Abstract Concepts*, 600–400 B.C. [Zurich 1993], 106–9.)

[1] **quince.** Before the wedding is consummated the bride must eat a quince or Cydonian apple (also Plut. *Roman Questions* 279 f., and *Solon* 20). Like other customs and laws governing family matters, this practice is attributed to Solon. By accepting food in her husband's home, the bride is united with her husband, as in myth Persephone was bound to Hades after she ate the pomegranate seeds he offered (*Hom. Hymn to Demeter* 372). Moreover, the apple was associated with love and fertility and was used in many parts of the ancient world as an erotic charm (see further John H. Oakley and Rebecca H. Sinos, *The Wedding in Ancient Athens* [Madison, Wis. 1993], 35, n. 96, and C.A. Faraone, "Aphrodite's Kestos and Apples for Atalanta: Aphrodisiacs in Early Greek Myth and Ritual," *Phoenix* 44 [1990], 219–43, esp. 230–2).

[2] **asparagus.** Asparagus acutifolius, a wild form of asparagus which becomes sweet when cultivated. Dioscorides Pedanius, writing in the first century A.D., describes it as multibranched, with many long leaves (*Materia medica* 2.152; see further Hellmut Baumann, *The Greek Plant World in Myth, Art, and Literature* [orig. published as *Die griechische Pflanzenwelt in Mythos, Kunst und Literatur*, Munich 1982, trans. and augmented by W.T. Stearn and E.R. Stearn, Portland, Or. 1993], 86, 88). Erika Simon ("Hera und die Nymphen: Ein Böotischer Polos in Stockholm," *Rev. Arch.* 2 [1972], 205–20, esp. 211) discusses the vegetation imagery of Hera's crown, as appropriate to a goddess whose domain includes fertility. See also [27]. The wild asparagus has sharp pointed leaves and small cream-colored flowers. Oakley and Sinos (*The Wedding in Ancient Athens*, 16) mention wedding scenes that show the bride wearing a crown with upright metal leaves.

**bee's sting.** Here the bee is male. The sexual connotations of the analogy are obvious. Guard bees are sometimes males, and can sting. On his wedding night the bridegroom is as implacable as a bee intent on stinging. The loss of virginity is often painful, and the bride may harbor resentment against the man who inflicted this pain. See [44] for an analogy between women and bees that sting and [8] for analogies between animals and human beings in general.

**honeycomb.** The wife is supposed to learn to enjoy sexual intercourse. This allusion to the sweetness that the relationship may attain continues the thought begun in chapter 1 with the reference to the bride's eating the aphrodisiacal quince.

[5] **Circe . . . pigs.** By mixing drugs into their food, Circe in Homer, *Odyssey* (10.239), turns Odysseus's men into pigs; our text of Homer does not mention asses. Pigs were traditionally considered gluttonous and asses lascivious. Both Homer and Plutarch make it clear that though a woman may attempt to use debasing charms to captivate a man, if the man, in turn, exercises temperance and self-control he actually becomes more attractive to a woman. The analogy with Circe implies that Eurydice has the potential of deploying great powers.

Plutarch wrote an amusing dialogue, *Gryllus* ("Grunter" = *Mor.* 985D–992), in which a pig lectures to Odysseus and Circe.

[8] **leap on to a horse . . . horse to kneel.** Feeble husbands make rich and noble wives lower themselves. They should respect their dignity, but curb them. The analogy between the male as rider and the woman as horse was common in Greek literature. The sexual connotations are patent. See above on Rampant Stallion (138B). Horses also connote luxury, for only the wealthy could afford them. Thus,

according to Semonides (fr. 7.57–70), the woman who is like a mare does not work and is considered a suitable wife only for a king or a tyrant. Moreover, it was commonly thought that, like a mare, a bride needed to be broken in and domesticated. For example, Xenophon (*Oec.* 7.10) uses the words *cheiroethes* (“tamed”) and *etethaseuto* (“domesticated”) to refer to a new bride (see further Pomeroy, *Xenophon Oeconomicus*, 231–2, 272). The same words often referred to the domestication of animals. Before they married, young Athenian girls participated in the cult of Artemis at Brauron. The girls dressed as bears; this costume symbolized, *inter alia*, their wild animalistic condition before they were domesticated by marriage. Analogies between people and animals were traditional in Greek literature and were not necessarily derogatory (see also on bees [2] and [44]). Medea, who complained that a new bride is like a resident in a foreign land who must learn the *nomoi* (“rules” or “customs”) of the place, used the word *neodmes* (“newly tamed”) when she referred to Jason’s relationship with his young second wife (Eur. *Medea* 623). Creon (*Soph. Antigone* 477–8, 579) declares that Ismene and Antigone must no longer run free, but should be bridled.

[9] **A good woman.** This term recurs in the *Advice* (chs. 10, 17, 25, 28, 29, 31) and *Consolation* (ch. 4). The Greek *sôphrona* refers to the most common virtue ascribed to women in Greece: *sôphrosynê*. It is frequently inscribed on women’s tombstones in both the classical and the Hellenistic periods (see further A.-M. Vêrilhac, “L’Image de la femme dans les épigrammes funéraires grecques,” in *La Femme dans le monde méditerranéen*, III: *Collection des travaux de la Maison de l’Orient*, 10, ed. A.-M. Vêrilhac [Lyon 1985], 85–112, esp. 92, 102). This virtue may also be attributed to men (e.g. Xen. *Oec.* 7.14–5; Plut. *Lyc.* 5.6, etc., *Numa* 4.3, etc.). It connotes self-restraint and chastity. According to Helen North (*Sôphrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature* [Ithaca, NY 1966], 248), Plutarch uses the term in ways that reflect the entire development of its use.

[10] **Herodotus.** The story of Gyges, Candaules, and the nudity of Candaules’ wife is told in *History* 1.8. Plutarch often uses Herodotus without complaint (e.g., *Solon*, *Themistocles*, and *Aristides*) but, with a ferocity unusual for him, he wrote an indictment of Herodotus: *Herodotus’s Malice* = *Moralia* 854D–874C. Here, Plutarch is using a *chreia*, or pregnant allusion to a well-known authority, in order to challenge it. He uses the same rhetorical technique, for example, in *On Listening to Lectures* (37C) and *Table Talk* (622F). In the classical period when Herodotus lived, respectable women were shielded from the eyes of men who were not their kin, and their nudity was strictly a private matter. In the Hellenistic and Roman periods, however, the tabu was partially lifted. Sculptors depicted some goddesses and their human epiphanies, queens and empresses, in the nude. Thus Diogenes Laertius (8.43) reports that Theano told a woman who was joining her husband to put away her shame with her clothing. See further below on ch. 31, and Pomeroy, *Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves* (New York 1975, reissued with new foreword 1995), 142–6.

[11] **two notes . . . the melody belongs to the lower note.** The musical theorist Aristides Quintilianus (*de Musica* 2.8, 16) assigned gender to notes and keys: the male was more rough and forceful, the female smoother and more emotional, and so on (see further M.L. West, *Ancient Greek Music* [Oxford 1992], 252). Aristides’

date is uncertain, but he lived between the first and fourth centuries (see Andrew Barker [ed.], *Greek Musical Writings, II: Harmonic and Acoustic Theory* [Cambridge 1989], 392). The male, of course, was deeper or heavier (*baruterou* in the present passage in Plutarch, *metechonta* . . . *baros*, *baruteta* in Arist. Quint. 2.16), the female more pliant (Arist. Quint. 2.16 *eucheres*). Thus the analogy between two notes and husband and wife was obvious. Music was also of great importance in Platonic and Pythagorean theory. For further references to music and marriage, see (138A) and [38]. For Pythagoreans, see Theano [31].

[13] **Cato expelled from the Senate the man who kissed his wife in their daughter's presence.** The elder Cato (234–149 B.C.) is often cited as an exemplar of old-fashioned Roman virtue. As Censor in 184 Cato struck off the lists of Senators a certain Manilius or Manlius because he was deemed unworthy (see further Alan E. Astin, *Cato the Censor* [Oxford 1978], 79–81). Plutarch tells the same story in *Cato the Elder* (17.7), adding Cato's comment that he himself never put his arms around his wife unless it thundered, and that he was fortunate when it thundered. In the same work (*Cato the Elder* 20.5) Cato states that his son's presence made him as careful to avoid making indecent remarks as the presence of the Vestals. The inference is that if one must avoid demonstrations of emotion in front of close relatives, one must avoid such displays even more in the presence of strangers.

[14] **No usefulness in mirror . . . likeness.** Just as a bejeweled mirror is useless if it does not reflect a clear image, a rich wife is useless if her life and habits do not reflect her husband's. Just as a mirror is useless if the image is sad when someone is cheerful, and displays a smile when he is angry, so a wife is useless if her mood does not imitate her husband's. A similar thought appears in Sophocles, *Oedipus* fr. 909 (Nauck, 2d ed. = \*545A in *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, ed. Kannicht): "It is pleasing too, if her husband has had some bad experience, for a wife to put on a sad face with him and to join in sharing his pains and pleasures. [lacuna] You and I—when you suffer, I will be content to suffer with you." (Trans. by Christopher Collard.)

[15] **Husbands . . . wives eating with them.** Plutarch advocates dining together in order to avoid the gluttony often attributed to women (e.g., Semonides [Diehl] fr. 7.6, 24, 46, 56) and not teach women to seek private pleasures. Plutarch's remark indicates that in the Hellenistic period dining together was optional. Roman couples regularly dined together (Nepos *Preface* 6–7). For the classical period see introductory essay.

[16] **When Persian kings dine, their legal wives sit beside them . . . concubines.** In the classical period, respectable Greek women did not attend symposia with their husbands and, as discussed just above, whether they even dined together in private at home is unclear. Thus the Greeks were outraged at the notion that Persian women dined with their husbands in public. Maria Brosius (*Women in Ancient Persia*, 559–331 B.C. [Oxford 1996], 94–5) points out that in this passage Plutarch, like other Greek authors, reveals an ignorance of the social status of concubines in Persia. They were not the equivalent of *hetairai* in Greece. Rather, both wives and concubines were present at feasts and banquets.

[19] **first . . . of our friends are the gods.** For the same, decidedly un-Epicurean, sentiment about the closeness of the gods see Plutarch *Live Unknown* (1103B), quoting from Xenophon *Symposium* 4.48.

**A married woman should . . . worship . . . the gods whom her husband holds dear, and these alone.** This precept marks a difference between the classical Greek view of marriage and the Hellenistic and Roman version. In classical Athens, a daughter did not renounce her father's cults. Unless they were adopted, the children of the head of the household were lifelong members of their natal family's cults. A married woman, like a new slave in the household, could be invited to participate in the cults of her husband's household gods (e.g. Xen. *Oec.* 7.8), but she was not a permanent member. See further Pomeroy, *Families in Classical and Hellenistic Greece*, 70–1.

**foreign superstitions.** See McNamara, this volume.

[20] **Plato.** The reference is to *Republic* 462C, where community of property among the Guardians is described.

**Community of resources . . . the property and the house should be called the husband's even if the wife contributes the greater part.** Inscriptional evidence does not support the notion that this ideal of merging the couple's resources, or submerging the wife's into the husband's, was put into practice completely. Van Bremen (*The Limits of Participation*, 138–9, 274–5) compares a decree of late first century B.C. Mantinea honoring a married couple for their benefactions: most of these are joint, but several are explicitly stated to have been made individually (*IG V.2.268 = Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 783). Plutarch mentions some of the same ideas that appear in the inscription. Indeed he may have looked at it, for it is a long one and doubtless was prominently displayed in the city. Compare, for example, “the wife was in harmony with him . . . They were yoked together . . . There was indivisible harmony . . . The dignified and husband-loving Epigone, herself, imitating her husband, became priestess . . .” (lines 31–41 excerpted).

**wine . . . water.** Greeks usually drank their wine mixed with water. In the mixture of wine and water, although there is more water, it is called wine; so should the household be called the man's even if the wife contributes more. Plutarch uses mixtures as a metaphor for marriage again in chapter 34. The same image appears in the Stoic Antipater of Tarsus, “On Marriage” (*peri gamou*, mid-2d cent. B.C.: Stobaeus *Flor.* 67.25 = *SVF* III.254–7, no. 63, esp. lines 15–6). Daniel Babut (*Plutarque et le stoicisme* [Paris 1969], 109 *et passim*) argues that such similarities do not prove that the Stoics were especially influential upon Plutarch's views of marriage, for there must have been many treatises on marriage available to him, and there is no direct evidence that he consulted the works of contemporary Stoics on this subject (see, however, below, on ch. 34). On the other hand, Plutarch may be harking back to a classical text. Xenophon suggested that a married couple's property be shared, and was radical in doing so (*koinon*: *Oec.* 7.30). In the classical period, however, the wife normally retained a firm bond with her family of origin (see further Pomeroy, *Families in Classical and Hellenistic Greece*, 71, 74, 82, 106–7). In the Hellenistic period the focus shifted to the married couple as a unit apart from their ascendants (see further Pomeroy, *Women in Hellenistic Egypt*, 91–2). The idea of merging property may also be borrowed from Rome where some women married *cum manu*, i.e., they became legally part of their husband's family. Compare, for example, the “*Laudatio Turiae*” = *ILS* 8393, 1.37–8: *omne tuum patrimonium acceptum ab parentibus communi diligentia conservavimus neque enim erat adquirendi tibi cura, quod totum mihi tradidisti* (“The entire patrimony that you received from your

parents we preserved with joint care; and you were not concerned to increase it, because you entrusted it all to me"). See further Susan Treggiari, *Roman Marriage: Iusti Coniuges from the Time of Cicero to the Time of Ulpian* [Oxford 1991], 365–6.

[22] **The Roman.** Lucius Aemilius Paullus Macedonicus (d. 160 B.C.), renowned for honorable behavior. For the story see Plutarch, *Aemilius Paullus* 5.

[23] **Thessalian lady . . . love potion . . . charms.** Philip II of Macedon was not only polygynous, but had several concubines as well. Philinna, a Thessalian, was the mother of Philip III Arrhidaeus (Satyrus, C. Müller, *FHG* III.161 = Athen. 13.557B–E; Ptolemaeus, son of Agesarchus, *FHG* III.67 = Athen. 13. 578A; and Justin 13.2.11). Thessaly was considered a breeding ground for female witches. Apuleius, who draws on traditional literary sources, sets his tales of witchcraft in *The Golden Ass* there. Plutarch (below [48]) describes the witchcraft of the Thessalian Aglaonice. **Olympias.** Fifth wife of Philip II and mother of Alexander the Great, she was murdered in 317. Letters purportedly exchanged between Alexander and his mother circulated in the Hellenistic period. Aulus Gellius (13.4.2) quotes one of the epistles attributed to Olympias, and praises her wisdom and prudence. Witty apothegms were attributed to her.

**Aphrodite's magic belt.** An allusion to *Iliad* 14.214–7 where Hera asks Aphrodite for her belt, pretending that she will use it to heal a marital quarrel between her parents, Cronus and Rhea, but actually to use as an aphrodisiac on her own husband, Zeus (see further Faraone, "Aphrodite's Kestros and Apples for Atalanta: Aphrodisiacs in Early Greek Myth and Ritual," 219–29). On Aphrodite's role in marriage see (138A) and [32].

[24] **marry with the eyes.** According to Phylarchus (*FGrH* 81 F 21 = Athen. 13.609C), Olympias made this warning remark to Monimus, son of Pythion, about Pantica of Cyprus who was living at her court.

[25] **Socrates.** In Diogenes Laertius (2.33) Socrates also advises young men to look at themselves in a mirror. The ugly ones should conceal their appearance through education, and the behavior of the handsome ones should conform to their appearance.

[26] **Tyrant of Sicily.** An allusion to Dionysius I (ca. 430–367 B.C.). Although there were many tyrants in Sicilian history, owing to the flamboyance and thirty-eight-year duration of his reign, Dionysius became known as the archetypal tyrant, and does not need to be named.

**Lysander's daughters.** In *Lysander* (2.4–5) Plutarch tells the same anecdote, but adds that when Dionysius showed two dresses (*stolai*) to Lysander a second time, and asked Lysander to choose one as a gift for his daughter, Lysander took both. Despite this acquisitiveness, Lysander was poor when he died (Plut. *Lysander* 30.5). How many daughters he had is not known. (On Lysander see Paul Poralla, *A Prosopography of Lacedaemonians* [2d ed. with Introduction, Addenda, and Corrigenda by A.S. Bradford, Chicago 1985], 89–91, no. 500).

**There's no adornment . . . folly.** Not assignable to any known play (Hugh Lloyd-Jones [ed.], *Sophocles: Fragments*, III [Cambridge, Mass. 1996], fr. 846).

**Crates . . . adorns . . . ordered.** Crates, Cynic philosopher (ca. 365–285 B.C.), known for his wit. Here he plays on two meanings of the word *kosmos*, "order" and "adornment." The Cynics cared nothing for material goods, the theme of chapter 26.

gold nor emerald nor scarlet. Purple dye was very expensive: thus scarlet clothing, which is also mentioned in chapter 30, like gold and emeralds, is indicative of great wealth.

[27] **Hera, as goddess of marriage.** Hera was the chief goddess of marriage. In Boeotia she was worshipped as a bride (Pausanias 9.2.1) and referred to in Latin by the epithet "Cinxia," referring to the loosening of the bride's belt (Arnobius *Adversus Nationes* 6.11). Plutarch (*On the Festival of Images at Plataea* = fr. 157) discusses the myths and rites of Hera as goddess of marriage and also notes that the gallbladder is omitted from the sacrifice (fr. 157.2). See, further, above [2]; Schachter, *Cults of Boiotia*, I.245–51; and on sacrifices to Hera, see Farnell, *The Cults of the Greek States*, I.195–8.

[28] **Xenocrates.** A pupil of Plato who was head of the Academy, 339–314 B.C. According to Diogenes Laertius (4.6), Xenocrates was sluggish, and Plato compared him to an ass. Because Xenocrates also appeared dignified and severe, Plato advised him to sacrifice to the Graces.

**woman . . . should not neglect cleanliness.** That some women were dirty is a misogynistic notion traceable back to Semonides (fr. 7.5–6 West). The good wife is like a bee and keeps her house clean (see below on ch. 44). If there is some truth in the charge of uncleanness it may be that because women did not frequent gymnasia, they did not enjoy a routine daily bath. In Xenophon, *Oeconomicus* (10.12), a husband declares that he prefers to have intercourse with his wife, rather than with a slave, among other reasons because his wife is *katharotera* ("cleaner," or "without blemish").

**Metrodorus.** Student and friend of Epicurus, born in Lampsacus (331/330–278/277 B.C.; fr. 36 [Körte]). Perhaps his wife, the *hetaira* Leontion, made him aware of the desirability of good grooming in a woman.

[29] **Antipater.** Macedonian general (397–319 B.C.), close to Philip II. He was instrumental in forging peace between Macedonia and Athens.

**Phocion.** Athenian general and statesman of high repute. Determined to make peace with the Macedonians, he served as envoy to Antipater, and was a member of the oligarchic government the Macedonians established in Athens. The restored democracy condemned him to death (318 B.C.). As a traitor he could not be buried in Athens, but around 306 his bones were returned to Athens and honored with a burial and statue at state expense (Plut. *Phocion* 38). Phocion's retort to Antipater is also found in Plutarch, *Friends and Flatterers* 64C, *Savings of Kings and Commanders* 188F, *Bashfulness* 533A, *Phocion* 30.1, *Agis* 2.2.

[31] **Theano.** The wife of Pythagoras. According to Diogenes Laertius (8.42) she may not have been his wife, but a pupil. Several authors of Neopythagorean treatises in the Hellenistic period are named for her. These texts deal with the proper behavior of women and recommend modest clothing, avoidance of adultery, control of one's passions, and tolerance of a husband's faults. Attention is paid to living a harmonious life. Theano enjoyed a reputation for wisdom (see [48]). Many apophthegms and seven apocryphal letters are also attributed to her (the latter are published in R. Hercher, *Epistolographi Graeci* [Paris 1873], 603–7, IV–X = Holger Thesleff, *The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period* [Åbo 1965], 195–200; see further Pomeroy, *Women in Hellenistic Egypt*, 64–71). In the Hellenistic period the

distinction between Platonism and Pythagoreanism was not strict and there were mutual borrowings (see introductory essay and John Whittaker, "Platonic Philosophy in the Early Centuries of the Empire," *ANRW* 2.36.1 [Berlin 1987], 81–123, esp. 117–21). The link is shown, *inter alia*, by the fact that some Neopythagorean treatises are attributed to women named Perictione, the name of Plato's mother. Nevertheless Plutarch refers to several members of his circle as Pythagoreans (see further Jackson P. Hershbell, "Plutarch's Pythagorean Friends," *CB* 69 [1984], 73–9).

[32] **Phidias . . . Aphrodite . . . Elis.** Phidias (born ca. 490 B.C.), an Athenian, was one of the greatest classical sculptors. Pausanias (6.25.1) states that this statue of Aphrodite, made of gold and ivory, was called Urania ("Heavenly"). Since Aphrodite was born from the foam of the sea, the *chelone* is probably a sea turtle, not a tortoise. In a neighboring precinct stood Scopas's bronze image of Aphrodite Pandemos ("Vulgar"), shown standing on a billygoat. The former was a goddess of marriage, the latter a favorite of prostitutes (see introductory essay and [138]).

**Speak only to . . . or through her husband.** Here and in *Isis and Osiris* (381E–F) Plutarch gives the conventional view when he declares that for unmarried girls surveillance is required and for married women staying at home and silence are suitable. He refers to Xenophon (*Oec.* 7.5–6, see also 3.13) when he states in *Why Are Delphic Oracles No Longer Given in Verse?* (405C) that, like the bride in Xenophon, a girl who is chosen as Pythia should have seen and heard as little as possible. (On the seclusion of women see Pomeroy, *Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves*, 79–84, 111, 131.)

[34] **Separate units . . . units connected together . . . and those which have a natural unity.** This passage is similar to one Plutarch attributes to the Stoic Chrysippus (426A = *SVF* II.367).

**The Roman lawgiver.** Ulpian (*Digest* 24.1–2) quotes Antoninus Pius (A.D. 86–161), "our ancestors judged honorable love only by feeling, and they also considered the reputation of the parties," so that harmony should not be understood to have been attained by a mercenary contract (see further Treggiari, *Roman Marriage*, 366–7).

[37] **Cyrus's Greek troops.** A sensible woman should keep quiet when her angry husband shouts; she should soothe him by chatting when he is silent. Husband and wife are compared with armies on a battlefield! Plutarch may be alluding imprecisely to the battle of Cunaxa waged in 401 B.C. between Cyrus the younger, pretender to the Persian throne, and his brother, king Artaxerxes II. In Xenophon, *Anabasis* (1.7.4, 1.8.11, 18), Cyrus addressed his Greek mercenaries before the battle and predicted that their barbarian opponents would advance shouting loudly. He proved to be wrong, for they proceeded in silence. The Greeks, however, raised the war cry and some banged their shields against their spears to terrify the enemies' horses.

[38] **Euripides.** *Medea* 190–200: "You would not be wrong if you said that mortals of the past were unclear and not very wise when they invented hymns for festivities, banquets, and feasts, as pleasurable sounds of life. Yet no mortal has discovered how to put an end to grief with music and songs of many notes . . . And yet it would be a boon if mortals could heal with song."

**I'll end this endless quarrel . . . to bed.** *Iliad* 14.205, 209.

[40] **Hermione.** Hermione, daughter of Helen and Menelaus, was married to Neoptolemus. According to Euripides, *Andromache*, Neoptolemus was excessively fond of Andromache, whom he had brought from Troy as his slave and who had borne him a son. Hermione, childless, was consumed by jealousy that she claimed was reinforced by women's gossip.

"Visits of evil women." From Euripides *Andromache* 930, cited also more briefly in *Consolation* chapter 7.

[42] **three Sacred Plowings . . . sowing and plowing in marriage for the procreation of children.** The sexual connotations of the plowing metaphor are obvious. Thus, e.g., Creon (Soph. *Antigone* 569) crudely observes that his son "will have other furrows for his plow." Plutarch (*Solon* 20.3) advises husbands to have intercourse with their wives three times a month. Three plowings were traditional in the Greek agricultural calendar, though the practice was not always followed. For the thrice-plowed field see Homer *Iliad* 18.542, *Odyssey* 5.127, and Varro RR 1.27 (see further Pomeroy, *Xenophon Oeconomicus*, 324–6, and Hamish A. Forbes, "The 'Thrice-Ploughed Field': Cultivation Techniques in Ancient and Modern Greece," *Expedition* 19.1 [1976], 5–11).

**Sophocles.** Not assignable to any known play (fr. 847 Lloyd-Jones).

**husband and wife . . . not sowing . . . crop.** Earlier in this paragraph Plutarch used the plowing metaphor, which is usually connected with the idea that only the male produces seed, while the female, like Mother Earth, is a fertile field in which the father's seed is nourished (e.g., Aesch. *Eumenides* 657–61 and see Pomeroy, *Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves*, 65, 99). Nevertheless, Plutarch seems to refer here to the alternative theory of reproduction found in the Hippocratic corpus according to which both parents were thought to contribute sperm to the embryo (*On Generation* 6–11, etc.; for additional references see Iain M. Lonie, *The Hippocratic Treatises "On Generation," "On the Nature of the Child," "Diseases IV": A Commentary* [Berlin 1981], 119–46). The dual-sperm theory is less demeaning of women.

[43] **Gorgias.** A famous sophist and teacher of rhetoric, known for his rich, ornamental style (483–376 B.C.). In Plato *Gorgias* (459E, 460C–461A), Socrates forces Gorgias to agree that a rhetorician must be a just man and never do wrong. The theme of the philosopher whose private life and erotic indulgences do not measure up to his expressed philosophy is a common one in Greek biography: see, e.g., Socrates and Xanthippe,<sup>29</sup> Aristotle and Phyllis,<sup>30</sup> Demetrius of Phaleron and his minions and mistresses,<sup>31</sup> and the elder Cato who took a young wife when he was about eighty (Plut. *Cato the Elder* 24, 27.5, *Comp. Arist. and Cato* 6, etc.).

**Melanthius.** Chronological factors indicate that this Melanthius was the Athenian tragic poet, a grandson of Aeschylus's sister. Comic poets pilloried his gluttony,

<sup>29</sup> Xen. *Symp.* 2.9–10, and see further Pomeroy, *Xenophon Oeconomicus*, 81–2.

<sup>30</sup> For the origin of this fiction see Marianne Cline Horowitz, "Aristotle and Women," *Journal of the History of Biology* 9 (1976), 183–213, esp. 189–91.

<sup>31</sup> W.S. Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens* (London 1911, repr. Chicago 1974), 40–1; F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristotle, IV: Demetrios von Phaleron*, 2d ed. (Basel 1968), fr. 34 = Athen. 12.542B–C, fr. 37 = Athen. 13.593F.

effeminacy, and other traits (Athenaeus 8.343C, Aristoph. *Peace* 804, 1009, 1012, *Birds* 151, etc.).

**the maid.** Most certainly a slave. The diminutive in the Greek word (*therapainidion*) used for the second mention of this woman suggests that she was young.

**Wives' sins . . . against wives.** Plutarch abruptly changes the focus from the man's failure to control his household to jealousy in the household between women. The latter situation is one that the husband should control and could easily control by altering his own behavior.

[44] **bees . . . become angry . . . towards those who have just had sexual relations with a woman.** The bee was famous for purity (see Introduction). Pliny (NH 11.16.46) notes that no one has ever observed the coitus of bees. Aelian (NA 5.11) remarks on this creature's *sôphrosynê* (on this concept see [9]). According to Semonides (fr. 7.90–2 West), the wife who is like a bee keeps the house clean and is so uninterested in sex that she does not even like to sit and listen to other women when they gossip about it. Various priestesses were called *Melissai* (LSJ s.v. "melissa"). Married women who participated in the Thesmophoria were also referred to by this term (Apollodorus of Athens, *FGH* 244 F 89). Bees were said to be censorious about human beings. Plutarch (*Natural Phenomena* 36 [Loeb] 11, pp. 218–9) also cites incidents of bees stinging adulterous or perfidious lovers in Theocritus 1.105 and in Pindar fr. 252 (Snell). According to the *Geoponica* (15.2.19), bees hate men who reek of wine and myrrh and attack women who have had sexual intercourse. Columella (RR 9.14.3) advises the man who intends to handle bees to abstain from sexual relations for a day. (On analogies between human beings and bees see introductory essay and [2]; S. J. Harrison, "Bee Imagery in Plutarch," *CQ* 41 [1991], 560–3; and Pomeroy, *Xenophon Oeconomicus*, 276–80).

[47] **Plato . . . old men . . . young.** Plato *Laws* 729B.

[48] **Timoxena . . . Aristylla.** We infer that Timoxena was the name of Plutarch's wife. Her treatise on love of ornament has not survived. Like most other learned women of the Hellenistic period, she probably wrote only one work. If this modest rate of publication is not simply an artifact of the vagaries of transmission, the reason may be that such women had time to write only one work before their literary creativity was curtailed by the demands of motherhood and wifedom. Discussion of women's adornment was a common theme in the Neopythagorean treatises written by female authors (see further Pomeroy, *Women in Hellenistic Egypt*, 61–72). Timoxena was also the name of Plutarch's daughter, and she was named after her mother (*Consolation* ch. 9). The identity of Aristylla is not known.

**a woman who understands mathematics will be ashamed to dance.** The choreography of dancing is expressed in geometrical patterns. Plutarch, like Plato (e.g. *Rep.* 524D–530C, *Laws* 817E, etc.), here draws attention to the ethical influence of mathematical study.

**Xenophon.** Athenian historian and philosopher. He is coupled here with Plato because he too was a disciple of Socrates and wrote Socratic dialogues. See introductory essay.

**mathematics.** Mathematics was an essential part of Pythagorean and Platonic philosophy, and women involved with these philosophical groups in their

Hellenistic reincarnations were clearly expected to be familiar with this subject. Theano, a Neopythagorean, wrote about the theory of numbers (see further Pomeroy, *Women in Hellenistic Egypt*, 67).

**astronomy.** The first Greek woman who wrote about astronomy apparently was Diophila, who worked, at the earliest, in the late fourth or early third century. According to Rudolf Pfeiffer, Callimachus consulted her poem when he was writing the *Aetia*.<sup>32</sup>

**Aglaonice . . . Thessalian.** On Thessalian witches see [23]. Plutarch expresses the same thought, citing Aglaonice as well in *Oracles in Decline* 417A.

**“father” . . . “lady mother” . . . “brother.”** From Homer, *Iliad* 6.429.

**No woman can make a child without the part played by a man; the shapeless, fleshy masses formed in the womb . . . are called “moles.”** Plutarch alludes to fibroid tumors, especially common among women who have not borne children. Soranus, *Gynecology* 3.36, discusses the *myle* or *mylos*. See further Soranus *Gynecology*, trans. O. Temkin (Baltimore 1956), 158–9.

**Theano.** See [10] and [31]. Plutarch gives this list of seven paradigmatic female sages in no perceptible order: four Greeks, two Romans. He ends with Sappho, the earliest and most famous of all the women named. The list demonstrates clearly the catholic range of intellectual interests and knowledge that Plutarch assumes in his readers.

**Cleobulina.** Flourished ca. 570 B.C., daughter of Cleobulus, one of the Seven Sages. She was renowned for writing riddles in hexameter. Her riddles, much quoted and praised by Aristotle and later authors, assured her immortality (see further Ménage, *The History of Women Philosophers*, 5–6).

**Gorgo the wife of Leonidas.** Born ca. 506 B.C., daughter of the Spartan king Cleomenes. She was author of wise statements made to her father and to non-Spartan men and women in Herodotus (5.48, 51; 7.205, 239; 9.10) and Plutarch (*Lycurgus* 14.4, *Spartan Sayings* = *Mor.* 225A2, 227E13, *Sayings of Spartan Women* = *Mor.* 240D–E). On Gorgo see Poralla, *A Prosopography of Lacedaemonians*, S, no. 190. Gorgo is the earliest Spartan woman to whom Plutarch attributes quotations in *Sayings of Spartan Women*.

**Timoclea the sister of Theagenes.** A local Boeotian heroine who distinguished herself when Alexander destroyed her city Thebes. Her brother commanded the Greek forces and died at Chaeronea (Plut. *Alexander* 12). In fame and accomplishments she is certainly not on a par with the other women on the list. Her inclusion is a result of Plutarch's Boeotian patriotism.

**Claudia.** Of the many famous female members of the family of the Claudii, the best candidate for Plutarch's list seems to be Claudia Quinta. In 204 B.C., during the second Punic War, she proved that she was chaste by miraculously moving a ship bearing an image of the Magna Mater. Her statue stood in the goddess's temple (Livy 29.14.12; Ovid *Fasti* 4.291–344; Suet. *Tib.* 2.3; Tacitus *Annals* 4.64; Valerius Maximus 1.8.11).

<sup>32</sup> R. Pfeiffer, *Callimachus* (2 vols., Oxford 1949, 1953), I.118–9, II.115–6.

**Cornelia.** Cornelia (180?–105? B.C.), daughter of Scipio Africanus, wife of Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus. She was famous for her cultivation, her interest in Greek philosophy, her modest attire, and the personal interest she took in her children's education. Her letters circulated after her death. Cicero praised them (*Brutus* 211; see further Plut. *Tiberius* 1.4 and *Gaius Gracchus* 4.19; Appian *Civil Wars* 1.20; Pliny *NH* 34.31; etc.).

**Sappho . . . “When you are dead . . .”** Fr. 55 (Lobel and Page). Sappho (b. ca. 612 B.C.) was the earliest Greek female poet whose works are extant. She foresaw that she would achieve immortality through her poetry. In some ways she may serve as a model for Eurydice: a biographical interpretation of her poetry indicates that she continued to write while she was a married woman. Her poetry was quite popular in Plutarch's day and was sung at dinner parties (*Table Talk* 622C, 711D).



## A Consolation to His Wife

*Plutarch to his wife, greetings*

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[1] The messenger you sent to tell me of the child's death must have missed me on his way to Athens; I only heard of it from my niece when I got to Tanagra. I imagine the funeral is now over, and hope it has been done in the way that will make for least pain for you both now and in the future. If there is anything you wished to do but refrained from doing, waiting for my decision, but which you think will make things easier to bear, pray do it, without extravagance or superstition, for which I know you have no inclination.

[2] Only, my dear wife, at this sad moment, keep yourself, and me, calm. I know I can get the measure of what has happened; but if I see you grieving to excess, that will hurt me more than the loss. But I am no "child of oak or rock": you know that, you have shared with me the upbringing of all our children, all reared at home by ourselves, and you know that this child was beloved by me above all, because she was the daughter you wanted after four sons and she gave me the opportunity to give her your name. There is a special savor in our affection for children of that age; it lies in the purity of the pleasure they give, the freedom from any crossness or complaint. She herself too had great natural goodness and gentleness of temper: her response to affection and her generosity both gave pleasure and enabled us to perceive the human kindness in her nature. She would ask her nurse to feed not only other babies but the objects and toys that she liked playing with, and would generously invite them, as it were, to her table, offering the good things she had and sharing her greatest pleasures with those who delighted her.

[3] But I cannot see, my dear wife, why this and other such things should have given us pleasure while she was alive but are now to pain and trouble us when they cross our minds. On the other hand, I am also afraid of throwing out the memory with the grief, as Clymene in Euripides, who says

I hate the crooked bow of cornel wood,  
and wish all sports away!

because she is frightened of remembering her son, her grief being inseparable from his memory. But our daughter was the sweetest thing to fondle, to watch, and to hear; and we ought to let the thought of her also dwell in our minds and lives, for there is much more joy in it than sorrow—if, that is, we can expect benefit ourselves in time of need from the consolation we have often given others, and are not to lie down under it, repaying all these pleasures with grief many times as great.

609 [4] Those who were with you tell me, with admiration, that you did not put on mourning, or allow yourself and the servants to disfigure yourselves; nor were there any ostentatious or lavish funeral preparations: everything was done decently and silently, and in the presence of close friends. It did not surprise me that you, who have never tricked yourself out for theaters or processions and have always believed that expense was useless in pleasures, should also have maintained the same simplicity and modesty in time of sorrow. It is not only “in Bacchic revels” that a good woman should avoid corruption; she should also realize that the distress and emotional disturbance of mourning stands in need of control, not in order to resist feelings of affection (as is often thought), but to resist license. We freely indulge our affection in desiring, honoring, and remembering the dead; but the insatiable craving for lamentation that leads to wailing and beating the breast is no less disgraceful than incontinence in pleasure, but is excused, apparently, by the fact that the disgrace is attended not by joy but by pain and bitterness. What is more irrational than to eliminate excesses in laughter and rejoicing, but open the floodgates of tears and lamentation, which all come from the same source? Or for men to resist women in matters of perfumes and purples, but allow mourning hairstyles, black-dyed clothing, and sitting or lying in unseemly or uncomfortable vigils? Or (worst of all) to oppose and obstruct them if they punish maidservants excessively or unjustly but freely let them punish themselves brutally and cruelly in sadness and misfortune that calls rather for comfort and kindness?

[5] You and I, my dear wife, have never needed that first conflict, nor, I believe, shall we need the other. Every philosopher who has been in our company has been amazed by the simplicity of your person and the unpretentiousness of your life. Every citizen in our temples, at our sacrifices, in our theaters, finds your simplicity a sight to behold. You have already displayed your stability in situations like the present at the loss of your eldest child, and again when our beautiful Chaeron left us. I remember that some stranger had traveled up from the sea with me when the news of the child's death arrived, and entered our house with the others. When they saw such complete peace and quiet, as they subsequently told others too, they could not believe anything dreadful had happened, and thought the report must have been false; so soberly had you ordered the household at a time which gave so much license for disorder. Yet you had nursed Chaeron at your own breast, and endured surgery when your nipple was bruised. This indeed was noble and loving.

[6] Most mothers, though, take their children in their arms like toys when they have been cleaned and made pretty by others, and then, if they die, dissolve into vain, ungrateful grief, not out of affection (which is a good and reasoned thing) but because a large admixture of vanity in a small quantity of natural emotion makes the act of grieving wild, insane, and difficult to sedate. Aesop seems to have been well

aware of this. He says that when Zeus was distributing honors among the gods, Grief came and asked for his. Zeus granted the request, but only among men who chose and wished to honor Grief. And this is what happens in the early stages: everyone invites Grief in. But when he is established, and become a member of the family, he does not go away, however much they wish it. One should resist him at the door and not abandon the fort through mourning clothes or hairstyle or anything like that: these things, encountered daily and causing embarrassment as they do, produce a mean, narrow, timid frame of mind that sees no way out and finds no appeasement; surrounded and occupied with all this, because of Grief, the mind knows no laughter, no light, no kindly table. Neglect of the body follows, and distaste for unguents and baths and the other routines of life. What should happen is quite the contrary: the soul should be helped in her trouble by the strengthening body. The sharp edge of the pain is dulled, and its tightness loosened, dissipated by the body's calm like the waves in fair weather; whereas, if squalidness and unkemptness result from a mean style of life, and the body cannot send up to the mind any message of comfort or goodness but only the bitter and unpleasant exhalation, as it were, of pain and sorrow, it is not easy to recover, even if you wish to. Such are the consequences of this kind of ill treatment of the mind.

[7] The most fearful danger of all, however, is one that I shall not fear in you: the "entrance of bad women," the cries and wailing with which they polish and sharpen the edge of pain and never let others reduce it, nor allow it to fade away on its own. I know the fight you fought lately to help Theon's sister, confronting the women who visited her with their howling and shrieking, truly "heaping fire on fire." When people see their friends' houses burning, they try to put the fire out with what speed and means they have; but when minds are ablaze, they bring fresh fuel to the flames. If a man has ophthalmia, they do not let all and sundry put their hands on him, nobody touches the inflamed eye; but a mourner sits there exposed to every passer-by to excite his flux and exacerbate his illness, which a little tickling and disturbance will scratch open into a horrible disfigurement.

[8] I know you will guard against this. Try, however, to take yourself away in thought to the time before we had this child, when we had no complaint against the future: compare the present time with that, for our circumstances are once again the same. If we treat the time before she was born as one of which we have less cause to complain, we shall appear to regret her birth. The intervening two years are indeed not to be expunged from the memory, but counted as pleasure because of the charm and enjoyment they gave us; we should not treat a small blessing as a great evil, nor be ungrateful for what is given because fortune did not add thereto what we hoped for. Fair words about the gods and uncomplaining serenity towards fortune always bear a good, sweet harvest. And in circumstances like these, he who most draws on the good things in his memory, and turns his thoughts to the bright and shining path of his life and away from darkness and troubles, either extinguishes his pain altogether or makes it dim and faint by the admixture of its opposite. Perfume always pleases the sense of smell, but it also has a medicinal value against bad smells; and similarly the thought of good things in bad times actually serves as a necessary aid to those who do not avoid the memory of good things or find fault with fortune for

611 everything and in every way. It would be wrong for us to bring a false charge against our life, if it is like a book with a single erasure but is otherwise perfectly clean and without blemish.

[9] You have often been told that happiness depends on right thinking, which results in a stable frame of mind, and that the vicissitudes of fortune do not mean a great decline or any catastrophic landslide in one's life. But if we too, like common folk, must needs be guided by external circumstances, count the strokes of fortune and make ordinary people the judges of our happiness; do not heed the present tears and lamentations of your visitors—they come from a bad custom and everyone encounters them—but think instead how much you are envied by these same women for your children, your household, and your way of life. It is absurd that others should be willing to prefer your fortune, even including the present bereavement, which so distresses us, while you, who really have it, grumble and complain, and cannot perceive in the very sharpness of your pain what delight there is in what is left to us. It would be absurd to behave like those who pick out the “headless” or “short-tailed” lines in Homer while paying no heed to all his marvelous poems, and count up maliciously and pedantically all the bad things in life while only forming an inarticulate, confused impression of the good. That is what misers do, who accumulate and then make no use of their accumulations but cry and moan when they are all lost. If you feel pity for her, because she died unmarried and childless, you can make yourself easier once again by reflecting that you have had a full share of these things: they are not the sort of blessings that are important to those who are deprived of them but trivial to those who do have them. She has come to painlessness; she does not need to cause us pain. What ill have we from her, if she now knows no pain? Deprivation even of great blessings loses its painfulness when the need is there no more. Your Timoxena is deprived of little things, for little things are all she knew and all she took delight in. How can she be said to be deprived of things her senses and her mind never conceived?

[10] You hear others say—many are convinced by them—that there is no evil or pain anywhere for the one who “suffered dissolution.” But I know that the traditional doctrines and the mystic tokens of the rites of Dionysus, known to us who share them, prevent you from believing this. You should think of the soul as immortal, and as like a captive bird. If it is reared a long time in the body and domesticated in this life by all its affairs and by long habit, then it comes back again into the world and does not cease from its involvement in passions and accidents in its successive births. Do not imagine that old age is abused and reviled for its wrinkles and gray hair and physical weakness; the worst of it is that it makes the soul stale in its recollection of the world beyond and anxious to hold on to this world, and so cramps and oppresses it, so that it retains the form that it was given in the body when it shared its fortunes. But a soul which <does not stay here long> in captivity leaps up towards its natural home . . . If you put out a fire and then rekindle it at once, it is soon fanned to flame and quickly takes hold . . . <And so those souls fare best whose fortune it is> “soonest to pass the gate of Hades’ house,” before they have acquired a deep love of this world and are drugged, as it were, into a state of softness and fusion with the body.

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[11] The truth about these things is made even clearer by our ancient, traditional laws and customs. People do not pour libations over dead infants, nor do they perform any other of the normal rites of the dead for them. Infants have no part in earth or earthly things. Nor do people tarry at the burial or the tomb or the wake, or sit a long time beside the body. The law forbids this in the case of small children, holding it wrong <to show grief thus> towards those who have passed to a better and holier land and lot. But as disbelief is harder than belief in these things, let us fulfill our outward observances as the law directs, but keep our inner health even more pure and undefiled and chaste.



ΠΑΡΑΜΥΘΗΤΙΚΟΣ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΗΝ  
ΓΥΝΑΙΚΑ  
(Plan. 23)

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Πλούταρχος τῇ γυναικὶ εὖ πράττειν.

5

1. Ὅν ἐπεμψας ἀπαγγελοῦντα περὶ τῆς τοῦ παιδίου Β τελευτῆς, ἔοικε διημαρτηκέναι καθ' ὁδὸν εἰς Ἀθήνας πο-  
ρευόμενος· ἐγὼ δ' εἰς Τάναγραν ἐλθὼν ἐπνυθόμην παρὰ τῆς  
θυγατριδῆς. τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν ταφὴν ἤδη νομίζω γεγο-  
νέναι, γεγονότα δ' ἐχέτω ὥς σοι μέλλει καὶ νῦν ἀλυπότατα 10  
καὶ πρὸς τὸ λοιπὸν ἔξειν. εἰ δέ τι βουλομένη μὴ πεποιήκας  
ἀλλὰ μένεις τὴν ἐμὴν γνώμην, οἷε δὲ κουφότερον οἴσιν  
γενομένου, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔσται δίχα πάσης περιεργίας καὶ  
δεισιδαιμονίας, ὧν ἥκιστά σοι μέτεστι.

2. Μόνον, ὦ γύναι, τήρει καὶ τῷ πάθει καὶ σεαυτὴν 15  
ἐπὶ τοῦ καθεστῶτος. ἐγὼ γὰρ αὐτὸς μὲν οἶδα καὶ ὀρίζω τὸ C  
συμβεβηκὸς ἡλικίον ἐστίν· ἂν δέ σε τῷ δυσφορεῖν ὑπερ-  
βάλλουσιν εὖρω, τοῦτό μοι μάλλον ἐνοχλήσει τοῦ γεγο-  
νότος. καίτοι οὐδ' αὐτός ἀπὸ δρυὸς οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης·  
ἐγενόμην· οἶσθα δὲ καὶ αὐτὴ τοσοῦτων μοι τέκνων ἀνα- 20  
τροφῆς κοινωνήσασα, πάντων ἐκτεθραμμένων οἴκοι δι'  
αὐτῶν ἡμῶν, τοῦτο δέ, ὅτι καὶ σοὶ ποθοῦσῃ θυγάτηρ

Cat. Lampr. 112. Codd.: C (pars altera, explicit 535, 10 ἢ  
πα) vαAE. Π = αAE, Π<sup>1</sup> = αA<sup>1</sup>. Raro affertur n.

2 Tit. sec. Cat. Lampr. παρ εἰς τ. γ. τὴν αὐτοῦ διὰ τὴν τοῦ  
παιδὸς τελευτήν C παρ. πρ. τ. γ. τὴν αὐτοῦ v παρ. πρ. τ. ἰδίαν  
γ. Π 6 ἀπ. τὰ π. C<sup>1</sup> 8 παρὰ] περὶ vΠ 9 θυγατριδοῦς C<sup>1</sup>  
10 ἐχέτω om. C<sup>1</sup> μέλει E 13 ἔστι C<sup>1</sup> ἔστω A<sup>2</sup> 16 καθ.]  
γεγονότος C<sup>1</sup> αὐτὸ 12 corr. Re. 20 τέκ.] παῖδων C<sup>1</sup> 21 κοιν.  
C<sup>1</sup> κοινωνοῦσα O 22 ἢ. αὐ. C (AE, sed corr.<sup>1</sup>) τούτοις C<sup>1</sup>  
ταύτῃ O corr. Mez. (τούτων Bern. lectiones C<sup>1</sup> defendens)

μετὰ τέσσαρας νιούς ἐγεννήθη καὶ μοι τὸ σὸν ὄνομα θέσθαι  
 παρέσχε· ἀφορμὴν, [οἶδα] ἀγαπητὸν διαφερόντως γε-  
 νόμενον. πρόσσεσι δὲ καὶ δριμύτης ἰδία τις τῷ πρὸς τὰ  
 τηλικαῦτα φιλοστόργῳ τὸ εὐφραΐνον αὐτῶν καθαρὸν τε  
 5 ὃν ἀτεχνῶς καὶ πάσης ἀμιγῆς ὀργῆς καὶ μέμφεως. αὕτη  
 D δὲ καὶ φύσει θανμαστὴν ἔσχε· εὐκολίαν καὶ πραότητα,  
 καὶ τὸ ἀντιφιλοῦν καὶ χαριζόμενον αὐτῆς ἡδονὴν ἅμα καὶ  
 κατανόησιν τοῦ φιλανθρώπου παρείχεν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον  
 βρέφεσιν ἄλλοις ἀλλὰ καὶ σκεύεσιν, οἷς ἐτέρπετο, καὶ παι-  
 10 γνίοις ἐκέλευε τὴν τίτθην διδόναι [καὶ προσφέρειν τὸν μα-  
 στὸν] καὶ προσεκαλεῖτο καθάπερ πρὸς τράπεζαν ἰδίαν  
 ὑπὸ φιλανθρωπίας, μεταδιδούσα τῶν καλῶν ὧν εἶχε καὶ  
 τὰ ἥδιστα κοινουμένη τοῖς εὐφραίνουσιν αὐτήν.

3. Ἄλλ' οὐχ ὁρῶ, γύναι, διὰ τί ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα  
 15 ζώσης μὲν ἕτερπεν ἡμᾶς νυνὶ δ' ἀνιάσει καὶ συνταράξει  
 λαμβάνοντας ἐπίνοιαν αὐτῶν. ἀλλὰ καὶ δέδια πάλιν, μὴ  
 E συνεκβάλωμεν τῷ λυποῦντι τὴν μνήμην, ὥσπερ ἡ Κλυ-  
 μένη λέγουσα (Eur. fr. 785) 'μισῶ δ' ἀγκύλον τόξον  
 κρανείας, γυμνάσιά τ' οἴχοιτ' ἀεὶ' φεύγουσα καὶ τρέ-  
 20 μουσα τὴν ὑπόμνησιν τοῦ παιδός, ὅτι συμπαροῦσαν  
 λύπην εἶχε· πᾶν γὰρ ἡ φύσις φεύγει τὸ δυσχεραίνόμε-  
 νον. δεῖ δέ, ὥσπερ αὐτὴ πάντων ἥδιστον ἡμῖν ἄσπασμα  
 καὶ θέαμα καὶ ἄκουσμα παρείχεν ἑαυτήν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν

2 παρ. ἀφ. οἱ. ἀγ.] ποιούμενον (ποθ. Bern.) ἐν αὐτῇ (ἐαυτῇ  
 Bern.) παρ. ἀγαπητοῦ C<sup>1</sup> del. Wil. μοι post διαφ. C  
 γενομένου C<sup>1</sup> 3 τις om. C<sup>1</sup> 4 φιλ. καὶ τὸ C αὐτὸν C<sup>1</sup>  
 αὐτῆς O corr. Stegm. 4/5 κ. τε ὃν ἀ.] κ. ἐστὶ C<sup>1</sup>  
 6 εὐκ. C<sup>1</sup> ἀσכולίαν O 7 ἔμα] ἀλλὰ C<sup>1</sup> 10 ἐκέλ. C om. O  
 del. Ha. (sane τίτθην nullo alio loco apud Plut. idem valere  
 atque μαστὸν monet Po.) 11 καὶ πρ. C προσεκαλεῖτο O  
 12 μ. τ. κ. ὧν] ὥσπερ (ὧνπερ Bern.) ἐγίνωσκε καὶ C<sup>1</sup> καὶ  
 post εἶχε om. C<sup>1</sup> 16 καὶ C om. O τοῦμπάλιν Po.  
 18 μισῶ δ' εὐάγκαλον Ω corr. Salm. 19 κρανείας C  
 τ' Keil δ' Ω οἴχοιτο O οἴχετ' C<sup>1</sup> οἴχοιτο Emp. ἀεὶ in edd.  
 cum inseqq. coniunctum distinctit Wil. 21 λύπ. Emp. αὐτὴν Ω  
 22 δέ] γὰρ C 23 παρέχειν C<sup>1</sup>

ἐπίνοιαν αὐτῆς ἐνδιαιτᾶσθαι καὶ συμβιοῦν ἡμῶν πλέον  
 ἔχουσαν μᾶλλον δὲ πολλαπλάσιον τὸ εὐφραῖνον ἢ τὸ F  
 λυποῦν· εἴπερ ἄρα τι τῶν λόγων, οὐδὲ πολλάκις εἰρή-  
 καμεν πρὸς ἐτέρονς, εἰκὸς ἐστι καὶ ἡμῶν ὄφελος ἐν καιρῷ  
 γενέσθαι, καὶ μὴ καθῆσθαι μηδ' ἐγκεκλειῆσθαι πολλὰ- 5  
 πλασίας ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ἐκείναις λύπας ἀνταποδιδόντας.

4. Καὶ τοῦτο λέγουσιν οἱ παραγενόμενοι καὶ θαυμά-  
 ζουσιν, ὥς οὐδ' ἱμάτιον ἀνείληφας πένθιμον οὐδὲ σαντῇ  
 τινα προσήγαγες ἢ θεραπαινίσιν ἀμορφίαν καὶ αἰκίαν,  
 οὐδ' ἦν παρασκευὴ πολυτελείας πανηγυρικῆς περὶ τὴν 10  
 ταφήν, ἀλλ' ἐπράττετο κοσμίως πάντα καὶ σιωπῇ μετὰ  
 τῶν ἀναγκαίων. | ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἐθαύμαζον, εἰ 609  
 μηδέποτε καλλωπισαμένη περὶ θέατρον ἢ πομπὴν ἀλλὰ  
 καὶ πρὸς ἡδονὰς ἄχρηστον ἡγήσαμένη τὴν πολυτέλειαν  
 ἐν τοῖς σκυθρωποῖς διεφύλαξας τὸ ἀφελὲς καὶ λιτόν· οὐ γάρ 15  
 'ἐν βακχεύμασι (Eur. Bacch. 317)' δεῖ μόνον τὴν σώ-  
 φρονα μένειν ἀδιάφθορον, ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ἤττον οἷσθαι τὸν  
 ἐν πένθει σάλον καὶ τὸ κίνημα τοῦ πάθους ἐγκρατείας  
 δεῖσθαι διαμαχομένης οὐ πρὸς τὸ φιλόστοργον, ὥς οἱ  
 πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἀκόλαστον τῆς ψυχῆς. τῷ 20  
 μὲν γὰρ φιλοστόργῳ χαριζόμεθα τὸ ποθεῖν καὶ τὸ τιμᾶν  
 καὶ τὸ μεμνήσθαι τῶν ἀπογενομένων, ἡ δὲ θρήνων ἀπλη- B  
 στος ἐπιθυμία καὶ πρὸς ὀλοφύρσεις ἐξάγουσα καὶ κοπε-  
 τοὺς αἰσχροὺς μὲν οὐχ ἤττον τῆς περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀκρασίας,  
 λόγῳ δὲ συγγνώμης ἔτυχεν, ὅτι τὸ λυπηρὸν αὐτῆς καὶ 25  
 πικρὸν ἀντὶ τοῦ τερπνοῦ τῷ αἰσχυρῷ πρόσεστι. τί γὰρ  
 ἀλογώτερον ἢ τὸ γέλωτος μὲν ὑπερβολὰς καὶ περιχαρείας

4 πρ. τοὺς ἐταίρους C<sup>1</sup> 5 ἐγκ. C<sup>1</sup> ἐγκαλειῆσθαι O πολλα-  
 πλασίαις C<sup>1</sup> 6 ἀντιδιδόντας C<sup>1</sup> 7 καί(τοι) Po. θαυμάζοντες C<sup>1</sup>  
 8 ἀν. π. (cf. 356 d)] ἡλλάξας C<sup>1</sup> 9 ἀ. κ. αὐ.] in C legit  
 ἐπιμέλειαν et corr. ἀτμήλειαν Bern. ἐπιμέλειαν in tabula luce  
 expressa legit Si. 10 ἦν πα| explicit C 14 καὶ (ut saepe)  
 om. v del. Po. 15 ἀφ. Re. ἀσφαλὲς Ω 17 ἦτ. οὐ. n οὐ. ἦτ. O  
 (hiatus) 25 'λόγῳ, quia obversatur ἔργῳ' Po. (ἀλόγως Re.)

ἀφαιρεῖν, τοῖς δὲ κλανυμῶν καὶ ὀδυρμῶν ρεύμασιν ἐκ  
 μιᾶς πηγῆς φερομένων εἰς ἅπαν ἐφίεναι; καὶ περὶ μύρον  
 μὲν ἐνίους καὶ πορφύρας διαμάχεσθαι ταῖς γυναιξί, κουράς  
 δὲ συγχωρεῖν πενθίμους καὶ βαφὰς ἐσθῆτος μελαίνας καὶ  
 C καθίσσεις ἀμόρφους καὶ κατακλίσεις ἐπιπόνους; καί, ὃ δὴ  
 6 πάντων ἐστὶ χαλεπώτατον, ἂν οἰκέτας ἢ θεραπαυνίδας  
 κολάζωσιν ἀμέτρως καὶ ἀδίκως, ἐνίστασθαι καὶ κωλύειν  
 αὐτάς, ὅφ' ἑαυτῶν δ' ὠμῶς κολαζομένας καὶ πικρῶς  
 περιορᾶν ἐν πάθεσι καὶ τύχαις ῥαστώνης καὶ φιλανθρω-  
 10 πίας δεομέναις; (5.) ἀλλ' ἡμῖν γε, γύναι, πρὸς ἀλλήλους  
 οὐτ' ἐκείνης ἐδέησε τῆς μάχης οὔτε ταύτης οἶμαι δεήσειν.  
 εὐτελεία μὲν γὰρ τῇ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἀθρουντὶα τῇ περὶ  
 δίαιταν οὐδεὶς ἐστι τῶν φιλοσόφων, ὃν οὐκ ἐξέπληξας ἐν  
 ὁμιλίᾳ καὶ συνηθείᾳ γενόμενον ἡμῖν, οὐδὲ τῶν πολιτῶν,  
 D ᾧ μὴ θέαμα παρέχεις ἐν ἱεροῖς καὶ θυσίαις καὶ θεάτροις  
 16 τὴν σεαυτῆς ἀφέλειαν. ἤδη δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολ-  
 λὴν εὐστάθειαν ἐπεδείξω τὸ πρεσβύτερον τῶν τέκνων  
 ἀποβαλοῦσα καὶ πάλιν ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ Χαίρωνος ἡμᾶς  
 προλιπόντος. μέμνημαι γὰρ ἀπὸ θαλάσσης ξένους μοι  
 20 συνοδεύσαντας ἀπηγγελμένης τῆς τοῦ παιδίου τελευτῆς  
 καὶ συνελθόντας ἅμα τοῖς ἄλλοις εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν· ἐπεὶ δὲ  
 πολλὴν κατάστασιν ἐώρων καὶ ἡσυχίαν, ὥς ὕστερον δι-  
 ηγοῦντο καὶ πρὸς ἑτέρους, ᾤοντο μὴδὲν εἶναι δεινὸν ἀλλὰ  
 E κενὸν ἄλλως ἐξηγνέχθαι λόγον· οὕτω σωφρόνως κατ-  
 25 ἐκόσμησας τὸν οἶκον ἐν καιρῷ πολλὴν ἀκοσμίας ἐξουσίαν  
 διδόντι, καίτοι τῷ σεαυτῆς ἐκείνον ἐξέθρεψας μαστῷ καὶ  
 τομῇς ἡνέσχου τῆς θηλῆς περιθλάσιν λαβούσης· γενναῖα  
 [γὰρ] ταῦτα καὶ φιλόστοργα. (6.) τὰς δὲ πολλὰς ὀρῶμεν  
 μητέρας, ὅταν ὑπ' ἄλλων τὰ παιδία καθαρῶ καὶ γανωθῇ,  
 30 καθάπερ παῖγνια λαμβανούσας εἰς χεῖρας, εἰτ' ἀποθα-

4 μελαίνης **Ω** corr. Bern. 14 οὔτε **Ω** corr. Stegm. 15 παρ-  
 εἶχες Xyl. 18 χάρωνος **Ω** corr. Xyl. 26 ἐκ. v ἐκείνο **O**  
 μ. ἐξ. **Ω** corr. Bens. (hiatus) 28 del. Wil. γε Po.

νόντων ἐκχεομένας εἰς κενόν καὶ ἀχάριστον πένθος, οὐχ  
 ὑπ' εὐνοίας (εὐλόγιστον γὰρ εὐνοία καὶ καλόν), ἀλλὰ  
 μικρῷ τῷ φυσικῷ πάθει πολὺ συγκεραννύμενον τὸ πρὸς  
 κενὴν δόξαν ἄγρια ποιεῖ καὶ μανικὰ καὶ δυσεξίλαστα <τὰ> F  
 πένθη. καὶ τοῦτο φαίνεται μὴ λαθεῖν Αἴσωπον· ἔφη γὰρ 5  
 οὗτος ὅτι τοῦ Διὸς τὰς τιμὰς διανέμεντος τοῖς θεοῖς ἕτει  
 καὶ τὸ Πένθος. ἔδωκεν οὖν αὐτῷ, παρὰ τοῖς αἰρουμένοις  
 δὲ μόνοις καὶ θέλουσιν. ἐν ἀρχῇ μὲν οὖν οὕτω τοῦτο γινό-  
 μενόν ἐστιν· αὐτὸς γὰρ ἕκαστος εἰσάγει τὸ πένθος ἐφ'  
 ἑαυτόν. ὅταν δ' ἰδρυνθῇ χρόνῳ καὶ γένηται σύντροφον καὶ 10  
 σύνοικον, οὐδὲ πάνν βουλομένων ἀπαλλάττεται. διὸ δεῖ  
 μάχεσθαι περὶ θύρας αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ προίεσθαι φρουράν δι'  
 ἐσθλήτος ἢ κουράς | ἢ τινος ἄλλου τῶν τοιούτων, ἃ καθ' 610  
 ἡμέραν ἀπαντῶντα καὶ δυσωποῦντα μικρὰν καὶ στενὴν  
 καὶ ἀνέξοδον καὶ ἀμείλικτον καὶ ψοφοδεῇ ποιεῖ τὴν διά- 15  
 νοίαν, ὥς οὔτε γέλωτος αὐτῇ μετὸν οὔτε φωτὸς οὔτε φιλ-  
 ανθρωποῦ τραπέζης τοιαῦτα περικειμένη καὶ μεταχειρι-  
 ζομένη διὰ τὸ πένθος. ἀμέλειαι δὲ σώματος ἔπονται τῷ  
 κακῷ τούτῳ καὶ διαβολαὶ πρὸς ἄλειμμα καὶ λουτρόν καὶ  
 τὴν ἄλλην δίαίταν· ὧν πᾶν τοῦναντίον ἔδει τὴν ψυχὴν πο- 20  
 νοῦσαν αὐτὴν βοηθεῖσθαι διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐρρωμένον.  
 πολὺ γὰρ ἀμβλύνεται καὶ χαλᾶται τοῦ λυποῦντος, ὥσπερ  
 [ἐν] εὐδία κῦμα, τῇ γαλήνῃ τοῦ σώματος διαχεόμενον, ἐὰν B  
 δ' ἀνχμὸς ἐγγένηται καὶ τραχύτης ἐκ φανύλης διαίτης καὶ  
 μηδὲν εὐμενὲς μηδὲ χρηστὸν ἀναπέμπη τὸ σῶμα τῇ ψυχῇ 25  
 πλὴν ὀδύνας καὶ λύπας ὥσπερ τινὰς πικρὰς καὶ δυσχερεῖς  
 ἀναθυμιάσεις, οὐδὲ βουλομένοις ἔτι ῥαδίως ἀναλαβεῖν ἐστι.

5 sqq. cf. 112 a

4 add. Re. 8/9 γινόμε. ἰδεῖν ἔστιν dub. Wy. 10 ἰδρυνθῇ  
 Ω corr. Duebn. 11 πάνν] πάλιν vΠ<sup>1</sup> 12 προσίεσθ. Ω corr. Re.  
 21 αὐτὴν <καθ' αὐτὴν> Si. 23 del. Herw. διαχεόμενον  
 Ω corr. Po. 27 βουλόμενον α<sup>1</sup>

τοιαῦτα λαμβάνει πάθη τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτω κακωθεῖσαν.  
 (7.) καὶ μὴν, ὃ γε μέγιστον ἐν τούτῳ καὶ φοβερώτατον  
 ἐστίν, οὐκ ἂν φοβηθείην ἑκατῶν γυναικῶν εἰσόδους  
 (Eur. Andr. 930) καὶ φωνὰς καὶ συνεπιθρηγήσεις, αἷς  
 5 ἐκτρίβουσι καὶ παραθήγουσι τὴν λύπην, οὐδ' ὑπ' ἄλλων  
 C οὐτ' αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ἐῶσαι μαρανθῆναι. γινώσκω γὰρ  
 ποίους ἑναγχος ἀγῶνας ἡγωνίσω τῇ Θέωνος ἀδελφῇ βοη-  
 θοῦσα καὶ μαχομένη ταῖς μετ' ὀλοφυρμῶν καὶ ἀλαλαγ-  
 μῶν ἔξωθεν ἐπιούσαις, ὥσπερ ἀτεχνῶς πῦρ ἐπὶ πῦρ φε-  
 10 ρούσαις. τὰς μὲν γὰρ οἰκίας τῶν φίλων ὅταν καιομένας  
 ἴδωσι, σβεννύουσιν ὥς ἔχει τάχους ἕκαστος ἢ δυνάμεως,  
 ταῖς δὲ ψυχαῖς φλεγόμεναις αὐτοὶ προσφέρουσιν ὑπεκ-  
 καύματα. καὶ τῷ μὲν ὀφθαλμιῶντι τὰς χεῖρας οὐκ ἐῶσι  
 προσάγειν τὸν βουλόμενον οὐδ' ἅπτονται τοῦ φλεγμαί-  
 15 νοντος, ὃ δὲ πενθῶν κάθηται παντὶ τῷ προστυχόντι παρ-  
 D ἔχων ὥσπερ ῥεῦμα κινεῖν καὶ διαγοιαίνειν τὸ πάθος ἐκ  
 μικροῦ τοῦ γαργαλίζοντος καὶ κινουῦντος εἰς πολλήν καὶ  
 δυσχερῇ κάκωσιν ἀναξαινόμενον. ταῦτα μὲν ὄντι οἷδ' ὅτι  
 φυλάξῃ· (8.) πειρῶ δὲ τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ μεταφέρουσα σεαυτὴν ἀπο-  
 20 καθιστάναι πολλάκις εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον, ἐν ᾧ μηδέπω  
 τοῦ παιδίου τούτου γεγονότος μηδὲν ἔγκλημα πρὸς τὴν  
 τύχην εἵχομεν, εἴτα τὸν νῦν καιρὸν τοῦτον ἐκεῖνῳ συνάπ-  
 τειν, ὥς ὁμοίων πάλιν τῶν περὶ ἡμᾶς γεγονότων. ἐπεὶ  
 τὴν γένεσιν, ᾧ γύναι, τοῦ τέκνου δυσχεραίνειν δόξομεν  
 25 ἀμεμπτότερα ποιοῦντες αὐτοῖς τὰ πρὶν ἐκείνην γενέσθαι  
 E πράγματα. τὴν δ' ἐν μέσῳ διετίαν ἐξαιρεῖν μὲν οὐ δεῖ τῆς  
 μνήμης, ὥς δὲ χάριν καὶ ἀπόλαυσιν παρασχούσαν ἐν

2 sqq. cf. 599 a sqq. 9 cf. 61 a 123 e 143 f 919 d v. Artax. 28  
 19 sqq. 473 e 599 f cf. Po. Herm. 40, 295

12 ταῖς δὲ ψυχ. φλ. η τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς φλεγόμενας O αὐτοῖς  
 Ω corr. Re. 14 ἅπτεσθαι dub. Po. 18 ἀναξεραιν. Ω  
 corr. Re.

ἡδονῇ τίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸ μικρὸν ἀγαθὸν μέγα νομίζειν  
κακόν, μὴδ' ὅτι τὸ ἐλπιζόμενον οὐ προσέβηκεν ἢ τύχῃ,  
καὶ περὶ τοῦ δοθέντος ἀχαριστεῖν. αἰεὶ μὲν γὰρ ἢ περὶ τὸ  
θεῖον εὐφημία καὶ τὸ πρὸς τὴν τύχην ἴλεων καὶ ἀμεμφές  
καλὸν καὶ ἡδὺν ἀποδίδωσι καρπὸν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς τοιούτοις ὁ  
μάλιστα τῇ μνήμῃ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπαρντόμενος καὶ τοῦ  
βίου πρὸς τὰ φωτεινὰ καὶ λαμπρὰ μεταστρέφων καὶ μετα-  
φέρων ἐκ τῶν σκοτεινῶν καὶ ταρακτικῶν τὴν διάνοιαν ἢ  
παντάπασιν ἔσβεσε τὸ λυποῦν ἢ τῇ πρὸς τοῦναντίον μίξει F  
μικρὸν καὶ ἀμαυρὸν ἐποίησεν. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ μύρον αἰεὶ 10  
μὲν εὐφραίνει τὴν ὄσφρησιν πρὸς δὲ τὰ δυσώδη φάρμακόν  
ἐστίν, οὕτως ἢ ἐπίνοια τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐν τοῖς κακοῖς καὶ  
βοηθήματος ἀναγκαίου παρέχεται χρεῖαν τοῖς μὴ φευ-  
γούσι τὸ μεμνησθαι τῶν χρηστῶν μὴδὲ πάντα καὶ πάν-  
τως μεμφομένοις τὴν τύχην. ὅπερ ἡμῖν παθεῖν οὐ προσ- 15  
ἤκει συκοφαντοῦσι τὸν ἐαυτῶν βίον, | εἰ μίαν ἔσχηκεν 611  
ὥσπερ βιβλίον ἀλοιφὴν ἐν πᾶσι καθαροῖς καὶ ἀκεραίοις  
τοῖς ἄλλοις.

9. Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ὀρθῶν ἐπιλογισμῶν εἰς εὐσταθῆ  
διάθεσιν τελεωτώντων ἤρτηται τὸ μακάριον, αἱ δ' ἀπὸ τῆς 20  
τύχης τροπαὶ μεγάλας ἀποκλίσεις οὐ ποιοῦσιν οὐδ' ἐπι-  
φέρουσι συγχυτικὰς ὀλισθήσεις τοῦ βίου, πολλάκις ἀκή-  
κοις. εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ ἡμᾶς καθάπερ οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς ἔξωθεν  
κυβερνᾶσθαι πράγμασι καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῆς τύχης ἀπαριθμεῖν  
καὶ κριταῖς χρῆσθαι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν 25  
ἀνθρώποις, μὴ σκοπεῖ τὰ νῦν δάκρυα καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυρηθήσεις  
τῶν εἰσιόντων ἔθει τιτὶ φαύλω περαινομένης πρὸς ἕκαστον, B  
ἀλλ' ἐννόει μᾶλλον ὥς ζηλουμένη διατελεῖς ὑπὸ τούτων  
ἐπὶ τέκνοις καὶ οἴκῳ καὶ βίῳ. καὶ δεινόν ἐστίν ἐτέρους

29 cf. 600 a

6 τῆς μνήμης Ω corr. Re. 9 τοῦν.] τὸ λυποῦν v 12 καὶ  
del. Re. def. Wil. quod duplex est effectus sicut murræ  
22 συντυχικὰς Ω corr. Re. 24 παρὰ v περὶ O

μὲν ἡδέως ἂν ἐλέσθαι τὴν σὴν τύχην καὶ τούτου προσόντος  
 ἐφ' ᾧ νῦν ἀνιώμεθα, σὲ δ' ἐγκαλεῖν καὶ δυσφορεῖν παρ-  
 ούση καὶ μηδ' ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ δάκνοντος αἰσθάνεσθαι  
 5 πηλίκα ἔχει τὰ σωζόμενα χάριτας ἡμῖν· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ  
 τοὺς ἀκεφάλους καὶ μειούρους Ὀμήρου στίχους ἐκλέγοντες  
 τὰ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα τῶν πεποιημένων ὑπέρειν παρ-  
 ορῶντες, οὕτως ἐξακριβοῦν καὶ συκοφαντεῖν τοῦ βίου τὰ  
 C φαῦλα, τοῖς δὲ χρηστοῖς ἀνάρθρως καὶ συγκεχυμένως  
 ἐπιβάλλουσιν ὁμοίον τι τοῖς ἀνελευθέροις καὶ φιλαρ-  
 10 γύροις πάσχειν, οἱ πολλὰ συνάγοντες οὐ χροῶνται παροῦσιν  
 ἀλλὰ θρηγοῦσι καὶ δυσφοροῦσιν ἀπολομένων. εἰ δ' ἐκείνης  
 ἔχεις οἶκτον ἀγάμου καὶ ἄπαιδος οἰχομένης, αἷθις ἔχεις  
 ἐπ' ἄλλοις ἡδίω σεαυτὴν ποιεῖν μηδενὸς τούτων ἀτελῆ  
 μηδ' ἄμοιρον γενομένην· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ ταῦτα μεγάλα μὲν  
 15 τοῖς στερομένοις ἀγαθὰ μικρὰ δὲ τοῖς ἔχουσιν. ἐκείνη δ'  
 εἰς τὸ ἄλυτον ἤκουσα λυπεῖν ἡμᾶς οὐ δεῖται· τί γὰρ ἡμῖν  
 ἀπ' ἐκείνης κακόν, εἰ μηδὲν ἐκείνη νῦν ἐστὶ λυπηρόν; καὶ  
 D γὰρ αἱ τῶν μεγάλων στερήσεις ἀποβάλλουσι τὸ λυποῦν  
 εἰς τὸ μὴ δεῖσθαι περιγενόμεναι. Τιμοξένα δ' ἡ σὴ μικρῶν  
 20 μὲν ἐστέρηται, μικρὰ γὰρ ἔγνω καὶ μικροῖς ἔχαιρεν· ὣν δ'  
 οὗτ' αἰσθησιν ἔσχεν οὗτ' εἰς ἐπίνοιαν ἦλθεν [οὗτ' ἔλαβεν  
 ἐπίνοιαν], πῶς ἂν στέρεσθαι λέγοιτο;

10. Καὶ μὴν ἃ τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούεις, οἱ πείδουσι πολ-  
 λούς λέγοντες ὥς οὐδὲν οὐδαμῇ τῷ διαλυθέντι κακόν  
 25 οὐδὲ λυπηρόν ἐστιν, οἷδ' ὅτι κωλύει σε πιστεύειν ὁ πά-  
 τριος λόγος καὶ τὰ μυστικά σύμβολα τῶν περὶ τὸν Διό-  
 νυσον ὀργιασμῶν, ἃ σύνισμεν ἀλλήλοις οἱ κοινωνοῦντες.  
 ὥς οὖν ἄφθαρτον οὖσαν τὴν ψυχὴν διανοοῦ ταῦτό ταῖς  
 E ἀλίσκομέναις ὀρῖσι πάσχειν· ἂν μὲν γὰρ πολὺν ἐντραφῇ

4 cf. 397 d 520 a Athen. XIV 632 d

2/3 παρούσης Ω corr. Schw. 13/14 ἀτελοῦς μηδ' ἄμοιρον  
 γενομένης Wy. 19 παραγεν. Ω corr. Re. 21/22 del. Po. Wil.  
 22 ἐπίν.] ἐπιθυμίαν Re.

τῷ σώματι χρόνον καὶ γένηται τῷ βίῳ τούτῳ τιθασὸς ὑπὸ  
 πραγμάτων πολλῶν καὶ μακρᾶς συνηθείας, ἀγῆδης καταί-  
 ρουσα πάλιν ἐνδύεται καὶ οὐκ ἀνίησιν οὐδὲ λήγει τοῖς ἐν-  
 ταῦθα συμπλεκομένη πάθεσι καὶ τύχαις διὰ τῶν γενέσεων.  
 μὴ γὰρ οἷον λοιδορεῖσθαι καὶ κακῶς ἀκούειν τὸ γῆρας 5  
 διὰ τὴν ῥυσότητα καὶ τὴν πολιὰν καὶ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τοῦ  
 σώματος· ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' αὐτοῦ τὸ χαλεπώτατόν ἐστιν, ὅτι  
 τὴν ψυχὴν ἑωλόν τε ποιεῖ ταῖς μνήμαις τῶν ἐκεῖ καὶ  
 λιπαρῇ περὶ ταῦτα καὶ κάμπτει καὶ πιέζει, τὸν σχημα- F  
 τισμόν, ὃν ἔσχεν ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἐν τῷ <προσ>πεπον- 10  
 θέναι, διαφυλάττουσαν. ἡ δὲ ληφθεῖσα μὲν . . . ὑπὸ  
 κρειττόνων ἔχεται, καθάπερ ἐκ καμπῆς ὕγρας καὶ μαλ-  
 θακῆς ἀναχαιτίσασα πρὸς ὃ πέφυκεν. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ πῦρ,  
 ἂν τις ἀποσβέσας εὐθὺς ἐξάπτῃ, πάλιν ἀναρριπίζεται καὶ  
 ἀναλαμβάνει ταχέως . . . 15

ὅπως ὥκιστα πύλας Αἰδαο περῆσαι' (Theogn. 427),  
 πρὶν ἔρωτα πολλὸν ἐγγενέσθαι τῶν αὐτόθι πραγμάτων καὶ  
 μαλαχθῆναι πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ συντακῆναι καθάπερ ὑπὸ  
 φαρμάκων.

11. Τοῖς δὲ πατρίοις | καὶ παλαιοῖς ἔθεσι καὶ νόμοις 612  
 ἐμφαίνεται μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ τούτων ἀλήθεια. τοῖς γὰρ 21  
 αὐτῶν νηπίοις ἀποθανοῦσιν οὔτε χοὰς ἐπιφέρουσιν οὔτ'  
 ἄλλα δρῶσι περὶ αὐτὰ οἷ' εἰκὸς ὑπὲρ θανόντων ποιεῖν [τοὺς  
 ἄλλους]· οὐ γὰρ μέτεστι γῆς οὐδὲν οὐδὲ τῶν περὶ γῆν  
 αὐτοῖς· οὐδ' αὐτοῦ περὶ ταφὰς καὶ μνήματα καὶ προθέ- 25

9 τάνταῦθα dub. Po. 10 add. Re. 11 διαφυλάττουσα Ω  
 corr. Re. lac. 86 litt. Ω <μένουσα δὲ βραχὺν ἐν τῷ σώματι  
 χρόνον ἐλευθερωθεῖσα> ὑπὸ κρείττ. ἔρχεται suppl. Wil. 18 ἀνα-  
 χαιτίσμα Ω corr. Wy. 15 lac. 140 litt. v 110 α 172 A 148 E;  
 <ἂν δὲ πλεῖον χρόνον ἀποσβεσθὲν μείνῃ, χαλεπωτέραν ἔχει τὴν  
 ἀναζωπύρωσιν, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ψυχῶν ἄριστα πράττουσιν, αἷς  
 συμβέβηκε κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν> suppl. partim Wy. partim Bern.  
 17 πρὶν Re. πλήν Ω 23 αὐτοῦς v 23/24 del. Wil.  
 24 οὐδὲ Stegm. οὔτε Ω 25 αὐτοῦ] αὐ Wil.

σεις νεκρῶν φιλοχωροῦσι καὶ παρακάθηνται τοῖς σώ-  
 μασιν· οὐ γὰρ ἔωσιν οἱ νόμοι <περὶ> τοὺς τηλικούτους,  
 ὥς οὐχ ὅσιον εἰς βελτίονα καὶ θειοτέραν μοῖραν ἅμα καὶ  
 χώραν μεθεστηκότας . . . . ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἀπιστεῖν χαλε-  
 B πώτερόν ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ἢ τὸ πιστεύειν, τὰ μὲν ἐκτὸς οὕτως  
 6 ὥς οἱ νόμοι προστάσσουσιν ἔχωμεν, τὰ δ' ἐντὸς ἔτι μᾶλ-  
 λον ἀμίλанта καὶ καθαρὰ καὶ σώφρονα.

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2 add. Wil. 4 lac. 20 litt. v 40 α 62 A 50 E; <αὐτοὺς οὕτω  
 κακοῖς καὶ θνητοῖς δόξοις θεραπεύειν> suppl. Si. 6 ἔχομεν α<sup>1</sup>

## Reflections on Plutarch, *A Consolation to His Wife*

To the modern reader a letter addressed by one parent to another offering consolation on the death of their young child may seem a distinctly odd creation. The sharing of grief is the intention; but the very fact that the writer can marshal his thoughts and create a work of literary merit would seem to betray a lack of feeling.

Knowledge of the personal and historical circumstances in which Plutarch wrote this letter should assuage, though perhaps not expunge, any suspicions we may harbor about the genuineness of his own sentiments. First of all, Plutarch was away from home when the two-year-old Timoxena died. Apparently he had told his wife that he was going to be in Athens, for she had sent a messenger there. The messenger missed him, and Plutarch did not hear the news until he reached Tanagra. Thus his letter reached his wife after the funeral, and after her initial, and presumably most uncontrollable, experience of grief. Considering that Tanagra is at most two days' journey from Chaeronea and that Plutarch would have been able to reach home soon after his wife had received the letter, why did he delay his return home by writing? In fact, why did he write at all?<sup>1</sup> Of course, it is always possible that he did not dash back home, especially since the funeral was already over. In that case, sending a letter is most understandable. Moreover, often a man of letters deals with his own emotions best through the familiar medium of words. For such a person, writing is therapeutic.

It is hazardous for the historian to attempt to probe the psychology of people long dead, for the application of modern psychoanalytic theory is anachronistic, and

<sup>1</sup> Hubert Martin, Jr. and Jane E. Phillips, "Consolatio ad Uxorem (*Moralia* 608A–612B)," in H.D. Betz (ed.), *Plutarch's Ethical Writing and Early Christian Literature*, IV (Leiden 1978), 394–411, esp. 394–5, argue that Plutarch adopted the epistolary form because it was commonly used for consolatory literature, but that he either did not actually send a letter, or sent a short one, not the version that is extant. In contrast, Anastasios G. Nikolaidis, "Plutarch on Women and Marriage," *WS* 110 (1997), 31, argues that the extant version is "a most intimate communication quite free from the rhetorical pretensions of consolatory epistolography."

interpretations are invariably subjective. Nevertheless the contents of the letter suggest to me that Plutarch did not want to arrive home and find his wife hysterical with grief. The letter warned her that he was coming and that he anticipated that she would control herself as she had in past situations of crisis. She could have been bravely managing the funeral and keeping a Stoical demeanor as long as she needed to be in charge of the household, but saving her indulgence in grief for her husband's return. In any case, in the Greek world women were expected, if not encouraged, to indulge in visible, audible expressions of grief.<sup>2</sup> Interestingly enough, in the Chaeronea of Plutarch's day magistrates titled *gynaikonomoi* ("regulators of women") supervised women's conduct (see introductory essay to *Advice*). Plutarch approves of their regulations and states that they were originated by Solon (*Solon* 21.5). Included in the legislation attributed to Solon were stipulations concerning women's participation at funerals.<sup>3</sup> In asking his wife to repress demonstrations of emotion, Plutarch is establishing a standard of behavior that runs counter to social norms. He himself apparently is quite calm. As is the rule in Greek didactic literature, the husband is the wife's teacher. Plutarch attempts to persuade her by setting forth the reasons why she must patiently accept this cruel blow of fate. It is possible that the daughter's death was more grievous to the mother than to the father (but see *Advice* ch. 36). The elder Timoxena had already given birth to four sons; thus a daughter, and a child born late in her productive years after twenty years of marriage, may have been especially precious to her. Plutarch, on the other hand, despite his acknowledgment of women's virtues and potential and despite his professed affection for his daughter, was still a captive of the patriarchal tradition that valued men more highly than women. The younger Timoxena died ca. A.D. 90.<sup>4</sup> Plutarch was then in his forties, a priest, a writer, and a person of influence, with much to divert him from family matters.

Whether Plutarch wrote with the intention of eventually publishing this letter is questionable. When we consider the formal, didactic quality of some of the admonitions and the fact that Plutarch declares three times that his wife will not have need of a specific piece of advice,<sup>5</sup> we must consider that he had a wider audience in mind and wanted to present his family in a favorable light. Furthermore, that the work has three titles in the manuscripts suggests posthumous publication.<sup>6</sup> The composition does not lack literary polish: there is nothing to indicate that he wrote

<sup>2</sup> For an analysis of Greek funerary legislation and male attitudes as shaped specifically to limit women's expression of grief see Gail Holst-Warhaft, *Dangerous Voices: Women's Laments and Greek Literature* (London 1992), esp. 98–9, 116–9.

<sup>3</sup> See further Sarah B. Pomeroy, *Families in Classical and Hellenistic Greece: Representations and Realities* (Oxford 1997), 101–5.

<sup>4</sup> See C.P. Jones, "Towards a Chronology of Plutarch's Works," in B. Scardigli (ed.), *Essays on Plutarch's Lives* (Oxford 1997), 71, and K. Ziegler, *Plutarchos von Chaironeia* (Stuttgart 1949), 13, 73.

<sup>5</sup> (Ch. 1) "superstition, for which I know you have no inclination"; (ch. 5) "you and I . . . have never needed that conflict, nor . . . shall we need the other"; (ch. 7) "danger, . . . that I shall not fear in you."

<sup>6</sup> See further Phillip H. De Lacy and Benedict Einarson, *Plutarch's Moralia*, VII (Cambridge, Mass. 1968), 576; similarly Ziegler, *Plutarchos von Chaironeia*, 156–7.

in haste or under stress.<sup>7</sup> On the other hand, as is clear from the *Advice*, Plutarch was fond of using literary allusions; thus the paucity of such allusions suggests that we have the letter as he originally wrote it. We are not told anything about how their daughter died; e.g., whether the death was expected. This is natural in a real letter to his wife, though the wider audience that would read it when it was published might expect to be told a few such details. Plutarch seems to be guarding his privacy, being deliberately reticent and giving minimal information. Thus it seems most likely that he sent a short letter to his wife when he learned of their daughter's death. Then, some time later, when he had gotten over the shock—perhaps very much later—he expanded it and published it as the version we now have. It must be admitted, however, that we can not prove the existence of an earlier, more personal, version.

The form and content of the letter are conventional. Plutarch doubtless had read letters of condolence by Cicero, Servius Sulpicius Rufus, the younger Seneca, and other authors, some of whose works are no longer extant, most notably the treatise by the Academic Crantor (ca. 335–ca. 275 B.C.) *On Grief* (Cic. *Academica* 2.135). Another contemporary text, the *Consolation to Apollonius*, which is preserved among Plutarch's works, was probably not written by him.<sup>8</sup> The letter of condolence was an established literary genre that the rhetoricians called *paramuthetike* ("exhortation," "consolation," or "encouragement").<sup>9</sup> Not only are similar letters found among the works of literary artists, but they are also preserved in papyri from Roman Egypt: these were usually written by the educated elite.<sup>10</sup> In the papyri there are more letters inspired by the death of children than of adults.<sup>11</sup> Thus, abundant parallels to Plutarch's thoughts and phrases can be cited from other classical works on consolation.<sup>12</sup> To state that this letter conforms to literary conventions, however, is not to denigrate it. Greeks and Romans normally confronted rites of passage with traditional, ritualized behavior. Originality and wit were not in good taste on such occasions.

Greek and Latin letters of consolation generally open on a note of sorrow and sympathy. These are followed by a tribute to the dead, including a description of the individual's fine qualities. The virtues of the dead establish the seriousness of the loss. Consolation is offered, often by recalling that human beings are mortal; that

<sup>7</sup> The textual problems at the end, especially in chapters 10–1, are due to transmission.

<sup>8</sup> J. Hani, *Plutarch: oeuvres morales* (Paris 1980), VIII.179 n. 3, believes that the *Consolation to Apollonius* is authentic but early and that this would account for its divergence from Plutarch's usual style, *contra* Ziegler, *Plutarchos von Chaironeia*, 158–62. The Lamprias Catalogue lists two works by Plutarch on consolation that are no longer extant: (111) To Asclepiades; (157) To Bestia.

<sup>9</sup> See further R. Kassel, *Untersuchungen zur griechischen und römischen Konsolationsliteratur: Zetemata*, 18 (Munich 1958); J. Mitchell, "Consolatory Letters," *Hermes*, 96 (1968), 299–318; and most recently J.H.D. Scourfield, *Consoling Heliodorus: A Commentary on Jerome, Letter 60* (Oxford 1993), esp. 15–27.

<sup>10</sup> On these see most recently J. Chapa, "Letters of Condolence in Greek Papyri" (Ph.D. diss., Univ. of Oxford 1992).

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.* 22.

<sup>12</sup> See the footnotes and endnotes to Paolo Impara and Mario Manfredini, *Plutarco: Consolazione alla Moglie* (Naples 1991), and the parallel passages in notes to Hani, *Plutarch: oeuvres morales*, VIII.

we must bear the inevitable; that death frees us from the pangs of life; and that time heals all pain. Finally the bereaved is exhorted to be grateful for having enjoyed the opportunity to know the deceased. Philosophy and religion offer a variety of consolatory ideas. For example, the Epicureans think the dead no longer exist (below [10]). In contrast, the Stoics and initiates into Mystery religions believe that the dead are blessed and immortal and Platonists believe that the soul is immortal. To these traditional thoughts Plutarch adds a personal element, reminding his wife of their years together and of other catastrophes they have endured.

## Commentary

(608) [1] **child's**. The Greek word does not reveal the child's sex.

**niece**. *Thugatri* can also mean "granddaughter" (thus *LSJ* s.v. "daughter's daughter," Lacy and Einarson in their translation *Plutarch's Moralia*, VII.581, and Robin Waterfield, trans., *Plutarch: Essays*, introduced and annotated by Ian Kidd [London 1992], 359–61, 365). According to the chronology postulated for the elder Timoxena (see [9]), it was certainly possible for her in her late thirties to have a granddaughter as well as a two-year-old daughter. Indeed, she could have had another daughter whom Plutarch never mentions. Greek fathers often obscured the fact that they had daughters. In *Convivial Questions* (620A, 636A, 642C, 700E) Plutarch mentions three men who could be his sons-in-law (see further Hani, *Plutarque: oeuvres morales*, II.175–7). If Timoxena actually had given birth to four daughters and four sons, she certainly would have had a very large (though not impossibly large) family by ancient standards. Furthermore, for any family to have raised four daughters would have been noteworthy, though not, of course, demographically unfeasible especially if the first three were already married when the last was born (see further Sarah B. Pomeroy, *Families in Classical and Hellenistic Greece: Representations and Realities* [Oxford 1997], 6–7, 118–22, and Tim G. Parkin, *Demography and Roman Society* [Baltimore 1992], 112–6.) The granddaughter would have been very young indeed. Not waiting for her mother to give the news to Plutarch, she would have blurted it out. Daniel Babut ("À Propos des enfants et d'un ami de Plutarque: essai de solution pour deux énigmes," *REG* 94 [1981], 47–62, esp. 61) suggests "daughter-in-law," an attractive option if a parallel could be cited for the use of *thugatri* in this way, though, as we have just pointed out, the informant need not have been "certainement adulte" (Babut, 59). Our translator, following Ziegler (*Plutarchos von Chaironeia*, 15), understands that Plutarch's informant was his niece.

Tanagra is approximately forty miles from Chaeronea, about one or two days' journey. Plutarch's wife had sent news to Athens, but he was in Tanagra. She cannot have known what he was doing, because Tanagra is not on the way to Athens. He must have been in Tanagra either (a) specifically to visit his *thugatri* or (b) on the way to or from Euboea. The former is surely more probable.

**funeral**. See [11].

[2] **No child of oak or rock**. Plutarch herewith asserts that he has feelings too, using

a common phrase: Homer *Iliad* 22.126, *Odyssey* 19.163, Hesiod *Theogony* 35, and see further M.L. West, *Hesiod: Theogony* (Oxford 1966), 167–9.

**human kindness.** Cf. “kindly” (ch. 6). Philanthropia was a very important virtue according to Plutarch. See R. Flacelière and J. Irigoin, *Plutarque: oeuvres morales*, I.i, xcvi–xcvii.

**ask her nurse.** The Greek verb *prokaleo* also connotes “summon” or “challenge.” As was normal for an upper-class infant who has learned to talk, Timoxena knows how to give orders to her slave. The nurse in this context is a wet-nurse. Note in chapter 5 that Timoxena had nursed her son Chaeron herself. Ancient writers, both medical and moralistic, were much in favor of nursing by mothers (see, e.g., Tacitus *Germania* 19, Soranus *Gynecology* 2.18, and on the selection of a wet-nurse, 2.19. See further Soranus *Gynecology*, trans. O. Temkin [Baltimore 1956], 90–4).

[3] **Clymene.** From Euripides *Phaethon* (Nauck, *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, Eur. fr. 785). Phaethon, son of Helios and Clymene, was a daredevil athlete who died when driving his father’s chariot. Here his mother laments his involvement in archery and other athletic pursuits. For a full account of the myth of Phaethon and Euripides’ play, see the introduction to J. Diggle, *Euripides: Phaethon* (Cambridge 1970); on this fr. 177–8. Most recently see C. Collard and others (edd.), *Euripides: Selected Plays*, I (Westminster 1995), 195–239, esp. 239 on this fr. “hopelessly corrupt.”

[4] **mourning . . . disfigure . . . lavish funeral preparations.** See [11]: there was no prothesis either.

**tricked yourself out.** Cf. *Advice* chapter 48.

**expense on pleasure.** Cf. *Advice* chapters 29, 48.

**good woman.** The Greek *sôphrona* refers to the most common virtue ascribed to women in classical Greece: *sôphrosynê* (see on *Advice* ch. 9).

**“Bacchic revels.”** Euripides *Bacchae* 317–8: “for even in Bacchic revels the good woman will not be corrupted.”

**license.** Cf. *Advice* chapter 29.

**perfumes and purples.** Cf. *Advice* chapters 29, 30.

[5] **eldest child.** Soclarus must be the oldest child. His brothers are listed in the dedication of *On the Creation of the Soul in Plato’s Timaeus* (1012A), but he is not, for he had already died when this work was completed. Soclarus was named for one of Plutarch’s friends (see on *Advice* [138A] Dedication, s.v. “Pollianus,” and Ziegler, *Plutarchos von Chaironeia*, 13).

**Chaeron.** The youngest son of Timoxena and Plutarch, named for the eponymous hero of Chaeronea (conj. Xylander). Plutarch was also away from home when Chaeron died.

**nursed Chaeron at your own breast, and endured surgery when your nipple was bruised.** This procedure was by no means invasive surgery (in the sense of modern medicine), rather it was something the doctor did with his hands, e.g., lancing of a blood blister or something similar. Oribasius *Collectiones Medicae* (Raeder, CMG VI), 44.5.6–7, cites Antyllus and Heliodorus, who wrote in the first to second centuries A.D., in his discussion of a simple incision for a breast abscess. Aetius Amidenus *Iatricorum liber xv* (6th cent. A.D.: S. Zervos, *Athena* 21 [1909], 7–138), 15.13.10–3,

discusses plasters for women who are nursing. On irritation and bruising of the breasts as a result of nursing, see Soranus *Gynecology* 2.8, trans. O. Temkin, 78. On mothers who did not nurse their babies, see [2].<sup>13</sup>

[6] **Aesop.** A teller of moralizing tales who lived in the sixth century B.C. Fables in which animals or abstractions were anthropomorphized were routinely attributed to his authorship. In Pseudo-Plutarch, *Consolation to Apollonius* (19 = *Mor.* 112A = Ben Edwin Perry, *Babrius and Phaedrus* [Cambridge, Mass. 1965], 517, no. 462), the same tale about the "Privilege of Grief" is attributed to a Hellenistic philosopher who told it to a queen named Arsinoë, a mother who was mourning for her son. This Arsinoë may have been the second queen of Egypt by that name, for Ptolemy Ceraunus had murdered her children.

[7] **the entrance of bad women.** From Euripides *Andromache* 930; the visits of bad women are mentioned also at greater length in *Advice* chapter 40.

**Theon.** Doubtless a philosopher, he appears frequently in Plutarch's dialogues.

"**heaping fire on fire.**" Proverbial, also in *Moralia* 61A, 123E, 143F, 919D, etc.

[9] "**headless**" . . . "**short-tailed.**" Hexameter lines with irregular first or last feet, in which a short syllable appears where the meter requires a long.

**Your Timoxena.** This is the first time that Plutarch uses his daughter's name. He may be guided by traditional rules of etiquette which discouraged referring to respectable women by name. Thus he names his son, Chaeron (ch. 5), but not his niece (ch. 1) or Theon's sister (ch. 7). In classical Greece names usually, but not invariably, alternated in successive generations. Sometimes, however, father and son bore the same name (e.g., Demosthenes, son of Demosthenes). Romans used the same name in successive generations and Hellenistic Greeks often did so as well. There is not abundant evidence for women's names, but they seem to have followed the same patterns as men's.

The elder Timoxena was a daughter of Alexion who was archon of Chaeronea in the first century A.D. (*IG VII.* 3366, 3369). She married Plutarch ca. 70, and bore four sons and one daughter (see also [1] "niece"). Plutarch refers to her writing a treatise in *Advice* chapter 48.

[10] **others say . . . suffered dissolution.** The reference is to standard Epicurean theory. See, e.g., Epicurus *Letter to Menoeceus* 124 and *Key Doctrines* 2.

**rites of Dionysus.** The Mystery cults of Dionysus offered the promise of blessed immortality.

"**soonest to pass the gate of Hades' house.**" Theognis *Elegy* 1.427. As the punctuation indicates, a long lacuna (perhaps 150 letters) in the manuscripts precedes the direct quotation. The translation is of a scholarly conjecture.

[11] **not pour libations over dead infants.** Deaths of small children were too common to elicit the mourning and burial ceremonies deemed appropriate for an adult. Infants and small children were often buried in pottery containers, or in a group apart from adults. That approximately 30 percent of the burials at Olynthus from the sixth century to the middle of the fourth were of babies seems to be a reasonable

<sup>13</sup> I am grateful to Ann Ellis Hanson for these references.

reflection of actual mortality. Children constituted another 21.4 percent of those buried: D.M. Robinson, *Excavations at Olynthus*, XI: *Necrolynthia* (Baltimore 1942), 146–7%. Children constituted 5% percent of burials in the Ceramicus and other Attic cemeteries. See also 14 “mourning,” and see most recently Sanne Houby-Nielsen, “‘Burial Language’ in Archaic and Classical Kerameikos,” *Proceedings of the Danish Institute at Athens*, 1–1995, 131–91, Tables 1–2. The grim figures remained consistent throughout Greco-Roman antiquity—see Bradley, this volume, and Parkin, *Demography and Roman Society*, 92–8).

**pure and undefiled and chaste.** This ending is abrupt, though climactic. The conclusion may have been lost, for we would expect some final words of sympathy and exhortation.



INTERPRETIVE ESSAYS



# Plutarch's Moral Program

## Private Lives and Public Lives

Plutarch was born about A.D. 40–45 and lived at Chaeronea in Boeotia till his death about 120, shortly after the accession of the emperor Hadrian.<sup>1</sup> He was a true aristocrat. His or his wife's family traced their ancestry to the ancient heroes of Boeotia and Phocis and felt "entitled to a greater share than others in Boeotia" because of it (*God's Slowness to Punish* 558A). When he was about 50 he became one of the priests of Apollo at Delphi, a role which accords with his commitment to public service and his firm belief in the traditional religion of the Greeks. It was apparently around this time that he began his career as a prolific author. By the end of his life his fame was well established. The story is told that his younger acquaintance Favorinus vainly "tried to rival the infinity of his collected works."<sup>2</sup> An indication of the number and range of these writings is provided by the catalogue of an unknown ancient library called the "Lamprias Catalogue." This lists 227 items (a few of these being misdivided, misshelved, or wrongly attributed works). It begins with the biographies, which are Plutarch's main source of fame today, but is for the most part a list of nonbiographical writings (including *Consolation* and *Advice*) of the sort we traditionally call the "moral works" (*Moralia*), comprising studies on politics, philosophy, religion, and literature. Of the biographies listed we have today twenty-two of the twenty-three pairs of *Parallel Lives*, two of a handful of various separate studies, and two from a series of imperial lives of Augustus to Vitellius. Nothing known to us is unknown to the Catalogue. With the *Moralia* the situation is different. The present corpus consists of seventy-eight titles (of which five are certainly not by

Thanks are due to Sarah B. Pomeroy for her comments. Where possible, translations have been taken from D.A. Russell, *Plutarch: Selected Essays and Dialogues* (Oxford 1993).

<sup>1</sup> For biographical details see C.P. Jones, *Plutarch and Rome* (Oxford 1971), 3–64; D.A. Russell, *Plutarch* (London 1973), 1–17.

<sup>2</sup> *Suda* φ 4 (IV.690 Adler).

Plutarch). Since a quarter of these are not in the Lamprias Catalogue, we may estimate that the total number of separate works written by him approached three hundred. Moreover, many of these were multivolume efforts.

Most of Plutarch's books are about people. The best way of introducing his moral program is to start with the biographies, where the focus on people is most concentrated, and to move thence to the *Moralia*. Plutarchan biography aimed to improve those who read it by providing full accounts of men, and some shorter ones of women, whose real lives offered an example for its readers to follow or avoid. Many essays in the *Moralia* also serve this purpose. Behind the aim of moral improvement lies Plutarch's theory of character, a theory that owes much to Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, but which has been modified to suit his own interests and observations. The most concentrated, though not altogether clear, exposition of his thought here comes in an important short work called *Moral Virtue*.<sup>3</sup> Every soul is formed from a common pool of basic virtues and vices, which are expressed as *pathê* ("passions" or "emotions"). These are an essential part of human life. The soul is governed by a rational and an irrational part. The passions lie with the irrational, and the job of the rational is to moderate them with the ideal aim of producing a series of means (e.g., "courage" as opposed to "cowardice" or "rashness"). The character (*êthos*) of each individual is set by the *ethos* or "habit" which the irrational side takes on under the control of reason. Reason is not only an innate resource. Here and elsewhere Plutarch thinks of it as a social force which is expressed in the laws and in the system of education (452D). By education (*paideia*) he always means Greek education, and the goal of this is full comprehension of the Platonic philosophy that enables us to live the good and happy life. The level of education available to each person depends on where one is born and how one is brought up. This is not simply commonsensical. For these variables explain why the core virtues and vices appear different in different people (*Life of Phocion* 3.7, *Progress in Virtue* 76A–B, *Virtues of Women* 243C). In the introduction to *Virtues of Women* Plutarch comments, with a reminiscence of Plato's *Meno*, that virtues (which are definable by core "powers") "acquire certain other differences, their own colors as it were, because of the natures [of different people], and assimilate themselves to underlying habits, bodily temperaments, upbringings, and ways of life." This conception helps to explain why he says he considered the paired heroes of the *Parallel Lives* to be basically very similar, with only minor or indiscernible differences in character,<sup>4</sup> and why in the formal comparisons (*synkriseis*) which follow most of the pairs he spends much of the time identifying differences due to varying circumstances.

The common construction of character enables us to observe what happens in others to the virtues and vices we have in ourselves, and allows Plutarch to use the details of particular individuals—be they long-dead biographical heroes or living

<sup>3</sup> See D. Babut, *Plutarque: de la vertu éthique* (Paris 1969).

<sup>4</sup> *Aemilius* 1.7, *Aemilius-Timoleon synkrisis* 1.1, *Aristides-Cato synkrisis* 1.1, *Cimon* 3.3, *Demetrius* 1.8, *Demosthenes* 3.3, *Dion* 1.3, *Lycurgus-Numa synkrisis* 1.1–2, *Pelopidas* 2.11, *Pelopidas-Marcellus synkrisis* 1.1–3, *Pericles* 2.5, *Philopoemen-Flaminius synkrisis* 3.5, *Phocion* 3.6–9, *Theseus* 2.1.

examples like Timoxena, Eurydice, and Pollianus — to offer us his moral truths. One of the things that is especially noticeable in all this is the absence of a barrier between what we might see as a separate private and public sphere. The heroes of the biographies are public figures, but their private sides, relations with parents or wives, treatment of slaves, etc., are in no way irrelevant. The same virtues and vices are in play. Again, in the shorter quasi-biographical accounts, such as those in *Virtues of Women* or, for example, the stories of Cammá and Empona in the *Dialogue on Love*, domestic matters are much in evidence. In fact, the interrelation of public and private is fully visible in many of the works of the *Moralia* where Plutarch is concerned with moral improvement and moral awareness. Where he is dealing with problems which we would consider proper to the individual's personal development (e.g., tranquillity of mind or control of anger), he is constantly aware of this individual as a social being. One reason for this is that the male elite is virtually always the point of reference and therefore the life of the city is necessarily relevant. But the idea of the community of virtues abolishes a truly private sphere. Thus problems of interaction with others and, in a word, of communication at home and abroad loom large. So Plutarch often seems to be concerned with promoting social harmony when he encourages individual contentment.

Surprising as it may seem, there is no proof that anyone before Plutarch wrote so extensive and coherent a set of moral-political essays and biographies. We can think about the contemporary setting of this moral program in two ways. First, it is agreed by scholars that a major concern among the Greek and Roman thinkers of Plutarch's age is the production of a sense of internal discipline. This is to be achieved through taking stock of and observing others, particularly (it is said) members of the family. In regard to the latter it is now widely held that observation entailed respect and that a mutuality of purpose reigned inside the marriage as a consequence. I postpone direct discussion of these matters, including Plutarch's own methods of observation, till a little later. Second, we must not fail to take account of a most important and not unrelated link between public and private life in the society and politics of Plutarch's time, and this is where I shall start. I refer to the nexus of ideas encapsulated in the term *homonoia*, which may best be translated "consent" (literally "like-mindedness"). "Consent" was a key term in the political life of the high Roman Empire, especially the eastern, Greek-speaking half.<sup>5</sup> It came into use in the later first century A.D. and remained important at least till the third century. It appears in literary texts, inscriptions, and on coins.

How did "consent" work? There is no doubt that the local aristocracies of this time believed that they ruled in the interests of the ruled and that the people accepted this. From Hellenistic times onwards it was a standard part of the political vocabulary of rulers to claim that they were "benefiting" some group or population. Furthermore it was part of the "social contract" of benefit that those benefited should make a show of gratitude. Many of these popular acclamations ("heroes,"

<sup>5</sup> See, e.g., A.R.R. Sheppard, "Homonoia in the Greek Cities of the Roman Empire," *AntSoc* 15-7 (1984-6), 229-52.

"feeders," "founders") are duly attested in inscriptions.<sup>6</sup> In accordance with this is the well-known reorientation of the word *dēmokratia*. From Hellenistic times onwards this term is regularly used of systems of government which are unrepresentative. The reason for this reorientation is not simply the decline in the fortunes of popular government itself but the attractions of a term that was inextricably associated with the most glorious city of the classical age. Athens herself had ensured furthermore that *dēmokratia* was indissolubly linked with another idea, *nomos* ("law").<sup>7</sup> In the first and second centuries A.D. what is important to Plutarch and his contemporaries is the legality of their societies. Since they regarded themselves as enjoying the full sanction of law, it made perfect sense to them to think of their cities as "democratic." Within this nexus of ideas "consent" had a major role because it suggested a happy acquiescence in the system. Its operation was twofold. Among equals (for example, the elites of neighboring cities) it worked in a horizontal field demonstrating parity in economic, political, and cultural achievement. At home advertisement of "consent" between the councilors (the politically visible members of the ruling class) and the people, such as we see recorded in coinage and speeches, operated in a vertical field, demonstrating the imagined or real contentment of the latter with the status quo.

It has been recognized that there is a close parallel between calls for, or the advertisement of, social harmony and calls for, or the advertisement of, harmonious relations in the life of the home.<sup>8</sup> This is not, however, a parallel in the horizontal domain of this ideology but in its vertical one, since in the household power continued to reside in the hands of the husband, as Plutarch's *Advice* shows full well. But in the wider private life of male relations and friends consent did have to operate more equally. The smooth running of the city was felt to depend on the smooth running of both these areas where public and private interacted. Consider, for example, the final chapter of Plutarch's *Political Advice*. In the context of Roman rule the local Greek politician of his day has, he says, only this one thing which is his responsibility alone, "but it is second to none: to ensure perpetual *homonoia* and friendship among one's fellows, and to remove all kinds of strife, dissension, and hostility." Plutarch goes on to remark that the politician must concern himself with resolving disputes which often start in private life and then inflame the state. "Most often, a neglected lamp or some rubbish catching alight in a house starts a conflagration which ends in widespread public damage." The two case histories that follow concern the public consequences of an aborted dynastic marriage and of a case of sexual infidelity among friends. Plutarch then widens the focus to include "trials and lawsuits against fellow citizens." He sums up by saying, "once private enmities are removed, public ones cost little, and bring no unpleasant or irremediable consequences" (824D–825F). Again, in the best surviving example of a speech advocating communal "like-mindedness," Aelius Aristides warns the Rhodians not to "think

<sup>6</sup> See, e.g., L. Robert, "Tropheus et aristeus," *Hellenica* 11/12 (Paris 1960), 569–76.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. J. Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens* (Princeton 1989), 299–304.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. and cfr. C. Panagopoulos, "Vocabulaire et mentalité dans les *Moralia* de Plutarque," *DHA* 3 (1977), 197–235, at 216.

that a single house would be properly settled in one way, but a whole city in another. Rather, if like-minded thought is the single means of safety for the individual home, cities must be so much more disposed in this way, etc." (*Or. XXIV To the Rhodians, On Homonoia* 7–8 after Behr). As we shall see, Plutarch makes very similar points in *Advice to the Bride and Groom*.

The importance attributed to domestic harmony brings us back to self-discipline and observation of others including family as a way of improving the male self. According to Michel Foucault (taking his cue from Paul Veyne and other Roman historians), the greater attention which was now to be given by males to the self, especially in the crucial areas of sexual and emotional conduct, took place with a constant eye on one's relation to others, especially the wife.<sup>9</sup> This inner reflection was motivated by changes in the "political game"; in other words, the withdrawal from public life of a large section of the elite, who were no longer allowed to compete with the one man in charge (the emperor), and the constraints imposed on those who stayed as courtiers, the "service aristocracy." This model has been very influential. It has a certain truth with respect to the Roman senatorial nobility—men such as Seneca or Pliny the Younger. Unfortunately it takes little account of the position of the eastern Greek-speaking aristocracies and their local political life. Obviously the freedom of action of these local elites was circumscribed by Roman power; but their lives still revolved around the public political life of their cities. There is no reason to make a change at the top of Roman society the cause of a new self-reflection or of an increased attention to family life in the whole Roman Empire.

In the Greek East it may be that these developments were at least partly the result of something entirely the opposite of that enshrined in the current wisdom. To accept that this is so involves accepting and understanding the interchange between public and private in works of moral advice like those of Plutarch. It is important to grasp that regulation of public life presupposed the regulation of private life. The particular imperative to moralize sexual conduct, especially the accent on sexual relations within marriage as the means of promoting family values and the disapprobation of pederastic homosexual relations (which is a marked change from classical times), may well have to do with the extraordinary investment in civic life made by the elites of the time. In a famous passage about his home city of Pergamum, Galen states that his first priority is to "know the families each of us come from."<sup>10</sup> This sums up the attitudes of a period when the Greek elites were obsessed more than ever with their classical ancestry and with the continuation of an inherited world that was their right by blood, imaginary or real as the case may be. Investment in the past had become a very personal matter and individual descent from named figures from the glorious past functioned as an important part of a general civic classicism. The perpetuation of this identity depended on reproduction, and it is not unreasonable to suggest that greater attention to the marriage relation and the marriage's role as a site of self-reflection should be connected with the

<sup>9</sup> M. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, vol. III: *The Care of the Self*, trans. R. Hurley (New York 1986).

<sup>10</sup> *On Precognition* XIV. 624 Kühn (written about A.D. 178). His second and third priorities are knowledge about his peers' education and culture and information about their property and standard of living.

preservation of the male elite at a time when self-consciousness of their own worth had reached new heights.<sup>11</sup>

For the most part observation of others concerns in fact other adult males, not wife and family. Plutarch offers the broadest evidence here. The biographies themselves are a gigantic observation platform. But the thought behind them may be observed for the most part in the moral essays. One of Plutarch's favorite sayings was "Know thyself," a dictum dear to him not only as a moralist but also as a priest of Apollo's temple at Delphi, on which it was written.<sup>12</sup> The opposite of self-knowledge is *philautia*, "self-love," which lays us open to flatterers and makes us blind to self-criticism.<sup>13</sup> Self-knowledge is achieved through comparison between our past and present, using the great blessing of memory to attain contentment and well-being by recalling the good times.<sup>14</sup> In confronting "passions" (*pathê*) we must again compare their past and present effects.<sup>15</sup> We must also examine the characters of others, both to maximize communication with them<sup>16</sup> and to improve ourselves by taking note of their behavior.<sup>17</sup> Reading and listening to philosophy, poetry, or history—the intellectual repositories of Greek culture—is of the very greatest assistance here because it allows us to imitate the great. Whenever wise men "embark on some course of action, take up office, or experience some turn of fortune, they set before their eyes good men of the present or of the past and ask themselves, 'What would Plato have done here? What would Epaminondas have said? How would Lycurgus have looked, or Agesilaus?' " (*Progress in Virtue* 85A). These men serve as "mirrors" (*esoptra*)—we gaze at them to see ourselves. Precisely the same metaphor is used in (among other places) an important passage in the *Parallel Lives* where Plutarch justifies the continuation of the series, suggesting that he (and we) can get to know the heroes of his pages as if they were friends and guests (*Aemilius* 1.1–3).<sup>18</sup> The subject matter of the *Parallel Lives* should remind us that Roman examples are as important for Plutarch's purposes as Greek ones. Since the memory of great deeds of the past gives us joy "after five hundred years and more," we will appreciate the pleasure it must have given the authors of the deeds (*Epicureanism Makes Even a Pleasant Life Impossible* 1099 f., cf. *Peace of Mind* 477B). Plutarch not only felt there was a strong continuity between past and present but also continuity from one generation of a

<sup>11</sup> It is worth remarking that in the Greek romances (such as Longus's *Daphnis and Chloe*), which are often taken as prime evidence of the "new conjugality" (see esp. D. Konstan, *Sexual Symmetry: Love in the Ancient Novel and Related Genres* [Princeton 1994]), the emotional reciprocity of the lovers is always set in the context of or leads up to lawful marriage. In these stories the city is the basis of civilized Hellenic living and marriage is the dynamic force underlying its continuing existence.

<sup>12</sup> *Flatterers and Friends* 49B, *Banquet of the Seven Sages* 164B, *The "E" at Delphi* 385D, *The Delphic Oracles* 408E, *Peace of Mind* 472E, *Demosthenes* 3.2, et al.

<sup>13</sup> *Flatterers and Friends* 48F–49A, 65A, *Peace of Mind* 470C–D, 471D, *Self-Praise* 542F, 546B.

<sup>14</sup> *Advice on Health* 126f, *Superstition* 168B, *Oracles in Decline* 423A, *Peace of Mind* 473B–E, *Marius* 46. 2.

<sup>15</sup> E.g., *Progress in Virtue* 83E–F, *Bashfulness* 536C.

<sup>16</sup> E.g., *Talkativeness* 512E, *Political Advice* 799B–800A.

<sup>17</sup> *Virtue and Vice* 101C, *Control of Anger* 455F, *Self-Praise* 547D, *God's Slowness to Punish* 551A, etc.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. *Advice to the Bride and Groom* 141D (the wife questions her virtues in the mirror; ctr. 139f' where she mirrors her husband's moods, a different usage).

city or family to the next (*God's Slowness to Punish* 558D–560A). Thus Athens, which he and many of his contemporaries held in special esteem, was not simply the symbol of Greece's great past (cf. *Pericles* 12.1), but continued to set an example through the present-day virtues for which “she is quite rightly the object of emulation and admiration” (*Aristides* 27.7, cf. *God's Slowness to Punish* 559B). Again, the descendants of Aratus, Polycrates of Sicyon and his sons, had to imitate the ancestor whose *Life* is dedicated to them, but they also had virtues in their own right which they must live up to.<sup>19</sup> Plutarch's job as a moralist was to point out such good examples as well as bad ones we should avoid (cf. *Aemilius* 1.5, *Demetrius* 1.6, *How to Study Poets* 26A–B, *Moral Virtue* 452D). At every turn learning from the common inheritance of the past was the basis of the living present.

## Women and Men in Family and Society

If women are not more often part of the stock of examples, that is a reflection of their role in ancient, particularly Greek, society. Romans were aware of the far greater integration of women in their world. Cornelius Nepos and Vitruvius make well-known comments on the segregation of Greek women at home.<sup>20</sup> Plutarch twice expresses disapproval of greater integration. In response to Cato the Elder's attack on naked bathing among men (which is taken as an attack on Greeks) Plutarch observes that, “having learnt the practice of nudity from the Greeks, [the Romans] in turn infected the Greeks with doing this even in the presence of women” (*Cato the Elder* 20.8).<sup>21</sup> Similarly he condemns (but without mentioning Romans) the presence of women at dinners given by “the many,” who are further stigmatized for their enjoyment of contemporary musical performances while they eat (*Table Talk* 712E, cf. 673A–B).<sup>22</sup> The passages in Plutarch's *Lives* and *Moralia* which refer to girls and women as children, wives, widows, *hetairai*, in public and in private life, have been assembled and discussed by Le Corsu.<sup>23</sup> There are four works which are especially important for discussing his view of women in relation to men. These all illustrate Plutarch's concern with people, his theory of character, and the interrelation of private and communal life in his thought. The two which form the subject

<sup>19</sup> *Aratus* 1.3–5. Polycrates (*The Delphic Oracles* 409B, *Table Talk* 667E) was priest of the Achaeian League (SIG<sup>3</sup> 846). Cf. *God's Slowness to Punish* 558C, 557F–558A on honors shown to the descendants of Cimon and Pindar, *Themistocles* 32.6 for honors to Themistocles' current descendants.

<sup>20</sup> Nepos *On Famous Generals* pref. 6–7: “Many things proper according to our system of morality seem disgusting to the Greeks. What Roman would be ashamed to take his wife into dinner? What Roman lady [*mater familias*] does not have her seat at the front of the house where she mixes with all the visitors? It is very different in Greece. For there a woman does not go into dinner, unless relatives are the only guests, nor can she sit anywhere except in the inside rooms which are called the *gynaekōnitis* (where no man is allowed unless he is a relation).” Vitruvius *On Architecture* VI.7: “they call the halls where men's dining takes place *andrōnes* because women do not enter them.”

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *Roman Questions* 40, 274A, D–E on the Roman view of Greek nudity in recreation.

<sup>22</sup> Cfr. Plutarch's criticisms of the most obvious Roman import into the East, gladiatorial games: since the enjoyment of these shows was not restricted to “the many,” he apparently managed to see the vice as a natural one. See S. Swain, *Hellenism and Empire* (Oxford 1996), 174 n. 118.

<sup>23</sup> F. Le Corsu, *Plutarque et les femmes* (Paris 1981).

of this volume, *Consolation and Advice*, I shall come to presently. I begin with comments on *Virtues of Women* and *Dialogue on Love*.

*Virtues of Women* is one of Plutarch's latest works, since it is addressed to Flavia Clea, whose dedication at Delphi to Memmia Eurydice "her own mother" makes it clear that she was the daughter of Eurydice and Pollianus.<sup>24</sup> She is also the addressee of Plutarch's theological essay on *Isis and Osiris*, where we learn that she was a Delphic priestess (363E). Naturally Plutarch calls her solely by her Greek name, as he does all his Greek friends who were Roman citizens (including Clea's parents).<sup>25</sup> The body of the work is a selection of twenty-seven biographical stories illustrating the loyalty and bravery of various groups of women or individual women. The idea for the book came as a result of a conversation Plutarch held with Clea following the death of "our good Leontis." They had "much talk" on the themes of "philosophical consolation," and Plutarch asserts that *Virtues of Women* was requested by Clea to show that "virtue is the same in man and in woman." This can easily be demonstrated, he says, by "comparing lives with lives and actions with actions." Thus we can examine "the ambition of Semiramis against that of Sesostris or the intelligence of Tanaquil against that of King Servius," and so on.

Clea's education and intelligence make it possible for her and Plutarch to talk. Yet at the same time as Plutarch affirms to her the comparability of man and woman, we have seen that he includes among the factors accounting for differences in the core virtues that of varying "bodily temperaments" (see above, p. 86), which in this passage must at least include the differences of male and female bodies. As humans we all share in virtue; but Plutarch avoids talking of equivalence in reality as well as in theory. The *Dialogue on Love*, one of his most polished works, offers a parallel here. The event which gives the dialogue its high drama is the fictional kidnapping of a younger man, Bacchon, by his older and richer lover, Ismenodora. As this unfolds a group of friends, including a young and recently married Plutarch, are pictured debating the merits of the classical "Platonic" model of pederastic love between a boy and older male lovers and a newer model which affirms that mutual respect, sympathy, and pleasure can take place only in a male-female relationship. By making Ismenodora the older partner, Plutarch is not simply using her to replace the male *erastês*, but cleverly suggests that contingent discrepancies in the female-male relationship do not matter in the face of what he calls their "honor, grace, and mutual love and trust" (769A). Bacchon is described as an "ephebe," i.e., he is between about 16 and 18 (749E). Ismenodora is "young and beautiful," for some time past a widow, and is a "close friend" of Bacchon's mother (749D-E). It is plainly important for her role that she is not too old to bear children (754C), since it is "married love that helps our mortal race to immortality" (752A) and "the right age for marriage is that which makes it possible for the couple to have children" (754B).<sup>26</sup>

<sup>24</sup> SEG I.159.

<sup>25</sup> Plutarch's own Roman name, Mestrius, is known only from a dedication he made as a priest at Delphi to the new emperor Hadrian, SIC<sup>3</sup> 829A.

<sup>26</sup> See *Solon* 20.7-8 for Plutarch's call to outlaw marriages which do not fulfill "the aim and task of marriage."

It is also important that she has wealth and high social standing (749E). That surely makes it easier for Plutarch to wax lyrical on women's "temperance, intelligence, loyalty, and justice," not to mention female "manliness (*andreia*), boldness, and greatness of spirit" (769B–C).

Plutarch ends the last-quoted passage on a high note: "In marriage, it is more important to love than to be loved. It helps us to rid ourselves of so many mistakes (*hamartēmata*) – indeed, from all the errors that corrupt and destroy marriages" (769D–E). The comment is made, of course, from a male viewpoint: marriage functions as a place for examining male "mistakes." What of the woman? Her capacity for virtue is recognized (76–A, 769B–C above). But Plutarch again appears to speak of virtues "in accordance with their nature" (769C). The slight difficulty of the text at this point makes the precise reference of this phrase difficult; but it seems to be a recognition of the limits of the woman's role.<sup>25</sup> In the *Dialogue on Love* Plutarch's model husband has no adult public role, and this underplays distinctions between males and females. Elsewhere this husband – as an adult – is advised to use his domestic life to practice his self-control for the public sphere. "What is the training (*meletē*) for an adult man in these matters? In my view it would seem particularly useful for us to undergo a preliminary training . . . on our servants and wives. For the man who is even-tempered at home will be the more so in public. He has been fashioned by his household into a doctor of his own soul" (fr. 148 from *On Anger*).<sup>26</sup> We have to remember that the *Dialogue on Love* has a very particular focus and that a public-political work like *On Anger* may well give a better general picture of Plutarch's view of the role of family life in society.

In *Consolation and Advice* the harmony of the household is once again a matter of private and public interest. I begin with *Consolation*. Death is one of the moments when the household is most exposed to public notice. Plutarch's consciousness of this is one of the ways in which the elements traditional to this type of literature are tailored not only to the circumstances of his daughter's death but also to his own interests and philosophy. Any reader will notice that one of the work's principal themes is the decorum of his wife, Timoxena, the happiness of their home, and the example their home sets the community. In the *Life of Solon* Plutarch expresses approval of Solon's laws limiting the public expression of grief by women (21.5–7 "most of these practices are forbidden by our laws too"). Plutarch's own wife is free from such emotional instability. *Consolation* chs. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10. He dwells on the public and private aspects of her "stable frame of mind," the benefits of which she has "often heard of" (611A). She has retained at this time the "simplicity and modesty" she has always displayed in theaters and during processions (609A). "Every philosopher who has been in our company has been amazed by the simplicity of your person . . . Every citizen in our temples, at our sacrifices, in our theaters, finds your simplicity a sight to behold" (609C). When some "strangers" arrived at the

<sup>25</sup> Some editors have preferred to connect, in these other respects (*kata tēn phusin autōn* "in accordance with their nature") to "in these other respects *kalēn tēn phusin autōn*" ("their nature is noble").

<sup>26</sup> Reading Sandbach's Loeb Classical Library text (XV.276).

house with Plutarch immediately after the death of their eldest child, they could not believe anything was amiss: “so soberly had you ordered the household” (609D). Thus Timoxena will resist “the ‘entrance of bad women’” (610B), i.e., mourning women unconnected to the family. As to the visitors who come round at this time “from a bad custom,” she will remember that she is envied by them “for your children, your house,<sup>29</sup> and your way of life” (611B). She will, says Plutarch in the final chapter, match her private behavior to the requirements of society. “Our ancient, traditional laws and customs” are right to forbid normal rites for infants. Thus, “let us fulfill our outward observances as the law directs, but keep our inner health even more pure and undefiled and chaste” (612B).

Many of the themes of Plutarch’s moral essays are on display here: the need to be restrained and to show restraint in our communications with others, the interrelation of past and present (chs. 3, 8, 9), the appeal to be guided by “traditional doctrines” (611D). Despite the details of the particular situation, the social context of death allows Plutarch’s advice itself to be public and general. As he develops his argument he forgets that he is not supposed to know of the funeral (608B) when he tells us that it had been free of extravagance (608F). It is no surprise to find a moralist turning personal tragedy to account. This explains why Timoxena is now commended for what she is doing, now enjoined to act in some way, and above all why for much of the work she functions as an emblem of correct female behavior.

*Advice to the Bride and Groom* deals with another great public ritual and with the subsequent establishment of a new household in the community. It consists of a series of injunctions and separate pieces of advice. This structure invites comparison with *Advice on Health* (especially the second half) and *Political Advice*. In all three of these works much of the advice Plutarch gives is couched in a negative form (“Do not do this,” “Avoid that”); but the tone is one of optimism and Plutarch never doubts that what he says is practicable. In *Advice to the Bride and Groom* he is addressing a young couple he knows. But the advice that he places between the opening and the final sections, where they are addressed directly, is general in its reference. (*Political Advice*, addressed to Menemachus of Sardis, is very similar.) It comprises the “main points of the teaching you have often heard in the course of your education in philosophy” (138C). Only a few of these general sections concern both partners, and just a handful discuss the role of the husband. The majority are directed at women. Further, those aimed at husbands consist mostly of advice about how he should deal with his wife. Throughout, Plutarch lays emphasis on education, reason, and good sense (i.e., social and individual guidance), and on the good or bad behavior dependent on these in various aspects of married life. The benefits of philosophy are specified in the introduction and in the final section. Here Plutarch enjoins Pollianus to study philosophy and to pass on to his wife what he learns: “such studies keep women away from absurd behavior” (145C). Eurydice in turn is enjoined to “always have on your lips the remarks you learned with me as a

<sup>29</sup> The word *oikos* here probably means “lineage,” the sense it bears when it refers to Ismenodora’s social status at *Dialogue on Love* 749E.

girl. That will please your husband and earn you the admiration of other women" (145E). That she herself so admires "education and philosophy" (146A) makes it clear that much of what Plutarch has had to say in the body of the work is applicable to her no less than it is to her husband.

"Every action performed in a good household [*en oikiâi sôphronousêi*] is done by the agreement of the partners [*hyp' amphoterôn homonoouyntôn*], but displays the leadership and decision of the husband" (ch. 11, 139D). In the thought of this period the idea of *sôphrosynê* (chastity, modesty, decency, self-control) is often linked with *homonoia*, for the aims of "consent" are furthered by quiet, stable behavior. Consent between the partners (literally "by both being like-minded") not only makes the husband's task easier at home. In ch. 43 Plutarch notes that when the fifth-century Sophist Gorgias read the Greeks his speech on "like-mindedness," it was pointed out that he himself could not make even his own household *homonoiein* ("be like-minded"). "A man who proposes to produce harmony [*harmozesthai*] in the city or in the marketplace or among his own friends, must have harmony at home. Wrongs [*hamartêmata*] committed by wives are more often overlooked [*lanthanein*] than wrongs done to them" (144C).<sup>30</sup> Gorgias had made a public speech on a topic where his own house was a failure. In Plutarch's period speeches were again being made on *homonoia*. As we have seen, the basis of public "like-mindedness" is often domestic harmony.<sup>31</sup> More than this, Plutarch's husband is being examined in public life for *hamartêmata* against his wife (her own "wrongs"/ "mistakes" are likely to remain hidden).<sup>32</sup> If, like Ismenodora, Timoxena, and Eurydice, she is "rich or highly born . . . [a]s you pay attention to the size of the horse when you use the curb, so you must pay attention to the prestige [*axiôma*] of the lady" (139B). In other words, family and friends are watching to ensure the mystique of ancestry is given due respect. The payoff for the preservation of dynasties is the merging of fortunes, and Plutarch puts this beautifully in ch. 20: "Their communion [*koinônia*] may be the better preserved by their joint efforts, through mutual exchanges of goodwill." This, he adds, is what Nature does when she mixes bodies together to produce a child of both parties. He goes on: "Community [*koinônia*] of resources also is particularly appropriate for the married; they should pour everything into one fund . . . and not think of one part as belonging to one and another to the other." So far, so good; however, "We call our mixed drink 'wine,' though there is more water than wine in it; similarly, the property and the house should be called the husband's even if the wife contributes the greater part" (140F). This was *homonoia* in action.

The wisdom of the ancients (*hoi palaioi*) was to be respected, of course (138C, 144B, 145F), just as it was in *Consolation*. Yet the traditional patriarchy of *Consolation*

<sup>30</sup> For *hamartêmata* cf. *Dialogue on Love* 769E, above p. 93.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Dio of Prusa Or. XXXVIII *To the Nicomedians, On Homonoia with the Nicaeans* 15: "the safety of our houses, etc.," and above pp. 88 f.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. K. Cooper, "Insinuations of Womanly Influence: An Aspect of the Christianization of the Roman Aristocracy," *JRS* 82 (1992), 150–64, suggesting that the main purpose of male conjugal rhetoric was to secure a good reputation.

and *Advice* should not obscure their present-day reference. One notable example of this in *Advice* concerns homosexuality. When Plutarch lists the peccadilloes a wife should forgive and a man avoid, boys are not among them (140B, 144D). It may be that, despite the general validity of the work, Plutarch chose to ignore a type of behavior that was alien to Pollianus. But more than this is the fact that pederastic relations could not serve as the basis of the communal values which were in the front of Plutarch's mind. His contemporary Dio of Prusa includes pederasty in a virulent attack on sexual relationships which undermine civic life (*Euboicus* 133–52).<sup>33</sup> Plutarch's approach in *Advice* is to pass over the topic in silence, but it is plain that he shared Dio's attitudes.<sup>34</sup> The intensified pride of the Greek elites in their ancestry made the marriage relation so much more important, and the web of kinship they relied on subjected the conduct of this relation to a correspondingly greater scrutiny and care. The role of Timoxena as a paragon of female family virtue in *Consolation*, and the function of Pollianus and Eurydice in *Advice* as symbols of an ideal which every generation must reenact, reflect this very well.

<sup>33</sup> Dio's call for the magistrates to implement his advice (136–7, 140) is paralleled by Plutarch's remarks on marriages between young and old at *Solon* 20.7–8 (cf. above p. 92).

<sup>34</sup> Cf. *Dialogue on Love*, *Table Talk* 712C: the primary reason for Menander's suitability for men "going home to sleep with their wives" is that "in not one of these plays is there a love-affair with a boy." See further P. Stadler, "'Subject to the Erotic': Male Sexual Behaviour in Plutarch," in D. Innes *et al.* (eds.), *Ethics and Rhetoric* (Oxford 1995), 221–36, at 231–3 on the cautious treatment in the *Parallels* of homosexuality among the classical Greeks. For Pollianus's exemption by silence in *Advice*, cf. and cfr. *Political Advice* 809A on the possibility of enriching one's friends while holding office: "Not everyone is a Menemachus!"

# Advice to the Bride and Groom

*Plutarch Gives a Detailed Account  
of His Views on Marriage*

## Structure

[44] Plutarch's *Advice to the Bride and Groom*<sup>1</sup> is addressed to his pupils Pollianus and Eurydice.<sup>2</sup> It is both a wedding present for the young couple and a wedding speech, full of advice on how to achieve a happy life together. Plutarch wants to remind the couple of the most important things they have learned while studying with him, and he presents this advice in the form of forty-eight brief "comparisons," *homoiotêtes*. He begins by explaining, like a kindly teacher, that he has chosen this form so that the main points will be easier to remember, because they are brief and graphic: "I have put together in the form of some brief similitudes, so that they are the more easily remembered, the main points (*kephalaia*) of the teaching you have often heard in the course of your education in philosophy. These I send as a gift to you both" (Preface, 138C).

As for the form of this brief work, the forty-eight pieces of advice — images, anecdotes, and apophthegms — appear at first glance to be arranged at random, in a more or less unconnected way, and they seem to follow each other quite arbitrarily, thrown together like a pile of beads of different colors. But closer examination reveals that

Translated by Hazel Mary Harvey and David Harvey from Lisette Goessler, *Plutarchs Gedanken über die Ehe* [Plutarch on Marriage], Diss. Basel (Zurich 1962), 44–69. Translations from the *Eroticus* as well as from the *Advice to the Bride and Groom* (provided in this version where Goessler prints the Greek) have generally been taken from Donald Russell, *Plutarch: Selected Essays* (World's Classics, Oxford 1993). Notes in square brackets have been added by the translators. Bracketed figures in bold type (e.g. [44]) indicate the page numbers of the original German text.

<sup>1</sup> *Moralia* no. 12, 138A–146A (Teubner vol. I. Cf. Daniel Wyttienbach, *Animadversiones in Plutarchi opera moralia*, vol. I (= vol. VI of his *Opera*, Oxford 1795–1830), pt. 2.870 ff.; K. Ziegler in RE 41 (1951), 791 (= 155 f. in the separate edition of 1949). Parallel passages from Stobaeus are here cited from the edition by Hense (1909), vol. IV; numbers in brackets refer to the page in Hense.

<sup>2</sup> *Advice* 138A: "Plutarch to Pollianus and Eurydice, greetings!" This Pollianus may be identical with the L. Flavius Pollianus Aristi[on] of the inscription from Tithora of A.D. 98, IG IX.1.200; so Ziegler (n. 1 above) 82 (= 46 in the separate edition).

they are in fact arranged in a [45] definite sequence: the items do have links between them, the assorted beads are carefully strung on a thread, and can even be joined up into a circle to form a necklace. In other words, the Preface and the conclusion form a ring-composition of the kind that can also be seen in the *Eroticus*.<sup>\*</sup> Let us take a closer look at this.

The **Preface** begins by mentioning the traditional ancestral rites (*patrios thesmos*)<sup>3</sup> which the priestess of Demeter has performed for the young couple: pride of place is given to the confirmation of their union by the gods. Plutarch then refers to his discourse (*logos*), which he links to the subsequent musical simile with the words *synhymenaiounta*, “an addition to your wedding song,” and *prosôdon*, “in harmony with.” Next, the comparison itself: just as in music there is a melody called “The Rampant Stallion” (*nomos hipphothoros*), which acts like a charm to impel the horse to mate with the mare, so too in philosophy, among its many important discourses (*logoi*) there is one that is particularly important: the theme of marriage (the *gamêlios logos*). The philosophical development of this theme acts like a charm upon the couple who are entering upon lifelong companionship, and helps to make them gentle and pleasing to each other. That is why Plutarch has composed a philosophical discourse on marriage, which he now presents to the young couple on the occasion of their wedding. The importance of this discourse—that is, the importance of philosophy itself—for their marriage is the main point of the Preface. The clause that follows, “praying that the Muses may be present and assist Aphrodite in her work” (138CD), is merely the same idea expressed in a new image and developed a little further.

Plutarch tells us that his dearest wish is that the Muses should stand by Aphrodite and assist her. Their task is not so much to bring lyre or cithara into tune (another musical image) as to guarantee that the melody of the marriage and household should be in tune (138C). In the *Eroticus* we find the Muses presented as guardians of philosophy as well as of poetry. That is their connection with philosophy here too—[46] they play an almost allegorical role. Plutarch places them at Aphrodite’s side, just as the ancients had placed Hermes beside her; Plutarch adds an allusion to this custom, and proceeds to interpret it, explaining that *logos*, by which he means consideration and philosophical reflection, is essential for a happy marriage.

Thus in the Preface, Plutarch emphasizes the importance of *logos* for marriage, and illustrates it with the image of the Muses as companions of Aphrodite. And he returns to the Muses and philosophy at the end of the work: “You [Pollianus] are old enough now to study philosophy; use its demonstrations and arguments to improve your character, conversing and associating with those who can help you. Gather whatever is valuable from every quarter, like a bee; carry it within yourself, share it with your wife and discuss it with her, making the best arguments her friends and familiars” (145B). Similarly 145E: “And you, Eurydice, familiarize yourself in particular with the sayings of good and wise men. Always have on your lips the remarks

<sup>\*</sup> [Discussed in the first section of Goessler’s dissertation.]

<sup>3</sup> For the meaning of *thesmos* see Wyttenbach (n. 1 above), 875 and R. Hirzel, *Themis, Dike und Verwandtes* (Leipzig 1907), 350, n. 3.

you learned with me as a girl”; and 146A: “Will you not be able to have proud and splendid thoughts yourself, if you have a share not in the roses, but actually in the fruit the Muses bear, and which they lavish upon those who admire education and philosophy?”

This completes the circle of the ring-composition of the *Advice to the Bride and Groom*. But there is another motif besides *philosophia* which also occurs both at the beginning and the end of the work. In the Preface it is remarkable how emphatically Plutarch addresses himself to both partners, and how frequently he stresses what they share, or have in common: “you were shut up together” (*syneirgnymenois*); “I think that this discourse will touch both of you alike” (*homou synephaptomenôn humôn*); “charms those who come together to share their lives (*tous epi biou koinônai syniontas eis auto*), and makes them gentle and amenable to each other (*allêlois*)” (138C). And again: “I send as a gift to you both” (*koinon amphoterois*, 138C); “from each other” (*par’ allêlôn*, 138D).

This theme recurs in the peroration (145A ff.), where Plutarch begins by addressing only Pollianus, but then quickly associates him with his bride, to whom he should be everything, as Hector was to Andromache: father, mother, brother, husband<sup>4</sup>—but also her tutor (*didaskalos*) in philosophy. His final words are addressed to the young Eurydice (145E), although here too he alludes [47] immediately to her husband, whose happiness must be her main concern.

At the beginning of the work Plutarch had linked the image of the Muses and Aphrodite with that of Aphrodite and Hermes by means of association. This device, the association of ideas, is the determining compositional principle of the whole work. Indeed, Precept no. 1 is linked to the Preface by just such an association. The Preface ends with Peitho (Persuasion) and the Graces, who, like Hermes, used to be placed at Aphrodite’s side. They are symbols of persuasion (*peithein*) and gracious obedience (*charizesthai*). These goddesses, as Plutarch explains at the end of the Preface, should inspire the young couple to achieve their mutual desires by these means—persuasion and gracious obedience—rather than by force. And his first piece of advice is concerned with the quince that Solon prescribed that the bride should eat just before she goes to bed with the groom,<sup>5</sup> because—according to Plutarch’s interpretation—“the first *charis* (grace) of her lip and voice should be harmonious and sweet.” Thus the Graces mentioned at the end of the Preface lead immediately into the “first grace,” the *prôtê charis*, of the first piece of advice.

Precept no. 2 is connected with this *prôtê charis* by contrast: it refers to the “first (*prôtê*) harsh and disagreeable impressions” which the young wife may give to her young husband at the beginning of their married life. These should not cause him to storm off in a bad temper. If he will be patient with his young wife, he will gradually reap the rewards of sharing a happy life with her. Plutarch uses the image of the prickly Asparagus acutifolius that the Boeotians use to make bridal garlands. This plant has sharp thorns, but eventually produces the most delicious fruit. Men who cannot put up with girls’ first (*prôtas*) quarrels or complaints are like those who

<sup>4</sup> *Iliad* 6.429

<sup>5</sup> On this Solonian prescription, to which Plutarch also refers in *Solon* 20.4 and *Roman Questions* 279F, see Goessler’s dissertation, 112, n. 53.

taste a single sour grape and leave the ripened bunch for others. Plutarch advises the husband to be patient and considerate with his young wife, and then addresses a corresponding piece of advice to her: the newly wed young woman should not be angry with her husband because of her first [48] experience of marital intercourse. That would be like someone who is stung by a bee and does not wait for the honeycomb.

Precept no. 3 is linked to nos. 1 and 2 by the word *prôton* (first), and to no. 2 by *diaphorai* (quarrels): it is especially at the beginning of their married life that couples should beware of these. Experience shows that jointed articles will come apart for the slightest reason to start with, but once the joints have become firm with the passage of time it takes an effort to separate them from each other, even with fire and iron. Precept 2 had been concerned with the difficulties that may arise from the first experiences of intercourse (*synousia*), whereas Precept 3 deals with *diaphorai* (quarrels) in general. And whereas in no. 2 Plutarch addresses the young groom and the young bride separately, in no. 3 he addresses the newly married couple together, as a pair. Moreover, the different referents of the word *prôtos* (first) are united in the more general concept *en archêi* (at the beginning), which might well stand as a heading for Precepts 1 to 4.

*Hupo pyros*, by fire, is the linking phrase that leads into Precept 4, which narrows the scope of no. 3 and makes it more specific. The union which is to be so indissoluble should not be a merely superficial attachment. In that case it would be an *erôs* (passion) inflamed by the mere physical beauty of youth. It would be like a fire that flares up quickly and violently in chaff and suchlike, but goes out just as quickly unless it gets hold of some more solid fuel. So too *erôs* does not become truly lasting or secure until it takes hold of the intellectual faculties, the character and the mind, and thereby acquires a life and soul of its own.

Precept no. 5 follows, again a development of its immediate predecessor, but this time, as it were, in reverse: it picks up the concept of the rational (*tou phronountos*) from no. 4 in the phrase "the man of sense, who consorted rationally (*phronimôs*) with her." Plutarch points out how foolish it is to make use of love-potions. A woman who does so makes a man dependent on her for the sake of pleasure. She therefore has to spend her life with a husband who is stupid and depraved. [49] It should be pointed out that Plutarch's example—the contrast between Circe and the men magically transformed into swine and asses on the one hand, and the rational Odysseus on the other—is not entirely consistent with its context. The actual piece of advice lays the emphasis exclusively on the way in which a woman should treat her husband, but at the end of the example the emphasis is on the way in which Odysseus treats Circe.

The threads in Precept 5 which carry over into nos. 6 and 7 are "winning men over by pleasure" (*cheiroumenai di' hêdonês*), and "stupid" (*anoêtos*), as opposed to "the man of sense" (*noun echonta*) and "wisely" (*phronimôs*). In no. 6, prompted by the example of Odysseus and Circe, Plutarch generalizes these notions of winning men over by pleasure and stupidity and discusses a woman's desire to dominate within a marriage. Women who prefer to dominate a stupid partner rather than obey a sensible one are like people who would rather guide a blind man on a journey than follow a sighted one. No. 7 on the other hand picks up *hêdonê* (pleasure) from

Precept 5, and warns women against undignified love of pleasure (*philhêdonia*): Pasiphae provides the dreadful example. The concepts of *akrasia* (lack of self-control) and *philhêdonia* are contrasted with the adjectives *austêros* (strict) and *sôphrôn* (self-controlled), just as in the previous Precept foolish men (*anoêtoi*) had been contrasted with sensible ones (*phronimoi*).

The advice in Precepts 5 to 7, then, is addressed to the wife: she should not gain control over her husband by the use of potions, she should not indeed desire to dominate him at all, and she should not cause him to choose his partner on the basis of mere sensuality. In no. 8 Plutarch turns to the husband with a corresponding piece of advice, and does so by picking up the keyword *kratein* (dominate) from Precept 6: the husband should not attempt to dominate his wife by brute force, particularly if she is noble and wealthy. That would be to behave like men who force thoroughbred horses onto their knees because otherwise they would not be able to mount them. They should preserve the dignity of their wives, as they would that of a thoroughbred horse, when they use the bridle.

The wife, for her part, should display her dignity (*axiôma*) by exercising restraint (*sôphrosynê*).<sup>\*</sup> This virtue (Precept 9) will be demonstrated most clearly to the world if she stays at home (*oikourein*) when her husband is away.<sup>6</sup> However, inside the house, according to Precept 10, [50] she will demonstrate these qualities to her husband by means of her modesty (*aidôs*). Plutarch disagrees with Herodotus, who had said that a woman lays aside her modesty when she lays aside her clothes.<sup>7</sup> On the contrary, he says, this is when the virtuous woman puts her modesty on: “and the sign of the greatest love between a married couple is the greatest modesty that they show towards each other.”

This phrase “towards each other” (*pros allêlous*) leads from Precepts nos. 9 and 10, which are intended for the wife only, to no. 11, which is addressed to both husband and wife, and is to some extent a recapitulation of the various pieces of advice that Plutarch has given so far. It describes the harmonious mutual relationship which should result from that advice, and does so by means of a musical simile. A well-run household resembles two voices singing together, with the deeper voice predominating. Everything proceeds in harmonious unison and by mutual agreement between the married couple—but the husband is always the leader and the one who makes the decisions.

However, he should exercise his leadership with loving gentleness, as Precept 12 teaches us by means of the parable of the sun and Boreas, the north wind. Just as

\* [No single English word corresponds to the Greek noun *sôphrosynê*, a virtue on which Plutarch lays special emphasis, or to its adjective *sôphrôn*. Forced to decide between prudence, chastity, good sense, sobriety, virtue, discretion, moderation, self-control, temperance, and restraint, the translators have used the word chosen by Russell at each point.]

<sup>6</sup> *Oikouria* (staying at home) is similarly required of the wife in Stobaeus 4.23 (*Gamika Parangelmata*) 11 = Menander fr. 592 Koerte (546 Kock); and 4.23.12 (Hense 575) = Euripides *Meleager* fr. 521 Nauck<sup>2</sup>: “the wife who stays indoors must be a good one; the one who goes outdoors is worthless.”

<sup>7</sup> Herodotus 1.8.3. See A.E. Raubitschek, *Rh. Mus.* 100 (1957), 139–41; R. Harder, *Kl. Schr.* (Munich 1960), 208–11 [= W. Marg (ed.), *Herodot* (Darmstadt 1965), 370–4].

the sun won the contest by means of its warmth, so the husband should use reason (*logos*) to keep his wife from vices such as luxury (*tryphê*) and extravagance (*polýteleia*) and to encourage her to practice economy and moderation; he should not resort to the chilly force and violence of the north wind. That would bring about the opposite of what the husband had intended, for such treatment only provokes wives to more bitter opposition (*diamachontai kai chalepainsin*). The mention of reason (*logos*) here in 12 and the musical image of the tune (*melos*) in 11 both echo the Preface (138BC), and the idea that the husband should be the teacher of the wife recurs as one of the main ideas in the peroration (145C). Thus Precepts 11 and 12 act as a kind of provisional summing-up, with links to both the Preface and the peroration, and in the midst of the individual precepts they point towards the aim of the whole work.

Fighting and quarreling (*diamachontai kai chalepainsin*), mentioned in 12, lead by association of ideas into Precept 13: arguments and disagreements between married partners are altogether ugly. And if—according to the strict criterion of the elder Cato—it is disgraceful (*aischron*) to exchange caresses in public, it is far more disgraceful [51] to exchange insults and to quarrel in public. Association of ideas also carries us over into no. 14, but this time it leads to the opposite, the perfect agreement of a couple: the wife should accommodate herself to her husband and his moods “like a mirror,” both when he is cheerful and when he is serious. What is more, a richly ornamented mirror that does not actually reflect very efficiently is like a wife who fails to adjust her character to that of her husband: “There is no usefulness in a mirror ornamented with gold and jewels, unless it shows a likeness. Similarly, there is no profit in a rich wife, unless she makes her life and character resemble and harmonize with her husband’s” (139F). And, a little further on: “Mathematicians tell us that lines and surfaces do not move on their own, but only in conjunction with bodies: similarly a wife should have no feelings of her own, but share her husband’s seriousness and sport, his anxiety and his laughter” (140A).

The main ideas here are those of the wife making her life and character harmonize with and resemble those of her husband (*ton bion homoion . . . kai symphônôn to êthos*) and of sharing (*koinônein*); and sharing, having things in common (*koinos*), is also the leitmotif throughout Precepts 14 to 20. The advice given to the husband in no. 15 follows on from 14: for his part, just as he should let his wife share his meals, so too he should let her share his joys and his jokes. However, Precept 16 sets a limit to this: he should follow the example of the kings of Persia and not allow his wife to share in his dissolute and drunken behavior. That is why the wife should not regard her husband as inconsiderate if he sometimes goes with a prostitute or a slave-girl. On the contrary, he is showing consideration towards her if he does not subject her to his drunken behavior (*paroinia*), licentiousness (*akolasia*) and violence (*hybris*). The phrase “unbridled and tasteless in his pleasures” (*akratês de peritas hêdonas kai anagôgos*) in no. 16 leads on to Precept 17, which is also addressed to the husband only. Just as the pleasures of princes are imitated by their subjects, so too the sexual habits of the husband cause his wife to behave like himself: “a husband who loves his own body produces a wife who adorns her person; a lover of pleasure, one who is licentious and acts like a *hetaira*; and a lover of goodness and honor, a wife who is chaste and sober.” These last two adjectives, *sôphrôn* and

*kosmios*, lead on into 18, which is the counterpart of no. 17, describing the behavior of a self-controlled, decent wife. She should not shrink from her husband when he comes to her, but she should not take the initiative either, for such behavior would be bold and like a *hetaira*, whereas [52] shrinking away from him would look like a sign of arrogance and lack of affection, *aphilostorgon*. This word leads us from physical to emotional relationships, for the notion of *philostorgia*, tender affection, opens up the whole sphere of *philia* (friendship) which Plutarch discusses in the paragraphs that follow. Precept no. 19 deals with *koinônia tôn philôn*, having friends in common. The wife should not have any friends of her own, her only friends should be her husband's, whom she should share with him. And since the gods are our first and greatest friends,<sup>8</sup> then in particular she should recognize and worship only those gods that her husband believes in. Harmony between the married couple reaches its highest form in agreement about religious matters. It is worth pointing out that this piece of advice is given directly, that is, without the use of any "comparison."<sup>9</sup>

This discussion of unreserved sharing in every area of life is crowned in no. 20 by a quotation from Plato—of special significance for Plutarch the Platonist. Plato says that a state in which the words "mine" and "thine" are hardly ever heard is truly happy, since all property is held in common.<sup>10</sup> Plutarch asserts that this is true to an even greater degree in marriage. Then he goes further than Plato, and adds to the fairly neutral concept of common ownership (*koinônia*) an emotionally charged image from medicine: *sympatheia*, mutual sympathy. Just as the pain from an injury on the left side of the body is felt "in sympathy" on the right, so man and wife should feel sympathy one for the other.<sup>11</sup> Ropes are made strong by combining and twisting the separate strands: so too if each side contributes goodwill (*eunoia*), their partnership (*koinônia*) will become strong and permanent. There follows an image from Nature, *physis*: in the union of parents she takes a part from each of them in order to produce the child. This idea leads to the more specific concept of the sharing of resources, *koinônia chrêmatôn*: Plutarch demands that this sharing should be total, [53] even when a rich wife brings to the marriage a larger fortune than the husband does.

The concepts of *chrêmata* and of the rich wife form the link between sections 14–20, which have sharing (*koinos*) as their theme, and 21–34, which demonstrate

<sup>8</sup> This is reminiscent of Xenophon *Symposium* 4.47 ff.; cf. *Not Even a Pleasant Life Is Possible on Epicurean Principles* 1103B, where Plutarch quotes this passage from Xenophon verbatim. Here we have another example of the influence of Xenophon on Plutarch, especially in the area of religious and ethical matters.

<sup>9</sup> Besides no. 19, the other Precepts expressed directly, i.e., without the use of "comparisons," are nos. 15 and 36.

<sup>10</sup> *Republic* 5.461E. Plutarch cites the passage in the same sense in *Brotherly Love* 484B and *Erotic* 767D.

<sup>11</sup> Similarly Stobaeus 4.2 (*Peri Gamou*) 14 (Hense 497) = Hippothoon (cf. Euripides fr. 164 Nauck<sup>2</sup>): "the best possession a man can have is a wife who shares his feelings."

that the wife's inner qualities are much more important to a marriage than her outward ones, such as wealth or beauty, however dazzling they may be.<sup>12</sup>

Precept no. 21 points out the dire consequences of the love of wealth and the love of pleasure (*philoploutia* and *philhêdonia*) in marriage, and contrasts them with the good sense (*phronêsis*) of Odysseus and the prudence (*sôphrosynê*) of Penelope on which their exemplarily happy marriage was based. Here the two qualities exemplified by Odysseus and Penelope correspond with each other precisely: for prudence (*sôphrosynê*) is the female version of good sense (*phronêsis*).

However—no. 22 now takes up the keyword *sôphrôn*, chaste—a woman's chastity (*sôphrosynê*), even in conjunction with wealth and beauty, does not guarantee that the couple will enjoy a happy life together. This is illustrated by the story of Aemilius Paullus's smart new shoe, which looked very fine to everyone else, but pinched where he alone could feel it.<sup>13</sup> Thus a marriage can be destroyed by tiny recurrent annoyances that the world does not see. A wife's dowry, birth, and beauty (*proix, genos, kallos*) [54] are of no use to her if she is not amiable and amenable in trivial everyday matters. *Symbiôsis*, true unity in married life, depends on her behavior and on her nature: "A wife should not rely on her dowry, her birth, or her beauty, but ensure by her conversation, manners and behavior in his company, which are the points that most touch a husband, that there is nothing in their daily life harsh or hurtful, but only painless and harmonious affection."

The negative example of the woman who is compared with a tight shoe is followed in Precept no. 23 by her positive counterpart: the wife who wins affection by means of the virtue that resides in her own character, like the Thessalian woman who won the love of King Philip. She was accused of using magic, but the magic lay in the excellence of her own character: "Thus a lawful wedded wife is invincible if she has everything in herself—dowry, birth, potions, Aphrodite's magic belt—and wins goodwill by her character and virtue."

These inner virtues, character (*êthos*) and virtue (*aretê*) are more important than the external advantages of birth, beauty and wealth (*genos, kallos, ploutos*).<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Compare Stobaeus 4.22 section 6, headed "That in marriage one should not pay regard to nobility nor to wealth, but to character." Here for example is no. 123 (Hense 546, author uncertain: Stobaeus attributes it to Hipponax, impossible; it probably comes from a comedy—see Hense's apparatus criticus): "The best kind of marriage for a sensible man is to take a woman of good character into his house. For that is the only kind of dowry that preserves the household."

<sup>13</sup> Plutarch tells the same story in *Aemilius Paullus* 5.2 ff. to explain Aemilius's divorce from Papiria, which seemed so inexplicable to outsiders: "No document giving the grounds for the divorce has come down to us, but there would seem to be some truth in a story told about a divorce, which runs as follows. A Roman once divorced his wife, and when his friends admonished him, saying: 'Is she not discreet? Is she not beautiful? Is she not fruitful?' he held out his shoe (the Romans call it *calceus*), saying: 'Is this not handsome? Is it not new? But none of you can tell me where it pinches my foot.' For, in fact, although great and notorious faults separate many wives from their husbands, the slight and frequent frictions that arise from some unpleasantness or incompatibility of character, unnoticed as they may be by everybody else, also produce incurable alienations between married couples." [Trans. B. Perrin, Loeb Classical Library, slightly modified.]

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Stobaeus 4.22.129 (Hense 548) = Euripides *Andromache* 207–8: "This too is a love potion: it is not beauty, Hermione, but virtues that delight a husband." Similarly Menander fr. 571 Koerte = 646 Kock: "There is one true love potion—a considerate character: *that* enables a wife to prevail over her husband."

That is why the husband, to whom Precept 24 is addressed, should not choose a wife “with his eyes,” or “with his fingers” — i.e., by calculating her wealth — but should consider how they will get on together in everyday life.

Precept no. 25 reiterates the idea that inward beauty is the decisive factor for a happy life together. Plutarch refers to a remark of Socrates and gives the same advice to the young wife: if she looks into the mirror and finds that she is not very beautiful, she should compensate for it with her *sôphrosynê* (virtue),<sup>15</sup> but if she is beautiful she should enhance her beauty with *sôphrosynê*: “for it is an honor to the plain woman to be loved for her character, and to the beauty to be loved also for her character.”

Precept no. 26 carries this idea further: the wife should pay even less attention to finery and adornment than to her own beauty. For what truly adorns a woman is not gold and scarlet and jewels, but good qualities of character such as dignity, discipline and modesty (*semnotês*, *eutaxia*, *aidôs*).<sup>15</sup>

[55] The phrase “heart’s blind folly” (*margotês phrenôn*) in the quotation from Sophocles in Precept 26 leads by association of ideas to anger (*orgê*) and bitterness (*cholê*) in no. 27. Just as the gallbladder is removed from animals sacrificed to Hera as goddess of marriage, so in marriage there should never be any bitterness or anger. And on the other hand the dignity (*semnotês*) recommended to the wife in Precept 26 recurs here as “sharpness” (*austêrotês*) — not however the sharpness of bitter aloes, but the pleasant sharpness of wine. And above all — and this is where no. 28 picks up the thread — dignity should not mean lack of grace. Xenocrates was a man of excellent character, but he was rather too serious in manner, so Plato advised him to sacrifice to the Charites, the Graces.<sup>16</sup> Similarly Plutarch believes that a wife needs the Charites as well as *sôphrosynê* in her dealings with her husband, “so as to enjoy living with him and not ‘feel angry because she is chaste,’ as Metrodorus [fr. 36 Koerte] said.” The sentence that follows, together with Precept 29, gives details of how the wife’s *charis* manifests itself. In the first place it should be present in her outward appearance and behavior, and then, above all, in the friendliness and cheerfulness

<sup>15</sup> The anecdote about Lysander’s refusal to allow his daughters to accept the fine garments that Dionysius sent them also appears in *Lysander* ch. 2, in *Sayings of Kings and Commanders* 190E (identical with *Spartan Sayings* 229A), and in *Spartan Sayings* 218E. All three examples that Plutarch uses here to disparage feminine love of adornment — the anecdote about Lysander, the quotation from Sophocles (fr. 762 Nauck<sup>2</sup> = Radt 846), and Crates’ saying — play upon the ambiguous concepts *kosmos* and *kosmein* [which mean both adornment and orderliness] and turn upon the question of what constitutes true adornment. The piling up of three examples here is significant, first because it shows what a common *topos* it was to rebuke the love of adornment, but also that Plutarch, confronted with such an abundance of examples, quotations, and comparisons, was unable to restrict himself to just one, but gives us three in a row, linked by association of ideas. For the contrast between worthless outward adornment and the qualities of character that constitute true adornment cf. Stobaeus 4.23.3 (Hense 569) = Antiphanes fr. 264 Kock (262 Kassel-Austin [perhaps spurious]): “You should wish to make your heart splendid by purity of deed and character, not to make your body splendid with cosmetics.”

<sup>16</sup> Plato’s advice to Xenocrates is also quoted by Plutarch in *Eroticus* 769D and in *Marius* ch. 2. (It is mentioned by Diogenes Laertius 4.6 as well.) This shows the special value that Plutarch placed on grace (*charis*), which he immediately proceeds to emphasize again in the next Precept (at 142B). Cf. the little excursus on *charis* in *Eroticus* ch. 5 (751D).

of character with which she influences her husband towards the good. It is characteristic of Plutarch's balanced and placatory manner that these comments are immediately followed by complementary advice to the husband whose wife lacks *charis*. This takes the form of a variant on Phocion's remark about the difference between a friend and a flatterer: the husband should tell himself that he should not expect to have the same woman as both wife and *hetaira*.

[56] The mention of a *hetaira* leads us by association of ideas to its opposite, the theme of the *sôphrôn*, the chaste, modest woman [see p. 101 n. \*]. Precepts 30 to 32 urge the wife to be reticent and reclusive. Precept 30 recommends physical seclusion: the wife should stay at home. Precept 31 recommends, as it were, inward seclusion—that is, silence: the wife should not speak to outsiders. And 32 brings the two together: Phidias's statue of Aphrodite at Elis shows her with her foot resting on a tortoise. This is a symbol of the requirement to stay indoors (*oikouria*) and of the silence (*siôpê*)<sup>17</sup> demanded of wives, who should speak only to their husbands or through their husbands. It also provides the link to the theme of the wife's submission to her husband, which has already been touched on in Precept 11 and is now discussed in no. 33. *Sôphrôn* is still the leitmotif, and Plutarch demands on the one hand that the wife should submit herself to the husband for the sake of her own reputation,<sup>18</sup> but on the other hand “the husband should rule the wife, not as a master rules the slave, but as the soul rules the body, sharing her feelings and growing together with affection. That is the just way. One can care for one's body without being a slave to its pleasures and desires; and one can rule a wife while giving her enjoyment and kindness.” The concepts of *sympathein* (sharing her feelings) and *sympephykenai* (growing together) are again significant for Plutarch; the words *euphrainein* (enjoyment) and *charizesthai* (kindness) at the end are also important, emphasizing as they do that joy, happiness, and amiability are essential for married life.

Yet a good, well-balanced relationship of this kind between the partners—this is the train of thought that links Precepts 33 and 34—is still not everything. Only if *erôs*, love, is also present will the marriage (*gamos*) become [57] a perfect unity, a truly organic integration: “A marriage between lovers has this natural unity; a marriage for money or children is made of units connected together; a marriage based simply on the pleasure of sleeping together is made of separate units, and should be called cohabitation rather than a shared life.” Thus only when marriage is the result of *erôs* can one speak of a true union as opposed to mere cohabitation (*symbioun*), and only then does it achieve the state of total integration (*krasis di' holôn*), in which

<sup>17</sup> Silence had already been required of the wife by Ajax in Sophocles *Ajax* 293: “Woman, it is silence that best adorns a woman.” And this demand for silence entails the demand for female submission in Plutarch's next Precept (33). Similarly Stobaeus 4.23 (*Gamika Parangelmata*) 5 (Hense 570) = Menander *Hypobolimaïos* fr. 484 Kock = 418 Koerte: “A wife should never speak first, and the husband should take precedence in all things. No household where the wife comes first in everything has ever escaped destruction.”

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Stobaeus 4.22.2 (Hense 494) = Euripides fr. 545 Nauck<sup>2</sup>: “Every decent woman is a slave to her husband,” and 4.23.20 (Hense 576) = Philemon fr. 132 Kock (120 Kassel-Austin): “A good wife, Nicistrate, should be submissive to her husband, not superior. A wife who defeats her husband is a great evil.”

everything forms an indissoluble mixture and everything without exception is shared.<sup>19</sup>

This Precept (34) forms the conclusion and climax of the second part of the work; again, like Precept 20, it is addressed to both partners. At the same time it constitutes another point of repose, which is clearly linked to the Preface and the conclusion as well as to Precept 20. Indeed, Precept 34 represents an intensification of no. 20: partnership (*koinōnia*) has already been mentioned in that section, under the keyword *koinos* (in common), though there Plutarch was chiefly concerned with the sharing of property. Here, by contrast, he is talking about inner *koinōnia*, which is created and deepened by *erōs*.

The keyword in 34 that connects it to the next section is *oikeioi*, the relatives.<sup>20</sup> They form part of the total integration (*krasis di' holōn*), and include above all the wife's mother-in-law. Precepts 35 and 36 deal with behavior towards her. No. 35 advises the young wife how to cope with the jealous rivalry (*zēlotypia*) of her mother-in-law in a sensible way; no. 36 how, in order to avoid such jealousy, she should show even more trust and dependence towards her in-laws than towards her own parents, and [58] win them both over by this proof of trust and affection: "To be seen to trust makes you trusted; to be seen to love makes you loved."

Adjustment to the husband's parents is followed in Precept 37 by adjustment to his moods. Here the theme is announced by the phrase "in anger" (*en tais orgais*), which binds together the whole section from 37 to 40: how to deal with anger and quarrels. No. 37 shows the wife how to behave towards an angry husband.<sup>21</sup> No. 38 is addressed to both partners, and advises them not to sleep apart from each other when they are angry or have had a quarrel, and not to sleep together only for the sake of pleasure (*hēdonē*) but apart from each other when they are angry. Rather, they should follow the advice of Homer, and make use of Aphrodite as the best medicine for any disagreements.<sup>22</sup>

Precept 39 develops this point: at all times and in all places husband and wife must beware of offending each other, but above all when they are sleeping together (*synousia*). For disagreements (*diaphorai*), insults (*loidoriai*) and angry passions (*orgai*) that arise in bed cannot easily be resolved elsewhere.

<sup>19</sup> The idea that only love (*erōs*) results in total fusion (*di' holōn krasis*) for a married couple is expressed in exactly the same form in *Eroticus* ch. 24, 769F. The Stoics used this phrase to describe the ideal combination of two liquid elements: cf. Antipater in SVF III.255 with Plutarch *Common Notions* 1078A.

<sup>20</sup> The view that the relatives on both sides are also involved in a marriage is the basis for the explanation that Plutarch makes Theon give when he is asked why so many guests are invited to weddings: "But add, if you will, a further point, that these particular banquets are not merely friendly entertainments but important family occasions, which solemnize the incorporation of a new set of relatives into the family. What is more important than this, at the union of two houses, each father-in-law regards it as a duty to demonstrate good will to the friends and relatives of the other, and so the guest-list is doubled" (*Table Talk* 4.3 667AB, trans. H.B. Hoffleit, Loeb Classical Library).

<sup>21</sup> Plutarch seems to have taken this example of the tactics used by Cyrus's army from Xenophon *Anabasis* 1.7.4, and to be quoting from memory: so Wytténbach (n. 1 above) 895. This is another instance of Plutarch's intensive use of Xenophon.

<sup>22</sup> The same idea recurs in *Eroticus* 769AB and in *Solon* ch. 20.

These disagreements (*diaphorai*) are picked up again in Precept 40 by the phrase “disagreements and jealousies” (*diaphorai kai zêlotypiai*). In order to prevent arguments and jealousy from damaging the partnership it is extremely important that the wife should not open her doors and her ears to gossiping women. This leads to catastrophe, as the words of Hermione in Euripides’ *Andromache* show.<sup>23</sup> And even when a loving and faithful wife is treated badly, she must not pay her husband back with hatred and ill-treatment<sup>24</sup>—for what would that lead to?

Nor, says Plutarch in Precept 41, must she allow jealousy, *zêlotypia*, to provoke her to seek a divorce; on the contrary, she should [59] remember that there is nothing that would make the other woman happier.

Precept 42 is connected retrospectively with no. 39, which had mentioned intercourse (*synousia*). Plutarch uses the image of the Athenians’ three Sacred Plowings to make the point that the procreation of children is the most sacred of all plowings and sowings. For that reason it demands especial reverence (*eulabeia*) from husband and wife, and requires them both to refrain from illicit intercourse. It is in accordance with this principle that in Precepts 43 and 44 Plutarch contradicts the limited concessions that he had granted the husband in no. 16, and demands that he too should be faithful. In Precept 43, indeed, this is expressed partly in terms of political theory. Plutarch demonstrates from the counter-example of the orator Gorgias that concord (*homonoia*) in the state must start with concord within marriage: “A man who proposes to produce harmony in the city or in the marketplace or among his own friends must have harmony at home.” In 44 he bases his demand for faithfulness on consideration for the feelings of the wife, which are wounded by the husband’s adultery. Plutarch goes so far as to call it wrong, *adikon*: “It is wrong to cause such pain and disturbance to wives for the sake of a slight pleasure.”

As a counterpart to this, in Precept 45 Plutarch advises women not to annoy their husbands or tantalize them with colored garments or musical instruments that they dislike, and recommends steady tranquility (*eustatheia*) and gentleness (*prôtês*) in their life together. To these qualities he adds four more in Precept 46. He refutes the saying that all women are the same in the dark by pointing out that it is true only in the case of adulterous husbands. It is when the lights are out that a wife should strive to be quite different from any other woman, and if her body cannot be seen then it is all the more important that her intelligence, her exclusive devotion to her husband, her tact, and her tenderness should be most apparent. On the other hand—for no. 47, which takes its cue from a passage in Plato, is addressed to the husband—it is the husband who makes the wife into what he is himself: “A husband should keep this in mind, and respect (*aideisthai*) no one more than he does his wife. The bedroom will be her school of discipline (*eutaxia*) or immorality (*akolasia*).”

<sup>23</sup> Plutarch also mentions these “visits of evil women” (*kakôn gynaiikôn eisodoi*) and the danger they bring in *Consolation* 610B. The line from Euripides (*Andromache* 930) is quoted by Stobaeus 4.23.27 (Hense 579), and its wider context at 4.23.4 (Hense 569) = *Andromache* 943–6, 952–3.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Stobaeus 4.23.37 (Hense 581) = Epicharmus fr. 286 Kaibel: “it is a virtue in a well-behaved woman not to wrong her partner.” (Valckenauer deleted the final word *andra* [husband] as a gloss.)

[60] The idea that a husband should set a good example to his wife provides the link to the final section, no. 48, in which Plutarch concludes by advising Eurydice against adornment and extravagance. In the image of the bedroom (*thalamos*) as schoolroom (*didaskaleion*) in no. 47, and here, in the notion of the husband setting an example to his wife, we also find the link to Plutarch's conclusion, in which, as we have already said [p. 99 above], the husband is told that he should be his wife's tutor, her *didaskalos*.

## Implications

In his *Advice to the Bride and Groom* Plutarch takes as his subject the correct behavior of a married couple towards each other. It is a veritable textbook on the duties of marriage. The work thus belongs to the tradition of Stoic writings on duties, *perī kathēkontōn*.<sup>25</sup> In this genre—as we can see from, for example, the fragments of the Stoic Hierocles<sup>26</sup> or Musonius<sup>27</sup>—there were separate treatises on duties towards the gods, towards one's native land, one's brother, and one's other relatives, and how one should behave towards them, as well as on duties towards one's wife and children.<sup>28</sup> But we do justice to only one aspect of Plutarch's marital precepts if we simply classify them among Stoic writings on duty. This should not surprise us. Plutarch is not a writer who fits into neat schematic pigeon-holes. The intellectual legacy of previous generations certainly determined and influenced his writings, but although he may have borrowed earlier ideas, he arranged and applied them with complete independence and freedom. He did not align himself with the doctrine of any one of the philosophical schools. Thus on several occasions in his *Advice to the Bride and Groom* Plutarch steps outside his chosen field of instruction to man and wife: for example, in Precept 24 he discusses the criteria for choosing a partner. Strictly speaking, such considerations are irrelevant [61] to a treatise on marital duties. Their proper place would be in a treatise on marriage, *Peri Gamou*, or, more precisely, in a discussion of the question whether one should marry, *Ei gamēteon*. In works of this kind, the standard arguments on either side are presented in clearly defined sections. First comes a positive section, which sets out considerations in favor of getting married; this would include general praise of marriage, as in chapter 21 of *Eroticus* (766E–768B). This is followed by a negative section that refutes considerations that appear to tell against marriage, such as the possibility that one might use the wrong criteria in choosing a partner. The standard answer to this is that the wrong choice of partner will almost inevitably lead to an unhappy marriage, but that does not constitute a good reason for not marrying.<sup>29</sup> In the *Advice*, as in the *Eroticus*,<sup>30</sup> the

<sup>25</sup> Cf. M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa* (Göttingen 1948), I.141, 202 ff., 237, 298 ff.

<sup>26</sup> K. Praechter, *Hierokles der Stoiker* (Leipzig 1901), 7–8.

<sup>27</sup> C. Musonii Rufi Reliquiae, ed. O. Hense (Leipzig 1905) [cf. C. Lutz, *YCLS* 10 (1947), 3–147].

<sup>28</sup> Plutarch's works on *Brotherly Love* (no. 31, 478A–492D, Teubner III.221 ff.) and on *Love of Offspring* (no. 32, 493A–497E, Teubner III.255 ff.) also belong in this context.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Antipater fr. 63 (SVF II.154); Musonius in Stobaeus 4.22.20 (Hense 497 ff.) = *Musonii Reliquiae* XIV, p. 69 Hense; Hierocles in Stobaeus 4.22.21 (Hense 502 ff.); cf. Praechter (n.26 above), 67 ff.

<sup>30</sup> See p. 31 of Goessler's dissertation.

question whether to marry, *ei gamêteon*, is closely connected with the Stoic “wise man,” the *sophos*. We have shown in the previous chapter [not translated in this volume] what a close connection Plutarch sees between philosophy and marriage. This is corroborated again and again in the *Advice to the Bride and Groom*. In the Preface and the Epilogue, that is, in the most prominent sections, Plutarch emphasizes the importance of philosophy for marriage, so that we might say that the actual precepts for marital harmony are put inside a philosophical frame. By so doing, Plutarch is at the same time answering the question “Should the wise man marry?” (*ei gamêteon tōi sophōi*) in the affirmative—as he had already done in the *Eroticus*—for if philosophy is essential to marriage, it follows that it is the wise man, above all, who should marry. And the very fact that philosophy is a part of marriage also demolishes the objection frequently brought against it, that marriage is a hindrance to a man who has chosen the contemplative life, the *bios theôrêtikos*.

The spiritualization of marriage that can be seen throughout the *Advice to the Bride and Groom* is something new, and is not found in this form in any author before Plutarch. It is apparent in Plutarch’s remarks on the purpose of marriage, where [62] he makes no mention at all of the procreation of children,<sup>31</sup> which is usually listed as its prime purpose. Rather, he characterizes the union of the young couple solely as a matter of *epi biou koinōniai synienai eis tauto*, “coming together to share their lives” (138C). And in Precept 34 he explicitly assigns a lower value to a marriage entered into solely in order to gain a dowry or to produce children than to one contracted on the basis of love (*erōs*). The former does not result in complete unity: “A marriage between lovers has a natural unity; a marriage for money or children is made of units joined together” (142F).

There is a very similar passage in chapter 21 of the *Eroticus*, where Plutarch replies to “sundry disagreeable and unlovely persons” (*andres dyskoloi kai anerastai*, 767C) who maintain that the *erōs* that leads to marriage is only an unstable desire (*akatastatos epithumia*), saying that such people marry only because they are much more eager to acquire money or children than to acquire a wife. Caring nothing for true love, these wretched characters “behave like cicadas, which deposit their seed on squills or what you will, and hastily impregnate any female they come upon, gather the harvest, and let the marriage go—or, if it holds, they do not give a thought to loving or being loved, which they regard as quite unimportant” (767D).

However, this does not mean that Plutarch underestimated the importance of the procreation of children, the responsibilities that it involves, and the joys that children bring. A glance at Precept 42 or his *Consolation to His Wife* will be enough to show that. But the earlier Greek view which still prevailed in his day, that the chief purpose (*telos*) of marriage was the procreation of children,<sup>32</sup> was not Plutarch’s own view. For him, the aim of marriage was also the creation of unity between the partners (*symbiōsis*), above all, a spiritual *symbiōsis*. Marriage is a total integration

<sup>31</sup> Cf. e.g. *Musonii Reliquiae* XIIIa, p. 67 Hense.

<sup>32</sup> *Ἐπὶ αὐτῶν παῖδων γνῆσιν* (for the purpose of sowing legitimate children) [Menander *Dyscolus* 842, *Periceironome* 1013–4]; cf. pseudo-Demosthenes 59 (*Against Neaera*), 122.

<sup>33</sup> *Advice*, Preface 138C; 11, 139D; 34, 134A; *Eroticus* ch. 24, 769F ff.

(*di' holôn krasis*) and sharing of every aspect of life (*koinônia pantos tou biou*)<sup>33</sup> in which for Plutarch the emphasis is clearly on the spiritual aspect: marriage is an affinity of souls (*sympatheia*).<sup>34</sup>

[63] Plutarch's new conception of marriage manifests itself in the high value he places on its emotional aspect, the finely differentiated feelings that he expects the couple to experience, and the consideration that he begs them to show for each others' feelings.<sup>35</sup> This goes together with the high respect in which Plutarch holds the woman, both as an individual and in her role as wife, and his recognition of her right to share in her husband's intellectual life and in his physical comforts and recreations.<sup>36</sup> He thus allots to the wife a radically different position from that assigned to her by Xenophon, in whose *Oeconomicus* the wife of Ischomachus is imprisoned within the confines of Attic housekeeping. On the other hand, the equal rights that Plutarch advocates for the wife are nothing like the total equality between the sexes envisaged by Plato in the *Republic*.<sup>37</sup> Plutarch takes her female individuality into consideration, and protects it. Because of this, he sets certain limits to her "emancipation": that even Plutarch regards the husband as the dominant partner is betrayed by the fact that of the forty-eight Precepts, twenty-eight are addressed to the wife but only nine to the husband (the other eleven are addressed to them both). Plutarch's view of the reciprocal roles of husband and wife in marriage cannot be expressed more clearly or more beautifully than by the image that he uses in Precept 11 of two voices in harmony, but with the deeper, i.e., the male, giving the lead: "When two notes are struck together, the melody belongs to the lower note. Similarly, every action performed in a good household is done by the agreement of the partners, but displays the leadership and decision of the husband."

In Precept 16 Plutarch is prepared to condone marital infidelity on the part of the husband at least to some degree, though he makes it clear that this applies only to a man who is intemperate and tasteless in his pleasures (*akratês peri tas hêdonas kai anagôgos*), and who does not wish to inflict his licentious [64] moods on his wife. It is impossible to know whether the good-hearted Plutarch really believed in this rather strange explanation, or whether he was simply making a concession to actual circumstances. But there can be no doubt that in the depths of his heart he condemned infidelity on the part of the husband as well as the wife. This can be seen in Precept 43 and above all in 44, where he condemns the husband's unfaithfulness as *adikon*, wrong, because it hurts the wife's feelings. In demanding that the husband

<sup>34</sup> Advice 14, 139F; 19, 140D; 20, 140D ff.; Peroration 145B ff. For the concept of *sympathein* see 20, 140E and 33, 142E. That this idea is new and is to be attributed to Plutarch himself is clear from the fact that in Precept 20 he inserts a special little excursus at 140E (from "Doctors tell us . . ." to ". . . mutual exchanges of goodwill"); in other words, the train of thought in "Nature joins you together in your bodies" follows on naturally from "Even more firmly should these words be banished from a marriage." Cf. also *Eroticus* ch. 21, 767D f.; ch. 23, 769A.

<sup>35</sup> Advice 4, 138F; 10, 139C; 15 and 16, 140B; 18, 140C; 29, 142AB; 33, 142E; 37, 143C; 39, 143E; 44, 144D; 45, 144E; 47 144F–145A; *Eroticus* ch. 21, 767E; ch. 23, 769E.

<sup>36</sup> Advice 2, 138E; 8, 139B; 12, 139D; 15, 140A; 33, 142E; 44, 144D; *Eroticus* ch. 23, 769C; ch. 24, 770C.

<sup>37</sup> Bk. 5.455 ff.

too should be faithful, Plutarch aligns himself with Musonius and Hierocles.<sup>38</sup> But Musonius is opposed to infidelity on either side simply because it conflicts with the Stoic ideal of the *sophos*, the wise man, in that it is a form of *akrasia*, lack of self-control, and evil, *kakon*, whereas in Precept 43 Plutarch bases his view on a political argument, and in 44 by demanding that the husband should show some consideration for his wife's feelings. In contrast to the Stoic, who formulated his prescriptions from an absolute ideal divorced from the realities of life, Plutarch deduces his moral principles from a sympathetic insight into human nature, in this case the nature of women and wives.

Another difference between Plutarch and the Stoics is his natural approval of sexuality in marriage, though of course that does not mean that he regards it as its main purpose. But, unlike the Stoics, he does not acknowledge it only because it is a means for the procreation of children. Far from it: he regards it as the physical basis for the emotional and psychological ties of affection (*philia*) and mutual concord (*homonoia*). We can see exactly the same sentiment in chapter 23 of the *Eroticus*: "Yet for married couples, sexual relations are a foundation of affection (*philia*), a communion (*koinônêma*), as it were, in a great mystery. The pleasure may be momentary, but the honor, grace (*charis*), and mutual love and trust arising therefrom day by day proves the Delphians right when they gave Aphrodite the name Harma—'Harmony'—and Homer right when he used the word *philotês*—'loving friendship'—of this association" (769A).

Thus there is no trace of asceticism in Plutarch. Cheerfulness and joy, in his view, characterize a marriage in which the partners make each other happy by the reciprocal and graceful exchange of favors (*charis*). But the moving force which brings about this delightful, cheerful harmony and forms the basis for this mutual understanding and happiness is love, *erôs*. Love is necessary to bring about that perfect marriage [65] that Plutarch celebrates in his praise of marriage (*enkômion gamou*) both in Precepts 20 and 34 and in the *Eroticus*. Let us set the parallel passages from the two works side by side:

First: *Advice*, Precept 20:

Plato [*Republic* 5.462C] says that the happy and blessed city is one in which the words "mine" and "not mine" are least to be heard, because the citizens treat everything of importance, so far as possible, as their common property. Even more firmly should these words be banished from a marriage. Doctors tell us that an injury to the left side refers the sensation to the right. Similarly, it is good for a wife to share her husband's feelings, and a husband his wife's, so that, just as ropes gain strength from the twisting of the strands, so their communion may be better preserved by their joint efforts, through mutual exchanges of goodwill. (140DE)

Compare *Eroticus* chapter 21:

In my view, though, the fact that the verb *stergein*, "to love," differs by only one letter from *stegein*, "to protect," itself expresses the mutual goodwill that time and familiarity inevitably produce. When Eros lights upon a man and inspires him, the

<sup>38</sup> The same demand had also been made by Plato, *Laws* 8.841CD.

first consequence is that he takes the words “mine” and “not mine” in the sense that they are given in Plato’s *Republic* [5.462C]; for the saying “friends’ things are common property” is not universally true, but only of persons who, though physically separate, force their souls together<sup>39</sup> and melt into one, neither wishing to be two separate persons nor believing that they are. (767DE)

On the other hand, *Advice*, Precept 34: “A marriage between lovers has natural unity [as of a living creature]; a marriage for money or children is made of units connected together; a marriage based simply on the pleasure of sleeping together is made of separate units, and should be called cohabitation rather than a shared life. Scientists tell us that liquids mix together in a total integration (*di’ holôn krasis*: Chrysippus, in *SVF* II.152.24; II.157.36): so should the bodies, resources, friends, and connections of a married couple. The Roman lawgiver forbade married couples to give or receive presents from each other. This was not to stop them sharing, but to make them think everything their common property” (142F–143A). This corresponds exactly to *Eroticus* chapter 24: “This integration of lovers is indeed what scientists call ‘total integration’ (*di’ holôn krasis*); the combining of persons who live together is more like Epicurus’s ‘contacts’ (*haphai*) and ‘nexuses’ (*periplokai*),\* subject to collisions and repulsions, but not [66] resulting in the kind of unity that Eros sets up within a conjugal union” (769F).

And to strengthen and give a poetic dimension to this praise of a perfect marriage, Plutarch concludes the *Eroticus* (ch. 24) by appealing to the authority of Homer: “No mutual pleasures are greater, no mutual services more constant, no form of affection is more enviable and estimable for its sheer beauty than ‘when man and wife in harmony of mind | keep house together’” (770A).<sup>40</sup>

These parallels show how closely the *Advice to the Bride and Groom* and the *Eroticus* are related to each other, and how their treatment of their chief concerns tends in the same direction. The only difference is one of emphasis. In the *Eroticus* Plutarch’s aim is to demonstrate that true *erôs* is *erôs* for one’s wife, that is, an *erôs* that finds its fulfillment in marriage. We might express it as a formula: *erôs* = *gamos*, with the emphasis on *gamos*. In his *Advice* he demonstrates that a true marriage is one in which *erôs* reigns, leading to complete unity and harmony: that is, *erôs* = *gamos*, with the emphasis on *erôs*. Thus the two works are closely related, and each complements the other.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>39</sup> G. Zuntz, *Rh. Mus.* 96 (1953), proposes to emend the text at this point, reading *henizomenoi* for *horizomenoi* and *biaiôs* for *biai*. This is clearly correct [and has been accepted in Russell’s translation above].

\* [Cf. e.g. Epicurus *Letter to Herodotus* 43–4.]

<sup>40</sup> *Odyssey* 6.183–4

<sup>41</sup> One is tempted to assume that they were written at roughly the same time. Since the *Eroticus* is dated relatively late (cf. R. Flacelière, *Plutarque: dialogue sur l’amour* [Paris 1952], 10 ff.), it follows that both works belong to Plutarch’s late period. This conclusion is supported by his address to his former pupils Pollianus and Eurydice in the Preface and exordium of the *Advice*. [Goessler’s association of these works is consistent with the dating proposed on other grounds by C.P. Jones in *JRS* 56 (1966), 61–74, who places *Advice* between ca. A.D. 90 and ca. 100, perhaps ca. A.D. 95, and the *Eroticus* after 96 (pp. 71–2); neither work, however, belongs to Plutarch’s very latest period.]

It is true that other ancient authors who wrote works on marriage, *Peri Gamou*, had sometimes mentioned *erôs* in this context.<sup>42</sup> But they do not put as much emphasis on it as Plutarch does, and their pronouncements on the subject lack Plutarch's characteristic warmth, a warmth that comes straight from the heart, and which sheds a new and totally different light on marriage.

Plutarch's view of marriage is very much closer to that of Homer than to these later writers. It is no coincidence that he refers to the Homeric poems so often in the *Eroticus* and the *Advice*.<sup>43</sup> His quotations from Homer are not just the usual *topoi* [67] found in Greek ethical treatises. They express the inner sympathy with which Plutarch reaches back beyond the classical period to the Homeric ethos. Hector and Andromache, Odysseus and Penelope, Odysseus's words to Nausicaa—for these characters and in these verses *erôs* and *gamos* belong together just as they do for Plutarch.

If we look at works rather closer to Plutarch's own time, we find that the ground for his attitude has already been prepared in New Comedy, above all by its supreme exponent, Menander. It would take us too far afield to cite all the relevant passages from his plays here. But lines 786–90 of the recently discovered \* *Dyscolus* put into a nutshell the central idea of Plutarch's *Advice*, that only a marriage entered into for the sake of love can be truly and enduringly happy, and they deserve to be quoted as a particularly impressive parallel:

I want you to get married to  
The girl you love, I say you must! . . .  
Yes, by the gods it does [meet all the requirements]!  
I realise that when you're young, it adds  
Stability to marriage if it's love  
That prompts the bridegroom. \*\*

This fundamental correspondence in their views on love and marriage is one of the main reasons that Plutarch prefers Menander to Aristophanes, both in his *Comparison* of those two poets<sup>44</sup> and above all in *Table Talk* 7.8.3;<sup>45</sup> one of the reasons that he prefers Menander, he says, is because there is no pederasty (*paidikos erôs*) in his plays, and because the rapes (*phthorai tôn parthenôn*) always eventually result in a wedding. Or because the young man regrets having consorted with a *hetaira*, or else the play is about a “noble *hetaira*,” a woman who is full of genuine

<sup>42</sup> For example, Stobaeus 4.22.20 = Musonius, *ek tou Ei empodion tôi philosophhein gamos* (Musonii Reliquiae XIV, p. 70 Hense); or Stobaeus 4.23.59 = Dio of Prusa, *ek tou Oikonomikou* (fr. VI in SVF II.310).

<sup>43</sup> *Iliad* 2.362 is discussed in *Eroticus* 761B; *Iliad* 14.209, *Odyssey* 11.246 and 248 are quoted in *Eroticus* ch. 23, 769A; *Odyssey* 6.183 in *Eroticus* ch. 24, 770A; Helen and Paris contrasted with Penelope and Odysseus in *Advice* 21, 141A; and *Iliad* 6.429 (Hector and Andromache) is quoted in the exordium to *Advice*, 145B.

\* [Goessler was writing in 1962; the *Dyscolus* was first published in 1958.]

\*\* [Trans. W.G. Arnott, Loeb Classical Library.]

<sup>44</sup> No. 56, *Comparison of Aristophanes and Menander* (only an abridgment survives: 853A–854D: Teubner vol. V). See Ziegler (n. 1 above) col. 872 (= 235 of the separate edition).

<sup>45</sup> No. 46 (612D–748D: Teubner vol. IV); Ziegler (n. 1 above) col. 885 ff. (= 248 ff.)

love and who turns out in the end to have a legitimate citizen father; or else time ennobles their love and [68] leads her to adopt a decent and emotionally refined way of life.<sup>46</sup> What Plutarch emphasizes in this passage is an exact reflection of his own views. He feels a kinship between Menander and himself—and that is why he values him so highly.

If we look for the sources of Plutarch's views on marriage, we find the influence of the traditional treatises on love (*Peri Erōtos*) and marriage (*Peri Gamou*) on the one hand, and on the other the general influence of the times, but there is a third and no less significant element: Plutarch's own experience and emotional life.

This is revealed in the most direct and beautiful way in the *Consolation to His Wife*,<sup>47</sup> the letter of comfort that he wrote to his wife when he was on a journey and received the news of the death of their little two-year-old daughter. This gives us first-hand evidence for the deep love of Plutarch as a husband for his wife, the great respect that he shows towards her, his consideration for her feelings, and his sensitive attentiveness. We can feel the close emotional union of the couple, the harmony of their marriage, and their shared spiritual life, their perfect unity (*symplois*) in every respect. And we see in it a living example of the *telos*, the purpose of marriage as Plutarch defined it in the *Eroticus* and the desirable ideal for which he gave detailed instructions in the *Advice to the Bride and Groom*. It is in this letter that we find the original model for the wife and for marriage that Plutarch had in mind in his other works, the yardstick by which he measured other marriages and the way they functioned. But conversely, his marriage with Timoxena clearly owed a good deal to the influence of his philosophy. Plutarch's own marriage is thus at the same time both the source of his philosophical views and the result of putting them into practice: there is a continual interaction between ideal and reality. And the *Consolation* confirms the individual nature of Plutarch's view of marriage that we have discovered in the *Eroticus* and *Advice to the Bride and Groom*. There is one sentence in chapter 23 of the *Eroticus* that expresses most memorably the fundamental idea that in the last analysis determines every detail of his writings about marriage: "In marriage, it is more important to love than to be loved. It helps us to rid ourselves of so many mistakes—indeed, from the all the errors that corrupt and destroy marriages" (769E).

<sup>46</sup> This corresponds with Plutarch's remarks about the ennobling effect of love on *hetairai* in *Eroticus* ch. 21, 767F–768A.

<sup>47</sup> No. 45, 608A–612B: Teubner III, 533 ff.; Ziegler (n. 1 above) 792 f. (= 156 f.) [and of course the present volume *passim*].

# Practicing What You Preach

## *Plutarch's Sources and Treatment*

*Advice and Consolation* both belong to ancient traditions.<sup>1</sup> The necessity of marriage is a commonplace,<sup>2</sup> only questioned theoretically by rhetoricians and philosophers.<sup>3</sup> Epic, drama, satire, and *epithalamia* celebrate and examine it. I shall illustrate how Plutarch selects and shapes preexistent material from a wide variety of genres: rhetoric, philosophy, poetry. Some have argued a pervasive Stoic influence and that Plutarch marks a “step forward” in thought about women, as “proto-feminist.”<sup>4</sup> A greater appreciation of Plutarch’s literary precedents reveals this as overenthusiastic pleading. We should be cautious about attributing to any philosophical school views, especially on gender, that were already traditional.

I start by discussing Plutarch’s treatment of a sample of traditional commonplaces (in no special order), then I illustrate how these are integrated into his didactic technique. Finally I show how Plutarch employs traditional motifs to present Timoxena as the ideal wife.

### Tradition

#### *Household Management*

From Hesiod’s *Works and Days* on, discussions of household management (e.g., Xenophon or Aristotle) and praise of women in, e.g., oratory or funerary epigram pri-

<sup>1</sup> F. Buddenhagen, “*Peri Gamou*” (Diss. Basel 1918); W. Sieveking, *Plutarch: Über Liebe und Ehe* (Munich n.d.); E. Bickel, *Diatriben in Seneca Philosophi Fragmenta. I: Fragmenta de Matrimonio* (Leipzig 1915); Lisette Goessler, *Plutarchs Gedanken über die Ehe* (Zurich 1962 and this volume).

<sup>2</sup> Hesiod *Works* 405–6; Menander I<sup>578K</sup>-T; Antipater SVF III.254.25 ff., 255.5–6, 256.33–4. Plut. *Quiet of Mind* 469D: man’s most respected possessions are his house, wife and a good friend.

<sup>3</sup> E.g., the *thesis ei gamêteon*; Musonius 14; D.A. Russell, “Rhetors at the Wedding,” *PCPS* 205 (1979), 104–71.

<sup>4</sup> See Patterson (this volume). For Stoics on women, see E. Asmis, “The Stoics on Women,” in J.K. Ward (ed.), *Feminism and Ancient Philosophy* (London 1996), 68–92.

marily discuss women as housewives, with little interest in their characters.<sup>5</sup> Plutarch's ideal wife in *Advice* is a housewife (*oikodespoina*), and Timoxena is praised in *Consolation* for her domestic management in Plutarch's absence, but Plutarch is much more interested in the psychology and harmony of the family. The wife and mother is seen like a moral barometer for the household: upon her virtue depends its security. One key ingredient is moderation (*sôphrosynê*), which forms a leitmotif in both works.<sup>6</sup>

### Extravagance

In *Advice* and *Consolation*, Plutarch adopts the traditional assumption that women are more extravagant than men:<sup>7</sup> Pollianus should use persuasion rather than force to curb Eurydice's extravagance (*tryphe*, *polyteleia*, *Advice* 12); Timoxena lacks extravagance in mourning (*polyteleia*, *Consol.* 4). However, Plutarch tempers the traditional "woman as vicious" image by accepting that men also fail in this regard: a husband's extravagance acts as a bad example for his wife; Pollianus is to refrain from expensive gifts (48).

### Passion

Traditionally women were depicted as sex-mad,<sup>8</sup> with men self-controlled. Plutarch's explicit admission of male lust therefore appears at first sight unusual. *Advice* 4, 7, and 38 imply that moderated passion is positive within marriage, a view reiterated in *Eroticus*, where marriage is a friendship inspired by love (769A) and sexual union (751D), in which carnal desire and erotic passion are most fully satisfied (769F–770A). There Plutarch also urges *mutual* chastity.<sup>9</sup> However, this appreciation of male lust is actually a commonplace of Greek poetic tradition from Odysseus onwards. The crude reality was rarely discussed,<sup>10</sup> but marital sex is common in epic and comedy.<sup>11</sup> Neopythagorean letters of Hellenistic date also comfort women who have to learn to cope with their husbands' sexual infidelity.<sup>12</sup> As a practical ethicist, Plutarch does not deny male lust—it is a common topic in his *Lives*<sup>13</sup>—but his recommendation that a husband have respect for his wife's feelings (44) has a precedent in Laertes' reluctance to sleep with his servant Eurycleia

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Pomeroy (this volume).

<sup>6</sup> Helen North, *Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature* (Ithaca, NY 1966); P.N. Boulter, "Sophia and Sophrosune in Euripedes' *Andromache*," *Phoenix* 20 (1960), 51–8.

<sup>7</sup> Semonides *Satire* 24 (food), 63 ff. (cosmetics); bee-woman increases property (85), cf. Aristotle *Pol.* 3.3 (wife to guard property); Antipater SVF III.256.8 (danger of *tryphe*); Theophrastus L46 Fortenbaugh.

<sup>8</sup> E.g., the myth of Teiresias; Eur. *Medea* 555, 568, 1338; Plut. *Eating Flesh* 997B.

<sup>9</sup> 752A, 752C, 753B–D, 767E.

<sup>10</sup> Note Plutarch's tact: *ta taouta* 18; "Aphrodite" 38.

<sup>11</sup> *Iliad* 14.209, *Od.* 11.246 ff.; Aristoph. *Lysistrata*.

<sup>12</sup> E.g., Theano: p. 605 no. 5 Hercher.

<sup>13</sup> E.g., Pompey stays with Julia, not going to Spain (*Crassus* 16); Sulla marries Valeria for her charms alone—the marriage fails (*Pompey* 53).

(*Odyssey* 1.433). Thus sexual desire, traditionally condemned as a threat to marriage and as especially overwhelming in women, becomes for Plutarch an important foundation for marital security in both partners.

### *Beauty and Dowries*

These two “threats” are also treated skillfully by Plutarch. He criticizes men who marry for looks or for a dowry (*Advice* 24), not because beautiful or rich wives are naturally evil, but rather because the true criterion ought rather to be a wife’s character. The priority of character over looks distinguishes her from the traditional prostitute stereotype (*hetaira*), who often defines respectable wifedom by opposition. Plutarch’s references to *hetairai* consistently show them in an unfavorable light. Pleasure lovers dress up their wives to look like wanton *hetairai* (17);<sup>14</sup> *hetairai* are bold and forward (29);<sup>15</sup> they start arguments with their lovers (18); they do not care if their lovers sleep with other women (44); in short, they lack the good wife’s modesty in looks, manners, language and sex. Plutarch confirms this rhetorically with a familiar epic parallel: Helen’s and Paris’s pleasure-seeking marriage as against the admirable one of Odysseus and Penelope (21).

### *Character*

If *hetairai* traditionally possess physical allure, how are wives to keep their husbands’ affections? Plutarch answers this age-old question with more traditional advice. The wife who is modest can keep her husband with more enduring charms than dowry, birth, or beauty, namely her “conversation, manners and behavior”; to be loved for one’s character (*êthos*) is more valuable than beauty (25).<sup>16</sup> A wife should use charm (28), be husband-loving and show friendliness (29). Her inward sense of shame, even when she undresses (10), will make her modesty clear even in the dark when her body cannot be seen (46).

Remarks about the importance of a wife’s character and its contrast with that of the lewd *hetaira* remind us of the comedies of Menander. In *The Bad-Tempered Man*, Cneion’s young daughter is admired by her lover for her character, which is untainted by the influence of a mother or other women (384 ff.). Fragments of Menander echo the sentiment: men should marry as they shop, examining the bride’s family and her manners (*tropos* F581K–T);<sup>17</sup> a girl’s manners (*tropos*) are as important as her beauty for the harmony (*homonoia*) of a marriage (F580); a wife should rule her husband with her good-natured manners (*eugnômôn tropos* F571).

It is not surprising to see Plutarch echoing sentiments shared by Menander’s plays, as he admired them for their moral content and style (*Comp.* 854A). In *Table*

<sup>14</sup> Cf. *Eroticus* 759F–760A (people share *hetairai* and use wives as prostitutes); Lucian *Twice Accused* 31, *True Histories* 2.46.

<sup>15</sup> Boldness criticized: Valeria for touching Sulla in the theater (*Sulla* 35).

<sup>16</sup> Cf. *Eroticus* 767A.

<sup>17</sup> Regret at not being able to shop for a wife: Theophrastus L46 Fortenbaugh.

Talk 711A, when explaining why he prefers Menander to Aristophanes for communal entertainment, Plutarch singles out Menander's lack of obscurity, his simple and useful sayings, his avoidance of homosexuality, and his fondness for ending plays with marriage (cf. F134 Sandbach). Many of these points remind us of Plutarch's own works, which offer broad moral didacticism through brief examples and anecdotes, and prefer married heterosexuality to homosexuality.

### Water Imagery

On several occasions in *Consolation* Plutarch uses water imagery to discuss women's grief and lamentation. He speaks of waves, tides, and springs (*salon* . . . *kinêma* . . . *rheumasin* . . . *pêgês* 4) and of the calm of the body like a calm in fair weather (*eudia*, *galênê* 6). Although water imagery may seem natural to describe overwhelming emotion, it adds an extra piquancy to recall that water was traditionally associated with women, e.g., Semonides' fickle water woman or Hesiod's Pandora, made from the base (and "feminine") elements of earth and water.

### Female Vocal Expression

From the Sirens on, women's voices were considered dangerous and so regulated accordingly. In classical Athens, respectable women ideally did not speak in public, except on religious occasions.<sup>18</sup> Women's greater freedom in the public domain by Plutarch's day meant that this aspect of the feminine ideal was now even more outdated, but Plutarch's enthusiasm for classical tradition still makes him urge the husband to speak for his wife in public (*Advice* 32). Similarly traditional is 37: a wife is to remain silent when her husband shouts at her in anger but is to speak gently to him if his anger is silent, soothing him with her words (*paramythoumenai kata-praunousin*).<sup>19</sup> Antipater, when discussing this (SVF III.255.28 ff.), quotes Euripides *Phrixus* (F819 Nauck), where a woman is said to "soften anger and move the spirit from unhappiness." Here a woman's "magical" vocal power is beneficial. Another "vocal" stereotype, that of the nag, at least as old as Homer's Hera (ironically the patroness of marriage, 27), is tellingly omitted by Plutarch, who prefers to focus upon the positive in women.

The motif of women's speech is developed subtly within *Advice*. The very first section records a law of Solon's which allegedly encouraged women to chew a quince when they slept with their husbands to ensure that their voices are sweet and harmonious (1). The quince may have been an aphrodisiac, and Solon's legislation on women was well known,<sup>20</sup> but Plutarch places this first to stress his theme of

<sup>18</sup> Silence an "adornment": Soph. *Ajax* 293; cf. *Od.* 1.358–9, 21.352; *Iliad* 6.492–3; Soph. F64.4 Radt; Aesch. *Seven* 230–1; Eur. *Heracleidae* 477–8; Democritus B68 F274D–K; Heliodorus 1.21; Lycophron *Alex.* 3.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. *Brotherly Love* 491D: husband to soothe (*praunein*) an angry wife.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. *Eroticus* 769AB; *Roman Questions* 279F; *Solon* 20.

women's gentle speech. Later he instructs husbands to converse gently with their wives (15). A modest woman watches her words, as speaking is like undressing in public: it reveals the speaker's "feelings, character, and disposition" (31).<sup>21</sup> This is consistent with the importance (noted above) of woman's character within *Advice* and with Plutarch's general belief that speech reveals character (e.g., *Alexander* 1). Similarly, the woman with sense (*hê noun echousa*) ignores other women's slander of her husband and instead takes pride in her modesty and love (40). The danger of women together, gossiping or spreading slander, was another tradition.<sup>22</sup> Plutarch urges a wife not to have her own but her husband's friends (19). Hermione's proverbial remarks (Eur. *Tro.* 930) about the danger of women visitors are quoted in both *Advice* (40) and *Consolation* (7). Thus, while apparently extolling partnership, Plutarch simultaneously perpetuates an ancient prejudice.

### *Marital Quarrels*

Quarreling spouses are as ancient as epic's Zeus and Hera, who have sex to make up, as Plutarch here advises (38).<sup>23</sup> The issue of marital quarrels recurs frequently in *Advice*, understandably, as the household is the basic social unit, but it does not figure prominently in traditional treatises on the household.<sup>24</sup> This is Plutarch's personal stress on the avoidance of discord. In all these instances it is the wife's job to resolve the quarrel, whoever may have been initially responsible.<sup>25</sup> However, she is not to humiliate herself. What is more important is her role as mistress of the household: she must ensure that it runs in a smooth and orderly manner.

### *Dominant Wives*

Dominant wives, often well dowered, were a stock of tragedy and comedy.<sup>26</sup> Plutarch would have the household full of those who love, not fear you (*Banq. Sev. Sages* 155D). His *Lives* contain several negative examples of such women.<sup>27</sup> This commonplace Plutarch could have omitted in *Advice*, but chose to include as part of his message of relative equality in marriage. He urges traditional care in the man's choice of a bride,<sup>28</sup> but also injects a personal touch by including two pieces of advice for the bride, balancing disincentive and incentive: *Advice* 6 discourages

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Plut. F129 Sandbach; Aesch. F393 Radt.

<sup>22</sup> E.g., Semonides *Satire* 12–20, 90–1; Eur. *Tro.* 943 ff.

<sup>23</sup> Marital problems: Eur. *Med.* 15 ff.; *Or.* 602 ff.; *Hel.* 296 ff.; Plut. *Aemilius* 5.

<sup>24</sup> Quarrels: 3, 22, 27, 28, 38, 39, 40, 45.

<sup>25</sup> Woman as reconciler is a pervasive commonplace: note *Brotherly Love* 491DE (the wife to reconcile brothers); *Romulus* (Sabine Women); *Coriolanus*; *Antony* (Octavia).

<sup>26</sup> Tyrannical wives: Menander F251K–T. Against riches/birth: Aesch. *Prom.* 890 ff.; Eur. *El.* 1097 ff.; Plut. *Eroticus* 754A; Theophrastus L46 Fortenbaugh.

<sup>27</sup> The ruler of the world ruled by a woman: *Cato* 8; Terentia in *Cicero* 29; Fulvia in *Antony* 10.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Antipater SVF III.254.5 ff.; Themistocles sought a man for his daughter more than money (*Them.* 18).

women from dominating foolish men, while 33 praises women who submit to their husbands instead of trying to control them.<sup>29</sup> As in epic or ancient friendship theory,<sup>30</sup> the ideal marriage is harmony: a community of money, friends, and relations (34).<sup>31</sup> Those who marry simply for money or for children<sup>32</sup> merely live together rather than sharing their lives (34).<sup>33</sup> This ideal, quarrel-free, mutual community of marriage is epitomized in F204 Sandbach, where the couple's *symbiosis* lacks only Plutarch's characteristic of education.

### *Mother-in-Law*

In ancient Greek comedy,<sup>34</sup> the mother-in-law was a favorite stereotype, presented as formidable and jealous of her son (for she is more often the husband's mother than the bride's). Plutarch is quite fond of this type in his *Lives*.<sup>35</sup> At first sight his treatment here is similar (35). He relates a Libyan custom whereby the bride asks the mother-in-law for a pot on the day after her marriage. The mother-in-law is to refuse. This, explains Plutarch, quickly informs the bride of the "stepmotherliness" of the mother-in-law. Thus the bride is not to become angry if the mother-in-law later acts selfishly. So here Plutarch offers a surprising twist on the type. The ritual is designed to show the mother-in-law's goodwill for the bride, thus allowing all three parties (bride, mother-in-law, husband) to maintain their self-respect and respect for each other. Plutarch reminds us that mothers-in-law are still mothers, naturally jealous of affection for their child.<sup>36</sup> This is particularly sympathetic, but as I have shown, even this has a precedent.

### Didactic Technique

We have seen examples of how Plutarch handles traditional material, omitting, selecting, and coloring his advice to suit his personal stress on harmony. In one important area, however, Plutarch considerably develops tradition. Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* discusses a wife's education, but that is strictly limited to domestic management. Plutarch's ideal wife is to be well versed in more sophisticated culture, especially philosophy. Plutarch's didactic technique and selection of traditional material rhetorically confirm his ideal, as I shall show by looking briefly at five areas: variety, flattery, quotations/anecdotes, metaphor, and contrast.

<sup>29</sup> Submission to husband: Eur. F545 Nauck; Philemon F120K-A; Menander F418K-T.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. *Eroticus* 770: the *chreiai* and *hedonai* of marriage partners.

<sup>31</sup> Mixing metaphor: cf. Antipater SVF III.255.6; Plut. *Common Notions* 1078A.

<sup>32</sup> Approved: *Eroticus* 767D. Disapproved: Theophrastus L46 Fortenbaugh. Cf. Q. Hortensius only wanting a child from the already married daughter of Cato (*Cato Ygr.* 25).

<sup>33</sup> *Symbiosis*: cf. Eur. *Bacch.* 354.

<sup>34</sup> E.g., Apollodorus's and Terence's *Mother-in-Law*.

<sup>35</sup> Grooms' mothers: Aurelia and Pompeia (*Caesar* 9); Thalea and Getania (*Numa* 25); Coriolanus marries to please Volumnia (*Coriol.* 4). Worst example: Parysatis and Statira in *Artaxerxes*, esp. 6, 14, 17, 19.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Ps.-Plut. *Education of Children* 3E.

### Variety

Plutarch deliberately structured *Advice* in the form of a loosely connected miscellany, a structure he adopts elsewhere.<sup>37</sup> He says that his brief similitudes are designed to be more memorable; they are the chief points (1). By Plutarch's day Greco-Roman culture was expanding with great speed. Even the well read, like Plutarch, often calmly employed commonplace collections of anecdotes and quotations. Well-educated Greeks, men and women, needed shortcuts to culture. This need was satisfied by a dramatic increase in the production of miscellanies, epitomes, and collections of brief, memorable material, both heavy and lightweight. *Advice* complies neatly with this contemporary trend for brevity and variety. Rhetorical handbooks praised variety for relaxing and entertaining the reader or listener. Thus the very format of *Advice* is contrived to appeal to educated readers. *Consolation* too is varied, although more clearly cohesive. Quotations, analogies, and metaphors provide an entertaining and educational mixture. We may compare the varied tone of Diogenes Laertius's *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers*, composed for a female patron with a special interest in philosophy, especially Plato (3.46).

### Didactic Flattery

Male or female, we are all prone to vanity. Plutarch frequently addresses his female readers individually, either with vocative addresses ("O wife"), or with singular expressions, as "modest" (*sôphrôn*) or "having sense" (*noun echousa*).<sup>38</sup> Such women act properly and so, implies Plutarch, if you, the female reader, think that you are *sôphrôn* and have *nous*, then this is the way you act, isn't it? Once the reader realizes the difference between her own behavior and that praised, she may alter it out of shame at the potential censure of others. Thus Plutarch tactfully uses our natural regard for our own reputation to encourage us to alter our behavior, which works far better as an educational incentive than a direct prohibition or command. Hence we may note the rarity of direct "commands" in *Advice* and that direct speech is confined in the main to anecdotes. In *Consolation* the desired behavior is taught by narrating the past behavior of an exemplary figure, his wife and addressee Timoxena, rather than by future injunctions to the reader. The technique recalls that of the *Lives*, where past heroes act as moral examples for the future.

### Quotations/Anecdotes

While flattery works at a fairly superficial intellectual level, anecdotes, quotations, and metaphors work more deeply. Unlike direct commands, they require the reader to work out the message for themselves. Her satisfaction at the recognition of the underlying message helps in turn to embed the message more deeply in her mind.

<sup>37</sup> Goessler (*Plutarchs Gedanken über die Ehe* and this volume) (oversubtly?) argues for more cohesion.

<sup>38</sup> Ismenodora as an example of a woman with *nous* as guide for a younger man: *Eroticus* 754D.

Thus Plutarch's deployment of such devices, which may appear at first digressive or as mere literary ostentation, appeal to the reader as an intellectual.<sup>39</sup>

I have said that collections of commonplaces and quotations circulated widely in antiquity. We know that Plutarch and Lucian, for example, frequently deploy the same quotations in a variety of different contexts.<sup>40</sup> They have their favorite authors and texts. Such quotations flatter the reader's education, while varying the tone of moral instruction. Unlike the farrago of quotations which is the *Consolation to Apollonius*, our *Consolation* includes select quotations from Homer, Euripides, and Theognis, with an allusion to Aesop,<sup>41</sup> and a reference to contemporary scholarly activity on Homer (9). It is noteworthy that the authors and passages selected are not at all abstruse, implying that although Plutarch's (female) addressees and audience are expected to appreciate erudition, they are certainly not scholars.

### Metaphors

Metaphors flatter the reader that s/he has the encyclopedic knowledge desired among the cultured elite. Plutarch's metaphors in these two works alone cover the fields of medicine, history, ethnography, zoology, and fictive literature. While obviously advertising Plutarch's own alleged reading, they also confirm his ideal of the educated husband and wife. An example of this technique is *Advice* 42, which is directed at both partners and discourages extramarital affairs that may result in illegitimate children. The content is traditionally moral and practical; the style contributes to its effect. Plutarch opens with a reference to Athenian plowing festivals—detailed antiquarianism. But, says Plutarch, “the holiest of all is the sowing and plowing in marriage for the procreation of children.” This is then amplified with a quotation from Sophocles (F849 Radt)—literary coloring. He then moves to explicit advice, but couches it in quasi-religious language (“keeping themselves pure . . . unholy . . . lawless”) designed to echo the opening of this section, deploying an expertly appropriate agricultural metaphor (“not sowing . . . crop . . . fruit”), the one used in the ancient Athenian marriage formula itself. This traditional metaphor, perhaps by Plutarch's time blunted by its frequency of use, is given a new edge, advocating chastity. Here form and content work together to impress, entertain, and educate the reader.

### Contrasts

Rhetorical contrasts, common in moral education, are especially characteristic of discussions of female ideals, from Homer's contrasts of Penelope and various women

<sup>39</sup> Cf. *On Reading Poets*.

<sup>40</sup> Plutarch: W.C. Helmbold and E.N. O'Neil, *Plutarch's Quotations*, American Philological Association Monograph 19 (Baltimore 1959); Lucian: F.W. Householder, *Literary Quotation and Allusion in Lucian* (New York 1941).

<sup>41</sup> Homer *Iliad* 22.126 and *Od.* 19.163 quoted at 2. Euripides: *Phaethon* F785 quoted at 3 (contrast Seneca *To Marcia* 2–3 for the contrast of Octavia and Livia; cf. *To Polyb.* 18.7); *Bacch.* 317–8 at 4; *Andr.* 930 at 7. Theognis 427 quoted to sum up the soul image at 10; Aesop at 5; cf. *Consol. to Apollonius* 112A.

in the *Odyssey*, to Semonides' satirical ten types of woman, to the heroines of tragedies such as Euripides' *Andromache* or *Trojan Women*. Plutarch's use of such contrasts is therefore traditional: for example, the good wife *versus* "most women" or "ordinary women" (*Advice* 46; *Consol.* 6, 9).

A development of contrast is the motif of the good woman as an example for others to admire. This too is traditional: Penelope was a positive role model for wives, as was Euripides' Alcestis. Plutarch ends *Advice* by saying that a wife's education will inspire the admiration of other women (48). His own (ideal) wife is described as an explicit public example ("a sight to behold"), admired by others, including philosophers (*Consol.* 5). And yet what these philosophers admire is not Timoxena's learning, but her virtuous behavior. Here we encounter a good example of Plutarch's ambivalence about female education. He may urge it at one moment, but the ancient stereotype of female intellectual inferiority still persists: it is not her mind but her manners that matter.

Female education is, as I have said, an important theme in both *Advice* and *Consolation*, an intellectual extension of the traditional ideal *homonoia* of marriage.<sup>42</sup> Although its advocacy was itself a commonplace,<sup>43</sup> Plutarch's frequent praise of it in his *Lives*<sup>44</sup> suggests that his essay in its favor (F128–33 Sandbach) is more than a mere rhetorical exercise. In *Advice*, education in philosophy is important for both partners: parts of 48 are addressed separately to Eurydice and Pollianus. Yet Pollianus is still to teach Eurydice.<sup>45</sup> Women who studied philosophy often came into the field through husbands or male relatives who acted as teachers.<sup>46</sup> The men always take the lead. As Plutarch collected "the main points" on marriage for the couple (1), so Pollianus is to search out useful pieces of advice and to discuss them with Eurydice (48). But even into this traditional picture Plutarch injects some humanity. This is not to be an intimidating educational experience, but gentle encouragement: Pollianus's words should be "loving." Here Plutarch deploys a common literary allusion: he compares Eurydice with the ideal Andromache (48 cf. *Iliad* 6.429),<sup>47</sup> but adapts the comparison to suit his message: Andromache viewed her husband Hector in familial terms, as father, mother, and brother; Eurydice's concerns are more philosophic—Pollianus is to be her "guide and philosopher . . . teacher of the noblest and divinest lessons." However, despite these assertions,

<sup>42</sup> Cf. *Od.* 6.180 ff.; Menander F580K–T; M.R. Lefkowitz, "Should Women Receive a Separate Education?" *New Literary History* 21.4 (1990), 799–815.

<sup>43</sup> Cleobulus: *Diog. Laert.* 1.91; Musonius 3 and 4.

<sup>44</sup> E.g., Cornelia combines youth with education, good birth, and a lack of common feminine vices (*Pompey* 55, cf. *G. Gracchus* 13); Aspasia in *Pericles* 24; Cleopatra in *Antony* 27.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Pythagoras and Theano (48); Hipparchia chose Crates as husband and teacher: *Diog. Laert.* 6.96–8; A.J. Malherbe, *The Cynic Epistles: A Study Edition* (Atlanta 1977), 82–3; E. Müsseler, *Die Kynikerbriefe 2: Kritische Ausgabe mit deutschen Übersetzung. Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums* 1.7 (Paderborn 1994), II.106–7.

<sup>46</sup> Sarah B. Pomeroy, "Technikai kai Mousikai: The Education of Women in the Fourth Century and in the Hellenistic Period," *American Journal of Ancient History* 2 (1977), 51–65; R. Hawley, "The Problem of Women Philosophers in Ancient Greece," in L.J. Archer, S. Fischler, and M. Wyke (eds.), *Women in Ancient Societies: "An Illusion of the Night"* (London 1994), 70–87.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. *Brutus* 23, yet stressing the equality of Portia and Brutus.

Plutarch then proceeds to patronize feminine intellect along very traditional lines that, coming at the end of the work, apparently undercut his earlier “progressive” message. If a wife studies geometry, she will not want to dance; study of Plato or Xenophon will make her less superstitious; education will set her apart from witches.<sup>48</sup> This structure calls to mind that of Semonides’ *Satire on Women*. There, after listing nine negative types of women, Semonides describes the positive bee-woman, only then to revert to a pessimistic tone with his exasperation that such good women are almost impossible to find.

## The Ideal Realized?

It is now time to examine how Plutarch uses traditional ways to highlight the exemplariness of his wife Timoxena. This raises important questions about how we read Plutarch’s accounts of his own family relations. As a moral teacher, he wants to appear to practice what he preaches.<sup>49</sup> I concentrate here on areas raised by *Advice*, *Consolation*, and *Eroticus*.

What little we know about Plutarch’s family relationships is what he chose to give us. In *Eroticus* 769A, Plutarch compares the ideal marriage to mutual participation in religious ceremonies: in *Consolation* 10 he refers to his and Timoxena’s joint initiation. In the setting for *Eroticus*, Plutarch and Timoxena have gone together to Thespieae to offer prayers to Eros. We may recall how important sex/love is as a theme in *Advice*. But why did Timoxena journey with Plutarch? Why must *she* make the prayer and sacrifice (749B)? Their journey, apparently, is to resolve a dispute that broke out between their respective parents shortly after the marriage.<sup>50</sup> I have shown the importance Plutarch lays on removing family conflict in *Advice*, and, furthermore, how it is the wife’s particular duty to resolve such quarrels, especially those with the parents of the married couple.<sup>51</sup> As *oikodespoina*, Timoxena offers the prayer and sacrifice for the extended *oikos* as a whole and so fulfills an ideal role, a role most obvious in *Consolation*.

Although consolation letters were a common literary genre, Plutarch’s is the only surviving example written about the death of so young a child,<sup>52</sup> thus emphasizing their grief.<sup>53</sup> Like the couple in *Advice* who should share everything, so Plutarch and his wife shared in the education of their children at home (2).<sup>54</sup> However, the letter places Timoxena firmly in the spotlight, perhaps implying that the intended readers were primarily women, an impression confirmed by the lack

<sup>48</sup> Aglaonice: *Oracles in Decline* 417A.

<sup>49</sup> D.A. Russell, *Plutarch* (London 1973), 69, although not noting how Plutarch presents his own marriage as ideal.

<sup>50</sup> Note that Plutarch and Timoxena, *ideally*, never quarreled: *Consol.* 5. Cf. K. Ziegler, *Plutarchos von Chaironeia* (Stuttgart 1949), 9 (repr. from *RE* 41 [1951], 636 ff.).

<sup>51</sup> Quarrels: see n. 24. Mother-in-law: *Advice* 35; cf. the reverence of the bridegroom’s parents: *Advice* 36.

<sup>52</sup> Grief for ones so young (*têlikauta* 2) is untraditional: contrast Cicero *Tusculans* I.93.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. his criticism of those who dislike open familial affection: *Advice* 13.

<sup>54</sup> Note how the word order emphasizes their joint role: *di’ autôn hêmôn* ends the sentence.

of direct address to her by name (merely the vocative, "wife").<sup>55</sup> Timoxena's restraint in mourning is outstanding: she did not display excess or superstition, both attributes of stereotypical women in *Advice*. This technique of expressing ideal feminine behavior in negative terms (e.g., she did *not* show excess) is common in Greek tradition from archaic poetry on.<sup>56</sup> At 4, she and her maidservants avoided self-disfigurement and lavish funeral arrangements, but acted "decently and silently." Women's silence in such circumstances is especially ideal, as funerals were traditionally notorious for women's excessive vocal lamentation (4, 6, 7). We recall the control of the female voice as a consistent ideal in *Advice*. Physically Timoxena also satisfies the ideal, not surprisingly for one who allegedly wrote a "letter" advising women to avoid adornment (48).<sup>57</sup> In this respect I think the perfume analogy (8) is carefully chosen. She did not put on mourning, and Plutarch tells us that she was not accustomed to dress herself up, but maintained "simplicity and modesty" (4). Simplicity is a traditionally praiseworthy virtue in women.<sup>58</sup>

The perfect wife according to tradition was not only a good mother but a good housekeeper.<sup>59</sup> In *Consolation* Plutarch also hints that here too Timoxena is ideal. She attended the funeral with her maidservants, and made sure that they also avoided excessive mourning (4). She ordered her household modestly (5). Plutarch also contrasts Timoxena's behavior with that of those who indulge in excessive emotion, and draws a parallel with those who are inconsistent in punishing slaves (4), whom we may note he says are female. We are surely to recall Timoxena once again as our example.

Plutarch's ideal, educated wife is also epitomized by Timoxena. On several occasions Plutarch structures the letter to show Timoxena's intellectual abilities. I have already discussed his use of quotation. He also appeals to logic, implying that she can follow it: e.g., the three rhetorical questions in climax ("what is more irrational . . .") on the illogicality of controlling joy and happiness only to surrender to grief (4).<sup>60</sup> There are echoes of philosophical commonplaces in the consolation tradition which may also imply Timoxena's ideal philosophical education.<sup>61</sup> For example, at 9 Plutarch says that Timoxena has "often been told" that happiness depends on correct reasoning, an idea deriving at least from Aristotle.<sup>62</sup> It is tempting to imply that Plutarch was teaching his wife, as he urges Pollianus in *Advice*.

<sup>55</sup> We only learn her name by deduction: 2, 9. Vocatives: 2, 3, 5, 8.

<sup>56</sup> E.g., Penelope did not behave shamelessly like Clytemnestra (*Od.* 11.444–53); the bee-wife in Semonides' *Satire* is good by not exhibiting normal womanly vices (83–93).

<sup>57</sup> Ziegler, *Plutarchos von Chaironeia*, 11–2.

<sup>58</sup> Simplicity (*apheleia*): cf. 5; Hermogenes *On Styles* 323; Photius *Library* 110B–120A. Modesty in grief: cf. Seneca *To Marcia* 3.4.

<sup>59</sup> E.g., Theophrastus 136 Fortenbaugh; *Control of Anger* 464AB; Antipater SVF III.256.22 ff., 257.3.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. the "absurdity" highlighted in *Consol.* 9.

<sup>61</sup> E.g., 3: natural to shun things that recall sadness, cf. Epicurus F398 Usener, Seneca *To Polybius* 18.7. Chapter 4 may recall Plato *Republic* 3.388E, 10.606C, *Laws* 5.732C. Chapter 8 (going back to before the child was born): cf. Teles p. 61.2–4 Hense; (avoid appearing to regret the birth): cf. Seneca *To Helvia* 19.7; (giving thanks for what we had): cf. Seneca *To Marcia* 12.1. Chapter 9 (death a place with no pain): cf. Ps.-Plato *Axiarchus* 327A.

<sup>62</sup> *Nic. Eth.* 1.10.1101A6–8; cf. Seneca *To Helvia* 5.1.

If Plutarch's wife, Timoxena, is exemplary in her behavior, so, equally suspiciously, was Timoxena junior. Plutarch employs the same traditional techniques to idealize his daughter's behavior. Timoxena junior is admirable because she lacked vice (cf. her mother's lack of vices above) and because she exhibited good nature, gentleness, and humanity (*eukolia*, *praotês*, *philanthrôpia* 2), all virtues which Plutarch praises consistently throughout his moral essays and biographies. It is also noteworthy, I believe, that her soul is likened to a caged bird (15). Although the image of a winged soul is a commonplace, Plutarch's choice of it here seems remarkably apt, as birds were traditionally pets kept by young girls.<sup>63</sup>

It is perhaps Plutarch's desire to depict both his wife and daughter as extraordinarily virtuous and fortunate that prompts him to take another traditional motif and offer a new perspective. It was a commonplace of funerary epigram to lament a young girl's death partly because she had failed to achieve in life her gender's goals of marriage and having children.<sup>64</sup> At 9, Plutarch switches the focus to comment on how Timoxena senior has *not* failed to experience those pleasures. Thus there is no negative sting to his daughter's death, only the pathos created by vivid vignettes of her happiness (esp. 2, 3), and Timoxena once again satisfies the ideal by being admired for the three most important things in a woman's life: children, household, and lifestyle (9).<sup>65</sup> Timoxena in *Consolation* thus acts as a rhetorical authority in two ways: not only does she exemplify the ideal wife of *Advice*, but her status as Plutarch's own wife in turn confirms his authority as moral teacher. Plutarch therefore treats past tradition very much with an eye to his present and future.

<sup>63</sup> J. Pollard, *Birds in Greek Life and Myth* (London 1977), 133–4.

<sup>64</sup> E.g., *Greek Anthology* 7.649, 7.486.

<sup>65</sup> Contrast *Consol.* to Apollonius: 1151f. the dead escaped the miseries of marriage and children.

# Plutarch's *Advice to the Bride and Groom*

## *Traditional Wisdom through a Philosophic Lens*

While the Romantic Robert Burns says “O, my love’s like a red, red rose,” Plutarch suggests that marital love is more like asparagus—which, he says, produces the sweetest fruit from the most prickly thorns.<sup>1</sup> This striking notion is but one of a series of such analogies, drawn from fields as diverse as household pots and pans and Aristotelian mathematics, which form the body of Plutarch’s *Advice to the Bride and Groom*—a wedding present to his newly married friends Eurydice and Pollianus. Although something of a *tour de force* in its lively use of analogy, the essay is at first sight sophisticated in neither style nor content and is usually relegated (especially by classicists) to the status of “lesser work.”<sup>2</sup> Authoritative opinion declares its ideas derivative, primarily from Stoic moralists such as Musonius Rufus,<sup>3</sup> and discussion has generally concentrated on the relation of Plutarch’s views to Stoic and early Christian ethics.<sup>4</sup> Continuing in this tradition, Michel Foucault made *Advice to the*

This essay was first published with the title “Plutarch’s Advice on Marriage: Traditional Wisdom through a Philosophic Lens” in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt / Rise and Decline of the Roman World* (ANRW), ed. Wolfgang Haase and Hildegard Temporini, vol. II.33.5, ed. Wolfgang Haase (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1991), pp. 4709–23. I am grateful to the editors for permission to incorporate the earlier material in the present, revised, version.

<sup>1</sup> For the identification of this particular sort of asparagus, see Pomeroy, “Commentary,” this volume.

<sup>2</sup> K. Ziegler, *RE* 21.791–2, summarizes and briefly discusses this work in one column. D.A. Russell (*Plutarch* [London 1973]) terms it a “comparatively early work” and notes that “it consists of a collection of similes or comparisons, each with a lesson, with only a modest amount of connected argument” (90). Russell’s analysis therefore stresses the moral character of Plutarch’s advice, concluding that it is more “in touch with common feeling” than is Stoic philosophy of marriage (91; cf. his comments twenty years later in *Plutarch: Selected Essays and Dialogues* [Oxford 1993], xvi). Since P. Wendland (*Quaestiones Musonianae* [Berlin 1886; cf. Ziegler 792]), however, the *Advice to the Bride and Groom* has been taken to reflect a Stoic moral stance.

<sup>3</sup> See Ziegler (above n. 2) who refers approvingly to Wendland’s view that Plutarch’s ideas here are “neither new nor his own.”

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, K. O’Brien Wicker, “First Century Marriage Ethics: A Comparative Study of the Household Codes and Plutarch’s *Conjugal Precepts*,” in J.W. Flanagan and A.W. Robinson (ed.), *No*

*Bride and Groom* a key text in the third volume of his *History of Sexuality*, arguing that this essay reflects a new "dual" and "reciprocal" marital morality.<sup>5</sup>

The persistent focus on the relation of Plutarch's ideas to the "latest developments" in philosophy or religion, however, has left other aspects of the essay unappreciated. First, by looking always for what is new, commentators have failed to notice what is quite old and traditional; and second, by assuming that Plutarch's perspective is primarily philosophical, they have failed to see what really is new in Plutarch's essay—an intimate focus on the marital relationship itself unencumbered by a concern for its larger social, political, or cosmic purposes. In this essay I do not attempt to take on the general issue of social and moral change addressed by Foucault and others;<sup>6</sup> rather, by focusing more narrowly on the content of *Advice to the Bride and Groom*, I hope to persuade the social historian as well as the general reader that this essay, on its own, is a distinctive source for the character and values of ancient marriage. Although modest in scope, it reveals the depth of Plutarch's Hellenic roots as well as his familiarity with the life and manners of the larger cosmopolitan Roman world, and is clearly an excellent illustration of Plutarch's ability to speak to diverse and seemingly incompatible audiences—both the traditional public and the elite philosopher, both the Greek and the Roman.

I shall proceed by first considering briefly the interpretation of *Advice to the Bride and Groom* put forth by Foucault. Since Foucault's "Stoic connection" is in fact a quite traditional approach, it may be useful to consider this argument at the outset, and then proceed to a closer look at the images of marriage called up by Plutarch's many analogies.

For Foucault, *Advice to the Bride and Groom* signals a changing attitude towards self and sexuality articulated by writers of the early Christian era. Foucault argues that Plutarch and the Stoics, in contrast to the classical philosophers, emphasized the conjugal or "dual" nature of marriage. Thus Plutarch's insistence that marriage is not simply a sleeping together or producing children together but a real "living together" (*sympioun* 34) reveals a new or changing "art of conjugality" which is now "an integral part of the cultivation of the self."<sup>7</sup> So Plutarch's use of a Stoic analogy on this topic, comparing marriage to the most complete sort of physical mixture, reveals his debt to contemporary philosophy. In claiming that marriage is like the *krasis di' holon* ("blending through the whole") of the parts of a living animal (34), Plutarch directly quotes the second century B.C. Stoic Antipater of Tarsus, who himself had adapted a point from physics to fit one of ethics.<sup>8</sup>

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*Famine in the Land: Studies in Honor of John L. McKenzie* (Missoula, Mont. 1975), 141–53; more generally, H.D. Betz (ed.), *Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature* (Leiden 1978).

<sup>5</sup> M. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, III: *The Care of the Self*, trans. R. Hurley (New York 1986), esp. Part V, "The Wife." In enunciating this view, Foucault followed the lead of his classical mentor, Paul Veyne (see *A History of Private Life*, I, trans. A. Goldhammer [Cambridge, Mass. 1987], 163).

<sup>6</sup> For an appraisal of this discussion and of Foucault's contribution, see A. Cameron, "Redrawing the Map: Early Christian Territory after Foucault," *JHS* 76 (1986), 267–71.

<sup>7</sup> *The Care of the Self*, 163.

<sup>8</sup> Stobaeus IV.22.

The blending that Plutarch and Antipater have in mind begins from sexual love but goes beyond a simple physical relationship. Extending the simile, Plutarch compares those who marry purely for money or for children to the attached parts of a house and those who merely sleep together to soldiers stationed next to one another in an army: neither has a true and complete union. Certainly, Plutarch has borrowed from the Stoics here, but borrowing from Stoic teaching on marriage did not preclude his returning at times to more traditional mode of argument—and to a marital morality notably different from his Stoic model.

A good example of both this independence of thought and also the real limitations of marital reciprocity in both Plutarch and the Stoics is the argument on marital fidelity. In discussing this issue Musonius requires a husband to stay away from a slave or servant woman's bed on the grounds that it is a reprehensible lack of self-control (*akolasia*) on his part that causes such behavior.<sup>9</sup> He does not appeal to a "reciprocal" obligation of fidelity. Plutarch also advises against infidelity, but uses the idiosyncratic argument that the pleasure it provides the husband does not match the pain it causes his wife—it enrages her just as a cat is excited to frenzy by perfume (44). On balance, it seems, such infidelity causes more trouble than it is worth. On the other side of the marital "yoke," Plutarch counsels the wife that purple clothes, cymbals, or drums drive a husband wild (as red clothes do the bull or drums the tiger) and should be avoided (45). The message seems to be that a woman should refrain from her favorite activities outside of marriage, i.e., the exotic religious cults, suggested by such dress and implements, as the husband should refrain from his, i.e., those moments with a serving girl or slave.

Plutarch's most direct statement on marital fidelity, a solemn injunction to avoid "unholy and unlawful intercourse" (44) with anyone other than a spouse, derives not from the Stoics but from Plato (*Laws* 839A). Yet here again Plutarch's moral imperative is not simply the corollary of some tenet of moral philosophy, but is qualified by an earlier appeal to tolerance on the basis of conventional mores. Although infidelity is painful to the wife, she should try to understand that it is "his respect for her that makes her husband share his intemperance or violent behavior (*hubris*) with another woman" (16). Remember, he counsels, how the Persian kings send away their wives and call for concubines when they want to get drunk and have a good time. The overall impression, then, of Plutarch's attitude toward marital fidelity is that it is essentially neither Platonic nor Stoic, but is rooted in a pragmatic accommodation to traditional sexual and marital morality. Likewise, while encouraging a wife to study geometry or astronomy (48) may seem novel and "enlightened," Plutarch's motivation is a very traditional concern with wifely behavior. If she studies geometry she will be ashamed to become a dancer (because she will understand the principles of movement?—Plutarch does not explain); and if she studies astronomy

<sup>9</sup> Stobaeus III.6.23. Foucault's analysis of this passage as imposing a reciprocal obligation of fidelity upon husband and wife (*The Care of the Self*, 172–3) is highly tendentious or simple wishful thinking. Musonius counsels the husband to restrain himself, and then asks rhetorically, "What if the wife is unfaithful with a slave or servant? Would not that be intolerable? And do we expect a wife to have more self-control than her husband, the proper ruler of the household?" The underlying assumption is that such behavior on a wife's part is completely reprehensible, not that fidelity is a mutual obligation.

she will not trust in magic charms or witchcraft, traditional female vices! The logic here appears to be Plutarch's own.

Thus, although Foucault has typically interesting things to say about Greek sexual morality (e.g., his analysis of the philosophers' emphasis on male self-control within marriage), his view remains a simplified and partial one, even within his own chosen realm of literary/philosophical discourse. Foucault does not see that the classical moral tradition he articulates so well continues among the Stoics themselves (as in Musonius's argument for sexual fidelity on grounds of self-control) and that Plutarch differs from the Stoics as well as their classical forbearers. Further, Foucault neglects what might be called the "popular discourse" about marriage, and so overestimates Plutarch's originality by underestimating the popular and traditional character of his advice. The notion that marriage is ideally a partnership of body, soul, and property, and a union of two "like-minded" people, would seem to be as old as the *Odyssey* (note that Homer is Plutarch's authority for the reconciling power of physical love).<sup>10</sup> Despite the difficulties of talking about popular morality (in a society whose literature is inherently elitist), it seems evident that Plutarch's advice is firmly grounded in traditional concerns of ancient Mediterranean society.

Plutarch presents his *Advice* as a wedding gift to both bride and groom together and as an expression of his wish that philosophy will charm those "who come together to share their lives" and make them "gentle and amenable to each other" (138C). This is in fact the main theme of the essay: reason can charm two people into living harmoniously together better than any potion or love charm. The deities whom we find in literature or art attending the marriage celebration, Aphrodite, Peitho, the Graces, and Hermes—the first three acting most likely to win the bride over to willing compliance and Hermes to escort her to her new life<sup>11</sup>—are here given a new, more philosophic function. Hermes is at the side of Aphrodite as the representative of reason (*logos*) since, says Plutarch, marital pleasure is particularly in need of reason. Then, Peitho and the Graces, rather than charming the bride into marriage, act together to convince the married couple to attain peaceably their mutual desires. The advice that Plutarch offers, in the series of brief analogies which follows, is clearly intended to illustrate just what a philosophic Peitho imbued with *charis* can do.<sup>12</sup>

Plutarch's dedication of his essay to Eurydice and Pollianus stresses the "dual" character of marriage in the sense that it is advice for two and differs in this regard

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Plutarch's comment in *Dialogue on Love* that the Delphians are not foolish when they call Aphrodite "Union" or "Harmony"; nor is Homer when he calls this union *philotes* (769A). Foucault does not deny the existence of such earlier sentiments but claims that it is only in Plutarch's time that "these ways of behaving, of acting and feeling, became themes of problematization, objects of philosophical discussion, and elements of a deliberative art of self-conduct" (*The Care of the Self*, 149).

<sup>11</sup> For a discussion of the representation of these deities in wedding scenes on Athenian painted pottery, see R. Sinos and J. Oakley, *The Wedding in Ancient Athens* (Madison, Wis. 1993).

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Russell's comment on Plutarch's use of arguments from analogy: "[T]he imagery has a rhetorical function in support of the point being made. But it is far too rich and ubiquitous to have no other end. We should I think credit Plutarch with letting his imagery fulfill also a sort of poetic purpose. The neat comparison passes easily into suggestive symbol, the arresting switch of theme into an imaginative vision" (*Plutarch*, 28).

from both Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, in which a husband instructs his wife on running the household (*oikos*), and Plato's *Republic* and *Laws*, in which the philosophic lawgiver sets forth rules on marriage for the general citizen body of a model *polis*. It also differs from the prescriptions for marriage enunciated by Musonius Rufus, who, while stressing the importance of a harmonious marriage, also emphasizes the importance of a productive (of children) marriage for a man's community and *polis*. Neither the *polis* nor even the *oikos* are uppermost in Plutarch's essay but rather the relationship of the two recipients of his gift. His advice is *gamika*, not *politika* or *oikonomika*, as is only proper on the occasion of a wedding celebration (*gamos*) in which the bride and groom are the central actors.

While it would certainly be misleading to say that the main body of *Advice* has a clearly defined structure,<sup>13</sup> it does at least cover the three areas of marital interaction—body, soul, and property—essential to the Stoic definition of marriage, and these will be as good an organizing structure as any. For the philosophic Plutarch, the most important of these areas is the community and harmony of soul. Even so, Plutarch does not ignore the “harmonies” of body and property since they contribute in an essential way to the overall harmony.

Beginning with the body and with Aphrodite herself, Plutarch insists that marital love be drug free. He acknowledges that physical relations in the initial stages of marriage can be difficult (the prickly asparagus) and that initial attraction and passions may be difficult to maintain (a fire burns quickly on chaff, fiber, and rabbit's fur, but goes out if it finds nothing to sustain it—4), arguing that only reason and the reasoning mind can support marital love. So there is no place for aphrodisiacs (dismissed implicitly and explicitly at the outset) or love potions: “Fishing with *pharmaka* (drugs) is a quick way to catch fish and an easy method of taking them, but it makes the fish inedible and bad” (5). On Plutarch's view, this is clearly a feminine vice and results in husbands who are “unreliable, foolish, and spoiled.” Here Plutarch may be in accord with popular belief (note, e.g., the mythical case of Deianira, wife of Heracles, and the actual court case of the stepmother of Antiphon I; cf. the popular picture of witches like Medea). Although the use of aphrodisiacs, love potions, or charms was in fact hardly limited to women,<sup>14</sup> it was the female use of such things that was seen in antiquity as a potential threat to the traditional social order.

For this popular anxiety (and prejudice) Plutarch adds a philosophical argument, linking the matter directly to his theme of proper marital harmony. The problem with *pharmaka* is that they take the mind (*nous*) away from the one who ought to be the ruling or leading partner in marriage, so weakening and perverting that partnership. To illustrate: the men bewitched by Circe were of no use to her, while Odysseus, who kept his mind, she loved exceedingly (5). Plutarch concludes his remarks on this topic by saying that women who prefer to have power over fools rather than listen to or obey wise men are like those who would rather lead the blind than follow men with sight and knowledge (6).

<sup>13</sup> But see L. Goessler, *Plutarch's Gedanken über die Ehe* (Zurich 1962 and this volume), for a literary analysis of the structure of the *Advice*, with an argument for ring-composition.

<sup>14</sup> See the title essay of J. Winkler, *The Constraints of Desire* (New York 1990).

While one might think that the idea of the leadership of the husband, and subordination of the wife, was a completely conventional notion, Plutarch nonetheless goes to some length and expends numerous analogies to clarify the nature of the husband's household "rule." This implies, perhaps, that just how or by what authority a husband led or ruled a wife were questions still of some interest to his readers—questions not regarded as having been decisively settled by Aristotle.<sup>15</sup> The analogy to the rule of soul over body (33) may be a commonplace, but more unusual is Plutarch's argument from musical theory. Just as, he says, when two notes sound together, the lower note takes the melody, so the household is run by both husband and wife "in agreement" but displays the husband's leadership and decision (11).<sup>16</sup> This is not just a rhetorical embellishment but an ingenious analogy for a relationship that essentially involves both harmony and hegemony. Plutarch illustrates further with another musical analogy his belief that marriage is a partnership in which the husband is the public voice of his wife's will or "music": like a flute player, a wife speaks more impressively through another's tongue, i.e., her husband's (32). Earlier in the essay, Plutarch uses an "inverted" astronomical analogy to emphasize the wife's conventional public modesty and "invisibility": just as the moon is conspicuous when at a great distance from the sun, so, on the contrary, the wife should be most visible when in her husband's company and least visible on her own (9). Plutarch thus strikes a middle chord between the extremes of Greek "seclusion" and Roman "liberation"<sup>17</sup> and advises a husband to eat with his wife, as opposed to encouraging her to seek her pleasure alone (15)—or, implicitly, to attend *symposia* (dinner parties) in the larger public world.

Plutarch's extended illustration of the ideal communality of feeling and property, as well as dining, between husband and wife reveals more fully the different public and private faces of the household. On the always central point of property ownership, Plutarch insists that all resources should go into a common fund, but that just as a mixture of water and wine is called "wine" even though there is more water than wine, so the property and estate (*ousia* and *oikos*) must be said to be the husband's even if the wife contributes more (20).<sup>18</sup> This observation about the

<sup>15</sup> Aristotle's explanation of the rule of husband over wife as "permanent political rule" (*Politics* I.1259B1) suggests that even he had to come up with some special combination of terms in order to capture the nature of the marital relationship. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, marriage is said to be both an aristocratic "government" (VIII.1160B32–5) and a kind of "unequal friendship" (1161A22–5). It was a relationship that seemed to defy neat categorization—and so Plutarch turns to analogy to capture its nature.

<sup>16</sup> See Aristotle *Problemata* 19.12.

<sup>17</sup> See David Cohen, "Seclusion, Separation, and the Status of Women in Classical Athens," *Greece and Rome* 36 (1990), 3–15—the argument can be extended, *a fortiori*, to the rest of the Greek world for which there is significantly less evidence; and Jane Gardner, *Women in Roman Law and Society* (London 1986), esp. 257–66.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. the comments of Ischomachos to his wife in Xenophon *Oeconomicus* 13 (quoted in text below). The wife who brought a large dowry was a traditional cause for concern; Aristotle, for one, thought that she could invert the natural household order and rule her husband as an "oligarch" (*Nic. Eth.* 1161A3). So also Menander fr. 333 (Koerte). On the other hand, Aristotle also considers "oligarchic" and so improper the husband's control of things in the wife's domain (i.e., the management of the household)—1169B35–6.

distinction between internal and external functioning of the Greek household, between its private and public images, makes perfectly clear the meaning of the expression “the *oikos* of Demosthenes” (or of any other male head of household). In ancient Greece, the household was the common possession of husband and wife but displayed the name and the choice of the husband, even if the wife was an *epikleros* (or heiress) and the husband a hen-pecked fortune hunter.<sup>19</sup> Again, Plutarch clearly approved of such a convention which he saw existing in Roman households as well. In chapter 34 he attributes the Roman law forbidding the exchange of gifts between husband and wife to a similar concern for communality of interest. We find a further Roman example of such sentiments in the eulogy of Turia spoken by her husband in the late first century B.C.: “With common prudence,” he says, “we have preserved all the patrimony which you received from your parents. Entrusting it all to me, you were not troubled with the care of increasing it; thus did we share the task of administering it, that I undertook to protect your fortune, and you to guard mine.”<sup>20</sup> Not much different is the comment of Xenophon’s Ischomachos to his wife: “[F]or the present this household is what is common to us. As to myself, everything of mine I declare to be in common, and as for you, everything you’ve brought you have deposited in common. It’s not necessary to calculate which of us has contributed the greater number of things, but it is necessary to know this well, that whichever of us is the better partner will be the one to contribute the things of greater worth.”<sup>21</sup> Despite significant difference in property and inheritance law, we find in both societies an image of “common” conjugal property, which the wife should administer and the husband protect.

Communality of property, however, is less important to Plutarch than harmony and *homonoia* (like-mindedness) of soul, the third and highest form of marital *koinonia*. Once again the husband’s is the leading voice, to be harmonized with or imitated. So—just as “mathematicians tell us that lines and surfaces do not move on their own, but only in conjunction with bodies” (34), “a wife should have no feelings of her own, but share her husband’s seriousness and sport, his anxiety and his laughter” (14). On the other hand, counterpoint is required at times: just as the Greeks in Cyrus’s army were instructed to receive in silence an army shouting in attack, but charge noisily a silent enemy, so a wife should bear silently angry words of a husband but talk to him when he is silent (37). The harmony here is openly asymmetrical, but for the sake of such harmony (particularly harmony perceptible in public) the husband also needed to exert self-control so as not to annoy his wife. For “wrongs committed by wives are more often overlooked than wrongs done to them” (43).<sup>22</sup> The public eye watches to see how a man treats his wife, while her behavior (for

<sup>19</sup> See Foxhall in this volume.

<sup>20</sup> “Laudatio Turiae,” in M. Lefkowitz and M. Fant, *Women’s Lives in Greece and Rome* (Baltimore 1982), 209.

<sup>21</sup> Xenophon *Oeconomicus* 13.

<sup>22</sup> The marriage contracts from Hellenistic Egypt (e.g., those discussed by Sarah B. Pomeroy, *Women in Hellenistic Egypt from Alexander to Cleopatra* [New York 1984], ch. 5) are good evidence for a popular concern that both spouses behave in ways that will not bring discredit to the other. The required behavior is not the same for both, but—as in Plutarch’s *Advice*—there is a reciprocity in “consideration.”

better or worse) may often be less noticed and more private. The wife may be a "shoe that pinches" (22), or she may be austere like a good wine (27). In such cases, says Plutarch, the woman's austerity must be respected. For just as a public man (Phocion for example) cannot use the same man as friend and flatterer, so a husband cannot use the same woman as wife and *hetaira* (29). On the other hand, if a wife is afraid to laugh with or tease her husband lest she be thought "bold and forward," she is, says Plutarch, like one who refuses to use oil lest she be thought to use perfume, or to wash her face lest she be thought to use rouge (29). Charm is clearly an asset in a wife and is prized among the full catalogue of wifely virtues. So in the eulogy of Turia, the Roman husband praises his deceased wife for her "modesty, deference, affability, . . . amiable disposition, . . . faithful attendance to the household duties, enlightened religion, . . . unassuming elegance, modest simplicity, and refinement of . . . manners."<sup>23</sup>

Plutarch's underlying assumption, fortified in this essay with homely (the joints of a pot grow stronger with age) as well as "academic" analogies, that marriage is a practical art of living together, is not an unusual idea, even if he shows more independence of his philosophic "influences" than he is usually given credit for. But what is unusual (within at least the Greek literary tradition) is his enunciation of the ideals of marriage in an essentially positive form. Although Greek myth and drama underline the centrality of marital ties in Greek society, their marriages are notoriously fragmented and impractical, as for example the marriages of Peleus and Thetis, Helen and Menelaus, or Deianira and Heracles, or even (until the very end of the *Odyssey*) Penelope and Odysseus. Athenian tragedy emphasized the tensions and conflicts of marriage while satire and comedy traditionally lampooned the "bad wife." Semonides' well-known diatribe against women is certainly a prime example of this negative portrayal of marriage and particularly of the wife. Yet when read, as though in a photographic negative, for its positive ideal of marriage and wifely behavior, Semonides' poem appears remarkably in accord with Plutarch's advice. If Eurydice follows Plutarch's advice, she will not become the various "animal" wives castigated by Semonides. She will not be too talkative or unsympathetic, nor too concerned with her appearance. She will not bring disrepute upon her husband's head. Rather, like Semonides' "bee-wife," she will love her husband as he loves her and preside, modestly, over a harmonious household.

While the Greek literary tradition illuminates the ideals of the conjugal relationship by vividly depicting their destruction or absence, the philosophical tradition subordinated that relationship to the larger ideals of state and society. Xenophon's discussion of the "ideal" household is not in any real sense about the practical and personal interaction of husband and wife. Although he does call marriage a "partnership" (*koinonia*: *Oec.* 7.19; cf. 7.13), it is partnership in management that particularly interests him—a partnership that if successful allows the husband to spend all of his time away from home and in the public world! (*Oec.* 7.3). Even further from Foucault's "art of conjugality" is the analysis of both the classical

<sup>23</sup> "Laudatio Turiae" (above n. 21).

political philosophers (i.e., Plato or Aristotle) and also the later Stoics (e.g., Musonius Rufus, Antipater, and Hierocles),<sup>24</sup> whose concern is the place and function of marriage within the larger political and (particularly for the Stoics) the natural order. Marriage is about reproducing the social order, not about simply living together on a daily basis. According to Musonius Rufus, marriage is both the “philanthropic” and “philopolitic” thing to do, through which one manages the household, produces children, and augments his *polis*.<sup>25</sup> According to Hierocles, marriage is the first and most basic human association, without which both *oikos* and *polis* are not complete.<sup>26</sup> Plutarch, however, jettisons the larger framework of cosmos, *polis*, and even (in this essay) *oikos*<sup>27</sup> in the interest of emphasizing the importance of practical marital harmony. This intimate focus, leaving political systems or legal structures outside of the household door, allows an unusual glimpse of dynamics of traditional husband/wife relations, and also an appreciation of the essential continuity and consistency in conjugal ideals within the ancient world.<sup>28</sup> As one Roman son said in regard to his mother: “praise of all good women is simple and similar . . . [I]t is hard to find new forms of praise for a woman.” Nonetheless, the son of Murgia went on to praise her “modesty, propriety, chastity, obedience, woolworking, industry, and honor.”<sup>29</sup>

The central interest of Plutarch’s essay on marriage lies in neither its novelty nor its reflection of a changing moral climate. Taking a place in the centuries-old discussion *peri gamou*, the essay is remarkable primarily for the simple elegance with which it draws together through illustrative analogies the basic “harmonies” of traditional marriage, a relationship which was as much an economic partnership as a physical and emotional one. Plutarch does not enunciate a “new” marital morality à la Musonius Rufus, but, as he himself says, he offers a “compendium” of well-known advice—if in a notably more positive format than was traditional in Greek literature. While it may be true that Plutarch had a “weakness for love and women . . . remarkable in a philosopher,”<sup>30</sup> or a particularly happy family life,<sup>31</sup> or was influenced by the way his Roman friends treated their wives, such “facts” cannot

<sup>24</sup> See the collection of Stobaeus IV.22–33, with *The Care of the Self*, 147–64.

<sup>25</sup> Stobaeus IV.22.20 (p. 501 Hense).

<sup>26</sup> Stobaeus IV 22.21 (p. 502 Hense). Antipater agrees (IV.22.25) and adds the argument from Stoic physics noted earlier in the text.

<sup>27</sup> Plutarch says nothing about how Eurydice and Pollianus should manage their household and only mentions procreation once when asserting that the “most sacred” sowing is the “sowing and ploughing in marriage for the procreation of children” (42), recalling the language of the Athenian (and generally Greek?) marriage agreement between the bride’s husband and her father. See, for example, Menander *Dyscolus* 842.

<sup>28</sup> I do not intend to say here “nothing ever changes,” or “people are all the same,” but to call attention to the potential error in the modern tendency (admittedly with some ancient precedent) to set up opposing paradigms of family relationships and family values in opposing political units—Athens and Sparta or Greece and Rome.

<sup>29</sup> Lefkowitz and Fant (above n. 21), 136.

<sup>30</sup> L.A. Post, “Women’s Place in Menander’s Athens,” *TAPA* 71 (1940), 452.

<sup>31</sup> Goessler (above n. 13), 68–9.

(I think most would agree) be taken as explaining his *Advice to the Bride and Groom*.<sup>32</sup> It is Plutarch's focus on the personal and practical relationship of husband and wife (as appropriate for a "wedding gift") that distinguishes his essay not only from Plato and Xenophon, but from the Stoics as well. Plutarch's academic arguments come from a wide range of philosophical traditions; on the other hand, many of his concerns are well known in Greek and Roman popular or literary traditions. Plutarch cites Homer several times in this essay, to illustrate the reconciling power of love or the dangerous power of drugs (38 and 5). But he inexplicably fails to cite the one Homeric passage which seems to best exemplify his ideal, Odysseus's wish for Nausicaa: "May the gods give you everything that your heart longs for; may they grant you a husband and a house and sweet agreement in all things, for nothing is better than this, more steadfast than when two people, a man and his wife, keep a harmonious household" (*Odyssey* 6. 180–4). If we assume Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle represent the classical view of marriage and Musonius Rufus (*et al.*) the new, not only are we left with no place to put Plutarch but also no room for Homer. Yet it would certainly be foolish to exclude the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* from the discussion of Greek morality, marital or otherwise.<sup>33</sup>

By blending popular morality with philosophical reason, Plutarch offers a distinctive and perhaps uniquely perceptive<sup>34</sup> view of ancient marital values. He views the marital relationship through a philosophic lens, but the aspect of marriage he is interested in is not that of traditional philosophic analysis—not marriage as conforming with "natural law," or the needs of the Platonic *polis* or the rules of household management. His advice is intended for a husband and wife living together on the basis of traditional gender structures and values. Just as in the *Lives* Plutarch gathered what historical facts and fictions, traditions and anecdotes, were available about his subject and constructed a *Life* in the light of his moral and ethical concerns—at times with little attention to political or other external chronology—so in *Advice to the Bride and Groom* he has gathered together traditional ideas about marriage and given them, through his many analogies, a sharper and somehow more compelling expression. And as Plutarch's *Lives*, when read with proper attention to his methods and interests, are a rich source for ancient biographical and political history, so his *Moralia*, including the *Advice to the Bride and Groom*, are sources for Greek social history and for our knowledge of ancient Mediterranean marriage ideals and values and—more important—of the persistence of those values through political and social upheaval and change.

<sup>32</sup> See, however, A. Nikolaidēs, "Plutarch on Women and Marriage," *WS* 110 (1997), 27–88, for a less skeptical view of these explanations for Plutarch's domestic views, and for a reenunciation of the traditional interpretation of this essay.

<sup>33</sup> Marriage is in fact a neglected topic in K. J. Dover's *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle* (Berkeley 1974).

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Glen Bowersock's comment that Plutarch "belongs to no recognizable category of authors apart from that of polymath" and that "in his unobtrusive, observant, and industrious way, Plutarch is unique," *Cambridge History of Classical Literature*, I (Cambridge 1985), 666.

# Foreign Powers

## *Plutarch and Discourses of Domination in Roman Greece*

Plutarch's position as a wealthy Greek, living in a Hellas under Roman rule in the late first to early second centuries A.D., has often been stressed as a factor in his thinking.<sup>1</sup> Reconciling the glories of the past with the mundane subjection of his present has frequently been pinpointed as an inspiration of Plutarch's intellectual project.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, in the large and varied body of his preserved work we have almost unparalleled access to the views of a member of the provincial elite, offering a personal glimpse of the impact of the Roman empire.

His writing can be set in the larger context of the rich archaeological and epigraphical record: the Greeks of Roman times were not reluctant to build monuments or record their achievements on stone. These other sources also help us to focus on Plutarch's Roman identity,<sup>3</sup> an aspect of his life that he underplays in his literary work, but which is constantly present in the background. It is clear that he and his circle (at least those with Roman citizenship) operated as Romans as well as identifying themselves as Chaeroneans, Athenians, or whatever.

The imposition of a new set of power hierarchies and the gradual assimilation of the elite into them ultimately produced a new set of statuses, reordering the ranking within the old cities of the Greek mainland. The trajectory of this process was not monolithic or simple: there were many pathways to power and modes of holding it, and the new orders thus emerged over a long period. In contrast to the insularity

I wish to thank Sarah B. Pomeroy and Emma Stafford for their encouraging, helpful, and critical comments on this paper.

<sup>1</sup> R.H. Barrow, *Plutarch and His Times* (London 1967), 12–3; C.P. Jones, *Plutarch and Rome* (Oxford 1971), 8–12; B. Forte, *Rome and the Romans as the Greeks Saw Them* (Papers and Monographs 24, American Academy in Rome 1972), 252–5; G.J.D. Aalders, *Plutarch's Political Thought* (Amsterdam 1981), 11.

<sup>2</sup> Forte, *Rome and the Romans*, 251, 268; Aalders, *Plutarch's Political Thought*, 26–7, 54–7; J. Harries, "The Cube and the Square: Masculinity and Male Social Roles in Roman Boeotia," in L. Foxhall and J. Salmon (eds.), *When Men Were Men: Masculinity, Power and Identity in Classical Antiquity* (London 1998).

<sup>3</sup> Barrow, *Plutarch and His Times*, 12; Jones, *Plutarch and Rome*, 48–64.

of *polis* communities in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., local elites developed a wide range of regional and even international connections through friendship, patronage, and sometimes marriage. In Plutarch's case this is clearly documented by the friends to whom he refers, or sometimes features as characters, in his work.<sup>4</sup>

This essay will explore the dynamics of power in Roman Greece, questioning the ways in which gender and marriage became entangled with notions of power and dominance. It has sometimes been suggested that accommodating Roman rule necessitated blurring traditional power dichotomies and hierarchies, including those of male and female.<sup>5</sup> Certainly the practicalities of Roman government entailed significant adjustments to the ways in which marriage and the family had traditionally been formulated as political entities.

The social history of mainland Greece in Plutarch's time has often been studied together with that of the hellenized cities of Asia Minor as if the two constituted a single phenomenon. However, the cities of old Greece plainly had distinctively different cultural traditions from the cities in Asia Minor that put on Greek garb at a relatively late date. Similarly, "Roman Greece" frequently collapses everything between Sulla in the first century B.C. and Constantine in the fourth century A.D. into a single sociocultural unit. In fact, it is clear there were great changes over the period, and Roman imperialism affected different parts of Greece in different ways. Here I have tried to draw on evidence as close in time and space as possible to Plutarch's life.<sup>6</sup>

Regularly Plutarch has been perceived as sympathetic to women in comparison to Plato, Aristotle, and other earlier Greek thinkers. He appears on the surface to emphasize partnership and harmony in marriage, and to offer a relatively supportive setting for women's intellectual development.<sup>7</sup> However, some of his treatises focus explicitly on dominating and subjecting women in wedlock. His justifications are founded on the "traditions" of both Greek and Roman "custom" as transmitted in literature. Here I will examine Plutarch's perceptions of women and their relationships with men, notably marriage, in the context of Roman Greece around the period in which he lived.

<sup>4</sup> Jones, *Plutarch and Rome*, 48–64.

<sup>5</sup> Harries, "The Cube and the Square."

<sup>6</sup> See, for example, C. Vatin, *Recherches sur le mariage et la condition de la femme mariée à l'époque hellénistique* (Paris 1970); R. van Bremen, *The Limits of Participation: Women and Civic Life in the Greek East in the Hellenistic and Roman Periods* (Amsterdam 1996), 9–10; K. Mantas, "Civic Decline and Female Power: Women's New Position in the Greek World Under Roman Rule" (Ph.D. diss., Univ. of Bristol 1994), though Mantas, p. 334, himself notes that women appear to have different roles in the cities of old Greece than in the hellenized cities of Asia Minor. For further examples of the synchronic treatment of "Roman Greece" see S.E. Alcock, *Graecia Capta: The Landscapes of Roman Greece* (Cambridge 1993).

<sup>7</sup> P.A. Stadter, *Plutarch's Historical Methods* (Cambridge, Mass. 1965), 5; F. Le Corsu, *Plutarque et les femmes dans les Vies parallèles* (Paris 1981); C. Patterson, "Plutarch's 'Advice on Marriage': Traditional Wisdom through a Philosophic Lens," *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt*, II, 33.6 (Berlin 1991), 4709–23, and this volume; K. Blomqvist, "From Olympias to Aretaphila: Women in Politics in Plutarch," in J. Mossman (ed.), *Plutarch and His Intellectual World* (London 1997), 773–98 at 73–4; Harries, "The Cube and the Square."

## Citizenship: Local and Roman

The survival of the civic and political institutions of the old Greek *poleis* is amply documented in inscriptions of the Hellenistic and Roman periods. During the first centuries of the Roman empire, the wealthy landowners of Greece were largely urban based, living in towns while their farms were worked by slaves or tenants located in the countryside.<sup>8</sup>

In Greek cities, bodies such as councils and offices like archonships or priest-hoods might change over the long term in their meaning or function, or new ones might be added over time, but rarely did old ones disappear. Elites also appeared eager to gain positions of power in sanctuaries such as Delphi, which had regional and international significance. Plutarch himself was a priest at Delphi at a time when Roman emperors and other elites sponsored much building on the site.<sup>9</sup> Most critically, the concept of local, *polis* citizenship, usually based on some combination of birth, wealth, and residence, remained throughout the Hellenistic age and under the Roman empire the critical criterion for participation in the affairs of city government at any level, whether as assemblyman or magistrate.<sup>10</sup>

Unlike in classical times, in the Roman period virtually all civic duties, even relatively humble ones such as serving on the council, became the prerogative of the wealthy.<sup>11</sup> Important local offices, certainly in Athens (which is best documented), were generally only open to those with local citizenship, not to wealthy men from elsewhere. Citizenship remained largely exclusive in Athens and other cities. In Athens one route to citizenship for a few foreigners at this time was probably by serving as an *ephebe*, i.e., a "cadet" in the gymnastic and military training program for young male citizens.<sup>12</sup>

Though wealthy and influential Roman citizens from elsewhere might successfully gain local *polis* citizenship, it was not conferred automatically or easily.<sup>13</sup> Those who wished to possess land where they were not citizens of the *polis* had to be granted the special privilege of *enktesis*. So, for example, although the father of the eminent Athenian Herodes Atticus appears to have served in the Spartan *ephebia* and held Spartan magistracies, there seem to have been special political circumstances which allowed him to be treated as an exception in the first instance; and

<sup>8</sup> Alcock, *Graecia Capta*, 48–56, 71–92, 96–105; L. Foxhall, "The Dependent Tenant: Land Leasing and Labour in Italy and Greece," *Journal of Roman Studies* 70 (1990), 97–114.

<sup>9</sup> D.A. Russell, *Plutarch* (London 1973), 31–2, 54.

<sup>10</sup> M. Woloch, "Roman and Athenian Citizenship at Athens A.D. 96–161," *Historia* 20 (1971), 743–50 at 744–6.

<sup>11</sup> Woloch, "Roman and Athenian Citizenship," 744.

<sup>12</sup> M. Woloch, *Roman Citizenship and the Athenian Elite* A.D. 96–161 (Amsterdam 1973), 2; Woloch, "Roman and Athenian Citizenship," 745–6. On the Athenian *ephebia* see J. Day, *An Economic History of Athens under Roman Domination* (repr. New York 1973), 199–200; P. Graindor, "Études sur l'éphébie attique sous l'empire," *Musée belge* 26 (1922), 165–228.

<sup>13</sup> Alcock, *Graecia Capta*, 74. Moreover, the strong links maintained by Roman senators with their native cities are well documented: W. Eck, "Rome and the Outside World: Senatorial Families and the World They Lived In," in B. Rawson and P. Weaver (eds.), *The Roman Family in Italy: Status, Sentiment, Space* (Oxford 1997), 73–99 at 88–93.

probably to have been granted Spartan citizenship eventually.<sup>14</sup> The family owned property in Laconia.<sup>15</sup> The epigraphical record suggests that normally the Spartan elite was a fairly closed community with a tendency toward endogamy.<sup>16</sup> Similarly, an eminent Corinthian, P. Licinnius Anteros, honored by the small *polis* of Methana with a grant of grazing rights (*epinomia*) and land ownership rights (*enktesis*), is specifically *not* granted rights of citizenship (IG IV.853).<sup>17</sup> Bestowing such rights might be construed as a way of appeasing rich and influential men while still keeping them at arm's length. The elaborate verbal formulae by which privileges are granted by a city's magistrates and citizens effectively distances such a foreign notable from a share in citizenship and direct participation in civic affairs.

In addition, some Greeks were favored with Roman citizenship, women as well as men. It is significant that although a woman could be given Roman citizenship, she could not be awarded the citizenship of a Greek city in the same way.<sup>18</sup> In classical and Hellenistic Greece, awards of citizenship to outsiders were made quite rarely and never directly or explicitly to women. In Plutarch's time not all local elites became Roman citizens. Indeed, Roman citizenship was much less common in the cities of old Greece than in western provinces and fewer persons of lower rank attained citizenship, mainly because much less recruitment into the Roman army (an automatic pathway to eventual citizen status) occurred in Greece than in the west.<sup>19</sup>

In Plutarch's world, the idea of the self-contained city-state endured, though it was no longer autonomous and its institutions and lands were dominated by local elites. Nonetheless *polis* citizenship and participation in local civic affairs remained important. As expressed in his writings, his world of politics was by and large the world of the *polis*, past and present.<sup>20</sup> Roman citizenship functioned as a kind of clumsy mantle fitting uncomfortably over the top of Greek citizen dress. Though certainly not unimportant to the global social and political status of local elites, nor irrelevant to the ways they operated in local politics, the demands of Roman citizenship were not easily accommodated within the customs and laws of *poleis*.

<sup>14</sup> A.J.S. Spawforth, "Sparta and the Family of Herodes Atticus: A Reconsideration of the Evidence," *BSA* 75 (1980), 203–20 at 206–7.

<sup>15</sup> Spawforth, "Sparta and the Family of Herodes Atticus," 210.

<sup>16</sup> A.J.S. Spawforth, "Families at Roman Sparta and Epidauros: Some Prosopographical Notes," *BSA* 80 (1985), 191–258 at 192, 202–3.

<sup>17</sup> Alcock, *Graecia Capta*, 78; C.B. Mee and H.A. Forbes (eds.), *A Rough and Rocky Place: Settlement and Land Use in the Peninsula of Methana, Greece* (Liverpool 1997), 80–1, 273–4.

<sup>18</sup> E.g., Spawforth, "Families at Roman Sparta and Epidauros," 198 (a husband and wife enfranchised in the same grant of Roman citizenship). On awarding Roman but not Greek civic citizenship to women see Mantas, "Civic Decline," 335.

<sup>19</sup> P.A. Brunt, "The Romanization of the Local Ruling Classes in the Roman Empire," in D.M. Pippidi (ed.), *Assimilation et résistance à la culture gréco-romaine dans le monde ancien* (Paris 1976), 161–73 at 162–3.

<sup>20</sup> Alders, *Plutarch's Political Thought*, 37–44.

## Greek and Roman Notions of Marriage and the Family: Legal Traditions and Customs

It is probably fair to say that overall, the laws of Greek city states, even in the Hellenistic period, were less formal and rigid than those of the Roman state. Moreover, there continued to be significant local variations on general themes among the laws and institutions of the Greek cities as there had been in classical times. In contrast, the law of Rome held fast (at least in theory) for Romans and their subjects throughout the empire. I say "in theory" for it is plain that in the Greek *poleis* people kept to their own customs, even when this might sometimes become awkward. So, for instance, traditions of naming children after grandparents, including maternal grandparents, persisted (via the cognomen) even though Roman naming patterns primarily emphasized agnatic connections, and the names of persons made Roman citizens had to conform to specific formats which manifested important relationships to patron or emperor.<sup>21</sup> Similarly, offices such as important hereditary priesthoods which according to Roman custom would never move out of the male line, in Greece occasionally pass through the female line.<sup>22</sup>

The injection of Roman law into the cities of old Greece as a result of the presence of Roman citizens living and operating in them had particularly interesting repercussions for the relationship of marriage and the family to the state/city-state. Despite some similarities between Roman marriage and family law and that of Greek city-states, there were many more differences. The aim of this section is not to summarize Greek and Roman family law and their complex, dynamic histories. There are now a number of useful modern works which comprehensively undertake this task.<sup>23</sup> Rather, the aim is to highlight critical differences in the ways Greek and Roman legal traditions construed relationships within the family and the links between family and state. The next section explores the implications for people negotiating these differences.

The most fundamental difference between Greek and Roman traditions in the legal construction of the family is that Greek practice lacks the strong legal tradition of Rome for the *potestas* (absolute power) of the *paterfamilias* (male head of the household/descent group). Hence, absolute power in familial and household settings were always in Roman legal theory (and generally in practice) in the hands of

<sup>21</sup> As exemplified by the family of Herodes Atticus: Spawforth, "Sparta and the Family of Herodes Atticus," 208, 212–6.

<sup>22</sup> Spawforth, "Families at Roman Sparta and Epidauros," 203–4.

<sup>23</sup> Greek: Vatin, *Recherches sur le mariage*; C. Patterson, "Marriage and the Married Woman in Athenian Law", in S.B. Pomeroy (ed.), *Women's History and Ancient History* (Chapel Hill 1991), 48–72; S. Todd, *The Shape of Athenian Law* (Oxford 1993); S.B. Pomeroy, *Families in Classical and Hellenistic Greece* (Oxford 1997). Roman: S. Treggiari, *Roman Marriage* (Oxford 1991); S. Dixon, *The Roman Family* (Baltimore, 1992); J.F. Gardner, *Women in Roman Law and Society* (London 1986); Rawson and Weaver (eds.), *The Roman Family in Italy*.

men. Though men controlled Greek families too, their power was not legally enshrined in quite the same way.<sup>24</sup>

Almost paradoxically, however, Roman law allocated a stronger notion of personhood to women than Greek legal systems generally did, so that under the former women could unambiguously inherit, own, and bequeath property in their own right in ways that Greek women often could not. Perhaps as a result, the Roman notion of *tutela* (guardianship) was stronger and more formal than the analogous Greek institution of *kyrieia*. Under both systems, women had to have “guardians” in order to execute any substantial legal or economic decision. However, Roman guardians (*tutores*) were legally and permanently designated in writing, often as part of a husband’s or father’s will. Though this might suggest that women’s choice over the appointment of a *tutor* was limited, there were also legal procedures available for women (wealthy ones at least) to dismiss a *tutor*. In contrast, any closely related male appears to have been able to act as “guardian” (*kyrios*) for a Greek woman when she needed one, and need not have been permanently fixed as her guardian. Especially in circumstances where there was no obvious *kyrios* such a father or brother, or where there were several equally plausible ones (e.g. more than one brother), she might have some flexibility to choose.<sup>25</sup>

Because of the “property rights” which accrued to Roman women, in Roman law there was no very precise equivalent to the *epikleros* (or *patroikos*, *patrouchos*, or any of the other regionally varying names by which she was called in Greece): the fatherless woman with no brothers to inherit the property and carry the male line down into a new *oikos* (household). In Greece, the *epikleros* served largely as a vehicle for the transmission of property to a male link in the following generation (her son), keeping the male line intact and coherent. Generally the institution of the epiklerate functioned within the cultural expectation of endogamous marriage: normally *epikleroi* married close relatives, usually (but not always) agnatic ones.<sup>26</sup>

Roman law was far less accommodating of endogamous marriages, drawing the limits of incest much more firmly and tightly. All marriages between ascendants (e.g., father-daughter, uncle-niece, aunt-nephew) were forbidden, as were marriages between collaterals closer than second cousin.<sup>27</sup> Despite Claudius’s law of A.D. 49 enabling men to marry a brother’s daughter, such marriages were rare in Italy afterward. In contrast, brother’s-daughter marriages were normal in Greek custom, even when the exigencies of the epiklerate were absent. Analogously, under Roman law a man could not marry his sister’s daughters, granddaughters, or great-granddaughters—alliances which were all perfectly correct within Greek legal traditions. Other

<sup>24</sup> *Patria potestas*: W. Lacey, “Patria Potestas,” in B. Rawson (ed.), *The Family in Ancient Rome: New Perspectives* (London 1986), 121–44; Pomeroy, *Families*, 9. Greek families controlled by men: Pomeroy, *Families*, 16 and *passim*; Todd, *The Shape of Athenian Law*, 209.

<sup>25</sup> See on *kyrieia* Todd, *The Shape of Athenian Law*, 207–9; V. Hunter, “Women’s Authority in Classical Athens: The Example of Kleoboule and Her Son (Dem. 27–9),” *EMC* 33, n.s. 8 (1989), 39–48. On *tutela* see Gardner, *Women in Roman Law*, 5–30.

<sup>26</sup> Pomeroy, *Families*, 37–8, 53–4; Todd, *The Shape of Athenian Law*, 226–31.

<sup>27</sup> Dixon, *The Roman Family*.

common" are ubiquitous in his thoughts on marriage. It is stressed from the outset of the *Advice*. The newly married couple is depicted as "coming together in a partnership for life" (138C), and the treatise is "a gift for both in common" (138C). On the surface his statements can entice the reader into the illusion that he is promoting equality. For Plutarch, however, partnership was always asymmetrical—not the equality of a shared yoke, but a lead rein over which the male partner always kept control (139B).

Even if husband and wife take decisions together (*koinon*), they are to be represented to the world as his (139E). His note must always sound stronger and louder (139C–D). She should have no feelings of her own, but share (*koinonein*) those of her husband (140A). A wife ought not to have her own friends, but share her husband's in common (*koinon*) with him (140D),<sup>31</sup> and not listen to anything bad women friends might say about her husband (143F). As long as there is a husband to take control, a wife must behave like a heavenly body revolving round him, but opposite to the way the moon behaves: a good wife can shine brightly in her husband's presence, but should hide herself when he is absent (139C).

Similarly in the *Consolation* partnership is held up as an ideal, but when scrutinized it turns out to be an unequal relationship in which the female partner is subservient to the male. Though she is in partnership with Plutarch in producing and rearing children (608C: *koinonousa*), the birth of a daughter gave *him* the opportunity of naming her after his wife.

Throughout the treatise Plutarch's wife, Timoxena, is praised for her self-control and her sense of moderation, and specific examples of her exemplary behavior are given, both in these grievous circumstances (608F) and in the past (609D–E, 610C). Her whole public life style and demeanor underpins her husband's position (609C–D). Both philosophers coming into their home and their fellow citizens at civic events (religious ceremonies, sacrifices, the theater) have been impressed with her simplicity and sobriety of body and behavior. She is portrayed as the living embodiment of the astronomical metaphor of the *Advice* (139C)

And yet, despite this high praise there is an undercurrent of exhortation from the start. He urges her constantly to behave with moderation lest she slip into the undesirable habits of excess (here, especially emotional excess) typical of woman. "Only, my dear wife, at this sad moment, keep yourself, and me, calm" (608C). On any matter that awaits his decision as the superior partner, he will ensure it is done, "without extravagance or superstition." Though he hastily adds that she does not indulge in either of these practices, it is significant that while praising her, he is also warning her against straying from the male-dominated straight and narrow. So, for example, lest she be led astray, and citing Euripides, he castigates "the entrance of bad women" lamenting (610B), because such behaviors "come from a bad custom" (611A–B: *ethei phaulo*).

The theme of partnership in marriage is, of course, an old one, most fully elaborated in Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*. However, there the unequal partnership is

<sup>31</sup> This is remarkably similar to Cato's and Columella's advice about slave estate-managers/bailiffs (L. Foxhall, "The Dependent Tenant: Land Leasing and Labour in Italy and Greece", *JRS* 70 [1990], 97–114 at 103), and probably given for the same reason: to discourage autonomy.

founded on rather different terms. Though there is still no question that the man is the controlling partner (Xen. *Oec.* 7.5–8), his dominance at the outset rests on age and experience as much as on inherent male superiority. The main difference with the notion of partnership as expressed in Plutarch's writing is that in Xenophon's fourth-century B.C. treatise the realms of the two partners are much more clearly articulated as separate and distinct (even though hers should ideally be under the ultimate control of his) (Xen. *Oec.* 7.18–31). Her equal share of moderation and good sense (Xen. *Oec.* 7.26–7) operates in a separate physical and conceptual space from his.

In contrast, in Plutarch's world, she is entertaining visitors and attending public events with him: feminine roles and duties are acted out alongside those of men. This was perhaps underpinned by the fact that Roman law offered women a different, more formally constituted legal and political persona than had traditionally been available in the cities of old Greece. The possibility that women might impinge on men's authority, and/or act autonomously, perhaps loomed as a greater threat to men where their lives were less separated from women's lives. The emphasis in Plutarch's writing on subjecting women to their proper place may be an expression of the suspicion that they might not stay there, and the long-standing imbalances of power in the partnership of marriage might be challenged.

### Authority and Virtue: The Proper Relation of Masculine and Feminine

For Plutarch, if the right kind of male power and leadership exists it ought unquestionably to be paramount in any situation or relationship. This clearly expressed in *Advice* via a rather skewed metaphor about adornment (again):

Rich men and kings who honor philosophers adorn both themselves and their beneficiaries, but philosophers courting the rich do nothing to increase the reputations of these people, but merely diminish their own. It is the same with wives. If they submit to their husbands, they are praised. If they try to rule them they cut a worse figure than their subjects. (142D–E)

The analogy is not quite apt, for what distinguishes the “philosophers honored” from the “philosophers courting” is the retention by the former of their own autonomy. Women subordinated (or subordinating themselves) have lost their autonomy. By definition, a woman who *ought* to be subordinate to a man, but who aims to dominate *over* men, is shameful.

It is paradoxical, at least on the surface, that Plutarch so often appears to highlight the virtue and bravery of women in his writings. However, in the literary settings in which he most regularly highlights feminine strengths two general scenarios predominate. The first is where women display virtue in proper (i.e., subordinate) relation to men. The passage just quoted (*Advice* 142D–E) expresses such sentiments. Other examples include the inverted metaphor of the moon mentioned above (*Advice* 139C), or the case of the Spartan girl who said when asked if she made advances to her husband, “No, but he has made them to me” (cited by Plutarch in both *Spartan Sayings* 242C and *Advice* (140C). More extreme is the story of the

women of Phocis in *Virtues in Women* (244B–E). Here the men of Phocis, about to engage in battle, agree in the assembly to bind the living women and children to a great pyre, to be set alight in the event of defeat. When it is suggested that the women be consulted about this plan, all agree with alacrity as good women should, backing up their menfolk unto death.

The second scenario occurs where the male side of what ought to be an equation is absent, flawed, or inadequate. Women's power and virtue in an active sense are portrayed as freestanding (i.e., not operating under male control) and positive only when there is some fatal defect in the proper male principle which ideally ought to be controlling, leading, and guiding women.<sup>32</sup>

This is illustrated and elaborated in many different forms in Plutarch's writings. Women are frequently depicted as saying things which spur men on to bravery, courage, and right actions. Sometimes they keep their men on the straight and narrow (e.g., *Spartan Sayings* 240D, recounting Herodotus's story [5.53] of Gorgo's advice to her father, King Cleomenes). At other times they underpin manliness, as in the case of Gyrtias (*Spartan Sayings* 240E–F), who chided her family for wailing when her grandson was brought home beaten up; she instead praised his valor in the fight.

In some instances women shame men's cowardly behavior, as with the stories of stereotypical Spartan mothers (*Spartan Sayings* 240F, 241B). Similarly, "[T]he Chian men were saved, having been taught courage by the women" (*Virtues in Women* 245B) when they had surrendered to the Erythraeans and the women shamed them into walking out of the city wearing arms instead of clothing. In all of these examples the aim is to show up bad, weak men, not to praise good, powerful women.

Absence of appropriate men often provides a setting for feminine bravery and virtue. Most notable in this regard is the setting of the *Consolation* itself: Timoxena's strength and bravery is praiseworthy at least in part because of Plutarch's absence at the time of the tragic event. Another story about the Chian women manning the defensive walls with the slaves (*Virtues in Women* 245B–C) highlights the absence of citizen men in a different way: perhaps they are to be understood as out fighting beyond the walls. Conversely, men's absence (legitimate or otherwise) provides an "excusable" circumstance in which women may appropriately take charge, at least temporarily.

The most dramatic example is the story of the appropriately named Aretaphila ("Virtue-Lover") of Cyrene, told as a kind of novelette in the *Virtues in Women* (255E–257E). Clever and beautiful, she was the respectable wife of a reputable man, but "the common fate of her country made her prominent" (255E) when a wicked tyrant seized power. In this story, Aretaphila's leadership in "masculine" activities (politics and public affairs) is legitimated by necessity, since tyrants are by definition inadequate, unsatisfactory men. However, when legitimate male authority is restored, she does the proper thing and retires to the realm of women.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Blomqvist, "From Olympias to Aretaphila," 75–7; F. Albin, "Family and the Formation of Character: Aspects of Plutarch's Thought," in Mossman (ed.), *Plutarch and His Intellectual World*, 59–71.

This situation is not very different from that of the much-discussed Ismenodora in the *Eroticus*. As with Aretaphila, Ismenodora's extraordinary actions take place in the absence of normal male authority. The significance of the debate between the lad's mentors over whether an immediate marriage with an older female lover was more or less advantageous than the love of an older male *erastes*, and the implications for the history of sexuality, have been the subject of special attention in recent years.<sup>33</sup> What has been generally overlooked is that the actors in this drama arranged by Plutarch are all in unusual sociolegal positions, but are acting correctly in fulfilling the roles in which they have been cast.

Ismenodora herself is a wealthy widow, a position which traditionally allowed considerably more autonomy than women in Greek society could normally exercise,<sup>34</sup> and under Roman law would leave her in control of her own property. Although she must have had a *kyrios*/tutor available, she would have needed him for almost none of the actions she executes in the dialogue, even abduction, except perhaps for remarriage itself. Much more interesting is the fact that she and Bacchon's mother are arranging the boy's marriage. We hear nothing about his father, though it is made clear the boy is still a minor (752E–F; 749F), and is thus considering marriage at a very young age for a Greek or Roman male.<sup>35</sup> The implication is that Bacchon is an orphan, and his mother may well be an *epikleros* (a woman with no father or brothers living).

Though no guardian is named, it is probably significant that his older cousin, Anthemion, argues that the marriage would be advantageous (even though his mother has doubts). Pisias, the boy's male lover, accuses Anthemion of "handing the young man over to Ismenodora" (749F). The logical conclusion of a Greek reader in antiquity would probably be that this cousin was the boy's legal guardian, acting in his material interests. None of the characters in the dialogue is thus behaving unremarkably, or does anything out of the ordinary with the important (for dramatic purposes) exception of Ismenodora's abduction of the young man.<sup>36</sup>

Goldhill<sup>37</sup> has focused on Ismenodora as a question left open at the end of the dialogue, while others have seen her as a kind of new woman.<sup>38</sup> Both approaches highlight Plutarch's manifest position that male and female virtue are the same.<sup>39</sup> Whatever Plutarch may have thought about virtue, the *Advice* makes it clear that to him male and female authority were not the same or equal (see above). In the *Eroticus*, as in the story of Aretaphila, there is a glaring lack of proper and legitimate

<sup>33</sup> See n. 30.

<sup>34</sup> V. Hunter, "The Athenian Widow and Her Kin," *Journal of Family History* 14/4 (1989), 291–311; Albin, "Family and the Formation of Character," 65–6.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Pomeroy, *Families*; Woloch, *Roman Citizenship and the Athenian Elite*, 258–9.

<sup>36</sup> This deed, resolving the central dilemma of the plot, was carried out under the influence of Eros acting as a kind of *deus ex machina* in the dramatic setting of the god's own festival.

<sup>37</sup> Goldhill, *Foucault's Virginity*, 158–61.

<sup>38</sup> Harries, "The Cube and the Square"; Patterson, "Plutarch's 'Advice on Marriage'." Blomqvist, "From Olympias to Aretaphila," 87–7, sees the ending as Plutarch's defence of marriage as sacred by the authority of the gods.

<sup>39</sup> Goldhill, *Foucault's Virginity*, 156–7; Harries, "The Cube and the Square"; Patterson, "Plutarch's 'Advice on Marriage'."

male authority.<sup>40</sup> Hence virtuous women fill the power vacuum, but withdraw to their proper place (or will hopefully do so) once the crisis is over and patriarchy is restored.

## Conclusion

Plutarch emphasizes throughout his work that women belonged in subservient roles in partnership with men. This contrasts significantly with what we know about the social and legal position of wealthy women in Roman Greece, and the portrayal of their behavior by Plutarch himself, suggesting that sometimes women were not as subservient as he would have ideally liked them to be. Roman rule, including the infiltration of Roman law and social custom into the civic arena of the Greek city, left openings for wealthy women at least to achieve a degree of autonomy which was uncomfortable for traditional, patriarchal male authority. This discomfort surfaces repeatedly in Plutarch's writing, most obviously in *Advice*, but, as this essay has demonstrated, also in the *Consolation* and many other works as well.

These openings for women appear in several different aspects of life. Their capacity for legal action is a threat (*Advice* 144A). Similarly women's control of property is frequently problematic. Though Ismenodora is more or less vindicated in the end, throughout his work Plutarch expresses great reservations about the potential of a wealthy wife to control her husband, and in the *Advice* stresses the importance of a "partnership" of property which makes everything his (140F). Women's independent involvement in religious cults also challenged and threatened masculine authority (*Advice* 139A, 140D; cf. *Consolation* 611D).

Read in both the sociopolitical setting of Roman Greece and the literary and philosophical setting of Plutarch's writing, the contradictory tone of these treatises is perhaps comprehensible. The elite women of Greek cities under Rome did not behave like the good Greek women of old, but Plutarch would have loved it if they had.

<sup>40</sup> The "authority" of an *erastes* was never, after all, unproblematic: M. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, II: *The Use of Pleasure*, trans. R. Hurley (New York 1985); L. Foxhall, "Pandora Unbound: A Feminist Critique of Foucault's *History of Sexuality*," in N. Lindesfarne-Tapper and A. Cornwall (eds.), *Dislocating Masculinity: Comparative Ethnographies* (London 1994), 133–46; repr. in D. H. J. Larmour, P. A. Miller, and C. Platter (eds.), *Rethinking Sexuality* (Princeton 1998).

## Gendering Virtue

In Plato's day, men could sit at dinner talking about themselves while they reduced women to a rhetorical device. Philosophers perceived that nature endowed everyone with some measure of virtue (manliness). They amused themselves with the abstract possibility that a few women might excel the majority of men and therefore qualify as rulers in an ideal republic. Individuals ranged along a single gender continuum from most manly to wholly effeminate. Thus most men and practically all women, lacking self-discipline and training, were doomed to subservience.<sup>1</sup> When the sons of the privileged spoke only to one another, it was easy to define women as imperfect or deformed men, confirming their smug conviction that they normally sank to the lower end of the scale, unable to govern themselves without the support and guidance of their natural superiors. In that classical golden age, a good woman was never even named in public.<sup>2</sup> An ideal woman was something for men to think *with*.

Plutarch was the child of a different age, painfully conscious of the need to think *about* the women who were aggressively present at every public function and dangerously active in the formation of public policy. His contemporaries brought their wives into the symposium lest they frequent other company. In the salons of Rome, women played music and discussed foreign affairs. Juvenal complained of literary women who corrected their husbands' grammar and quoted "poets I never heard of."<sup>3</sup> He was not alone in testifying to the female intrusion into public discourse. In Christian congregations, opinionated women interrupted preachers with questions and comments. In some places, they prophesied, assuming the prerogatives of men.<sup>4</sup> Even in medical literature, the substantial reality of women was

<sup>1</sup> This is a common attitude running through classical discourse, most succinctly stated in Aristotle's *Politics* I.1260A.

<sup>2</sup> As Thucydides has Pericles say, *The Peloponnesian War* II.45.

<sup>3</sup> Satire VI.457. All references to Juvenal refer to Satire VI.

<sup>4</sup> Paul, 1 Cor. 11.

enhanced as Soranus discarded popular notions of the wandering womb, recognizing that women possessed approximately the same internal equipment as men.<sup>5</sup> The realities of monarchy gave the imperial consort power over the most aristocratic patriarchs. Once there had been a time when women were judged by their absence. But Eurydice was no simple analytical device. She was a woman who might, if she chose, challenge her husband or engage his friends in debate. As her mentor, Plutarch advised her against making herself conspicuous, or even too attractive, in company. His own wife, Timoxena, was no fictive Diotima. In the Roman manner, he praised her as a model and co-mentor, referring Eurydice to an essay she had written "on the love of ornament" (*Advice* 48).<sup>6</sup> In short, contrary to the opinion underlying the analysis of Foucault and other modern scholars that male writers simply used women to think with, I believe that the first-century discussion of marriage was driven by men's need to address women and adjust their arguments for this new audience.<sup>7</sup> Christian writers, who recognized that the resources of wealthy women were indispensable to their fledgling communities, faced the same social reality. Ultimately, Christian apologists, starting with Paul, argued that they differed from pagans most radically in living up to their common moral standards.<sup>8</sup>

The scrupulous balance that many writers affected in addressing their advice to both partners in a marriage gives a superficial appearance that they were advocating egalitarian marriage. Certainly, they sought to produce harmonious families that would support the harmonious society. Earlier in the century, Paul had indicated that husbands and wives belonged to one another and were obligated to please one another.<sup>9</sup> Plutarch expressed the same sentiments, urging his young couple to be sensitive to one another's feelings and settle their differences amicably. Seeking to restore an archaic model of conjugal harmony, he advised wives to act as faithful mirrors of their husbands' moods, but he knew that they might well refuse to do so. He warned the couple to refrain alike from displays of affection or mutual reproach in public. Indeed, he warned his young pupil, Pollianus, against hurting or angering his wife for fear that, like a disturbed bee, she might sting (*Advice* 44). But neither Paul nor Plutarch seriously advocated equality for women any more than they

<sup>5</sup> Soranus *Gynecology*, trans. O. Temkin (Baltimore 1991).

<sup>6</sup> In *Virtues of Women*, Introduction, Plutarch associates the habit of praising women with the Romans, in specific opposition to the opinions of Thucydides.

<sup>7</sup> Michel Foucault, *History of Sexuality*, III: *The Care of the Self*, trans. R. Hurley (New York 1988), 39 ff., extended the classical mindset to the first-century A.D. marriage debate which he defined as *psychomachia*, men's inner struggle to conquer the undisciplined, effeminate elements of their own nature and maintain the manliness threatened by their loss of political power as the Roman republic gave way to the Augustan principate. He characterizes the Stoic philosophers as turning to marriage as an alternative venue for their "cultivation of the self," substituting women for their vanished political mirrors. The same line of argument is extended into the Christian culture of later centuries by Peter Brown, *The Body and Society: Men, Women and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity* (New York 1988).

<sup>8</sup> This follows the line of Wayne Meeks, *The Origins of Christian Morality: The First Two Centuries* (New Haven 1994). See particularly the arguments made by Ignatius of Antioch, *Epistle to Diognetes*, in Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (eds.), *Antenicene Fathers*, I (Grand Rapids, Mich. 1975).

<sup>9</sup> Most of Paul's views on marriage appear in 1 Cor. 7 which, unless otherwise noted, is the source of all my references to him.

advocated equality for slaves. In considering the dynamics of a couple, they were seeking readjustments in the gender system that would persuade potentially rebellious women to accept its strictures.

Plutarch placed himself firmly in a tradition at least as old as Xenophon (*Oec.* 10) that recognized the essential likeness of men and women ranked on a continuum equating virility with character.<sup>10</sup> But he shared with many of his contemporaries a widespread sense that the gender hierarchy was no longer functioning properly. In their own homes, their own beds, women contested the manliness of their husbands. Virgil, Livy, and Plutarch himself constructed an idyllic Roman past when, as Juvenal said, soldierly men guarded the republic while poverty and hard work preoccupied their women. Virgil's Aeneas was the model for all Roman men: pious to his father, just to his family, subordinating his personal desires to his duty. The nostalgic Livy fantasized an alliance of patriarchal families ever renewed and maintained by the virtuous descendants of the Sabine mothers. Manly patricians, in defense of their violated families, rescued their fellow citizens from monarchy, a form of government that exposed them to the power of women and men of lesser virtue. For centuries, the senate guarded Rome against its return. The republican constitution represented the continuum of virtue incarnate. The senators ward off every threat of feminine encroachment on their sacred precincts.<sup>11</sup> Thus shielded by the conscript fathers, Roman matrons, who fell just short of Roman men in virtues far superior to the general run of humanity, could healthfully serve the commonwealth by administering their households. Plutarch himself attributed the civic virtue of the Gracchi to the excellent training of their mother, Cornelia. But peace had softened men and wealth had strengthened women. He linked the fall of the republic to Antony, the self-indulgent son of a hen-pecked father, grandfather of the unspeakable Nero.<sup>12</sup> Dido, Tanaquil, and Cleopatra proved the logic of the gender continuum. Women's virility naturally found expression when men faltered.

The unmanly triumvir's fate was sealed when he submitted to the influence of the wrong woman. The republic's fate was sealed when its institutions were undermined by a broader collapse of traditional family values. Paternal power within the household had depended heavily on the homosocial politics of the senate. Under prevailing Roman law, women disposed of their own fortunes and the custom of marriage *sine manu* kept them under the authority of their fathers rather than their husbands. Once men failed to maintain their solidarity, they became vulnerable to feminine competition. Civil war annihilated the senate and Rome's self-indulgent children found themselves subordinated to a "Father of the Country" and to an imperial mother who all too often delegated their supervision to slaves.<sup>13</sup> Tacitus and

<sup>10</sup> Plutarch, *On the Virtue of Women*, 1.

<sup>11</sup> See particularly Livy's account of the debate over the Oppian Laws, *History* Book 34, surely a morality tale for contemporaries of the Empress Livia.

<sup>12</sup> *Life of Antony*, 1.

<sup>13</sup> In this as in so many respects, the imperial household modeled itself on the typical Roman aristocratic family. On the roles of slaves and men see the first two essays in Keith R. Bradley, *Discovering the Roman Family: Studies in Roman Social History* (New York 1990).

Suetonius demonized the Julio-Claudian empresses, Livia, Messalina, and Agrippina, ruthlessly dominating their husbands, their sons, and their hapless subjects.

The men of the ruling class abdicated. They preferred indulging their own vices, or even their own virtues, to training and supporting their wives and dependents. Juvenal mocked the civic-minded man who hoped to find an old-fashioned wife to share the responsibility of governing his family, characterizing even Plutarch's exemplary Cornelia as an intolerable bore.<sup>14</sup> Gnostic writers preached rejection of a carnal world personified by fallen Sophia, dragged from the cosmic pleroma by her uncontrolled reproductive drives.<sup>15</sup> Many Stoics taught that the moral crisis was so pressing that it behooved men to renounce marriage in order to cultivate their own virtue.<sup>16</sup> Paul reluctantly admitted that there was special virtue in the renunciation of sex for those who had the vocation from God. But preoccupied men left virile women to their own devices, which meant that they could embrace the worst vices of men: fencing and mud wrestling, pissing away their excess wine on the altar of chastity before making love to one another, as Juvenal charged.<sup>17</sup> Plutarch warned Pollianus that if he did not occupy his wife's mind with his own superior interests, she would cultivate the dangerous knowledge that women acquire on their own:

No woman can make a child without the part played by a man; the shapeless, masses formed in the womb as a result of corruption are called "moles." One must take precautions against such developments in woman's minds. If they do not receive the seeds of good words or share their husband's education, they conceive many strange and evil schemes on their own. (*Advice* 48)

The shadows of other women lurked ominously at the threshold of Roman homes. They came to supply an insecure wife with dangerous charms to subjugate her husband sexually. Even more horribly, they shared their arcane knowledge of poisons. Gossips were always ready to fan the flames of domestic discord with misplaced sympathy for the abused wife. Plutarch warned Eurydice against listening to scandalmongers who would goad her into throwing away her marriage in anger when her husband betrayed her with a rival. "Wise" women told fortunes and passed horrid superstitions from generation to generation. Plutarch congratulated his wife that she, unlike her neighbors, would not admit "bad women" to disturb the decorum of her mourning with howling and shrieking (*Consolation* 7).

Religion, normally one of the great social bonders, made the home particularly vulnerable in those times. Romans had come to treat the gods rather like food. Wives who had not been initiated into their husbands' religious tastes formed their own. Juvenal mocked women who deserted the marriage bed to pursue strange gods, "just

<sup>14</sup> Satire VI.39 and 70.

<sup>15</sup> The origins of Gnosticism are linked to Simon Magus, first encountered in the Book of Acts and then associated with Helena, whom he characterized as the fallen Ennoia in the Clementine Homilies 2.25. See further, Giovanni Filoramo, *A History of Gnosticism*, ch. 9 (New York 1990).

<sup>16</sup> Foucault, *Care of the Self*, 154–8, outlines the contemporary philosophic debate on whether or not to marry.

<sup>17</sup> Satire VI.245, 308.

the sort of rare mind and spirit, no doubt, that a god would choose to talk to in the small hours."<sup>18</sup> Plutarch admonished Eurydice, "No god takes pleasure in cult performed furtively by a woman" (*Advice* 19). Religious infidelity in women was, in his mind, the equivalent of male sexual infidelity. The marriage was equally threatened when they succumbed to passions that turned them from their husbands and bonded them to strangers.

Christians saw the independent activity of women in a very different light but they unwittingly corroborated the fears of pagan critics. Unmarried or separated women, some prostitutes, and several demoniacs spent their fortunes to support Jesus, a preacher who repeatedly urged his disciples to abandon the powerful family traditions of the Jews if they wished to follow him.<sup>19</sup> The Pauline epistles revealed a spreading network of women who opened their homes to men preaching a subversive religion not shared by their husbands. Juvenal's picture of the home polluted by obscene feasts under the pretense of religious observance is at the beginning of a long pagan tradition of equating Christian gatherings with disgusting orgies.<sup>20</sup> A century later, Tertullian would sympathize with Christian women whose fasts were interrupted by husbands who wanted to give banquets. From this point of view, Juvenal's tormented husband became the villain who tormented his wife when her religious duties kept her from meeting him at the baths or took her from his bed at night. He was the tyrant who ordered her not to make her charitable rounds in the poorer streets of the city and in the prisons and locked his storehouses against her generosity. He was the jealous warden who refused to countenance the visits of preachers and male coreligionists, resenting their mutual love as Christians.<sup>21</sup> When Plutarch wrote, women had already appeared in the arena among the Christians executed by Nero for the burning of Rome. Though he believed them innocent of that crime, Tacitus felt they deserved punishment for their antisocial behavior.<sup>22</sup>

Some Christians saw these difficulties as an argument for celibacy and praised the superior manliness of women who spurned their marriage beds.<sup>23</sup> Most were content to promote marriage within the faith. Paul probably sympathized with the Emperor Augustus, who tried to force his delinquent ruling class to marry and take up their political responsibilities. In harmony with the imperial design, he forbade women to leave their husbands and reminded the men of Corinth that marriage was no sin and reproduction was part of God's plan. Paul's misgivings about the desirability of celibacy were amply reflected in a popular fiction that circulated after his death concerning a young virgin, Thecla, who accidentally overheard him praising virginity and vowed to refuse marriage and devote herself to the new religion.

<sup>18</sup> Satire VI.533, on pilgrims to the shrines of Isis.

<sup>19</sup> Mark 13.12; Luke 12.4953 and 10.3440; Matt. 10.34.

<sup>20</sup> Satire VI.341. For further developments of this tradition, see Norman Cohn, *Europe's Inner Demons* (New York 1975).

<sup>21</sup> *Ad Uxorem (Letter to His Wife)* 4, in *Opera, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina*, I (Turnholt 1954).

<sup>22</sup> Tacitus, *Annals* 15.43; Clement of Rome, *Address to the Greeks* 6, trans. F.X. Cima, *Fathers of the Church* (New York 1947).

<sup>23</sup> This is a recurrent theme in the stories edited by Edgar Hennecke and Wilhelm Schneemelcher, *New Testament Apocrypha* (Philadelphia 1963-5).

Distrustful of her enthusiasm, Paul refused to baptize her but, disguised as a man, she undertook her own preaching mission. Facing martyrdom, she finally baptized herself.<sup>24</sup> The later author of the Pastorals discouraged his congregations even from accepting vows of celibacy from young widows.<sup>25</sup> Finally, at the end of the second century, Clement of Alexandria, the champion of Christian marriage against the rising fashion for celibacy, gave the same advice as Plutarch: husbands should join their wives at meals and escort them to church ceremonies.<sup>26</sup>

After the collapse of the senatorial patriarchy, the forms and formalities of marriage apparently devolved steadily upon the humbler subjects of the Roman Empire. Ever increasing numbers of people were recognized as properly married or determined to present themselves as though they were. Thus the responsibilities of manhood were lightened as the scope of the household diminished, but they were pressed upon people who had traditionally been placed low on the gender continuum. Imperial law and biblical authority conspired to strengthen the fledgling authority of these modest householders, who had to confront their wives without the support of political office and the homosocial traditions of a ruling class. A whole array of experts and regulators turned their attention to training both girls and boys from childhood forward rather than leaving the education of a young wife solely to her husband.<sup>27</sup> Plutarch reminded Eurydice of the precepts "you learnt with me as a girl" and provided her with a handy string of classical models whose emulation would assure her marital happiness and earn her praise in future (*Advice* 48). Though in his *Advice* he recommended women to remain in obscurity when their husbands were absent, in the *Consolation* he proudly offered Timoxena as a paragon who could shine like the moon when the sun is dark.

This increased male attention may be coupled with women's new resistance to traditional conjugal roles both by sexual license and professed virginity. Juvenal warned that sex was a political weapon with which women broke their husbands to their whims before moving on from one marriage to another "until the bridal veil's worn out."<sup>28</sup> His grim portrait of contemporary society exposed men's feats of wives who gained dominance in bed by using potions and charms and then nagged and cuckolded their husbands with impunity. Women separated men from their boyhood friends and then ganged up on them in the home. Mothers encouraged their daughters to make free with their husband's money, steering legacies to their lovers. Unrestrained by a manly hand, mistresses gratified irrational sadistic urges against their slaves and rumors of poisoned husbands ruined many a family dinner. Plutarch offered three models of marriage, groping for some workable insight into the true relationships of men and women (*Advice* 34). Naturally, he began with the marriage

<sup>24</sup> *Acts of Paul and Thecla*, *Antenicensis Fathers* VIII.490.

<sup>25</sup> 1 Tim. 5.9.

<sup>26</sup> Clement of Alexandria, *Christ the Educator* 7, trans Simon P. Wood (New York 1954).

<sup>27</sup> C. Vatn, *Recherches sur le mariage et la condition de la femme mariée à l'époque hellénistique* (Paris 1970), 274, tracks the evolution of marriage contracts in Hellenistic Egypt which enhance the wife's liberty by legally defining her obligations of obedience while restricting the husband by imposing obligations on him. Foucault, *Care of the Self*, 77, argued that marriage became more general as a practice as it became more public as an institution.

<sup>28</sup> *Satire* VI.135

bed, likening the couple whose principal connection was sexual to units in an army or ships in a fleet which act together, each under its own power.

Popular imagery compared sexual passion to fire, an indispensable element for human well-being as long as it was kept firmly under control. Paul saw marriage as a means of banking the unquenchable flame, a necessary distraction from the couple's primary duty to please God. Plutarch was more concerned with the inadequacy of lust as the basis for a solid marital consortium: fires quickly kindled are quickly extinguished (*Advice* 4). Love should arise from character and shared tastes, not the illusory flames of lust. He pictured a couple focused on one another, attentively tending their mutual love lest it burn off in an instant. He advised Pollianus to treat his lawful wife with affectionate respect, indulging her natural austerity for the sake of her virtue. He was to avoid quarrels in bed and compensate, if he finds her lacking in charm, by taking his wilder sexual impulses to the singing-girls (but not when his wife might sense his infidelity and punish him) (*Advice* 16 and 44).

Plutarch endorsed the popular Stoic teaching that manliness in marriage was proved by self-control. More subtly, he recognized that women rivaled men for self-mastery as well as self-indulgence. Unlike the misogynist satirist, he gave the young girl the initial advantage of reluctance and resistance to her husband's ardor, urging her not to let the pain of her initiation put her off later pleasure, the honeycomb won by those who suffer the bee's sting. He further gives her advice on deploying modest marital charms, cleanliness, and humor to secure her husband's appreciation and goodwill. In the hidden darkness of the marriage bed, a wife's virtue should shine most brightly, her very nakedness shielded by her modesty. In that fundamental sexual encounter where women are most equal to men, Plutarch tried to train Eurydice to forgo her advantages, reminding her that Circe got no pleasure from the men she controlled through her esoteric lore (*Advice* 5).

Homer was still on Plutarch's mind in thinking about the second type of marriage, likened to a house with separate rooms: a joint enterprise undertaken for children or for profit. The disastrous conjunction of Paris and Helen was based on their respective love for pleasure and for wealth. The fruitful and happy union of Odysseus and Penelope joined wisdom and prudence. It was as close as a first-century thinker could come to a concept of egalitarian marriage. A reader who remembered her circumstances, however, would have known without being told that Penelope's capacity to act in her husband's absence had very palpable limits. Plutarch constructed the model matriarch as a responsible partner in keeping social order, a woman whose virtue flourished under male guidance. Plutarch exemplified this kind of relationship in his description of his own marriage. He recognized his wife as a partner in decision making but expected her to defer to his wishes in action. He claimed that he and Timoxena shared their children's upbringing, but he was absent, traveling on some business of his own, when she had to deal with their daughter's death. Friends reported on her dignity and self-control throughout the funeral ceremonies, and he wrote to express his gratitude for a wife who conducted herself with such decorum in the most trying conditions. He delegated the power to undertake any services that would comfort her, trusting that she would do nothing extravagant or superstitious but behave with the restraint she showed in happier times.

The *Consolation* is a commendation for a deserving pupil. His affection for her is clear and so is their mutual grief, which he hopes to assuage with the help of their shared religious convictions, bidding her take consolation in their Dionysian faith that their dead daughter, who had never lived long enough to be bound closely to worldly things, had easily achieved spiritual freedom. This is very close to the family values that would be expressed in Tertullian's *Letter to His Wife*, praising the couple equal in faith: "praying together, prostrating themselves, performing their fasts together, teaching one another, and sustaining one another."<sup>29</sup> Plutarch's assurances of private affection, however, were minimal compared to his satisfaction that "every citizen in our temples, at our sacrifices, in our theaters, finds your simplicity a sight to behold" (*Consolation* 5). Timoxena's virtue was a tribute to Plutarch's leadership of their union. A sober husband, he observed, produces a sober wife. In giving Pollianus primacy over the tastes and habits of the newly wed couple, he admonished him to exercise similar wisdom.

Finally, Plutarch produces a third analogy that seems to imply that marriage requires mutual subordination. "Nature joins you together in your bodies, so that she may take a part of each, and by mixing them together give you a child that belongs to you both, such that neither of you can say what is his or her own, and what the other's" (*Advice* 20). More practically, he knew that society joined two fortunes. Juvenal on one side and Tertullian on the other agreed that a husband's leadership was threatened when his wife was his superior in wealth and status. Thus that happy union that makes a marriage begins with a mixture of property under the husband's effective disposition "even if the wife contributes the greater part" (*Advice* 20). The logic of the gender continuum pointed to the conclusion that women of superior virtue were entitled to autonomy and even authority over less virile men. Women of wealth and status supported many early Christian communities. Accordingly, the new religion incorporated the manliness of women into its ideology.<sup>30</sup> Widows and virgins defied imperial marriage laws, preached against marriage, and gendered themselves male as they entered the arena of martyrdom.<sup>31</sup> The conceit of the virile woman ultimately produced the argument that marriage was an intolerable distraction for women who needed time to devote to the salvation of their own souls and that of all humanity.<sup>32</sup> This was not, however, a direction in which most men

<sup>29</sup> *Letter to His Wife* II.8.

<sup>30</sup> Luke's story of the virgin birth came very close to the specter of the mole with which Plutarch threatens his young bridegroom. In the uncanonical Gospel of Thomas, Jesus promised to make Mary male so that she could participate fully in the Christian mission (Brown, *The Body and Society*, 111).

<sup>31</sup> This is dramatically attested by the one female author we have among the early Christians, Perpetua: *The Passion of Perpetua and Felicity*, trans W.H. Shewring (London 1931). The problem of dress is first noted by Paul, who orders women to veil themselves when praying and prophesying in church. The same problem arises at greater length in Tertullian, *De Virginitate Velandis*, *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina*, I (Turnholt 1954). By the fourth century, the transvestite saint is canonized in popular hagiography.

<sup>32</sup> Not, however, until the fourth and fifth centuries: see Jo Ann McNamara, "Sexual Equality and the Cult of Virginity in Early Christian Thought," in David M. Scholer (ed.), *Women in Early Christianity* (New York 1993).

wished to travel. Thecla remained a dubious model even for second-century Christians.<sup>33</sup> Despite their admiration for the women whose martyrdom crowned their virtue, critics sought to curtail the autonomy of virgins by commanding them to defer to Christ's conjugal authority as represented by their bishops.<sup>34</sup>

The "egalitarian" concept of marriage depended upon the husband's capacity for leadership. Plutarch did not mention a third well-known Homeric couple, Agamemnon and Clytemnestra, but the unhappy knowledge that a man might fail, that a wife could master him, formed a subtext to his homily. He groped for a prescription that would solve the inescapable problem of the wife who was more virtuous than her husband. In the *Eroticus* he toyed with the desirability of submitting a young and inexperienced husband to an older, wealthier, and wiser wife.<sup>35</sup> This made a good mental exercise but not a very satisfactory social model. In the *Advice*, he obviously hoped to convince women who had the choice to prefer wise husbands over frivolous boys, but he recognized that some husbands used their authority to degrade morally superior wives to their own level rather than raising themselves (*Advice* 6–8). Again, Christian sources engaged this problem vehemently. Though Paul clung to the conviction that wifely subordination was the divine command, he recognized that the believing wife should assume leadership over her unbelieving husband. Justin Martyr praised a Christian woman whose pagan husband betrayed her to the executioners when she abandoned their joint debaucheries.<sup>36</sup> Tertullian warned that pagan husbands blackmailed Christian wives out of their property.<sup>37</sup> Plutarch admonished Pollianus to remember that "a husband who enjoys pleasure which he prohibits in his wife is like a man who tells his wife to fight the enemy to whom he has himself surrendered" (*Advice* 47).

In thinking seriously about women and their claims, Plutarch approached a new construction of woman in explicating his third marital model. Seeking a formula to accommodate the woman of superior virtue, he subtly subverted the structure of the gender system in order to reshape it. His final formula for the ideal marriage lay in the natural unity of the animate body which blended husband and wife into one conjugal unit. There is great and obvious attraction in this ancient idea. The Gospel of Matthew reached back to the book of Genesis for the same image: they shall be no more twain but one flesh.<sup>38</sup> Plutarch offered the image of marital concordia as the mixture of wine and water into one pleasing brew (*Advice* 20, 34). The mixing of wine and water requires two different elements and Plutarch tactfully refrained from stating explicitly who was which or what proportion dominated the recipe. In the same spirit as Paul's analogy of husband and wife to Christ

<sup>33</sup> Tertullian, *De Baptismo*, *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina*, I (Turnholt 1954).

<sup>34</sup> See particularly Cyprian of Carthage, *De Habitu Virginum*, *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina*, III (Turnholt 1972–6).

<sup>35</sup> *Eroticus*, in *Selected Essays and Dialogues*, trans. Donald Russell (Oxford 1993), 246–83. Foucault used this text extensively to argue that Plutarch was shifting the terms of his discourse toward marriage by substituting the aggressive widow for the manly mentor of Platonic debate.

<sup>36</sup> Justin Martyr, *Second Apology* 2, *Antenicene Fathers*, I.

<sup>37</sup> *Letter to His Wife* 5.

<sup>38</sup> Matt. 19.6.

and the church, he told Pollianus, "[T]he husband should rule the wife, not as a master rules a slave, but as the soul rules the body, sharing her feelings and growing together with her in affection" (*Advice* 33). Did the same metaphor occur to him when he wrote to his wife that in times of stress the strengthened and well-groomed body should rule the agitated soul?

The bulk of Plutarch's practical advice to the young couple was addressed to Eurydice, urging, cajoling, and bribing her to make her marriage comfortable by pleasing her husband. He adopted the traditional assumption of male superiority in repeatedly advising her to find happiness in submission to her husband's greater wisdom and authority. But at the same time, he educated her in the subtle wiles that allowed the truly superior woman to manipulate her inadequate husband. Hers, in effect, was to be the self-control that dominated the marriage. If her husband wronged her, she should control the anger that would play into her rival's hand. Privately participating in all their joint decisions, she should leave him alone to carry them out. Forgoing her own chances to shine in public, she should help him impress their mutual friends. By suggesting that she should speak only to her husband or through her husband, he hinted that hers was the intellect that made him her instrument. Her happiness must be found in accepting her husband's authority regardless of his inferiority. Submission itself, however, would enhance her virtue, and her greater virtue, properly deployed, might ultimately secure her the leadership she deserved.

The so-called egalitarian partnership became a vehicle for a new concept of virtue, femininity. What must surprise and perhaps even charm us most is a concept of womanhood whose real happiness lay in finding a man strong enough to master her. Plutarch's advice to Eurydice was that she accomplish her own subordination to her husband. He acknowledged her agency, her moral choice, her otherness. Plutarch himself implies that Eurydice, following his advice, will shape her husband by encouraging him to shape her. Urging her to think of herself as his mirror, she would reflect what she chose to emulate in him. She is not to be equal but is to choose her inequality. This is a subtly different view of women's nature.

Writers of the Augustan age began to consider women seriously as actors in the moral universe. Their first impulse was to reinforce the natural manliness of women while firmly reasserting the authority of true men. Such a morality, based on women's subtle manipulation of men, confined women to a subordinate position, but its poisonous results where the women were not benign terrified them. Thus Plutarch and his contemporaries began to define a different set of gender characteristics which approached the concept of an opposite sex. The prominence of women among their original converts and their heroism as martyrs pressured Christian writers to canonize virile women as soldiers of Christ. Eventually, however, they too came to redefine the virtue of women who had successfully converted their unbelieving husbands. They subtly transformed the strength of virgins resisting the aggression of predatory men into the virtue of suffering their assaults.

Among them, these influential advisors to women began to delineate a feminine model that differed inherently from the masculine exemplar of virtue. Woman was envisaged not as a failed man, but as his natural dependent whose humility became a virtue to adorn his authority. Her placatory ways were cultivated as a

complement to male rigor. Her power was located in her ability to soften. Her love would turn away his blows; her understanding would reveal his virtues to himself. Thus they developed an alterity which attaches feminine honor to chastity and opposes feminine nurturance to male creativity. The "real woman" whom they conceived as the fitting mate for the "true man" emerged as an analytical tool with the potential to silence the virile woman except, perhaps, in a Christian heaven.

## Plutarch on Persuasion

The ancients set Hermes at Aphrodite's side, knowing that the pleasure of marriage needed his word more than anything, and with them they set Persuasion and the Graces, that married couples might gratify their desire with each other by persuasion, not in conflict or quarrelsomeness.

(Plutarch, *Advice* 138C–D)

In the opening paragraph of the *Advice*, Plutarch adduces the religious practice of “the ancients” in support of the proposition that harmony in marriage should be sought by means of mutual persuasion. In the immediate context of the quote this “persuasion” seems to be of an erotic variety, since its goal is gratification of desire, but such a preference for persuasion over confrontation in general is a feature of the essay. Plutarch’s advice on the subject is drawing on a long tradition of the “persuasion (*peitho*) against force (*bia*)” argument, a commonplace of classical rhetoric. His application of such ideas to the context of marriage, however, is informed by a further set of traditional associations which emphasize persuasion’s erotic side: *Peitho*, persuasion personified, was worshipped alongside Aphrodite and may have had a part to play in classical Greek wedding ritual. Although we have only a few notices of the continued observance of *Peitho*’s cult in first- to second-century A.D. Greece, Plutarch, like Pausanias, was certainly well aware of her role as a mythological and cult figure in the past, so to appreciate what he means by “persuasion” we need some understanding of the *Peitho* of “the ancients.”<sup>1</sup>

### *Peitho*, Aphrodite, Hermes, and the Charites

*Peitho*’s very first appearance in literature establishes both her association with Aphrodite and her own special sphere of influence, with its inherent danger. In the Prometheus story of Hesiod’s *Works and Days*, Zeus instructs Hephaestus to make

Wherever possible I use D.A. Russell’s translations of the *Moralia* (*Plutarch: Selected Essays and Dialogues* [Oxford 1993]); all other translations are my own.

<sup>1</sup> I discuss much of this material more fully in ch. 4 of my “Greek Cults of Deified Abstractions” (Ph.D. diss., London Univ., 1998).

Pandora as a punishment for man. Athene is to teach her weaving, Hermes to give her "lies and crafty words and a deceitful nature" (Hesiod *Works and Days* 77–8), and Aphrodite to endow her with "grace and cruel longing" (65–6) a task she delegates to appropriate assistants: "And the divine Graces and lady Persuasion put golden necklaces around her neck, and the rich-haired Seasons garlanded her with spring flowers" (73–5). Persuasion's gift is not one of eloquence, but of sexual attractiveness, expressed in visual terms. Extravagant adornment is always regarded with suspicion in Greek literature, and golden necklaces may carry additional negative connotations from the story of the bribing of Eriphyle. The seductive properties of Persuasion's necklaces are made explicit by the scholiast on this passage—"because the adorned woman quickly persuades the man to intercourse"—who refers to Peitho as one of the three Graces, along with Aglaia and Euphrosyne. This identification is also made by the Hellenistic elegiac poet Hermesianax (fr. 11 P), quoted by Pausanias (9.35.5) in the course of a discussion of the Graces prompted by his visit to Orchomenus, their major cult site; the Boeotians themselves, though, do not seem to have been concerned to give their three Graces individual names.<sup>2</sup>

Hesiod's association of Peitho with Hermes and the Charites, as well as Aphrodite, also appears in evidence for her cult on Paros, Thasos, and Lesbos, which lends weight to the supposition that religious tradition lies behind Plutarch's combination of deities.<sup>3</sup> Elsewhere Peitho's most regular cult associate is Aphrodite, the two even occasionally appearing as a single deity "Aphrodite Peitho."<sup>4</sup> Our fullest picture of Peitho's cult, however, comes as usual from Athens, where we have information about the goddess from literature and vase painting to fill out the framework established by more direct cult attestation.<sup>5</sup> Together the sources give a reasonable picture of the Athenian Peitho flourishing as goddess of both sexual and rhetorical persuasion, worshipped alongside Aphrodite Pandemus, with whom she shared a temple on the southwest slope of the Acropolis from the early fifth century B.C.<sup>6</sup> Pausanias (1.22.3) is our main source for the cult observed at this temple, which he describes as established by "Theseus," and although his reference is brief, it does suggest that Peitho and Aphrodite Pandemus were still in residence at the time of writing, the latter half of the second century A.D. Further evidence for the period comes from inscriptions in the Theater of Dionysus reserving seats "for the singer-priestess of Child-Nurturing Demeter (and) of Peitho" (IG II<sup>2</sup>.5131) and "for the priestess of Aphrodite Pandemus (and) of Nymphe . . ." (IG II<sup>2</sup>.149). The dating of the seats is debated, but they are likely to have been in place, and in use by the religious officials named, in Plutarch's day. The separation of Peitho from Aphrodite Pandemus, and both goddesses' new company, is slightly puzzling, but may well be

<sup>2</sup> On Orchomenus, see A. Schachter, *Cults of Boiotia*, I, *BICS Suppl.* 38 (London 1986), 140–4.

<sup>3</sup> Paros: IG XII suppl. 206. Thasos: IG XII.8.360, IG XII.8.358b, SEG II.506 (Louvre Ma 696.9800617), IG XII suppl. 394. Lesbos: IG XII.2.73, 1–4.

<sup>4</sup> Knidos (SEG XII.423); Pharsalos (IG IX.2.236); Lesbos (above n. 3).

<sup>5</sup> Aristophanes *Lys.* 203–4, *Frogs* 1391 (= Eur. *Antigone* fr. 170 Nauck); Isocrates *Antidosis* 15.249; Demosthenes *Prooimia* 54.1460.

<sup>6</sup> See E. Simon, *Festivals of Attica* (Madison, Wis. 1983), 48–51, pl. 15.1.

explained by the hypothesis that one or two priestesses served several neighboring small shrines on the south slope of the Acropolis (cf. Paus. 1.22.1–3). Nymphe is “the Bride,” to whom wedding vases were dedicated after the ceremony at a sanctuary just south of the Acropolis.<sup>7</sup>

### *Peitho and Bia, Seduction and the Wedding*

In cult, then, Peitho is firmly linked with Aphrodite and the sphere of love. P/persuasion’s relationship to seduction, force, and marriage can now be illustrated by reference to the literature and visual arts of fifth-century Athens.<sup>8</sup>

In visual representations Peitho is almost invariably in Aphrodite’s retinue. In scenes with no recognizable narrative her significance is difficult to assess, though a pelike associated with the Meidias Painter suggests a possible link between Peitho and the persuasive power of music, an association also made by Plutarch (see above, *Advice*, Commentary [138A], s.v. “harmony,” and fig. 1). Apart from non-narrative scenes, however, Peitho appears most frequently in various stages of the story of Helen, once in a Judgment of Paris (presumably there to help Aphrodite persuade Paris of her right to the prize),<sup>9</sup> but more notably in depictions of Helen’s abduction and her recovery by Menelaus, both first portrayed on an early fifth-century skyphos in Boston by Macron.<sup>10</sup> The question of Helen’s innocence or guilt was, of course, a popular *topos* in the late fifth century. Gorgias’s *Encomium of Helen* summarizes the case for her innocence, adducing four possible exonerating circumstances in Helen’s defense: “So how should one consider the blame of Helen just? Whether she did what she did because she was enamored by sight or persuaded by speech (*logos*) or seized by force (*bia*) or compelled by divine necessity (*ananke*), in every way she escapes the charge” (*Enc.* 20). Although Gorgias does not explicitly personify Peitho, he does earlier on speak of the persuasive word as “a great ruler” (*Enc.* 8), and of divine necessity personified as Tyche and Ananke (*Enc.* 6). There are obvious technical difficulties with representing such abstract forces in visual terms, difficulties tackled in vase painting by the inclusion of personifications, as can be seen on the Heimarmene Painter’s “Persuasion of Helen” amphoriskos in Berlin.<sup>11</sup> In the central scene a pensive Helen sits on Aphrodite’s lap, attended by Peithō, while Himerus seems to be giving Paris advice: there is at least the illusion that Helen has some choice in the matter of her removal to Troy, though the odds are against her,

<sup>7</sup> Theater-seat rights: M. Maass, *Die Prohedrie des Dionysostheaters in Athen* (Munich 1972). Nymphe’s shrine: J.H. Oakley and R.H. Sinos, *The Wedding in Ancient Athens* (Madison, Wis. 1995), 15, 42, 43, 131 n.6, 137 n.63. Peitho’s cult: V. Pirenne-Delforge, “Le Culte de la persuasion: Peithō en Grèce ancienne,” *Revue de l’histoire des religions* 208 (1991), 395–413.

<sup>8</sup> Literature: R.G.A. Buxton, *Persuasion in Greek Tragedy* (Cambridge 1982). Art: H.A. Shapiro, *Personifications in Greek Art: The Representation of Abstract Concepts 600–400 B.C.* (Zurich 1993), s.v. “Peitho”; N. Icard-Gianolio, *LIMC*, VII (Zurich 1994), 242–50, s.v. “Peitho.”

<sup>9</sup> Ca. 510–500 B.C.; Shapiro (above n. 8), no. 122.

<sup>10</sup> Ca. 490–480 B.C.; Shapiro (above n. 8), no. 123, fig. 148.

<sup>11</sup> Berlin 30036, ca. 430; Shapiro (above n. 8), no. 129, 192–5; in more detail, H.A. Shapiro, “The Origins of Allegory in Greek Art,” *Boreas* 9 (1986), 11–4.



FIGURE 2. The Persuasion of Helen. Neoattic relief of the first century B.C., Naples inv. 6682. Courtesy of the National Archaeological Museum of Naples.

personified by four female figures, two of whom are identified by inscriptions as Nemesis (Retribution) and Heimarmene (Fate). These framing pairs of allegorical figures are exceptional, but the central scene is a popular motif in red-figure vase painting of the last third of the fifth century, and continued interest in the Persuasion is demonstrated by the existence of three Neoattic reliefs of the first century B.C., of which the best preserved is in Naples (fig. 2). It is generally thought that these must have a common model, probably a monumental painting of the late fifth century now lost.<sup>12</sup>

The persuasion of Helen brings us to the question of Peitho's *modus operandi* and her relationship to force: do mortals have any choice when up against her power? On a hydria by the Meidias Painter she appears in a scene depicting the "Rape of the Daughters of Leucippus by the Dioscuri."<sup>13</sup> In the upper part, Castor is dragging a reluctant girl towards his chariot, while Polydeuces, who already has

<sup>12</sup> Icard-Gianolio (above n. 8) nos. 16–8; for detailed analysis, H. Froning, *Marmor-Schmuckreliefs mit Griechischen Mythen im 1. Jh. v. Chr.* (Mainz 1981), 63–71; also L.B. Ghali-Kahil, *Les Enlèvements et le retour d'Hélène dans les textes et les documents figurés* (Paris 1955), 225–33, nos. 170–9.

<sup>13</sup> London E224, ca. 420 B.C.; Shapiro (above n. 8), no. 63, fig. 168.

an exhausted victim in his chariot, prepares to depart; below, Zeus and Aphrodite look on unconcerned, while a girl labeled Agave runs off to the left, leaving another picking flowers unperturbed; Peitho is fleeing to the right, looking back at the scene. Most commentators take this as an example of Peitho representing nonviolent methods of persuasion, horrified at the forcible abduction going on, and contrast her righteous indignation to the complacency of Aphrodite.<sup>14</sup> Burn has a point, however, in suggesting that Peitho's alarm "can scarcely be taken seriously":<sup>15</sup> on the Boston skyphos she seems not to be so squeamish, and a number of literary references suggest she is not averse to the application of a little force. Pindar talks of "Peitho's whip" (*Pythian* 4.219), and the Peitho of Aeschylus's *Agamemnon*, evoked by the chorus as they tell the story of Paris's crime, is decidedly coercive: "Baneful Persuasion, irresistible child of forward-planning Ruin, forces him . . ." (385–6). In Herodotus (8.111), Themistocles threatens the recalcitrant Andrians with the two "great gods" the Athenians have on their side, Persuasion and Necessity (*Ananke*); Plutarch's version of the story, in his *Themistocles* (21), pairs Peitho with *Bia* herself.<sup>16</sup>

*P/peitho*, then, has strong associations with seduction, and need not be gentle in her means. The persuasion of Helen is the paradigmatic adulterous seduction for fifth-century Athens, and Peitho's involvement in it underlines her potentially subversive nature, first hinted at by Hesiod. A number of late literary references, however, establish a firm association between Peitho and marriage. In Nonnus's *Dionysiaca* Peitho, "in the form of a hard-worked woman," leads Cadmus to his bride Harmonia; she is "attendant in the bridal chamber" and "delighting in weddings, nurse of Loves" (3.84–6, 112). In a later episode she is "wedding-preparing" (*gamostolos*), and arms Dionysus and Poseidon, who are preparing to fight for Beroë's hand in marriage (42.530). The epithet *gamostolos* is otherwise usually attached to Hera or Aphrodite, as in the *Orphic Hymn to Aphrodite* (55.8–9), where Aphrodite is "wedding-preparing mother of Loves, enjoying the marriage bed of Peitho." Colluthus has Peitho attending a wedding: "[A]nd Persuasion came, who had decorated a bridal wreath" (30). More direct reference to Peitho's involvement in wedding ritual is supplied by an epigram by Joannes Barbocallus, which purports to record a rustic bridegroom's offerings: "Hermophiles the herdsman, bridegroom of budding-wreathed Eurynome, dedicated curds and honey-combs from the hive to Peitho and the Paphian. Receive the curds for her sake, the honey for mine" (*Palatine Anthology* 6.55).

A closer look at some of Peitho's representations in vase-painting also reveals an intriguing relationship with wedding imagery. On Macron's skyphos Paris leads Helen by the wrist with the gesture of a groom leading his bride to her new home, while Aphrodite adjusts Helen's fillet, like the bridesmaids in many wedding scenes.<sup>17</sup> Without the inscriptions marking it as a "Persuasion of Helen," the central

<sup>14</sup> Shapiro (above n. 8), 206; Buxton (above n. 8), 58.

<sup>15</sup> L. Burn, *The Meidias Painter* (Oxford 1987), 17.

<sup>16</sup> *Peitho* and *bia* as polarities: Buxton (above n. 8), 58–63. Cf. *Lysias Against Eratosthenes* 32–3, on seduction (*peitho*) as a worse crime than rape (*bia*).

<sup>17</sup> Oakley and Sinos (above n. 7), 32–3, figs. 82, 85, 87, 94, 97, 102, 106, 110, and 118.

scene of the Berlin amphoriskos could be a generic prewedding bridal adornment scene.<sup>18</sup> On a lekythos in London Peitho prepares *kanoun* for Aphrodite, which could again be a wedding reference, as such baskets appear in a number of wedding scenes, though they seem to have been used in other rituals as well.<sup>19</sup> This involvement of Peitho with legitimate unions may be illuminated by the Eretria Painter's epinetron, on which three scenes are depicted: on the end Peleus pursues Thetis, and on one side Alcestis is visited by friends after her wedding night.<sup>20</sup> On the other, a bridal adornment is in progress, the figures all identified by inscriptions: the bride Harmonia is seated in the center, attended by Peitho, Kore, and Hebe, while Harmonia's mother Aphrodite is seated to left; there are two winged youths, Eros and Himerus, indicating the erotic context. Although these are mostly familiar mythological characters, Shapiro makes a good case for an allegorical reading of the scene:<sup>21</sup> the good bride-to-be (Harmony) is being encouraged by the experienced Aphrodite, with the help of Persuasion, to leave behind her maidenhood (Kore) and enter properly into her prime (Hebe). In other words, we have here the traditional premarriage instruction session, the bride being decked out with sexual knowledge as well as with such trappings as jewelry and perfume: "[W]e must think of the bride not only as being the target of persuasion but also as acquiring the power represented by this divine figure."<sup>22</sup>

### P/peitho in Plutarch

Whether Pollianus and Eurydice's wedding involved Peitho at all is of course a moot point. We have already noted our scant contemporary evidence for Peitho at Athens—Pausanias's mention of her shared temple with Aphrodite Pandemus and the theater-seat inscriptions—and outside Athens we only have the testimony of Plutarch. The second of his *Roman Questions* (264B) asks why five torches are lit as part of the marriage ceremony: "Or is it because they think those getting married need five gods, Zeus Teleios, Hera Teleia, Aphrodite, and Peitho, and besides all these Artemis, whom women in childbirth and labor pains invoke?"

It is not clear whether this should be taken as evidence for practice in Plutarch's own day, as the details are all concordant with classical Greek ritual, despite the supposedly Roman context: Hera the Fulfiller is regularly the presiding goddess of marriage (cf. "the sacrifice to Hera, as goddess of marriage," *Advice* 27), with Zeus consecrating the union's legitimacy and legal status; Aphrodite's role in the "delightful works of marriage" is established as early as the *Iliad* (5.429); Artemis must be placated by young women leaving her sphere for marriage, or they risk death in

<sup>18</sup> Oakley and Sinos (above n. 7), 16–21; Ghali-Kahil (above n. 12), 176. See also my "A Wedding Scene? Notes on Akropolis 6471," *JHS* 117 (1997), 200–2.

<sup>19</sup> London E697, 410–400 B.C.; Shapiro (above n. 8), no. 21, fig. 163.

<sup>20</sup> Athens NM 1629, ca. 420 B.C.; Shapiro (above n. 8), no. 47, fig. 58; Oakley and Sinos (above n. 7), 41–2, figs. 128–30.

<sup>21</sup> Shapiro (n.11), 14–20; more briefly, Shapiro (above n. 8), 105–6, no. 47, fig. 58.

<sup>22</sup> Oakley and Sinos (above n. 7), 46.

childbirth.<sup>23</sup> The *Advice's* opening reference to "the traditional ordinance, which the priestess of Demeter laid upon you when you were shut up in your wedding chamber together" (138A) is intriguing. As goddess of grain and the fertility of crops, Demeter's relevance for the wedding night is obvious enough (cf. *Advice* 42 on the Athenian "Sacred Plowings"), and her standing as archetypal mother would suit her for a part in the proceedings, but she does not usually appear in a wedding context in our extant sources.

Whatever contemporary wedding practice was in Plutarch's part of the Roman world, however, our opening quote is susceptible of fairly elementary allegorical interpretation. If Hermes is taken in his usual role as messenger, and Aphrodite as physical love, the message could read: "Physical attraction combined with good communication, seasoned with persuasive and charming manners, make for a harmonious marriage." Might Plutarch be speaking purely allegorically when he introduces such a personification as Peitho? We can compare the case of Grief (Penthos) in the *Consolation* (6), introduced in the story which Plutarch attributes to Aesop, where Grief asks Zeus for a share in the honors being handed out to the gods. Human form is certainly implied by the context: Grief is one of the gods, he is invited into the homes of the incautious and becomes a member of the family. But as Plutarch continues with comment on the fable he immediately slips into talking about grief as an emotion rather than a deity. In Greek the distinction between abstract and personification is even less clear than in English, since there is no convention of an initial capital for proper names. English also applies a gender differentiation to the animate/inanimate distinction: the abstract is neuter (it) and the personification feminine or masculine (she or he). Since all three genders are used for all kinds of nouns in Greek, gender is of no help in identifying a personification. As a rule Greek personifications follow the gender of the nouns they embody — *erôs* is masculine, so Eros is male, *nikê* is feminine, so Victory is a woman — but neuter nouns like *penthos* present a problem. In this case Plutarch's Greek is equivocal, but English translations like our own are obliged to designate Grief as "he" in order to maintain the personification.<sup>24</sup> The fact that no sharp distinction between a concept and its anthropomorphic incarnation can be indicated linguistically suggests that the two were not clearly distinguished in thought either. To understand how Plutarch imagined his personifications we can only look to external evidence: Penthos is a rather shadowy figure not otherwise attested in literature and nowhere represented in art, whereas Peitho has a solid tradition in art, literature, and cult. Furthermore, he associates her with "the ancients", a sure sign of validation: as he

<sup>23</sup> W. Burkert, *Greek Religion: Archaic and Classical*, trans. J. Raffan (Oxford 1985), 133 and 135 (on Hera), and 151 with nn. 24–5. Aphrodite and marriage: V. Pirenne-Delforge, *L'Aphrodite grecque: contribution à l'étude de ses cultes et de sa personnalité dans le panthéon archaïque et classique* (Liège 1994), 421–6. The Roman Questions: J. Boulogne, *Plutarque: un aristocrate grec sous l'occupation romaine* (Lille 1994), 77–88 (marriage) and 118–24 (Plutarch's conflation of Greek and Roman gods).

<sup>24</sup> Cf. F. C. Babbitt's translation of *Consolation to Apollonius* 112A for Penthos as "she" (Cambridge, Mass. 1928). See further my "Masculine Values, Feminine Forms: On the Gender of Personified Abstractions," in L. Foxhall and J. Salmon (eds.), *Thinking Men: Masculinity and Its Self-Representation in the Classical Tradition* (London 1998).

says of the divinity of Eros (another personification), "the ancient faith of our fathers suffices" (*Eroticus* 13).<sup>25</sup>

Apart from his acknowledgment of Peitho as a figure of myth and cult, Plutarch has a keen interest in rhetorical *peitho* as a concept, as befits an intellectual and public man of his time. Like the seductive variety, rhetorical persuasion can be put to proper or improper use, and may be regarded with just as much suspicion. Succumbing to persuasion may imply gullibility: Timoxena is praised for not believing the false doctrines of the Epicureans concerning life after death, though "they persuade many" (*Consolation* 10); similarly a wife educated in philosophy will not be taken in by the claims of magic, but "she will laugh at the ignorance and folly of women who are persuaded of such things" (*Advice* 48). On the other hand, the virtuous may use persuasion to good ends, as Aretaphila's daughter "began to urge and persuade (*anapeitho*)" her husband Laander to liberate Cyrene from his brother's tyranny (*Virtues in Women* 19). For Plutarch, as indeed for a long line of Greek intellectuals, a speaker's facility in persuasion is paradoxically always secondary to his or her innate virtue.<sup>26</sup> This equivocal attitude towards rhetorical persuasion should be borne in mind when we are considering Plutarch's use of *peitho* in the context of love and family relationships.

Rhetorical persuasion is associated with the Graces and Muses in the introduction to *Virtues in Women* (243A), but it is the more erotic side of persuasion which we might expect to be associated with grace (*charis*), and the two are indeed paired in the *Eroticus*. Daphnaeus, one of the supporters of heterosexual marriage, defines *charis* as "the name the ancients gave to the yielding of the female to the male" (5) and argues that it is absent from homosexual unions, as are Aphrodite and Eros. Pisias, chief defender of homosexuality, retorts that heterosexual "love" is nothing but base lust, in turn arousing the young Plutarch's indignation: marriage cannot possibly be loveless, for we know that "when the persuasion (*peitho*) and favor (*charis*) of love (*eros*) has gone, a partnership can hardly be held together by the yoke and curb of shame and fear" (6). A little later, in his speech on Eros, Plutarch argues that love *should* have a god of its own, for "here is nothing ugly, nothing forced, only persuasion and grace", which leads to a virtue and affection that "has no god as guide and master save only the companion of the Muses, of the Graces, and of Aphrodite—that is, Eros" (15). Towards the end of the dialogue, it is once again the character of Plutarch who defends women as "abounding in persuasion and charms" although he acknowledges the double-edgedness of their gifts: "Nature endows them with charm (*charis*) for the eye, persuasiveness (*pithanotēs*) of tongue, and seductiveness of form; she therefore contributes both to the deceptive delights of the wanton and to the conjugal affection and kindness of the chaste" (23).

<sup>25</sup> Cf. *Eroticus* 14 (below, p. 172) and 18; D. Russell, "Plutarch, *Amatorius* 13–18," in J. Mossman (ed.), *Plutarch and His Intellectual World* (London 1997), 99–111.

<sup>26</sup> Plutarch's *Demosthenes* and *Cicero* are excellent examples of such attitudes towards rhetoric; I am grateful to Judith Mossman for letting me see a prepublication version of her "Is the Pen Mightier than the Sword? The Failure of Rhetoric in Plutarch's *Demosthenes*," *Histos* (forthcoming).

We have come full circle to the ambiguously persuasive Pandora of Hesiod. Unlike Hesiod, however, Plutarch chooses to emphasize the “positive” side of female attractiveness, even advising the “good and chaste woman” to pray to Eros for “feminine charm” to keep her marriage happy (23). He cites here the story, also used in much the same context in the *Advice* (28), of Plato’s advice to the austere Xenocrates that he should sacrifice to the Graces to improve his manner.

Persuasion’s dual spheres of operation, rhetorical and erotic, are perhaps reflected in the *Advice* in Plutarch’s association of her with Hermes on the one hand and Aphrodite and the Graces on the other. These two sides of persuasion are intertwined throughout the essay, which is, after all, a rhetorical piece designed to persuade the newlyweds to exercise both kinds of persuasion in their married relationship: “[I]t may be that words (*logos*) also will touch you and contribute to your wedding . . .” (138A). Plutarch’s most explicit articulation of the *peitho* vs. *bia* opposition, however, is at least ostensibly concerned with rational rather than erotic persuasion, in the fable of the Sun’s competition with the North Wind (12). The Aesopian version exaggerates the North Wind’s failure, which makes the man put on an extra layer, and the Sun’s victory, which has the man not only removing his coat, but stripping off and bathing in a nearby river. The moral reads: “This story shows that persuasion (*to peithein*) is often more practicable than force (*to biazesthai*).”<sup>27</sup> Plutarch adapts this moral to his own purpose by restricting its application to the relationship between women and their husbands, with particular regard to the supposedly female vice of extravagance: “[I]f they are persuaded by reason (*peithôntai meta logou*)” they will be moderate. Here the *peitho/bia* opposition is clearly spelled out, the persuasion in question being explicitly the rational variety, though it should be noted that the Sun’s method of persuasion was entirely physical, little to do with “reason.”

The importance of love and harmony in marriage is stressed throughout the *Advice*, as in the *Eroticus*, but the unity of husband and wife is particularly necessary when it comes to the procreation of children (20). Likewise, while Persuasion, the Graces, and the Muses may be facilitators in the relationship in general, our opening quote relates their role specifically to the pleasures of marital sex. This in itself, however, is essential to marital harmony—“for married couples, sexual relations are a foundation of affection, a communion, as it were, in a great mystery” (*Eroticus* 23)—and sex has a particular role in reconciliation—“Eros is sweeter and keener when lovers are reconciled (*anapeitho*) after anger and jealousy” (*Eroticus* 19). In the *Advice* Plutarch enlarges on this idea: when you have a quarrel, “that is especially the time to call in Aphrodite, who is the best doctor for such troubles” (38). He adduces the authority of Homer, quoting from a speech by Hera: “I’ll end this endless quarrel, / letting him come to me in love to bed” (*Iliad* 14.205 and 209). Though this is apparently an apposite reference to a truce in the ever-stormy relationship between Zeus and Hera, the Iliadic context rather undermines the message. Hera is talking to Aphrodite, asking for the “love and desire with which you tame

<sup>27</sup> A. Hausrath (ed.), *Corpus Fabularum Aesopicarum* (Leipzig 1956–9), no. 46.

mortals and immortals" 14.195–9, which she says she wants in order to reconcile the estranged Oceanus and Tethys; her real purpose, however, is to "seduce" her husband Zeus, so that Sleep can put him out of action while Poseidon strengthens the Achaeans, Hera's favored side. Aphrodite complies, giving Hera her own elaborately embroidered belt, the description of which is telling: "On it are woven all enchantments, / love, desire and the fond / allurements which craftily steals away even the mind of the wise" 14.215–7. Once again, persuasion can be used to good or dubious ends, even within the context of the divine marriage *par excellence*. "Aphrodite's magic belt" is referred to earlier in the *Advice* as part of the successful married woman's essential equipment, along with dowry, good birth, and potions (*pharmaka*, 23). Dowry and birth are obvious assets, but *pharmaka* are just as equivocal as Aphrodite's belt, the word applying in a "good" sense to medicines but also to the love potions used by the kind of superstitious women Plutarch deplores. He does, however, specify that this "invincible" wife should be of good character and virtue, so presumably she would be capable of using these dangerous powers wisely.<sup>28</sup>

The role Plutarch has in mind for persuasion within marriage is illustrated very well by a mid-second century B.C. terracotta group from Myrina (fig. 3).<sup>29</sup> Such domestic scenes are rare outside vase painting, but here we have a glimpse of a groom persuading his hesitating bride, or perhaps the couple's reconciliation after a quarrel. The young woman is well wrapped up in her cloak, legs crossed, her body facing slightly away from the youth, although she turns her head towards him; he is dressed only in cloak and hat, following the convention of "heroic nudity" for men in their prime, with one arm around her, the other reaching towards her. He seems to be cajoling, and she is beginning to be persuaded; the fact that they are together on a couch suggests the kind of persuasion in progress and its desired goal.

## Conclusion

It can be seen, then, that Plutarch is writing within a tradition that has many ambivalences in its attitude towards persuasion. *Peitho* is at once an abstract force and a goddess, whose influence straddles the realms of rhetoric and sex, within which it may be used to good or bad ends. While for the most part Plutarch's usage of *peitho* is entirely true to Classical Greek ideas, his interest in persuasion in the context of marriage is notable. His confidence that such a dangerous force, so often associated with extramarital seduction, can be used to good purpose within marriage is influenced by his fascination with character: a virtuous character will naturally use persuasion well. Although he advocates persuasion as a tactic for both husband and wife, it would seem that the woman is expected to work harder on the arts of physical attraction, while the man is to employ reason in curbing her excesses; such a division of

<sup>28</sup> *Amoribus* towards sex and marriage in the Second Sophistic: S. Swan, *Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism, and Power in the Greek World A.D. 50–250* (Oxford 1996), 118–31.

<sup>29</sup> *Excavations, MYRINA, I. J. Pollini, *Art in the Hellenistic Age* (Cambridge 1994), 194, fig. 147. R. A. Higgins, *Greek Terracottas* (London 1967), 117, pl. 54a.*



FIGURE 3. Bride and Groom. Terracotta group, mid-second century B.C., Louvre MYR 268 (photo: M. Chuzeville). Courtesy of the Musée du Louvre.

labor is entirely consonant with Plutarch's general attitude towards marriage as a partnership, but not of equals. Plutarch's references to the deities who will support this partnership also reflect his intellectual but conservative attitude towards traditional religion: the gods may be interpreted allegorically, but they still exist. "Others again will say that Aphrodite is desire, Hermes speech, the Muses arts, and Athena wisdom. You can see the abyss of atheism that opens under our feet if we classify the gods as various passions, capacities, or virtues" (*Eroticus* 14).

# *Philosophos kai Philandros*

## *Plutarch's View of Women in the Moralia and the Lives*

The evident admiration and affection Plutarch shows his wife Timoxena in *Consolation* sit uneasily with the subservience he seems to recommend to the young bride Eurydice in *Advice*. Plutarch often shows women in action in his works, but they rarely pursue their own agendas, and when they do, they are usually criticized. Still, Plutarch urges women to study, and firmly states that "virtue is the same in man and woman" (*Virtues in Women* 242F). How then did women fit into his thinking? In what follows, I will first define more precisely the level of education he expected in women, as seen in his writing for his friend Clea. Then, I will use the discussion in *Isis and Osiris* to consider his metaphysical basis for the virtues and limits of female action. Finally, I will show that the examples of women's virtue in *Virtues in Women* and the *Lives* suggest that he expected women to act to supplement and support men, or in response to male deficiency or violence, rather than as independent agents.

### Clea and Her Education

Plutarch is unusual among ancient authors in writing several works addressed to women he knew.<sup>1</sup> Even more than the *Consolation* to his wife, the two works he dedicated to his friend Clea, *Virtues in Women* and *Isis and Osiris*, reveal the level of education and philosophical sophistication that Plutarch might expect in a woman.

Clea was a woman of some distinction, the leader of a group of women devotees of Dionysus (*thyiades*) at Delphi, as well as active in the Isis cult (*Isis and Osiris* 364E). Her parents had been active in the cult, for they initiated her as a child.<sup>2</sup> The

<sup>1</sup> I exclude poetic works and works dedicated to women as patrons or rulers.

<sup>2</sup> *Isis and Osiris* 364E. Child initiation was common, though Clea is the earliest known female initiate: S.K. Heyob, *The Cult of Isis among Women in the Graeco-Roman World* (Leiden 1975), 78, 109. Both Plutarch and his wife Timoxena were initiates in the cult of Dionysus (*Consolation* 10)

depth and nature of her involvement are uncertain, though some think she served as a priestess. Inscriptions confirm that she, like Plutarch, belonged to the wealthy elite of central Greece, and reveal a close personal tie to Plutarch: she was probably the mother of Pollianus and the mother-in-law of Memmia Eurydice, the young couple to whom *Advice* is dedicated,<sup>3</sup> and the wife of Plutarch's good friend Soclarus.<sup>4</sup> After the death of a mutual woman friend, Leontis, she had conversed with Plutarch at length on Leontis's excellent qualities and on virtue in women and the honor to be accorded it (*Virtues in Women* 242F).

Clea's education must have reached at least the level normal among Plutarch's male readers. The style and literary form of the works dedicated to Clea does not differ from Plutarch's normal sophistication of language, thought, and allusion.<sup>5</sup> In *Virtues in Women*, he expressly avoids well-known stories that she had already read. In fact, there are no stories from the major Greek historians. His casual references to historical and literary figures imply the reader's familiarity with standard Greek literary texts from Homer to Alexander, and with Roman history.<sup>6</sup> *Isis and Osiris* employs a more complex structure to unfold the successive levels of interpretations of the Isis cult. One of Plutarch's most ambitious philosophical works,<sup>7</sup> it ranges widely, addressing the question of religious syncretism and the philosophical interpretation of religious myth, with special attention to the problem of evil in the world. It is a major source for our knowledge of the Isis cult, and one of Plutarch's most significant statements on religion.<sup>8</sup> It is not a simple work, composed for a simple woman: Plutarch unfolds all his erudition for Clea, who is addressed five times.<sup>9</sup> He assumes her knowledge not only of the Isis cult and myth, but of basic philosophical concepts. Clea will join him in the search for knowledge of the gods, the greatest blessing the gods can give (*Isis and Osiris* 351C), and can follow his arguments. Some of Clea's knowledge—like that of her male contemporaries—no doubt derived from epitomes or compendiums, but Plutarch's explicit statements and the literary and intellectual sophistication of the two treatises argue for an impressive level of education.

<sup>3</sup> See B. Puech, "Prosopographie des amis de Plutarque," ANRW 2.33.6 (1992), 4831–93, at 4842–3, with bibliography.

<sup>4</sup> Puech (above n. 3) accepts Kapetanopoulos's suggestion that Clea is the mother of Memmia Eurydice, but more likely she is mother of Pollianus and wife of T. Flavius Soclarus of Tithorea, where there was a sanctuary of Isis which Pausanias calls the holiest in Greece (10.32.13–7).

<sup>5</sup> On the cultural importance of knowing literary Greek, see S. Swain, *Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism, and Power in the Greek World, AD 50–250* (Oxford 1996), 17–64. C. Froidefond, *Plutarque: œuvres morales*, vol. V, pt. 2: *Isis et Osiris*, 26–7 notes how that work addresses Clea's concerns as Dionysiac leader and Osiriatic initiate.

<sup>6</sup> The same could be said of Timoxena and Eurydice on the basis of *Advice* and *Consolation*.

<sup>7</sup> On the style of *Isis and Osiris*, see especially Froidefond (above n. 5) 24–6, and on its dialectical structure 28–44. It is the longest treatise of the *Moralia*—even major works like *Eroticus* or *Socrates' Daimonion* run one-third shorter.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. F.E. Brenk, "An Imperial Heritage: The Religious Spirit of Plutarch of Chaeronea," ANRW 2.26.1 (1987), 248–349, especially 294–303.

<sup>9</sup> *Isis and Osiris* 351C, 352C, 355B, 358F, 364E.

Thus the advice offered to Pollianus, to teach to and share with Eurydice the philosophy he is learning (*Advice* 145B), is not empty: Plutarch addresses Clea as someone with a trained and curious mind, and shares with her his best arguments. A woman's education is not an ideal but unrealizable goal, as it was to Plato, but a living reality among Plutarch's acquaintance.<sup>10</sup>

### *Isis and Osiris and the Female Principle*

Why did Clea elicit such a rich philosophical treatment of religion? Was it merely her curiosity about the opinion of a learned friend like Plutarch on the un-Hellenic religion that apparently meant a great deal to her? Or did Plutarch believe that she needed his philosophy to keep her from falling into the kinds of superstitious abuses from which he warns Eurydice (*Advice* 140D, 145C)? He addresses Clea directly in insisting that the Isiac myths do not represent literal truth (355B), and at the conclusion of his summary of the myth, which omits particularly outrageous material, he notes that she will naturally reject in disgust those who believe such stories to have actually happened (358EF). As his words to Timoxena show, he himself was able to combine his rational philosophy with belief in the Dionysiac mysteries (*Consolation* 10). The Isiac myths give an indication of the truth. Plutarch compares them to our perception of the sun in a rainbow. He seems confident that Clea takes an equally rationalizing view. It is possible, however, that this is a rhetorical ploy, and like laudatory speeches to the emperor, the treatise assumes the attitude in the addressee that the treatise itself wishes to create. If Clea looked to Isis for a validation of her own femininity, Plutarch's essay both affirmed and limited her hopes.

After his censored account of the myth, Plutarch offers a series of interpretations, culminating in his preferred Platonic reading of Isiac myth and ritual.<sup>11</sup>

Isis is the female principle in nature (*to tês physeôs thêlu*) and that which receives all procreation, and so she is called by Plato the Nurse and the All-receiving,<sup>12</sup> . . . because she is transformed by reason (*logos*) and receives all corporeal and spiritual forms. Imbued in her she has a love of the foremost and most sovereign (*kyriôtatou*) thing of all, which is the same as the Good, and this she longs for and pursues. (372E)

This notion develops the tripartite Platonic statement that the intelligible (*noêton*) is "the form and pattern and father"; the material (*hylê*) is "the mother, the nurse, and the seat and place of generation"; and the third part born from these two is the

<sup>10</sup> This advice is all the more credible if Clea is in fact the mother of Pollianus or Eurydice, see above. Plutarch himself has taught Eurydice (*Advice* 145E). Eurydice was superior in family and probably in wealth to Pollianus, unless Clea was both a Memmia and mother of Pollianus: cf. B. Puech, "Soclaros de Thîthorée, ami de Plutarque, et ses descendants," *REG* 94 (1981), 186–92 at 192, and above n. 3.

<sup>11</sup> On the relation of Plutarch's account to the cult see especially J. Gwyn Griffiths, *Plutarch's De Iside et Osiride* (Cambridge 1970), and Froidefond (above n. 5) with bibliography. On his Platonic interpretation, cf. Froidefond, 93–125.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Plato *Timaeus* 49A, speaking of the "receptacle": "it is receptive of all generation, like a wet-nurse," and 51A.

"offspring" (373E).<sup>13</sup> Plutarch invokes further parallels with the matrimonial number of Plato's *Republic*,<sup>14</sup> and with the *Symposium*'s account of the love of Poverty for Plenty,<sup>15</sup> which he interprets as the love of the *hylê* for what is perfect and desirable, that is, the love of Isis for Osiris (374C–E).

Thus Plutarch radically reconstructs the discourse of the *Symposium* and the *Timaeus* to make the action of love in the universe a relation between two different natures, male and female, rather than between two similar natures, the male lovers of the *Symposium*. In addition, he assimilates the desire of the soul for the forms, and especially the form of the good, found in the *Symposium*, *Phaedrus*, and *Republic*, to the love of the female for the male, mythically seen as the love of Isis for Osiris.

This view of Isis/the female carries a corollary: Plutarch's *hylê* is active, moving with love toward the perfect model, unlike that of the *Timaeus*, which is inanimate and inert, until formed by the "Craftsman." For Plutarch, the male principle (Osiris in the myth) is the power or origin of generation, whereas the female is the material and nurture, so that Isis

always [has] a part in the highest god and [has] union with him [or intercourse, *synousan*] through love of the beautiful and good things about him. She does not oppose him, but as a lawful and just husband is said to "love rightly," and an honest wife, while having a husband and living with him, is nevertheless said to "desire" him, so we may say that [Isis] always yearns after Osiris and coaxes him and is impregnated with the most sovereign and pure parts. (374F–375A)<sup>16</sup>

Osiris and his offspring by Isis can be killed and dismembered by the evil principle, Typho (Egyptian Seth), but she always recovers her consort and regenerates the world by her search for, preservation of, and reunion with the scattered members of Osiris. Together Isis and Osiris preside over all that is good, "the one providing the beginnings, the other receiving and distributing" (377A). Plutarch concludes his account<sup>17</sup> by explaining that Osiris is the pure beauty for which all souls long, once they have been set free, and it is this beauty which Isis loves and pursues. By having intercourse with it she fills the earth with everything generated which is beautiful and good (383A).

Plutarch finds in the Isis-Osiris myth an expression on the metaphysical plane of the love of male and female and of the nature of human marriage. Male and female principles are essential to the creation of the world, and constantly are the source of the visible and generated cosmos. The male (Osiris) is ontologically superior, in the sense that it is origin and power (*archê* and *dynamis*). The female (Isis) is ontologically less perfect, but equally necessary, since exactly because it is less perfect it can perform the necessary function of pursuing and taking into itself the good,

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Plato *Timaeus* 50C–D.

<sup>14</sup> Plato *Republic* 546B–C.

<sup>15</sup> Plato *Symposium* 203B.

<sup>16</sup> The text is sometimes emended to delete the statement that the husband loves the wife; I keep the manuscript reading, with Froidefond.

<sup>17</sup> *Isis and Osiris* 383F–384C are to be taken as an appendix.

and then through generation distributing it. As Plato indicated in the *Symposium*, love depends on a lack that needs to be fulfilled by what is complete: metaphysically, it would seem, the male is what is complete, and the female what desires completion. The myth, however, also suggests a passivity in the *noêton*/Osiris, which is vulnerable to destruction and depends on the action of the *hylê*/Isis to be made whole and able to generate.

Isis and Osiris are gods, not humans, and furthermore are interpreted by Plutarch on a very abstract level. Yet Plutarch's metaphysics are grounded also in his human physiology, which in this work, as in *Eroticus* and *Advice*, insists on the necessary role of both sexes. Following a long tradition, he sees the male as origin and giver, the female as the receiver, the one who gives birth, and the one who nourishes. Both are necessary for the generation of the child: the male seed requires the female womb to become fruitful, and the female the intercourse with the male. Plutarch, however, especially emphasizes the love and cherishing in this relationship, which he considers prior to the fruitfulness of the two.

It is not accidental, then, that Plutarch has chosen to write this work for a woman friend. In it he considers the metaphysical basis for the role of women, for the necessity that they learn philosophy and be freed of superstition and of the desire for wealth or power. Isis's search for and union with Osiris shows the female principle as active, loving, generative, nourishing, and saving. The cult of Isis to which Clea adheres, if the myth and rituals are properly interpreted, will be a powerful incentive toward the philosophic life, and cherishing her husband.

But *Isis and Osiris* is not only for women. Most of Plutarch's reading audience were men, whom Plutarch throughout his life encouraged to lead philosophically informed lives. Osiris as perfect good expresses the ideal male principle, but not the reality of men's lives. Isis provided a model for men as well as women, since both have the same longing and faculty to come to an "association with the god" through "the dim vision of his presence that they achieve by the understanding gained through philosophy" (382F). On the human level, men and women share the same lack.

### *Virtues in Women: The Manifestation of Excellence*

*Isis and Osiris* establishes a metaphysical groundwork for female nature; *Virtues in Women*, the other work addressed to Clea, looks to historical examples to establish a philosophical discourse that will illustrate the proposition that "virtue is the same in man and woman" (249F).<sup>18</sup> The examples give the female half of a comparative study, which will reveal both the differences and the similarities in the two groups. A principle well known from the *Parallel Lives* is also at work here: the same virtues manifest themselves in different individuals differently, depending upon the nature

<sup>18</sup> On this work, cf. K.O. Wicker, "Mulierum Virtutes (*Moralia* 242E–263C)," in H.D. Betz, *Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature*, *Studia ad Corpus Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti* 4 (Leiden 1978), 106–34.

of the person, and “are assimilated to their underlying habits, physical temperaments, diet, and way of life” (243C). Therefore virtues in women will look rather different from the same ones in men, because of the different natures and circumstances of women and men. We should expect not to see women acting as men do, but to see them demonstrating in their own way the presence of bravery, loyalty, prudence, and so on. Not unexpectedly, given the practices of ancient society and the metaphysical position of *Isis and Osiris*, in these twenty-seven stories women’s virtues are usually expressed in relation or reaction to male action.

Most stories begin in a setting of male strife and violence: war, factional fighting, a tyrant’s outrages.<sup>19</sup> In these situations, which are most often moments of crisis, the women distinguish themselves by determination, intelligence, and courage. They think of schemes to resolve the men’s problems, either helping them to fight effectively or persuading them to settle their differences. They procure the death of violent men or tyrants. In acting they may show not only resolution and intelligence but leadership (Telesilla and Megisto, 4 and 15) and political craft (Aretaphila, 19).

Their courage only occasionally leads them to take up arms (3 and 4); usually they work by persuasion or deception. Love or affection enters infrequently, used by the women to persuade men to make peace (16) or to calm them (1); on the other hand, women repay with deadly vengeance men who lust after women not their wives, or women whom they force to become their wives (17, 19, 20, 22, 24, 25, 26). Most often the women manifest their bravery in a willingness to put themselves in danger, to take risks (7, 10–1, 13–5, 17, 19, 20, 22, 24–6). The Phocian women, to support their men in a desperate battle, even vote to immolate themselves if the city’s army is defeated (2).

Often the women are motivated by a defense of what is right and of customary decency, especially in the sexual sphere. Women resist being exposed to public gaze, even when dead (11, Aristotimus’s daughters in 15), prefer to die rather than yield to a tyrant (Micea in 15), and reject a liaison with slaves (3, 4). They remain true to their lawful husbands and loyal to their city, although they may betray their city if the men of the city plot violence against innocent Greeks (7, 18). Women shame men into acting bravely (5, 26) or sparing their city (9), or suggest to them ways to preserve their independence when the men are at a loss (10). Plutarch never presents the women as acting irrationally or to the detriment of right-thinking men.<sup>20</sup> They reject the lure of money, luxuries, and power when offered to them by tyrants or lovers, and choose simplicity, peace, and freedom for their cities. Thus his examples contradict the stereotype of women as weak, emotional, irrational, and luxury-loving.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>19</sup> The stories are cited by number; *Virtues in Women* as a whole is 242E–263C. Three arise from other male difficulties: 1, 21, 27; only two directly from the women themselves: 11, 12.

<sup>20</sup> The suicidal impulse of the Milesian women (11) had a physical cause.

<sup>21</sup> Among the virtues explicitly named in this work are daring (4, 14), courage (7), good discipline (12), high spirit (15, 20), leadership (15), nobility (15), good sense (19), political skill (19), loyalty to one’s husband (20), kindness (20), generosity (20, 27), affection for children (21), intelligence (22), self-control (chastity) (20, 21, 25), spirit (22), valor (24), humanity (25), bravery (25), and wisdom (27). Cf. also the list in Wicker (above n. 18), 114–5.

However, unlike male actors, Plutarch's virtuous women, in all their variety of action, display their virtue only where gaps appear in the fundamentally male society. They support or retaliate against male action, and do not initiate action. Nevertheless, though apparently marginal to the society, they are essential to its survival. An important feature of these examples is the women's position as both insiders and outsiders in the male household or city: they cross boundaries, bringing into contact Greeks and barbarians, or two enemies.<sup>22</sup> The woman in the tyrant's household, especially if previously married, provides an entry point for freedom fighters. Pythes' wife (27) shows good sense and sympathy for the welfare of the townspeople when her ruler husband is thoughtless or depressed. Women, as both outsiders and part of the community, uphold moral standards which men may have forgotten, and thus can negotiate peace among opposing groups: the Celtic women even become impartial judges and arbiters of public affairs (6). The women are tied to men, but cannot be owned or seized. They are willing supporters of husbands to whom they have given themselves.

In this way *Virtues in Women* reinforces with concrete examples the suggestion of *Isis and Osiris* that the female role is to support and nourish what is good. Their role in crisis situations recalls Isis's search throughout the world to recover the members of the dead Osiris, so that he can live once more. Women in these historical examples are not only nurturers, but in time of crisis, saviors, until men can resume their leading role. Women's virtues, though the same as men's, are manifested differently, according to their different situation in the city and the family.

### Women's Roles in the *Parallel Lives*

The numerous sketches of women found in the *Parallel Lives*—women such as Aspasia, Elpinice, Olympias, Volumnia, Cornelia, Cleopatra—do not change the fundamental outlines of the picture, though they reveal shades and nuances not met in *Virtues of Women*. In part, this is a result of Plutarch's sources, which often are silent on women, and of his focus on the (male) statesman. But Plutarch's treatment is too consistent for it not to reflect his own attitude as well. The double pair of lives matching the Spartan kings Agis and Cleomenes with the Roman reformers Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus is particularly rich in female figures, and thus provides good evidence for both the variety and the limited role which Plutarch ascribes to female excellence.

These lives of reformers bent on reshaping their cities by persuasion or violence are curiously framed by accounts of women, some wealthy and powerful in their own right, others distinguished chiefly by their nobility of action. King Agis's mother and grandmother, despite their extensive landholdings, abandoned their own interests to support the land reform of Agis, and were killed in the turmoil that followed (Agis 7, 20). Agis himself was murdered, but his wife Agiatis remained loyal to him

<sup>22</sup> Wives in a patrilocal society come from outside the family, and as such represent either a threat or a support. Contrast Theseus, whose rapes cause wars, and Romulus, whose fair treatment of the stolen Sabine women brings peace (*Romulus* 19 and *Comp. Thes.-Rom.* 6), and also *Roman Questions* 289DE.

even after she was forced to take his murderer Cleomenes for a second husband. With intelligence and affection she inspired Cleomenes to continue Agis's reform (*Cleomenes* 1–2, 22). Cleomenes, no more successful than Agis, finally met his death in Alexandria; soon after, his mother Cratesicleia and the other Spartan women there met their deaths calmly and courageously. The bravery of the Spartan women—Plutarch says that “the female drama rivaled the male one”—expresses itself in the support of their men, not in independent action (38).<sup>23</sup> It is the reverse in Egypt. Ptolemy's mistress and her pimp mother rule the cowardly king, and Cleomenes condemns the Alexandrians who refuse to rally to his desperate call to freedom: “It's no surprise that women rule these men who run from liberty” (37). The bravery of the Spartan women is a corollary of the bravery of their men; cowardly Egyptians deserve to be ruled by degraded women.

Cornelia, mother of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, also is the focus of anecdotes that frame their lives. She was a beloved wife, and after the premature death of her husband raised her children alone. She instilled in them virtues of courage, self-restraint, liberality, eloquence, and nobility, and incited them to preeminence in the political arena, acting through them rather than directly. The Gracchi, however, showed an excess of political zeal and became inflamed by the popular frenzy. Cornelia, even when her sons were murdered, remained stoically calm, and refused to lament their loss, instead recalling “the stories of their deeds and fates without grief or tears, as if narrating the story of some ancient heroes.” Plutarch insists that her behavior reflected neither insensibility nor excessive grief, but the dominance of reason over fortune (*Gaius Gracchus* 19). With Cornelia, as with Cratesicleia, Plutarch focuses not on her powerful social position and the political influence that she wielded, though he is aware of it, but on her role as mother, first training her sons, then rationally controlling her grief at their violent deaths, showing the same kind of philosophically grounded self-possession that he expected of his wife Timoxena in *Consolation*. In none of these cases does he expect a woman to have her own agenda, to which a husband or strong and noble males should be subordinate.

Two other Roman lives provide a more nuanced model of this conception of the “equal but secondary” woman. Cleopatra in *Antony* provides the example of what happens when a strong woman does choose to pursue her own agenda, without the help of philosophy or a stronger male as guide. Attempting to use Antony as a support for her own ambitions for her kingdom, she destroys his capacity as a warrior and blocks the political solution that might have protected her interests. Although Cleopatra presented herself as Isis to the Egyptians,<sup>24</sup> in Plutarch she appears as an anti-Isis who weakens and emasculates her lover.<sup>25</sup> To provide a foil

<sup>23</sup> Note also Plutarch's admiration for Chilonis, whose love for her husband he considered worth more than being king of Sparta (*Cleomenes* 15). The stories in these lives derive from the historian Phylarchus, but nevertheless indicate what Plutarch thought important to report.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Plutarch *Antony* 54 and F.E. Brenk, “Antony-Osiris, Cleopatra-Isis: The End of Plutarch's Antony,” in P.A. Stadter (ed.), *Plutarch and the Historical Tradition* (London 1992), 159–82.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. her effect on him at Actium, *Antony* 62.1, 66.8.

for her behavior, Plutarch portrays Octavia, sister of Octavian and new wife of Antony, as a paragon of virtue. Where Cleopatra is jealous, clings possessively to Antony, and divides him from the other Romans and especially Octavian, Octavia, patient and affectionate, attempts to unite the families of her brother and her husband. The conflict in the *Life* at this point focuses not on Antony, who is completely devoted to Cleopatra and sees Octavia only as a convenient means of reconciliation with Octavian, but on the opposition between Octavia and Cleopatra.

Octavia's conciliatory role echoes that ascribed to the Sabine women in Plutarch's *Romulus* (19) and often to other women throughout his works. In Plutarch's mind, Antony's love for an outsider and Cleopatra's insistence on dividing him from his Roman loyalties led to the split of the dynasts. For Plutarch, every politician should work for harmony in his city and nation.<sup>26</sup> Women play a particularly valuable role in creating this harmony, in politics as well as in the family.

Plutarch might have left Cleopatra as a purely negative paradigm. Instead, after their defeat at Actium, he shows Antony and Cleopatra in a new relationship, in which Cleopatra shows herself not as manipulator, but as an affectionate lover. Cleopatra's last words dramatically reveal the change. Falling on Antony's tomb, she prays to die with him in Egypt, calls herself his wife, and laments that "of all my innumerable troubles, none has been so grievous as this short time I have lived apart from you" (*Antony* 83). In some sense, Cleopatra grieving at the tomb of Antony has become a true Isis, grieving for her lost Osiris, and her love gives a nobility to her suicide. In finally putting Antony ahead of her own plans, she has for Plutarch assumed her proper role.

A woman's education in philosophy will give her understanding and self-possession, courage and determination. Porcia, the wife of Brutus, is known for having tested her courage with a knife, and committed suicide by swallowing hot coals. Plutarch, however, emphasizes her philosophic training, received from her father Cato and her husband, and her loving desire to participate in all aspects of her husband's life, even the conspiracy against Caesar. Confronting her sleepless husband, she pleads to know his worries, "to be a companion of your successes and troubles." As so often with Plutarch's women, she takes no direct action, but reinforces her husband's resolve and shares his defeat. Plutarch's characterization of her epitomizes a good woman's "equal but secondary" role: she is *philosophos kai philandros*, "loving wisdom [therefore endowed with virtue] and loving her husband [and so linking her life to his]."<sup>27</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Cf. *Rules for Politicians* 823F–825A and the numerous places in the lives where he praises peace efforts or attacks politicians like Lysander, Agesilaus, Sulla, Marius, and Pompey for pursuing partisan or personal goals at the cost of civil peace.

<sup>27</sup> *Brutus* 13. Sintenis's emendation of *philosophos* to *philostorgos* ("affectionate") is surely wrong, though accepted by modern editors: cf. *philosophos* used of Plato's female guardians (*Republic* 456A) and of Plutarch's Isis (*Isis and Osiris* 351E).

## Conclusion

The affection and trust that Plutarch expresses toward his wife in *Consolation* are not aberrations, but reflect his appreciation of women and his recognition of their capacity for acting virtuously. However, Timoxena only becomes the subject of discourse because there is a family crisis, the death of a beloved child while her husband is absent. Despite her reading and training, she would usually stay in the background, as Plutarch recommends to Eurydice, and he would act for her. Plutarch presumes that the male will be leader, when men have the wisdom and courage necessary. When men act badly, are overwhelmed by force, or some other crisis intervenes, then the women may emerge either to right the situation or to suffer together with the men.<sup>25</sup> Although for a woman, as for a man, philosophical training develops and reinforces the natural capacity for virtue, Plutarch expects men to learn from other men, and women, like Porcia, from their fathers and husbands. There are exceptions, when men learn from their mothers (the Gracchi) or women from other women (Timoxena's book on adornment). Plutarch became the educator for Clea, as he did for Eurydice, and as he did for so many of his male friends. Nevertheless, despite his admiration for and encouragement of women's excellence, Plutarch accepts the traditional social presumption of male priority and leadership, whether presented in terms of historical examples or philosophical myth, and prescribes it to his young friends in *Advice*. Eurydice will be able to "make her life and character resemble and harmonize with her husband's" (*Advice* 14) when she shares in the fruit of the Muses, "lavished upon those who admire education and philosophy" (*Advice* 48).

For Plutarch, the myth of Isis and Osiris expresses the Platonic quest of matter to attain form and of the soul to know the good. In this vision philosophy is a source of discovery, integration, and harmony. The highest human act is to create harmony in our souls and in the social units to which we belong, whether family, city, or empire. Woman's role as restorer of harmony, defender of what is right, and sufferer, seen in the quest of Isis for Osiris, the examples of *Virtues in Women*, or the failed attempt of Octavia, and even Cornelia's calm ability to see in her sons' deaths a continuity with the ancient heroes, is an essential element of this human vocation, parallel to the more visible activity of the statesman. Plutarch does not express himself directly on the imperial women, good and bad, of his own times, preferring to address women prominent in his own Delphic circle. However, his praise of Octavia and criticism of Cleopatra indicate that for him even the most public woman should act as supporter of her husband and harmonizer in the state, not for her own ends. Female virtue, always necessary for family or state, assumes center stage only in moments of crisis. Then Plutarch is ready to praise the courage, determination, intelligence, and loyalty of women, glimpsed in the cracks of history.

<sup>25</sup> Ismenodora's kidnapping of Bacchus in *Erotricus*, an apparent exception, is required by the obstinacy of Bacchus's male lovers, who refuse to let him marry.

# Images of Childhood

## *The Evidence of Plutarch*

The superstitious man . . . treats everything as a blow from god or an assault of some daemonic power. It does not matter what it is: illness, financial loss, the death of a child, ill-luck or failure in politics.

In the catalog of misfortunes that Plutarch can anticipate befalling his superstitious man (*Superstition* 6), the death of a child is the only one that might strike the modern western reader as possibly odd. Becoming sick, losing money, failing in public life (for those who choose such a career)—these are eventualities that may overtake anyone and comprise just a few of the many risks of ordinary daily life. As far as mortality is concerned, however, people today generally expect to die in generational sequence, so that the death of a child is not an easily predictable event. Most people have their first experience of death as children or young adults when their grandparents die. They then expect in midlife to lose their parents; and when they reach an advanced age and anticipate their own demise most people expect to have children, and often grandchildren, to survive them. Tragedies of course sometimes intervene to disrupt expectations: there is still the fatal illness or accident or crime that takes a child away prematurely. But that is precisely my point: when a child dies the event is tragic because of its abnormality.

Plutarch knew a different set of mortal realities, and a different set of expectations. The starting point of the *Consolation* is the death of his two-year-old daughter Timoxena, a loss that was not the first Plutarch and his wife had experienced. Two sons had succumbed earlier. And as various items in the *Parallel Lives* show,

Throughout this essay I use the English titles of the works comprising the *Moralia* given in D.A. Russell (ed.), *Plutarch: Selected Essays and Dialogues* (Oxford 1993), xxiii–xxix, and refer to section numbers of the works without the continuous *Moralia* references (n. 16 apart). Quotations are given from the translations either of Russell (which includes the *Consolation* and *Advice*) or, in the case of the *Parallel Lives*, from the various Penguin volumes of I. Scott-Kilvert (*The Rise and Fall of Athens* [Harmondsworth 1960], *The Age of Alexander* [Harmondsworth 1973], *Makers of Rome* [Harmondsworth 1965]). For their advice on a preliminary version I am grateful to Michele George, Leslie Shumka, Susan Treggiari, and especially Sarah Pomeroy.

their experience was hardly unique: Fabius Maximus delivered the funeral laudation for his son who died when consul (*Fabius Maximus* 1.5; 24.4); Aemilius Paullus lost two sons aged fourteen and twelve after he had given away two others in adoption (*Aemilius Paullus* 5.3; 35.2); Sulla's dead son appeared to him in a dream portending his own death (*Sulla* 37.2); and Pompeius's daughter survived only a few days after the birth which took her mother's life as well (*Pompeius* 53.4). Such isolated incidents could be dismissed as unrepresentative. They consist, however, with the demographic profiles of Roman antiquity proposed by modern scholars, one undisputed feature of which is the excessive degree of infant and child mortality with which every generation was faced. Precise details are irrecoverable but the broad trend is all that is needed: of all children born, probably more than twenty-five percent died before the age of one, and roughly fifty percent by the age of ten. These are staggering proportions, and unlikely to have been substantially different in earlier Greek history. Everyone knew that children ought not to die before their parents, and evidence from sepulchral epitaphs, both Greek and Roman, shows parents affirming the ideal as they lament the loss of their young—and so reveal the way things actually were. Child death in antiquity was a matter of everyday reality, a foreseeable event that made the loss not premature as it would be called today, but simply untimely, an event with which any parent might legitimately have to cope. It is not surprising, therefore, that Plutarch presents the wise man as including in his prayers for his fellow citizens the request that their children should be reared safely (*Rules for Politicians* 32).<sup>1</sup>

The omnipresent reality of child death did not render parents insensate. The manner in which Plutarch addresses his wife in the *Consolation* is evidence enough of that, and there are many other expressions of parental grief besides. In my view it did mean that parents were compelled to deal with child death in a very sanguine manner, though this is an impressionistic view based on probability arising from a culturally specific context only and is incapable of proof (but also incapable of disproof). The high rate of child mortality nonetheless raises the question of how sensitive to and appreciative of young children parents in antiquity were—indeed of how classical antiquity viewed children and childhood at large—given the knowledge that they might lose their children at any moment. Stated in such terms, without provision for time or place, the social standing of the family, and other variables, the question is too complex to deal with fully here. But as a contribution to the issue, my purpose is to focus attention on a number of passages from Plutarch's writings that suggest a special sensitivity to the distinctiveness of the young child on the part

<sup>1</sup> Sons: *Consolation* 5; cf. D. Babut, "Sur les enfants et un ami de Plutarque," *REG* 94 (1981), 47–62 for discussion of the number of Plutarch's children. Incidents: cf. *Pyrrhus* 30.3–5, a son lost in battle. Infant and child mortality: T.G. Parkin, *Demography and Roman Society* (Baltimore 1992), 93–8; R.S. Bagnall and B.W. Frier, *The Demography of Roman Egypt* (Cambridge 1994), 32–6, 151–3; R.P. Saller, *Patriarchy, Property and Death in the Roman Family* (Cambridge 1994), 21–3. Greek history: S.B. Pomeroy, *Families in Classical and Hellenistic Greece: Representations and Realities* (Oxford 1997), 6–7, 121–2. Sepulchral epitaphs: R. Lattimore, *Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs* (Urbana 1962), 184–91.

of one highly educated individual at a particular moment of Roman imperial (and Greek) history.<sup>2</sup>

The most striking image in the *Consolation* to my mind is Plutarch's recollection of how his daughter played with her toys: "She would ask her nurse to feed not only other babies but the objects and toys that she liked playing with, and would generously invite them, as it were, to her table, offering the good things she had and sharing her greatest pleasures with those who delighted her" (*Consolation* 2). At first blush the image might be dismissed as sheer sentimentality (and Timoxena's habit of command not taken too literally). But throughout classical literature references to children at play are liberally scattered, while the child at play is now a subject that can be especially well appreciated through the recent publication of a catalog of ancient toys from a French exhibition, evidence that brings the literary record to life in a very graphic way. In particular, the ancient dolls still to be seen help authenticate the image of Timoxena found in the *Consolation*, and immediately a keen observational eye for the young child becomes noticeable in Plutarch.<sup>3</sup>

A wealth of information about childhood might be expected from the *Parallel Lives*. From a modern perspective biography requires a description of the whole life of a subject, and Plutarch's lives do contain some relevant material. There might be wide-ranging generalizations about a young subject's character: "Agesilaus was more aggressive and hot-tempered than his companions. He longed to be first in all things, and he had in him a vehemence and an impetuosity which were inexhaustible and carried him over all obstacles: yet at the same time he was so gentle and ready to obey authority that he did whatever was demanded of him. He acted in this way from a sense of honour, not of fear, and he was far more sensitive to rebuke than to any amount of hardship" (*Agesilaus* 2.1). Or there might be lively anecdotes such as this one concerning Alcibiades: "Once, when he was hard pressed in wrestling, rather than allow himself to be thrown, he set his teeth in his opponent's arms as they gripped him and held on so hard he would have bitten him through. The other let go his hold and cried out, 'Alcibiades, you bite like a woman!' 'No, like a lion,' was his reply" (*Alcibiades* 2.2). The material, however, is not copious, perhaps because antiquity had little interest in preserving information about the childhood lives of

<sup>2</sup> Parental grief: M. Golden, "Did the Ancients Care When Their Children Died?" *G&R* 35 (1988), 152–63. Sanguine: K.R. Bradley, "Wet-Nursing at Rome: A Study in Social Relations," pp. 201–29 in B. M. Rawson (ed.), *The Family in Ancient Rome: New Perspectives* (Ithaca, NY 1986); K.R. Bradley, "The Nurse and the Child at Rome: Duty, Affect and Socialisation," *Thamyris* 1 (1994), 137–56. Children and childhood: the full range of modern scholarship can be reached through the following select items: T. Wiedemann, *Adults and Children in the Roman Empire* (New Haven 1989); M. Golden, *Children and Childhood in Classical Athens* (Baltimore 1990); K.R. Bradley, *Discovering the Roman Family: Studies in Roman Social History* (New York 1991); Saller, *Patriarchy, Property and Death in the Roman Family*; Pomeroy, *Families in Classical and Hellenistic Greece*. Passages: for a comprehensive collection, see E. Eyben, "Children in Plutarch," *Studia Hellenistica* 20 (1996), 79–112.

<sup>3</sup> Catalog: *Jouer dans l'antiquité* (Réunion des Musées Nationaux, Musées de Marseille 1991–2). Literary record: L.J. Shumka, "Children and Toys in the Roman World: A Contribution to the History of the Roman Family," M.A. Diss., Univ. of Victoria, 1993; cf. Wiedemann, *Adults and Children in the Roman Empire*, 146–53; Golden, *Children and Childhood in Classical Athens*, 53–6, 74–5. Dolls: *Jouer dans l'antiquité*, 54–63.

political figures other than in connection with their preparation for adult public roles. In any case, dealing as it does with characters from the past, the *Parallel Lives* is a work essentially historical in nature and although of occasional value not the best source for immediate purposes.<sup>4</sup>

The essays and dialogues of the *Moralia* are more fruitful, especially because they contain images that seem to come from Plutarch's own reactions to children in the world around him. I am struck, for example, by his description (*God's Slowness to Punish* 9) of children in the amphitheater who look excitedly at the criminals about to provide the grisly entertainment and imagine the men utterly content as they parade around in their gold and purple and garlanded finery, until their illusions are suddenly shattered as metal, the scourge, and fire take their toll on the bodies of the damned. The sense conveyed of innocence rudely destroyed is compelling, as if Plutarch is reporting something he has seen for himself. Other passages, frequently in the form of comparisons, create the same impression of reality observed, not of images drawn from a repertory of literary clichés.<sup>5</sup>

Many of the images concern children at play. With the material evidence of children's toys in mind, especially animal figurines, consider first the statement that a child given the choice of a loaf of bread or a small animal baked from the same dough (a dog or a cow) will naturally be drawn to the animal figure. Plutarch makes this statement (*Table Talk* 5.1) to support an argument that the intricate is naturally more attractive than the plain in a discussion of why seeing the representation of anger and pain in actors on stage is more pleasurable than actually feeling these emotions. It is coupled with the analogous statement that a child given a shapeless piece of silver and an animal or cup made from the same metal will again naturally be drawn to the shaped objects because of their greater aesthetic appeal. The validity of the argument is irrelevant. What is interesting is Plutarch's selection of the child and objects with which the child might play as specific illustrations of the generalization he wishes to make. He concludes by adding that for the same reason children prefer stories with something puzzling about them and games that are full of obstacles. Like the other examples, it is a comparison that is not immediately obvious for the issue at hand.<sup>6</sup>

Play can be structured or spontaneous. Plutarch speaks (*Table Talk* 7.10) of rattles and balls, two of the most common toys in the material record, as playthings conventionally given to restless children to keep them calm. But he also talks of children dressing up in adult clothes—putting their father's shoes on their feet or his garlands on their heads—when (*Rules for Politicians* 17) he castigates the behavior of civic

<sup>4</sup> Generalizations: cf. *Alexander* 4.8–11; *Fabius Maximus* 1.3; *Cato Minor* 1.3. Anecdotes: cf. *Pyrrhus* 3.1–3; *Alexander* 5.1–3. Because: C.B.R. Pelling, "Childhood and Personality in Greek Biography," pp. 213–44 in C.B.R. Pelling (ed.), *Characterization and Individuality in Greek Literature* (Oxford 1990); cf. D.A. Russell, "On Reading Plutarch's *Lives*," pp. 75–94 in B. Scardigli (ed.), *Essays on Plutarch's Lives* (Oxford 1995) (= *G&R* 13 [1966], 139–54).

<sup>5</sup> Innocence: cf. G. Clark, "The Fathers and the Children," *Studies in Church History* 33 (1994), 1–27 at p. 20: innocence became the chief characteristic of childhood only in late antiquity under Christian influence.

<sup>6</sup> Animal figurines: *Jouer dans l'antiquité*, 64–73.

leaders who cause social disruption by giving imprudent advice to their fellow citizens (this is no cause for laughter, as the children are). A piece of ice will amuse a child, and present a problem: because the ice is too cold, the child will be unable to hold it for long, but because it is such a novelty the child will not want to let it go. The image of the child juggling the ice from one hand to the other becomes for Plutarch (*Talkativeness* 12) a metaphor for the busybody who ferrets out gossip and cannot contain himself once he has discovered something salacious. Then there are the children who, drawn by its prettiness and charm, try to catch the rainbow in their hands, a fitting symbol for the pursuit of an unattainable illusion (*Eroticus* 20). Comparably, "Children get more pleasure and enjoyment," Plutarch remarks, "from seeing rainbows and haloes and comets than from seeing the sun and the moon" (*Why Are Delphic Oracles No Longer Given in Verse?* 30), his point again being to stress children's interest in the unusual and puzzling rather than the straightforward. There are also children running races, tumbling helplessly before they reach the end of the course because they lack self-control, as uncontrollable anger manifests itself in violent, physical irruptions (*The Control of Anger* 10); or children impetuous and boisterous who symbolize the emotional gyrations to which anyone in life might be subject (*Moral Virtue* 7).<sup>7</sup>

Images of this sort have a romantic appeal about them. But not everything is sweetness and light. Stressing the foolishness of lamenting what might be lost when so much still remains, Plutarch (*Quiet of Mind* 8) brings his half-full half-empty platitude to life by comparing children who immediately throw away all their playthings in fits of howls and tears if someone removes just a single toy. Play should be pleasant, but the cruelty of boys killing frogs with stones is recognized (*The Intelligence of Animals* 7), and (12) an incident recorded from Rome in which a group of boys tormented an elephant by sticking their writing-styluses into the animal's trunk (it retaliated by lifting one of them up into the air as if about to dash him to the ground but brought him safely down after an appropriate interval). Children too could fight: the young Cassius objected so much to the arrogant boasting of Sulla's son Faustus that he thrashed him at school (*Brutus* 9.1–2), and even among brothers there was a notable tendency to argue over fighting quails and cocks (*Brotherly Love* 17). Despite these aspects of behavior, however, Plutarch evidently took childhood to be the time of life most marked by the capacity to play for play's own sake.<sup>8</sup>

One of the most interesting statements in the *Consolation* (2) is that Plutarch and his wife reared all their children in their home together. The comment has an almost modern, familiar ring to it, suggesting that in Plutarch's view child rearing was a joint parental responsibility and that the father had an important role to play apart from the conventional obligation of looking to his sons' formal education. There are traces of this attitude elsewhere. To show that punishment is better administered in a state of reason than a state of anger, he evokes (*The Control of Anger* 10) the image of a father who sees his son using a knife to cut something in half,

<sup>7</sup> Cf. also *Alcibiades* 2.2–3; *Aemilius Paullus* 10.3–4; *Cato Minor* 2.5–6; *Fabius Maximus* 1.3; *Themistocles* 2.1; *Demosthenes* 5.5; *Cicero* 17.2–3; *Agessilaus* 25.5. Rattles and balls: *Jouer dans l'Antiquité*, 50–3, 92–9.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. *Dion* 55.2; *Cicero* 7.7.

apparently with little success, and intervenes to do the job for him, the implication being that this is what a good father, a father like Plutarch, should do. And to show that unfounded fears should not cause distress, he urges (*Exile* 5) a therapy of the sort used with children who are frightened when they first see the masks actors use on the stage: give the children the masks to handle themselves so that they will learn there is nothing to be afraid of, the implication again being that Plutarch is speaking from his own experience.<sup>9</sup>

In the vignette of Timoxena with which I began, however, there is something less familiar, and that is the presence of the nurse in the child's world of play. Plutarch has much to offer on the topic of the childminding nurse, and while this too seems to derive from personal experience, the constant presence of the nurse in the child's life his remarks assume undercuts to some degree the emphasis on direct parental involvement in child rearing that otherwise seems so strong. He regards nurses, most importantly, as a natural presence in children's lives (*Eroticus* 9), and he knows all their habits and techniques—how they manipulate children by allowing them to have what they are crying for only if the crying stops (*The Control of Anger* 10); how they use the breast to quiet and comfort the child (*The Education of Children* 12); how they try not to expose children to moonlight because they believe the moon draws moisture from children's bodies, inducing spasms and convulsions (*Table Talk* 3.10); how they mold the limbs of the young to encourage good growth (*Is Virtue Teachable?* 2); how they only scold children who have fallen down once the children have been picked up, tidied, and calmed (*Friends and Flatterers* 28); how when they wash children they sometimes rub too hard and hurt the children's skin (*Bashfulness* 2). Almost compassionately, Plutarch compares the life of the mind, free to wander into the realm of the intellectual once the bodily appetites for food and drink have been satisfied, to the nurse who is able to enjoy her food only in the quiet that finally comes when her charges have been fed and peacefully put to sleep (*Table Talk* 5 prol.). He knows, moreover, that the nurse is a childminder who will eventually give way to the pedagogue (cf. *Eroticus* 9; *Is Virtue Teachable?* 2), whose role will be to take care of older children and teach them social deportment. In the sector of society to which Plutarch belonged, the surrogate was as common a figure in the child's life as the parent proper.<sup>10</sup>

Whether this is to be understood as undercutting or complementing the parental role is less important than recognizing its normative cultural character in Plutarch's society. It does not diminish Plutarch's keen interest in children, which

<sup>9</sup> Conventional obligation: *Cato* 20 provides the supreme example; cf. *Coriolanus* 1.2; *Sertorius* 2. For other evidence of observations arising from personal experience and concern, see *Table Talk* 9.2; *On Listening to Lectures* 2; *Griilus* 2; *Against Colotes* 25; *Eroticus* 19, 24; *The Education of Children* 12; *Theseus* 14; *Love of Offspring* 3; *Fragments* 96, 131, 216A, 217C, 217F.

<sup>10</sup> On the childminding nurse, see Bradley, "Wet-Nursing at Rome"; *Discovering the Roman Family*, 13–36; "The Nurse and the Child at Rome." Charges: the implication of *Consolation* 2 is that Timoxena was only one of several infants in her nurse's care, unsurprisingly at her age; cf. K.R. Bradley, "Sexual Regulations in Wet-Nursing Contracts from Roman Egypt," *Klio* 62 (1980), 321–5 at pp. 321–2. Note (*Consolation* 5) that the elder Timoxena had nursed at least one child herself. Pedagogue: Bradley, *Discovering the Roman Family*, 37–75.

appears again in the way he contrasts practices different from those he assumes to be standard. Here I draw on evidence from the *Parallel Lives* and the *Moralia*, and stress the often antiquarian, almost anthropological, character of what Plutarch has to say. He expatiates, for example, on the practices of Spartan nurses under the regime of Lycurgus, women who unusually did *not* swaddle infants but left their limbs and bodies to grow freely, who trained their charges *not* to be cranky or picky about their food or afraid of the dark or of being left alone (*Lycurgus* 16.3). He writes at relatively great length (*Lycurgus* 5.8–19.4) on the Spartan system of communal child rearing and the many peculiar idioms involved: the elders' corporate verdict on the viability of a newborn, the system of group living and competitive martial training to which boys were exposed from the age of seven, the emphasis on physical rather than intellectual prowess, the notion of joint fathering and sharing of sons. All this is a study in the otherness of child-rearing customs, and it is given special point by Plutarch's record (*Lycurgus* 18.1) of having seen for himself the harsh physical discipline to which Spartan boys were still subjected in his own day. The study continues in his writings on Rome. He is intrigued by how Roman children might be named as a result of some casual circumstance: Proculus because a child was born when his father was away, Postumus if the father were already dead (he cites Sulla's daughter as an example [*Sulla* 37.4]), Vopiscus because the child was the sole surviving twin (*Coriolanus* 11.4). In explaining the origin of the *ficus Ruminalis*, he observes that the Romans have a goddess Rumilia who presides over child rearing, sacrifices to whom are made with libations of milk instead of wine (*Romulus* 4.1; *Roman Questions* 57). A whole string of questions can in fact be asked of the Romans: "Why do they forbid children who want to swear by Hercules, to do so under a roof, but make them go into the open?"; "Why, in the old days, did they never dine abroad but they took with them their sons, when they were mere children?"; "Why do they name male children on the ninth, females on the eighth day from birth?"; "Why do they call unfathered children *spurii*?" (*Roman Questions* 27; 33; 102; 103).<sup>11</sup>

Plutarch was fascinated by the fact that Roman children wore amulets (*bullae*) around their necks. On one occasion (*Romulus* 20.3) he attributes the origin of the convention to concessions made by the early Romans to the Sabine women, recording that the *bulla* took its name from the shape of a bubble. He also comments (*Romulus* 25.5; cf. *Roman Questions* 53) on how in his own day when Romans offered sacrifice for a military victory an old man was led through the forum to the Capitol wearing a boy's toga and a *bulla*, a tradition he traces all the way back to the triumph celebrated by Romulus over Veii when the aged enemy leader was humiliated in this way. It is in this passage, however, that Plutarch's preoccupation with the *bulla* is most forcefully expressed (*Roman Questions* 101):

<sup>11</sup> Complementing: P.D.A. Garnsey, "Child Rearing in Ancient Italy," pp. 48–65 in D.I. Kertzer and R.P. Saller (eds.), *The Family in Italy from Antiquity to the Present* (New Haven 1991). Spartan system: on the treatment of Spartan girls, see E. Fantham, H.P. Foley, N.B. Kampen, S.B. Pomeroy, and H.A. Shapiro, *Women in the Classical World* (New York 1994), 56–67. Named: cf. *Fabius Maximus* 1.3. *Roman Questions*: the titles are from H.J. Rose (ed.), *The Roman Questions of Plutarch* (Oxford 1924).

*Why do they adorn their children with the neck-ornaments which they call bullae?*

(a) Is this one of the many honours which they voted to the wives they captured, that their offspring should be so decorated? (b) Or in honour of the courage of Tarquin? It is said that while he was still but a boy, in the battle against the combined Latin and Etruscan forces he charged the enemy, fell from his horse, withstood with vigour those who attacked him, and so encouraged the Romans. A brilliant victory was won over the enemy, whose loss amounted to sixteen thousand men, and he received this prize of valour from his father the king. (c) Or because among the ancients it was not accounted dishonourable or shameful to love handsome young slaves, as we can still learn from the comedies; but they were careful to keep their hands off free-born boys, and so, to prevent any mistakes even if they were met with naked, the children used to wear this distinguishing mark? (d) Or is it a guard against licentiousness, a kind of bridle on their passions, making them ashamed to indulge in a man's vices before they lay aside the badge of childhood? (e) The explanation of Varro and his school is unlikely: it is to the effect that *bullā* is the Aiolic word *bolla* (= *boulē*, counsel), and that this ornament is worn by the boys as a symbol of good counsel. (f) But may not this be another moon-emblem? The moon at her full does not look like a sphere but like a lentil-seed or a disk; nay, Empedokles holds that this is her true form.<sup>12</sup>

The passage indicates that Plutarch had no idea what the true origins of the *bullā* were. In the central Roman era, the amulet fulfilled two functions: one was to identify freeborn children, boys especially, which is reflected in Plutarch's third explanation though best understood from the practice of slave-dealers placing *bullae* around the necks of slave children they were importing into Roman territory to avoid paying import duties at frontier checkpoints. The *bullā* was a mark of juridical status, and often a key element in artistic representations of children of free birth. It could also signify a family's wealth and social status if made from a precious metal: so Plutarch notes (*Sertorius* 14.3) that when Sertorius in Spain provided the sons of local notables with Latin and Greek tutors and fitted them with Roman togas, he also gave them *bullae* made of gold to reflect not only their new cultural identity but their high social rank as well. The second function was far less rational (in modern terms) but equally comprehensible: it was to protect children against evil influences, especially that of the Evil Eye. Given their vulnerability to early death, even magical means were deployed to safeguard the young from harm, and when they came of age in their middle teens (when elite girls often married), the *bullā* could be set aside and dedicated to the Lares. The child was now an adult and supernatural protection was no longer necessary — as if the demographic reality were understood that the dangerous years of childhood were over and the prospects of survival now increasing dramatically.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Trans. Rose. On the *Roman Questions* in general, see J. Boulogne, "Les Questions romaines de Plutarque," *ANRW* II.33.6 (1991), 4682–708.

<sup>13</sup> On the functions and representations of the *bullā*, see P.G. Warden, "Bullae, Roman Custom and Italic Tradition," *OpRom* 14 (1983), 69–75; H. Gabelmann, "Römische Kinder in Toga Praetexta," *JDAI* 100 (1985), 497–541; H.R. Goette, "Die Bulla," *BJ* 186 (1986), 133–64. Practice: e.g., Suet. *Gramm.* 25.5. Vulnerability: for a different sense of children's weakness, see *Dion* 2.1–2.

Despite his inability to find an answer, Plutarch's investigation of the history of the *bullā* is clearly part and parcel of the interest in children visible throughout his writings. Does this mean, therefore, that there was in his age a heightened awareness of children in society at large, that Plutarch's sensibilities are part of a wider social development? In answering that question three items require consideration.

First there is the issue of defining what "society" means. Plutarch was in the first instance a Greek who spent much of his life in Greece and who was thoroughly imbued with Greek culture—a typical *pepaideumenos* of the age. He was also, however, L. Mestrius Plutarchus, a Roman citizen who knew Latin and who during his life traveled extensively in the Roman Empire (at Rome he both taught and mingled in the highest social circles). The works to which I have referred span the whole of his adult life and must reflect observations made in different times and places, but with no significant distinction arising between east and west except when unfamiliar customs raised intriguing questions for him. Children chasing rainbows could have been seen in Rome as well as in his native Chaeronea—or anywhere else in the Roman Empire at the turn of the second century where Plutarch happened to be. The "society" of Plutarch accordingly was made up of the culturally variegated regions of the Mediterranean world in which he was able to travel as a result of the relative security the Roman Empire offered. Some forms of childish behavior were probably not limited by Greek or Roman boundaries, but measuring change against such a huge geographical backdrop is obviously a forbidding prospect.<sup>14</sup>

One point is clear. Pioneering studies of the history of childhood grandly claimed that childhood as a specifically demarcated stage of life was a discovery of the early modern world and that in antiquity children were generically treated with indifference and cruelty. Plutarch's evidence alone, however, is problematical as far these views are concerned, no matter whether he is regarded as Greek, Roman, or Greco-Roman. (The complexity of the cultural issue is captured in the way Plutarch addresses his essay *On Listening to Lectures* to the Greek Nicander, who had just entered manhood by taking as a Roman citizen adult Roman dress, the *toga uirilīs*.) Like other educated Greeks and Romans, Plutarch was easily able to portray a children's world distinct from that of adults, with its own activities, rituals, and rites of passage, countering thereby any notion that children were regarded simply as miniature adults. Moreover, there is a tenderness of attitude towards children that may reflect within his own personality a certain idealization of childhood but which nonetheless offsets any view that children were treated with total disregard. In the *Consolation* there are special circumstances why this should be so, but the innocence of childhood that is one of the *Consolation's* themes is matched elsewhere, not least by the pitiful description of the children of Perseus in Aemilius Paullus's triumph—too young to comprehend the depths of shame into which their father's

<sup>14</sup> On the cultural identity of Plutarch, see C.P. Jones, *Plutarch and Rome* (Oxford 1971); S. Swain, *Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism, and Power in the Greek World A.D. 50–250* (Oxford 1996), 135–86. On the chronology of Plutarch's works, C.P. Jones, "Towards a Chronology of Plutarch's Works," pp. 95–123 in B. Scardigli (ed.), *Essays on Plutarch's Lives* (= *JRS* 56 [1966], 61–74) (cf. Jones, *Plutarch and Rome*, 135–7).

fate had plunged them and a greater object of the crowd's sympathy consequently than Perseus himself (*Aemilius Paullus* 33.3–4). This is not to say, however, that the degree of social differentiation of childhood or of concern for children in antiquity was identical to that found in modern western societies, and what remains important, even vital, is to establish exactly where the boundaries lay in a society permeated by heavy child mortality.<sup>15</sup>

Secondly, the factor of social status. The children whose behavior he observed are likely to have belonged for the most part to the same socio-economic sector of society as Plutarch himself. Less fortunate children were sometimes observed by others, though with what degree of sympathy it is difficult to say. A slave boy who died (like Timoxena) at the age of two, having fallen down some stairs and broken his neck, inspired commemoration in a Greek epigram (*Palatine Anthology* 7.632), but this was something of a rarity. In the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston there is a figurine of a squatting African boy, unable to move, whose head rests dejectedly on his knees, his arms held tightly against his body, his fists clenched, his legs in shackles. He is perhaps six or seven years old and a victim of the slave trade. What motivated the artist to produce this study in subjection (not unique) I do not know, but despite his knowledge of famous sayings attributed to prisoners of war, this is not the kind of child or setting which appealed to Plutarch.<sup>16</sup>

Thirdly, there is the problem of trying to measure changes in social attitudes over time predominantly from works of literature. Two interrelated points arise. I have maintained so far that Plutarch's writings evince a strong personal interest in young children, but the objection could be raised, first, that the images culled from his works are *topoi* and so of no particular historical import. Like Plutarch, Epictetus (2.1.15) refers to the practice of children handling masks to teach them not to be afraid, so some of the images Plutarch evokes must be conventional. That, however, does not invalidate them as significant observations but only raises the question of why a *topos* is a *topos* to begin with. Secondly, and more importantly, the tactic of comparing one set of literary passages from a certain time period with those from another is to use a method hopelessly fraught with difficulties when distinctions of genre and authorial focus intervene to render comparison dubious — not to mention whether similar amounts of material are available (obviously the high number of images of children in Plutarch has something to do with the voluminous scale of his writings) or how in a period when evidence is sparse a *topos* can ever be successfully

<sup>15</sup> Pioneering studies: P. Ariès, *Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life* (New York 1962); L. DeMause, "The Evolution of Childhood," pp. 1–73 in L. DeMause (ed.), *The History of Childhood* (New York 1974); L. Stone, *The Family, Sex, and Marriage in England, 1500–1800* (London 1977); cf. Clark, "The Fathers and the Children," 13–14, stressing the representation of adult qualities in children. Vital: Bradley, "Wet-Nursing at Rome," 220.

<sup>16</sup> Greek epigram: cf. A.S.F. Gow and D.L. Page, *The Greek Anthology* (Cambridge 1968), I.287, II.269–70. Figurine: shown in F. Snowden, Jr., *Blacks in Antiquity: Ethiopians in the Greco-Roman Experience* (Cambridge, Mass. 1970), 72, fig. 42: "Black steatite statuette of a crouched boy, perhaps a captive, Alexandrian — hair in rows of tight curls radiating from center of head, broad nose, high cheekbones, subnasal prognathism, thick lips"; cf. xvi. "... with rings around legs." According to the museum caption, it served as a box lid. Famous sayings: *Spartan Sayings* 234B–C; 242C–D.

identified as such. I cannot in fact imagine that the child in Plutarch's era was suddenly any more or any less a subject of concern in "society" simply because of the evidence Plutarch has left, though whatever allowance is due to convention, I equally cannot doubt his own attentiveness to the world of the child.<sup>17</sup>

An analogy may be drawn from the evidence of art. Decorative elements on Roman imperial sarcophagi of children who suffered untimely deaths sometimes include scenes of play or scenes representing stages of children's lives (their birth and education, for example). They illustrate again how childhood ought generally to be understood, that is, from an adult perspective what its primary constituents ought to be, and so in another medium provide evidence complementing Plutarch's. The availability of the sarcophagus as an item of evidence, however, depends on its widespread adoption in Roman society towards the end of the first century A.D. when shifts in funerary fashions were making themselves felt. Most examples belong to the second and third centuries. The interest in children they display therefore cannot be linked to any putative new social sensibility, but illustrates only how certain conceptions of childhood were transferred to an artifact that became prominent under specific cultural conditions. To prove the growth of a new sensibility, an equal number of children's sarcophagi from an earlier period with completely different decorative elements would be needed.<sup>18</sup>

Confirmation comes from another area of art history. It is an axiom of modern scholarship that Hellenistic art reflects a new interest in children, since artists began in the Hellenistic age to portray the young more realistically than they had ever done before. The axiom depends on comparisons of portrayal that can be drawn along an uninterrupted sequence of time. Judged consequently from an Hellenic perspective, Plutarch's attentiveness to children could be seen as an outgrowth of social attitudes whose roots are best detected in art, not literature. Then, however, the question arises of what impact on western society Hellenistic art made in the era of Roman expansion in the east, whether Roman social attitudes were affected as a result, and how all this influenced the views of educated Greeks who traveled to the west in the imperial age. These are complex issues far beyond the scope of this essay, but they point up the problem of measuring social change, as too the need to reconstruct epochs successfully and comparably before attempts at explaining change can be made.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Problem: K.R. Bradley, "Writing the History of the Roman Family," *CP* 88 (1993), 237–40. Epictetus: the emphasis, however, is very different; cf. *Juv.* 3.175–6. Conventional: the kissing practice referred to in *On Listening to Lectures* 2 is attested elsewhere; see I. Kidd and R. Waterfield (eds.), *Plutarch: Essays* (London 1992), 29, n. 3. Cf. also *App. BC* 5.128 on crowns.

<sup>18</sup> Sarcophagi: J. Huskinson, *Roman Children's Sarcophagi: Their Decoration and Social Significance* (Oxford 1996). Widespread adoption: D.E.E. Kleiner, *Roman Sculpture* (New Haven 1992), 256–9.

<sup>19</sup> Axiom: J.J. Pollitt, *Art in the Hellenistic Age* (Cambridge 1986), 128–30; cf. M. Golden, "Change or Continuity? Children and Childhood in Hellenistic Historiography," pp. 176–91 in M. Golden and P. Toohey (eds.), *Inventing Ancient Culture* (London 1997) (cautiously). Complex issues: cf. B.M. Rawson, "The Iconography of Roman Childhood," pp. 205–38 in B.M. Rawson and P.R.C. Weaver (eds.), *The Roman Family in Italy* (Canberra 1997).

In Roman public art the figure of the child had become a manipulable entity by Plutarch's day that could easily lend itself to communicating messages of political and ideological import—so it has been maintained. The concept of the manipulable is dubious, but it is evident that when the decorations of Trajan's arch at Beneventum were designed, it was both natural and desirable to incorporate children in scenes of imperial beneficence and splendor or the subjection of foreign enemies. The child was an integral element of society, not to be excluded from the main spheres of adult life as the sponsors and executors of monuments perceived them. The same is true, but more significantly, of those paintings from Pompeii which experts agree are not examples of politically inspired art but reflect the city's daily life: "documentary art" in an apposite phrase, one celebrated example of which is the painting of a baker's shop where the baker himself hands bread to an adult male customer while a young boy stretches out his hands to the man, presumably his father, as though he cannot wait to taste one of the freshly baked loaves stacked on the counter before him. If the scene is a reminder that the giving of daily bread in antiquity was never to be taken for granted, it is also a scene which assumes the centrality of the child in the life of the community as a whole, because the figure of the importuning boy did not have to be included as an essential compositional ingredient. The same is true of the scenes of life in the forum, in which children are again prominent: a child accompanies an adult who contemplates the wares of a coppersmith; a woman apparently considering a purchase holds an infant on her lap; a boy is mending a pot on the ground while his father, the craftsman, negotiates with a customer; a woman presents a girl to a group of seated men, perhaps magistrates of some sort; two children seem to be chasing round a column; and there is a school scene in which a pupil is about to be flogged as the rest of his class looks on (Plutarch was familiar with such discipline). There is nothing socially or culturally marginal about children in all of this.<sup>20</sup>

The Pompeian paintings are conventionally dated to the third quarter of the first century A.D. Yet it is scarcely credible that the activities they record were not the same a century earlier, given the timeless quality of the business of the forum or agora of any town or city in the central Roman era: the selling of commodities and foodstuffs, social intercourse and the exchange of news and gossip, the conduct of litigation, and the teaching of children. Rather than revealing the child's emergence as an object of social concern in a specific period, the paintings more plausibly sug-

<sup>20</sup> Maintained: S. Currie, "The Empire of Adults: The Representation of Children on Trajan's Arch at Beneventum," pp. 153–81 in J. Elsner (ed.), *Art and Text in Roman Culture* (Cambridge 1996). Apposite phrase: R. Ling, *Roman Painting* (Cambridge 1991), 163. Baker's shop: Ling, *Roman Painting*, 163 and pl. 176; E. Lessing and A. Varone, *Pompeii* (Paris 1996), 185. (Whether the distributing figure is actually a baker or a civic official has never to my knowledge been determined.) Forum: S.C. Nappo, "Fregio dipinto dal 'praedium' di Giulia Felice con rappresentazione del foro di Pompei," *RSP* 3 (1989), 79–96; I. Baldassare, *Pompeii: pitture e mosaici*, III (Milan 1991), pls. 113–24. The precise details of these scenes remain controversial: for early descriptions, often in conflict, see W. Helbig, *Wandgemälde der vom Vesuv verschütteten Städte Campaniens* (Leipzig 1868), nos. 1489–1500 (and no. 1501 for the baker's shop); A. Mau and F.W. Kelsey, *Pompeii: Its Life and Art* (2d ed., 1902, repr. New Rochelle, NY 1982), 54–6. Familiar: cf. *Caesar* 61.3.

gest that children were always regarded as valuable resources on which the future of communities depended, to be protected, instructed, and prepared for adult life, though in ways that were not always the ways of the modern world. The random survival of discrete pieces of evidence allows glimpses of historical attitudes to children in antiquity, but little that convincingly proves substantial historical development.

In sum, therefore, Plutarch's evidence cannot be taken to demonstrate a historical trend towards a greater sentimentalization of the child in the Roman imperial age, but what remains valuable is the concern in his work with children itself, and especially the means advocated to deal with the constant possibility of loss by which all society was constrained.

In the opening section of the *Consolation*, Plutarch explains that he was on a journey when Timoxena died and so missed her funeral. This is one reason why the *Consolation* can seem so moving. But even if originally provoked by physical separation of husband and wife, the act of writing and preserving for posterity a philosophizing letter might at face value be judged a rather cool parental reaction to the loss of a child. In antiquity, however, the letter of consolation was a socially approved and distinctive response to the news of death which achieved the status of a literary form. It was no barrier to the genuine expression of grief. Throughout his letter Plutarch draws a contrast between the response he thought appropriate to his wife, educated and high-minded as she was, and that of more conventional women: she must be philosophical and strive for inner calm, not histrionic and self-indulgent, and above all reason must control her behavior. It was not the only time he urged such advice. Aeschines criticized Demosthenes as unnatural for appearing in public in all his finery to celebrate the death of Philip of Macedon when his own daughter had died not six days before (*Demosthenes* 22.3–7). But in Plutarch's estimation Aeschines missed the point, because the true test of feeling in a situation like this was not the surface appearance but how emotion was handled within: "This only proves the weakness and vulgarity of his own nature," he said of Aeschines, "if he considers that the wearing of mourning and an extravagant display of grief are the signs of a tender heart, but finds fault with a man who bears his loss in a serene and resolute fashion" (*Demosthenes* 22.3). Again, to avoid having children is not the way to prepare for child death, any more than to take up poverty is the way to prepare for suddenly losing one's possessions or to make no friends the way to prepare for their loss; no, reason must be used to anticipate and cope with life's vicissitudes (*Solon* 7.3–4). Throughout the *Consolation* traditional arguments are deployed to make the case for serenity and resolution, but they are intermingled with touches of the tender that leave no doubt about the reality of Timoxena's loss: "our daughter was the sweetest thing to fondle, to watch, and to hear; and we ought to let the thought of her also dwell in our minds and lives, for there is much more joy in it than sorrow" (*Consolation* 3). To recognize the combination of the intellectual and the tender is to recognize how before the ubiquity of child death parents in antiquity responded in ways that made sense to themselves, if not always to us, and it is to recognize that while the addressee of the *Consolation* was his wife, the letter was written as much for Plutarch himself as for her. For above all the letter was the coping mechanism by which a philosopher-father whose literary works display a persistent fascination

with children expressed his own sense of devastation, when the ghastly possibility that every parent in antiquity must always have had to contemplate was yet again realized in his own life. As he wrote, he may perhaps have sought inspiration from the past, bearing his loss with patience like Fabius Maximus, that ideal man of old, "a wise man and a good father" (*Fabius Maximus* 24.4).<sup>21</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Distinctive response: R. Kassel, *Untersuchungen zur griechischen und römischen Konsolationsliteratur* (Munich 1958); H. Martin, Jr. and J.E. Phillips, "Consolatio ad Uxorem (Moralia 608A–612B)," pp. 394–441 in H.D. Betz (ed.), *Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature* (Leiden 1978), at pp. 397–410. Traditional arguments: Martin and Phillips, "Consolatio ad Uxorem," 410–12; Kidd and Waterfield, *Plutarch: Essays*, 359–64; cf. Kassel, *Untersuchungen zur griechischen und römischen Konsolationsliteratur*, 38. Inspiration: cf. *Timoleon* prol. 1–2.

## Bibliography of Plutarch's *Advice and Consolation*

In recent years Plutarch, one of the “three men who conferred distinction on the potato-air of Boeotia into which they were born,”<sup>1</sup> has been the focus of increasing scholarly attention. The space devoted to him in *L'Année philologique* may serve as a rough indication of the scale of that increase: in the 1960s about two pages were devoted to Plutarch each year, whereas these days he requires no less than twelve.

It was, of course, the successive volumes of *L'Année philologique* from which the foundations of this bibliography were quarried. It is surely time that someone sang the praises of the heroes and heroines, thanked by few, who compile this invaluable aid to research, used by all. For recent years we rely on *Plutarchos*, the journal of the International Plutarch Society, published by the Department of History at Utah State University (Logan, Utah), to which thanks and acknowledgment are also due. Indeed, it is the International Plutarch Society that is responsible for some, though by no means all, of the surprising upsurge of recent publications. In particular, there have been no less than twenty conferences on Plutarch in the last fifteen years: details are listed in an appendix. References to this appendix are given as (e.g.) “Conference 1 (Rome 1985/6).”

This bibliography concentrates on work published since the early 1960s: Lisette Goessler's careful dissertation on Plutarch and marriage, published in 1962 (B4.6), seemed a reasonable starting point. However, it also contains a number of important discussions from earlier years which it seemed foolish to omit, as well as some items which I have not seen, marked with the conventional *n.v.* I should perhaps add that I hope no one will be so foolish as to assume that I have read every word in the works listed.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> “Pindar, Epaminondas und Plutarch, drei Männer, die der Kartoffelluft von Böötien, in der sie geboren waren, Ehre machen” (Georg Christoph Lichtenberg (1742–99), quoted in R. Hirzel, *Plutarchos* [Leipzig 1912], 1).

<sup>2</sup> The Linguistic Society of America recommends that one should “not cite a male scholar by surname only and a female scholar by first name plus surname.” I have rejected this advice, and have generally used initials for men and first names for women, chiefly because that is how the majority of scholars have referred to themselves. But I also believe that a man's view and a woman's view of marriage and the loss of a daughter are likely to differ, and the reader should therefore be alerted to the sex of the author—and no one speaks of Eric Dodds. However, I have not aimed at total consistency: D. Morris is just as unidiomatic.

The bibliography has been divided into numbered sections: cross-references take the form of author, short title, and number, but the publications of any scholar can also be traced from the index at the end. Abbreviations are those used in the third edition of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (1996), though in some cases fuller forms have been preferred.

It is a pleasure to record my thanks to the Ashmolean and Bodleian Libraries at Oxford, to the Joint Hellenic and Roman Library at the Institute of Classical Studies, to the Warburg Institute and the British Library in London, and to the library of Exeter University. I am also most grateful to Fran Titchener of the IPS Resource Center for providing me with information about less easily accessible items; to Hein van Dolen for kindly sending me a copy of his translation of *Advice and Consolation* (B3.6 and C3.7); to Frans Ahlheid for persuading him to do so, and for providing relief from bibliographizing by means of piano duets; to Alexei Zadorojnyi for information otherwise unobtainable about B3.12, and for xeroxes; to my son Francis for scrupulous proofreading; and above all to Sarah Pomeroy for her encouragement and patience—both very necessary—over a period quite appallingly longer than either of us had expected.

The bibliography is organized as follows:

#### A. WORKS ON PLUTARCH

1. General Books and Articles
2. Bibliographies
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#### B. ADVICE

1. Texts
2. Commentaries
3. Translations
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5. Specific Passages
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#### C. CONSOLATION

1. Texts
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#### D. MANUSCRIPTS AND TEXTUAL TRADITION

1. General
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#### E. INFLUENCE

*Appendix. Conferences*  
*Index of Authors*

## A. Works on Plutarch

## A1. General Books and Articles

This section includes a few standard books and articles that are not directly relevant to *Advice* or *Consolation*: we hope that this will save readers some fruitless searches. Page references for specific discussions will be found in the sections that follow.

- A1.1 O. Gréard, *De La Morale de Plutarque* (Paris 1866): "stimulating and wise" (Russell).
- A1.2 R. Volkmann, *Leben, Schriften und Philosophie des Plutarch* (Berlin 1869).
- A1.3 R. Hirzel, *Plutarchos* (Leipzig 1912).
- A1.4 W. Schmid and O. Stählin, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*, II.1 (Munich 1920) 485–534 (indexed in II.2, 1564–6).
- A1.5 E.R. Dodds, "The Portrait of a Greek Gentleman", *G&R* 2 (1932/3) 97–107: packed with material from the *Moralia*, and a pleasure to read; deserves to be reprinted.
- A1.6 (a) K. Ziegler, *Plutarchos von Chaironeia* (Stuttgart 1949): pre-publication of (b), but with different page numbers. The standard reference work; but note the reservations in the review by R. Flacelière, *REG* 63 (1950) 300–3.  
 (b) K. Ziegler, article "Plutarchos von Chaironeia" in *RE* XXI (Stuttgart 1951) 636–962: this includes additional material not in (a).  
 (c) K. Ziegler, *Plutarchos von Chaironeia* (Stuttgart 1964): reprint of (a) with *Nachträge* at 325–34: these pages contain still further additional material, besides that in (b).  
 (d) K. Ziegler, *Plutarcho*, edited by B. Zucchelli, translated by M.R. Zancan Rinaldini (Brescia 1965): Italian translation of (b); n.v.
- A1.7 F. Fuhrmann, *Les Images de Plutarque* (Paris 1964): systematic examination of 2,968 images in Plutarch (mercifully well indexed).
- A1.8 C.P. Jones, "Towards a Chronology of Plutarch's Works," *JRS* 56 (1966) 61–74, reprinted in *Scardigli Essays* (A1.32) 95–123.
- A1.9 R.H. Barrow, *Plutarch and His Times* (London 1967): superseded.
- A1.10 D. Russell, "On Reading Plutarch's *Moralia*," *G&R* 15 (1968) 130–46: a classic essay.
- A1.11 D. Babut, *Plutarque et le Stoicisme* (Paris 1969).
- A1.12 R. Flacelière, "État présent des études sur Plutarque," *Actes du VIIIe Congrès G. Budé* (Paris 1969) 483–506.
- A1.13 C.J. Gianakaris, *Plutarch* (New York 1970): universally condemned—most harshly in *AJP* 95 (1974) 296–7: "it does not deserve to be read."
- A1.14 C.P. Jones, *Plutarch and Rome* (Oxford 1971): standard work; nothing specifically relevant to *Advice* or *Consolation*.
- A1.15 D.A.F.M. Russell, *Plutarch* (London 1973): the best introduction in English (note esp. ch. 5, "The Moralist and His Fellow-Men"): clear, sympathetic and beautifully written. Fullest review: H.G. Ingenkamp, *Gnomon* 48 (1976) 546–51.
- A1.16 H.D. Betz (ed.), *Plutarch's Theological Writings and Early Christian Literature* (Leiden 1974): a collection of essays (easily confused with A1.21): no relevant material.
- A1.17 K. Ziegler, article "Plutarchus" in *Der kleine Pauly* IV (Munich 1975) 945–53: brief account.
- A1.18 F.E. Brenk, *In Mist Apparell'd: Religious Themes in Plutarch's Moralia and Lives* (*Mnemosyne* Suppl. 48, Leiden 1977).
- A1.19 J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (London 1977) 184–230: survey of Plutarch's philosophical positions.
- A1.20 Cécile Panagopoulos, "Vocabulaire et mentalité dans les *Moralia* de Plutarque," *Dial. d'Hist. Anc.* 3 (1977) 197–235: analysis of Plutarch's moral and political vocabulary.
- A1.21 H.D. Betz (ed.), *Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature* (Leiden 1978): a collection of essays (easily confused with A1.16).

- A1.22 M.-H. Quet, "Rhétorique, culture et politique: le fonctionnement du discours idéologique chez Dion de Pruse et dans les *Moralia* de Plutarque", *Dial. d'Hist. Anc.* 4 (1978) 51–117 with tableaux I–III; confined to the political and rhetorical discourses.
- A1.23 Jacqueline de Romilly, *La Douceur dans la pensée grecque* (Paris 1979) 275–307, esp. 275–7 (vocabulary), 293–307 (mostly on *Moralia*).
- A1.24 F. le Corsu, *Plutarque et les femmes* (Paris 1981): concerned only with the *Lives*; not helpful.
- A1.25 R. Flacelière and others (edd.), *Plutarque: oeuvres morales*, I.1 (Paris [Budé series] 1987): contains excellent and extensive *Introduction générale* by R. Flacelière and J. Irigoin at vii–cccxxiv; see esp. lxxxviii–cxx on "Le Moraliste."
- A1.26a J.P. Hershbell, "Plutarch and Stoicism," *ANRW* 2.36.5 (1992) 3336–52 and
- A1.26b J.P. Hershbell, "Plutarch and Epicureanism," *ibid.* 3353–83: neither touches on *Advice* or *Consolation*.
- A1.27 I. Kidd, introduction to Waterfield, *Essays* (C3.4) 1–26.
- A1.28 L. van der Stockt, *Twinkling and Twilight: Plutarch's Reflections on Literature* (Brussels 1992).
- A1.29 J. Boulogne, *Plutarque: un aristocrate grec sous l'occupation romaine* (Lille 1994).
- A1.30 D. Russell, introduction to his translation (B3.5) ix–xxx; useful list of *Moralia* at xxiii–xxix (revised version of Russell *Plutarch* [A1.15] 164–72).
- A1.31 D. Russell, "Self-Disclosure in Plutarch and in Horace," in G.W. Most and others (edd.), *Philanthropia kai Eusebeia: Festschrift Albrecht Dihle* (Göttingen 1993) 426–37, esp. 426–31.
- A1.32 Barbara Scardigli (ed.), *Essays on Plutarch's Lives* (Oxford 1995): contains a scatter of interesting remarks on *Advice* and *Consolation*: details in sections B and C below.
- A1.33 D. Russell in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (3d ed., 1996) s.v. "Plutarch": the latest reference work, with basic bibliography.
- A1.34 L. van der Stockt (ed.), *Plutarchea Lovaniensia* (Leuven 1996).
- A1.37 Judith Mossman (ed.), *Plutarch and His Intellectual World* (London 1997).

## A2. Bibliographical Surveys

- A2.1 J. Alsina, "Ensayo de una bibliografía de Plutarco," *Estud. Clás.* 6 (1962) 515–33.
- A2.2 Brenk, *Mist* (A1.18) 276–99.
- A2.3 J. Barthelmess, "Recent Work on the *Moralia*," in Conference 1 (Rome 1985/6), 61–81.
- A2.4 G.M.W. Harrison, "The Critical Trends in Scholarship on the Non-Philosophical Works in Plutarch's *Moralia*," *ANRW* 2.33.6 (1991) 4646–81.
- A2.5 W. Seavey, complete bibliography of Plutarch's works based on *L'Année philologique*, forthcoming (see *Ploutarchos* 11.1 [1994] 3).

## A3. Other Reference Works

- A3.1 Concordance: D. Wyttenbach, *Plutarchi Moralia: Index Graecitatis* (2 vols., Oxford 1830).
- A3.2 W.C. Helmbold and E.N. O'Neil, *Plutarch's Quotations*, American Philological Association Monograph 19 (Baltimore 1959): a catalog of passages, with no discussion.
- A3.3 Bernadette Puech, "Prosopographie des amis de Plutarque," *ANRW* 2.33.6 (1992) 4831–93.
- A3.4 E.N. O'Neil, *Concordance to Plutarch*, forthcoming: see Harrison (A2.4) 4657.

## B. Advice

### B1. Advice: Texts

For the textual tradition see section D2 below.

- B1.1 Teubner *Moralia I: Plutarchi Moralia* vol. I, edited by W.R. Paton and J. Wegehaupt, with preface by M. Pohlenz (Leipzig [Teubner] 1925): preface (on the text) xxix–xli,

text with app. crit. 283–99. *Advice* was assigned to Wegehaupt, who died before completing it; this work was therefore edited by W. Sieveking.

The second edition, revised by H. Gärtner (Leipzig 1974, corrected reprint 1993), contains addenda and corrigenda at pp. 396–8.

- B1.2 **Loeb Moralia II:** *Plutarch's Moralia* vol. II, edited and translated by F.C. Babbitt (London and New York [Loeb series] 1928): preface 297, text and facing English translation 298–343. Convenient but unreliable: “la pessima edizîone” (I. Gallo).
- B1.3 **Heimeran:** W. Sieveking, *Plutarch: Über Liebe und Ehe* (Munich [Heimeran] 1940), text and German translation 7–43; n.v.
- B1.4 **Budé Moralia II:** *Plutarque: oeuvres morales* vol. II, edited and translated by J. Defradas, J. Hani, and R. Klaerr (Paris [Budé series] 1985). *Advice* is edited by Klaerr: introduction 139–45, text with app. crit. and facing French translation 146–66 (double pages), notes 312–21.
- B1.5 **Corpus Plutarchi Moraliū 6:** *Corpus Plutarchi Moraliū* vol. 6, *Precetti coniugali*, edited and translated by G. Martano and A. Tirelli (Naples [d'Auria] 1990): introduction 7–50, text, app. crit., and annotated facing Italian translation 56–105; further notes 109–20, and index locorum.

## B2. *Advice: Commentaries*

- B2.1 R. Klaerr's Budé edition (B1.4) includes full and helpful notes, virtually a commentary.
- B2.2 G. Martano and A. Tirelli, *Corpus Plutarchi Moraliū* vol. 6 (B1.5).

## B3. *Advice: Translations*

### ENGLISH

- B3.1 T.G. Tucker, “Advice to Married Couples,” in *Selected Essays of Plutarch* (Oxford [olive-green series] 1912) 96–112; virtually no notes.
- B3.2 F. C. Babbitt, “Advice to Bride and Groom,” in *Loeb Moralia* vol. II (B1.2) 298–343, with introduction (297), facing text, and occasional notes.
- B3.3 Moses Hadas, “Marriage Counsel,” in *On Love, the Family and the Good Life: Selected Essays of Plutarch* (New York [Mentor paperback] 1957) 79–92, with introductory paragraph; no notes.
- B3.4 Rex Warner, “Advice on Marriage,” in *Plutarch: Moral Essays* (Harmondsworth [Penguin Classics] 1971) 12–30, with introductory paragraph and a few notes.
- B3.5 Donald Russell, “Advice on Marriage,” in *Plutarch: Selected Essays and Dialogues* (Oxford [World's Classics] 1993) 284–96 (reprinted in the present volume), with introductory paragraph and a few notes at 381–2, 399.

### DUTCH

- B3.6 Hein L. van Dolen, “Adviezen aan een jong echtpaar,” in *Plutarchus: Huwelijk moraal en praktijk* (Amsterdam 1993) 69–84, with a few notes; introduction at 18.  
The introduction and the first 33 Precepts were pre-published in *Hermeneus* 65 (1993) 235–42.

### FRENCH

- B3.7 R. Klaerr, “Préceptes de mariage,” in *Budé Moralia* vol. II (B1.4).

### GERMAN

- B3.8 W. Sieveking in *Liebe und Ehe* (B1.3; n.v.).

## ITALIAN

- B3.9 G. Martano and A. Tirelli, "Precetti coniugali," in *Corpus Plutarchi Moraliū* vol. 6 (B1.5) 56–105.
- B3.10 L. Bianco, *Filosofia del matrimonio* (Palermo 1995): contains *Advice* and the spurious *Love stories* (no. 48, *Amatoriaē narrationes*), with introduction and notes; the Latin translation of *Advice* by C. Valgulio (Venice 1505) is reprinted in an appendix: n.v.: see *Ploutarchos* 13.2 (1997) 12.

## JAPANESE

- B3.11 S. Yaginuma, translation of *Advice* (with *Consolation*, *Eroticus* [no. 47], and *Virtues in Women* [no. 17]) (Tokyo 1986): introduction, translation, and commentary: n.v. "Beautifully printed in traditional Japanese style" according to F.E. Brenk, *Ploutarchos* 5 (1989) 17.

## RUSSIAN

- B3.12 E. Yuntz (= Junec), "Nastavlenie Suprugam," in *Plutarch Sochinenia* (selections from the *Lives* and *Moralia*, Moscow [Khudozestvennaya Literatura] 1983) 347–59.

## SPANISH

- B3.13 C. Morales Otal and J. García López, "Deberes del matrimonio," in *Plutarco: Obras morales y de costumbres (Moralia)* vol. II (Madrid [Biblioteca clásica Gredos] 1986): annotated translation at 177–205, with introduction at 171–6; no Greek text.

*B4. Advice: Discussions*

"If the Women's Liberation Movement ever decided to choose a patron, they might consider—indeed, in my opinion they *ought* to consider—Plutarch of Chaeronea, the first profoundly 'philogynistic' (woman-friendly) Greek philosopher after all those misogynists" (R. Flacelière, *Bulletin de l'Assoen. G. Budé* [1979], 269 [slightly abbreviated]).

"In my view, despite his good intentions, Plutarch would certainly be the target of harsh criticism from the feminists of our own day" (J. García López [B4.18.114]).

- B4.1 Gréard, *Morale* (A1.1) 91–167, esp. 91–105.
- B4.2 Volkmann, *Leben* (A1.2) II.165–81 on Plutarch and the family: 172–81 summarizes *Advice*, with a few comments.
- B4.3 Hirzel, *Plutarch* (A1.3) 29–31.
- B4.4 U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, "Plutarch als Biograph," *Reden und Vorträge* II (4th edn., Berlin 1926) 247–79 at 252–3 and 256–7; translated by Juliane Kerkhecker in Scardigli, *Essays* (A1.32) 47–74 at 52 and 55–6.
- B4.5 Dodds, "Portrait" (A1.5) 102–3.
- B4.6 Ziegler, *Plutarchos* 1949 (A1.6a) 73, 155–6 = 1951 (A1.6b) 709, 791–2.
- B4.7 W.L. Odom, "A Study of Plutarch: The Position of Greek Women in the First Century After Christ" (Diss. Univ. of Virginia 1961, available from University Microfilms Inc., Ann Arbor, Mich.): a pioneering study, which assembles Plutarch's views on marriage, the education, occupations, and virtues and vices of women, and the erotic. A level-headed account (summary at 147–56), which deserves proper publication.
- B4.8 Lisette Goessler, *Plutarchs Gedanken über die Ehe* (Zurich 1962): the first thorough modern discussion of Plutarch's views on marriage. Part I consists of chapters on the *Eroticus* (15–43) and on *Advice* (44–69, translated in the present volume), in which the author quietly and methodically brings out the structure and major themes of these works; part II examines a handful of the *Lives*.

- Reviews: D. Babut, *Ant. Class.* 32 (1963) 254–6; R. Flacelière, *Riv. Filol. Ist. Class.* 91 (1963) 349–51; H. Mounard, *REG* 76 (1963) 275–6; L. Nyikos, *Mus. Helv.* 20 (1963) 245; F.H. Sandbach, *CR* 13 (1963) 222–3; H. Bolkestein, *Mnem.* 17 (1964) 195–7; H. Martin, *AJP* 85 (1964) 443–5; Z.K. Vysoký, *Listy Filologické* 88 (1965) 350–1 [in Czech]; J. Defradas, *REA* 68 (1966) 148.
- B4.9 Fuhrmann, *Images* (A1.7) *passim*, esp. 217–24.
- B4.10 Jones, “Chronology” (A1.8) 71, 73: dates *Advice* between ca. A.D. 90 and ca. 100, probably after 96.
- B4.11 Helen North, *Sophrosyne* (Ithaca, NY 1966): standard work on a concept central to *Advice*; Plutarch discussed too briefly at 248–9.
- B4.12 Russell, *Plutarch* (A1.15) 90–1.
- B4.13 Kathleen O. Wicker, “First Century Marriage Ethics: A Comparative Study of the Household Codes and Plutarch’s *Conjugal Precepts*,” in J.W. Flanagan and A.W. Robinson (edd.), *No Famine in the Land: Studies in Honor of J.L. McKenzie* (Missouri, Mont. 1975) 141–53. (The “household codes” are those of the early Church, as found in the New Testament and Church fathers.)
- B4.14 Panagopoulos, “Vocabulaire” (A1.20) 209–22, 227 on moral vocabulary and concepts.
- B4.15 S. Zedda, “Spiritualità cristiana e saggezza pagana nell’etica della famiglia: affinità e differenze tra San Paolo e i *Coniugalia Praecepta* di Plutarco,” *Lateranum* 48 (1982) 110–24.
- B4.16 M. Foucault, *Le Souci de soi*, vol. III of *L’Histoire de la sexualité* (Paris 1984) 173–216; 206–16 is on *Advice* (the following chapter, entitled “Plutarque,” is on homosexuality) = *The Care of the Self*, vol. III of *The History of Sexuality* (translated by R. Hurley, New York 1986) 147–185, esp. 176–85.
- B4.17 G.J.D. Aalders, “Ideas About Human Equality and Inequality in the Roman Empire: Plutarch and Some of His Contemporaries,” in I. Kajanto (ed.), *Equality and Inequality of Man in Ancient Thought* (Helsinki 1984) 55–72: on the inadequacy of Plutarch’s notions of sexual equality (briefly, at 58–9).
- B4.18 J. García López, “Relaciones personales en *Moralía* de Plutarco: familia, amistad y amor,” in Conference 5 (Fuengirola 1988/90) 105–22: collects and compares passages on these themes; for *Advice* see esp. 112–4.
- B4.19 E. Valgiglio, “Dagli *Ethica* ai *Bioi* in Plutarco,” *ANRW* 33.6 (1991) 3963–4051: collects parallels between the *Moralía* and the *Lives* (3980–1: Numa, Solon, Cato).
- B4.20 Rosa M. Aguilar, “La Mujer, el amor y el matrimonio en la obra de Plutarco,” *Faventia* 12–3 (1990–1) 307–25, esp. 315–9: a more favorable assessment of Plutarch’s views on marriage and sexual equality; summary in *Année phil.* 64 (1993) no. 4797.
- B4.21 J. García López, “La Naturaleza en las comparaciones de Plutarco,” in Conference 8 (Murcia 1990/1) 203–20: comparisons in the *Moralía* with the world of nature.
- B4.22 A. Montano, “*Harmonia e homologia* nei *Coniugalia Praecepta* di Plutarco,” *Elenchos* 12 (1991) 331–8: a wedding discourse for the cultivated élite, reflecting Plutarch’s ethical theories and his relationship with his own wife.
- B4.23 A. Tirelli, “Lo ‘Schema omologico’ nei *Coniugalia Praecepta*: dal modello formale alle strutture ideologiche,” in Conference 7 (Palermo 1989/91) 357–73: on Plutarch’s “similarities” (138 C): the narrative/didactic pattern is not rigid, as analysis of the first six chapters shows; disruption is caused by the contradiction between the ideal of “total fusion” (ch. 34) and the husband’s dominance.
- B4.24 Cynthia Patterson, “Plutarch’s ‘Advice on Marriage’: Traditional Wisdom Through a Philosophic Lens,” *ANRW* 2.33.5 (1991) 4709–23, reprinted in the present volume: the essential modern study, engaging with Foucault’s interpretation.
- B4.25 van der Stockt, *Twinkling* (A1.28) 146–8: *Advice* is a *gamêlios logos* only in a non-technical sense; cf. 123–31: *to kalon meth’ hêdonês* (ch. 29) as a literary principle.
- B4.26 Janick Auberger, “Parole et silence dans les *Préceptes du Mariage* de Plutarque,” *Les Ét. class.* 61 (1993) 297–308: linguistic analysis reveals masculine bias. Summarized in *Année phil.* 64 (1993) no. 4803.
- B4.27 Boulogne, *Aristocrate* (A1.29) 77–88, esp. 84–6 on “l’altérité du sexe.”

- B4.28 Yvonne Vernière, "Plutarque et les femmes", *Anct. World* 25.2 (1994) 165–9: general context.
- B4.29 P. Stadter, "'Subject to the Erotic': Male Sexual Behaviour in Plutarch," in D. Innes and others (edd.), *Ethics and Rhetoric: Festschrift Donald Russell* (Oxford 1995) 221–36: recurrence of ideals of *Advice* in the *Lives*; criticism of Foucault (B4.11) at 222–3.
- B4.30 C. Skidmore, *Practical Ethics for Roman Gentlemen: The Work of Valerius Maximus* (Exeter 1996) 35–42, 85, 122–4 on *chreiai*, collections of anecdotes intended to be learnt by heart (see K. Herna and K. von Fritz s.v. "Gnomê" in *RE* suppl. 6 [1935] 74–90, esp. 87–9, cf. 79–81; biblio. at 85–7), a genre to which *Advice* is clearly related.
- B4.31 A.C. Nicolaides, "Plutarch on Women and Marriage," *WSt* 110 (1997) 27–88: by far the most thorough discussion of all aspects of the subject: wide-ranging, lucidly arranged, and fully annotated.
- B4.32 Victoria Wohl, "Is Male to Female As Mind Is to Body? Marriage, Philosophy and the Body in Plutarch's *Gamika Parangelmata* and Xenophon's *Oikonomikos*," in Conference 16 (San Diego 1995): not yet published.

### B5. *Advice: Specific Passages*

- Dedication: the family and identity of Pollianus and Eurydice:** B5.1 The statue base of Eurydice: *Klio* 17 (1921) 169 no.159, with 18 (1922) 306 = SEG 1.159.
- B5.2 G.W. Bowersock, "Some Persons in Plutarch's *Moralia*," *CQ* 15 (1965) 267–70 at 267–8 (in n. 3 to 267, for "159" read "no. 154").
- B5.3 E. Kapetanopoulos, "Klea and Leontis: Two Ladies from Delphi," *BCH* 90 (1966) 119–30 at 128–9.
- B5.4 Bernadette Puech, "Soclaros de Tithorée, ami de Plutarque, et ses descendants," *REG* 94 (1981) 186–91.
- B5.5 Puech, "Prosopographie" (A3.3) 4849 (Eurydice), 4873 (Pollianus), 4842–3 (Clea, mother of Eurydice; the comment on Bowersock [B5.2] in n. 36 appears to be mistaken).
- Preface: the "traditional ordinance":** B5.6 R. Hirzel, *Themis, Dike und Verwandtes* (Leipzig 1907) 350–1 n. 3.
- Preface: parallels for Muses and Graces:** B5.7 S.C.R. Swain, "Hellenic Culture and the Roman Heroes of Plutarch," *JHS* 100 (1990) 126–45 at 138, reprinted in Scardigli, *Essays* (A1.32) 229–64 at 251.
- chs. 1–6 analyzed:** B5.8 Tirelli, "Schema" (B4.23) 363–70.
- ch.1: quinces:** B5.9 J. Trumpf, "Kydonische Äpfel," *Hermes* 88 (1960) 14–22.
- B5.10 Vinciane Pirenne-Delforge, *L'Aphrodite grecque* (= *Kernos* suppl. 4, Athens/Liège 1994) 410–12.
- ch.10: Herodotus and *aidôs*:** B5.11 R. Harder, "Herodot 1.8.3" in G.E. Mylonas and D. Raymond (edd.), *Studies Presented to D.M. Robinson* (St. Louis, Mo. 1953) II.446–9, reprinted in W. Marg (ed.), *Herodot* (Darmstadt 1965) 370–4.
- B5.12 A.E. Raubitschek, "Die schamlose Ehefrau (Herodot 1.8.3)," *RhM* 100 (1957) 139–41.
- B5.13 D.L. Cairns, "'Off with Her *Aidôs*': Herodotus 1.8.3–4," *CQ* 46 (1996) 78–83: over-subtle?
- ch. 11: heterophony:** B5.14 M.L. West, *Ancient Greek Music* (Oxford 1992) 205–7, esp. 206 n. 41.
- ch. 19: gods as friends:** B5.15 Babut, *Stoïcisme* (A1.11) 474–5, 504.
- ch. 19: superstition:** B5.16 Elisabetta Berardi, "Plutarco e la religione," *Civiltà classica e cristiana* 11 (1990) 141–70: the context of Plutarch's remarks about piety, superstition, and Thessalian witches; see esp. 145–6, 155–7.
- ch. 22: the shoe that pinches:** B5.17 J. Geiger, "Plutarch's *Parallel Lives* and Choice of Heroes," *Hermes* 109 (1981) 85–104 at 102, reprinted in Scardigli, *Essays* (A1.32) 165–90 at 187.
- ch. 27: wine terminology:** B5.18 R. Brock and H. Wirtjes, "Athenaeus on Wine," in D.C. Braund and J.M. Wilkins (edd.), *Athenaeus and His Philosophers at Supper: Reading Greek Culture in the Roman World* (Exeter, forthcoming 1999).
- ch. 29: to kalon meth' hêdonês:** B5.19 Babut, *Stoïcisme* (A1.11) 351: a reply to Stoic doctrine.

- ch. 32: Pheidias's statue of Aphrodite: B5.20 S. Settis, *CHELÔNE: saggio sull' Afrodite Urania di Fidia* (Pisa 1966), esp. frontispiece, 3–23, 173–4, 180, 195, 204–8 and figs. I–II. B5.21 Pirenne-Delforge, *Aphrodite* (B5.10) 231–6.
- ch. 34: three kinds of unity: B5.22 Babut, *Stoïcisme* (A1.11) 232: derived from Chrysippus.
- ch. 34: marriage as *krasis*: B5.23 Babut, *Stoïcisme* (A1.11) 108–9. B5.24 Boulogne, *Aristocrate* (A1.29) 52–4.
- ch. 36: mother-son relationships: B5.25 Judith P. Hallett, *Fathers and Daughters in Roman Society* (Princeton 1984) 62–3, cf. 246–57.
- ch. 41: divorce: B5.26 D.A. Russell, "Plutarch *Alcibiades* 1–16," *PCPS* n.s. 12 (1966) 37–47 at 41–2, reprinted in Scardigli, *Essays* (A1.32) 191–207 at 198–9. B5.27 Nicolaïdes, "Women" (B4.31) 58–62.
- ch. 42: Ox-Yoking: B5.28 R. Parker, *Athenian Religion: A History* (Oxford 1996) 286–7.
- ch. 44: crazy cats: B5.29 Cf. Desmond Morris, *Catwatching* (London 1986) 92–3.
- ch. 44: the bees: B5.30 Sarah B. Pomeroy, *Xenophon Oeconomicus: A Social and Historical Commentary* (Oxford 1994) 278–80.
- ch. 48, 145A: Aristylla: B5.31 Puech, "Prosopographie" (A3.3) 4839.
- ch. 48, 145A: Timoxena's essay: B5.32 Wilamowitz. "Biographi" (B4.4) 252 n. 1 = Scardigli, *Essays* (A1.32) 52 n. 10: "it is easy to see [my italics, FDH] that Plutarch wrote Timoxena's essay himself"; echoed by Barrow, *Plutarch* (A1.9) 20 and by Russell, "Self-Disclosure" (A1.31) 430, though Russell had rightly accepted Timoxena's authorship in *Plutarch* (A1.15) 6.
- ch. 48, 145B: ornamental collars: B5.33 A. Greifenhagen, "Chlidôsin hêmionôn kai hippôn perideraiois," *JDAI* 75 (1960) 84–7: the archaeological evidence.
- ch. 48, 145CD: superstition: B5.34 Babut, *Stoïcisme* (A1.11) 504–6. B5.35 Berardi, "Religione" (B5.16) 145–6, 155–7.

## B6. Marriage

At the time that Plutarch was writing *Advice*, Greece had been a province of the Roman empire for two and a half centuries. Hellenistic and earlier ideals will certainly have survived in the Boeotia of his day, but we must also look to discussions of Roman imperial *mores* if we want to understand the social background to this work.

- B6.1 G. Williams, "Some Aspects of Roman Marriage Ceremonies and Ideals," *JRS* 48 (1958) 16–29: see 23–5 for three traditional Roman ideals, including wifely obedience.
- B6.2 C. Vatin, *Recherches sur le mariage et la condition de la femme mariée à l'époque hellénistique* (Paris 1970): see esp. 33–40, 207–9.
- B6.3 P. Veyne, "La Famille et l'amour sous le Haut-Empire romain," *Annales ESC* 33 (1978) 35–63.
- B6.4 P. Garnsey and R. Saller, *The Roman Empire: Economy, Society and Culture* (London 1987), 130–6 on husbands and wives.
- B6.5 Foucault, *Souci* (B4.15) 173–216 = English translation 147–85.
- B6.6 K.R. Bradley, "Ideals of Marriage in Suetonius' *Caesares*," *Riv. stor. dell' antichità* 15 (1985) 77–95.
- B6.7 Aline Rousselle, "Gestes et signes de la famille dans l'empire romaine," in A. Burguière and others (edd.), *Histoire de la famille* I (Paris 1986) 231–69 = "The Family Under the Roman Empire: Signs and Gestures," in *A History of the Family* I (translated by S. Hanbury Tenison and others, London 1996) 270–310, 670–28.
- B6.8 Suzanne Dixon, "The Sentimental Ideal of the Roman Family," in Beryl Rawson (ed.), *Marriage, Divorce and Children in Ancient Rome* (Oxford 1991) 99–113.
- B6.9 Susan Treggiari, *Roman Marriage* (Oxford 1991) 331–9 on the double standard of sexual morality.
- B6.10 Suzanne Dixon, *The Roman Family* (London 1992) 83–90, 210–2: good brief survey of emotions within Roman marriages.

- B6.11 Francesca Albinì, "Family and the Formation of Character in Plutarch," in Mossman, *Intellectual World* (A1.37) 59–71: see esp. 62–3.
- B6.12 Suzanne Dixon, "Continuity and Change in Roman Social History: Retrieving 'Family Feeling(s)' from Roman Law and Literature," in M. Golden and P. Toohey, *Inventing Ancient Culture* (London 1997) 79–90.

#### MUSONIUS ON MARRIAGE

The views of Plutarch's elder contemporary Musonius Rufus on marriage provide some illuminating comparisons. The main texts are fragments XIII, "What Is the Chief End of Marriage?" and XIV, "Is Marriage a Handicap for the Pursuit of Philosophy?" (Lutz [B6.13 below] 88–97, Jagu [B6.15] 65–70), but frs. III, "That Women Too Should Study Philosophy" (Lutz 38–43, Jagu 28–30) and XII "On Sexual Indulgence" (Lutz 84–9, Jagu 62–4) are also relevant.

- B6.13 Cora E. Lutz, "Musonius Rufus, 'The Roman Socrates,'" *Yale Cl. St.* 10 (1947) 3–147: includes text of fragments with translation.
- B6.14 M.R. van Geytenbeek, *Musonius Rufus en de griekse Diatribe* (Amsterdam 1949) 56–89, translated as *Musonius Rufus and Greek Diatribe* (Assen 1963) 51–77: n.v.
- B6.15 A. Jagu, *Musonius Rufus: Entretiens et fragments* (Hildesheim/New York 1979): includes annotated French translation.
- B6.16 Foucault, *Souci* (B4.15) 177–82, 187–90, 196–202 = English translation 150–5, 159–62, 168–74.

### C. Consolation

#### C1. Consolation: Texts

For the textual tradition see section D3 below.

- C1.1 **Teubner Moralia III: Plutarchi Moralia** vol. III, edited by W.R. Paton, M. Pohlenz, and W. Sieveking (Leipzig [Teubner] 1929): preface (on the text) xxiii–xxv, text with app. crit. 533–42. *Consolation* is edited by Sieveking.
- C1.2 **Loeb Moralia VII: Plutarch's Moralia**, edited and translated by P.H. de Lacy and B. Einarson (London and Cambridge, Mass. [Loeb series] 1959): introduction 575–9, text and facing English translation 580–605. Praised by all reviewers.
- ?C1.3 *Consolazione a Timossena*, edited by A. Casanova (Turin 1964 [stencilled]): n.v. ; possibly a translation without text.
- C1.4 M. Pinnoy, "Plutarchus' *Consolatio ad uxorem*," *Kleio* (Leuven) 9 (1979) 65–86: introduction, text, and Dutch translation and commentary; n.v.
- C1.5 **Budé Moralia VIII: Plutarque, Oeuvres morales** vol. VIII, edited and translated by J. Hani (Paris [Budé series] 1980): introduction 173–87, text with app. crit. and French translation 188–98, notes at foot of pages and 250–7.  
Fulllest review: D. Babut, *Rev. de philol.* 55 (1981) 319–24.
- C1.6 **Corpus Plutarchi Moraliū 9: Corpus Plutarchi Moraliū** vol. 9, *Consolazione alla moglie*, edited and translated by P. Impara and M. Manfredini (Naples, d'Auria] 1991): introduction 7–42, text, app. crit., and annotated facing Italian translation; further notes 79–85, and index locorum.

#### C2. Consolation: Commentaries

- C2.1 H. Martin, Jr. and Jane E. Phillips, "*Consolatio ad uxorem* (Moralia 608A–612B)," in Betz, *Ethical Writings* (A1.21) 394–441: introduction (394–412) and very full commentary (413–41), with special attention to parallels in early Christian literature.

- C2.2 J. Hani's Budé edition (C1.5) includes full and helpful notes, virtually a commentary; unaware of Martin and Phillips (C2.1).  
 C2.3 P. Impara and M. Manfredini, *Corpus Plutarchi Moralia* vol. 9 (C1.6): also unaware of Martin and Phillips.

### C3. *Consolation: Translations*

#### ENGLISH

- C3.1 Moses Hadas, "Letter of Consolation to His Wife," in *On Love* (B3.3) 93–100, with introductory paragraph; no notes.  
 C3.2 P.H. de Lacy and B. Einarson, "Consolation to His Wife" in Loeb *Moralia* vol. VII (C1.2) 580–605, with introduction (575–9), facing text, and notes.  
 C3.3 Rex Warner, "A Letter of Consolation to His Wife," in *Moral Essays* (B3.4) 176–85.  
 C3.4 Robin Waterfield, "In Consolation to His Wife," in *Plutarch: Essays* (Harmondsworth [Penguin Classics] 1992) 365–74, with introduction (359–64) and footnotes.  
 C3.5 Donald Russell, "A Consolation to His Wife," in *Plutarch: Essays* (B3.5) 297–303 [reprinted in the present volume], with introductory paragraph and a few notes at 382–3, 399.

#### DUTCH

- C3.6 A.J. Koster in *Bloemlezing uit de Moralia* (Amsterdam 1954): n.v.  
 C3.7 Hein L. van Dolen, "Troostbrief," in *Plutarchus: Huwelijck moraal* (C3.6) 85–92, with a few notes; introduction at 19–20.

#### FRENCH

- C3.8 J. Hani, "Consolation à sa femme," in Budé *Moralia* vol. VIII (C1.5) 188–98.

#### GERMAN

- C3.9 B. Snell in *Von der Ruhe des Gemütes und andere philosophische Schriften* (Zürich 1948) 1–8: n.v.

#### ITALIAN

- C3.10 G. Pernice, "Consolazione a Timossena" (Tortona [Quaderni di Stasimon, Liceo Statale] 1967): n.v.  
 C3.11 P. Impara and M. Manfredini, "Consolazione alla moglie," in *Corpus Plutarchi Moraliū* vol. 9 (C1.6) 54–75.  
 C3.12 Adele Vaghi, "Consolazione alla moglie" (Vimercate [Collana Libri di una Sera, La Spiga] 1993), with translations of *Exile* (no. 44) and *Fate* (no. 42): n.v.

#### JAPANESE

- C3.13 S. Yaginuma, translation of *Consolation* (with *Advice* etc.): see B3.11.

#### SPANISH

- C3.14 R.M. Aguilar, "Escrito de consolación a sa mujer," in *Plutarco: obras morales y de costumbres (Moralia)* vol. VIII (Madrid [Biblioteca clásica Gredos] 1996): annotated translation at 313–25, with introduction at 307–11; no Greek text.

### C4. *Consolation: Discussions*

- C4.1 Gréard, *Morale* (A1.1) 135–40 [p. 135 is wrongly headed 125].  
 C4.2 Wilamowitz, "Biograph" (B5.32) at 252–3 = Scardigli, *Essays* (A1.32) at 51–2.

- C4.3 Ziegler, *Plutarchos* 1949 (A1.6a) 73, 156–7 = 1951 (A1.6b) 709, 792–3.  
 C4.4 Fuhrmann, *Images* (A1.7), esp. 217–24.  
 C4.5 Jones, “Chronology” (A1.8) 71, 73 = Scardigli, *Essays* (A1.32) 117–8: dates *Consolation* between ca. A.D. 85 and ca. 95.  
 C4.6 Russell, *Plutarch* (A1.15) 5–6, 78–9, 90.  
 C4.7 de Romilly, *Douceur* (A1.23) 294, 298–9.  
 C4.8 K. Hopkins, *Death and Renewal* (Cambridge 1983) 217–32 on grief and mourning.  
 C4.9 K.R. Bradley, “Wet-Nursing at Rome: A Study in Social Relations,” in Beryl Rawson (ed.), *The Family in Ancient Rome* (London 1986), 201–29, esp. 218.  
 C4.10 J.-P. Néraudau, “La Loi, la coutume et le chagrin: réflexions sur la mort des enfants,” in F. Hinard (ed.), *La Mort, les morts et l’au-delà* (Actes du colloque du Caen [Nov. 20–2, 1985], Caen 1987) 195–208.  
 C4.11 Valerie French, “Birth Control, Childbirth and Early Childhood,” in M. Grant and R. Kitzinger (edd.), *Civilization of the Ancient Mediterranean III* (New York 1988) 1355–62 at 1359–62 on early childhood in the ancient world.  
 C4.12 M. Golden, “Did the Ancients Care When Their Children Died?” *G&R* 35 (1988) 152–63; not a word about *Consolation*, but much comparative material.  
 C4.13 Rosa M. Aguilar, “El Léxico del duelo [grief] en las *Consolationes* de Plutarco,” in Conference 5 (Fuengirola 1988/90) 127–33: analysis of vocabulary (assumes *Consolation* to *Apollonius* is authentic: see C6).  
 C4.14 R. Garland, *The Greek Way of Life* (London 1990) 106–62, 315–23: childhood: the general context.  
 C4.15 Maria Cannatà Fera, “La Struttura delle *Consolationes* plutarchee,” in Conference 7 (Palermo 1989/91) 315–25.  
 C4.16 Aguilar, “Mujer” (B4.20), esp. 319–20.  
 C4.17 Russell, “Self-Disclosure” (A1.31) 429–30: does *Consolation* give a real picture of Plutarch’s family?  
 C4.18 Persephone Pagonari-Antoniou, “La *Consolation* à sa femme de Plutarque: est elle vraie ou imaginaire?” *Actes du II Congr. Int. d’Études Béotiennes (Levadhia 1992)* (Athens 1995) 119–27: n.v.  
 C4.19 E. Eyben, “Children in Plutarch,” in van der Stockt, *Plutarchea Lovaniensia* (A1.34) 79–112: from conception to adolescence, with scattering of references to *Consolation*.  
 C4.20 F. Lillo Redonet, “La *Consolatio ad uxorem* de Plutarco y la tradición de la consolarón femenina,” in Conference 13 (Salamanca 1994/6) 157–66.  
 C4.21 S. Fessenmeyer, unpublished paper: see *Ploutarchos* 10.1 (1993) 4.

### C5. *Consolation: Specific Passages*

- ch. 1: the *thugatridê* problem: Ch. 2 (608C) strongly suggests that the child who has died was Plutarch’s only daughter, yet according to ch. 1 (608B) he hears the news from his *thugatridê*, which should mean his daughter’s daughter. Solutions:  
 C5.1 The *thugatridê* is the daughter of an older daughter: see e.g. de Lacy and Einarson, Loeb vol. VII (C3.2) 575–6; Hani, Budé vol. VIII (C1.5) 175–7; I. Kidd in Waterfield, *Essays* (C3.4) 360–1.  
 C5.2 She is his niece: e.g. Volkmann, *Leben* (A1.2) 128–9; Ziegler, *Plutarchos* 1949 (A1.6a) 15 = 1951 (A1.6b) 651; Russell, *Essays* (C3.5) 297, 382.  
 C5.3 D. Babut, “A propos des enfants et d’un ami de Plutarque: essai de solution pour deaux énigmes,” *REG* 94 (198) 47–62, reprinted in Babut’s *Parerga* (Lyon and Paris 1994) 389–404, translates *thugatridê* as daughter-in-law: this is persuasive, and accepted by Puech, “Prosopographie” (A3.3) 4882 n.195.  
 ch. 1: superstition C5.4 Berardi, “Religione” (B5.16).  
 ch. 2: nurse C5.5 Bradley, “Wet-Nursing” (C4.9).  
 C5.6 Garland, *Way of Life* (C4.14) 113–18, 317–18.  
 ch. 2: toys C5.7 F.A.G. Beck, *Album of Greek Education* (Sydney 1975) 47–8 with plates 54–7 (classical period only).

- C5.8 Garland, *Way of Life* (C4.14) 124–7.
- ch. 2: *philanthrôpia* C5.9 Hirzel (A1.3) 23–32.
- ch. 3: Clymene C5.10 J. Diggle (ed.), *Euripides Phaethon* (Cambridge 1970) 3–49 for the myth and the play, 177–8 for the quotation.
- C5.11 C. Collard in Collard and others (edd.), *Euripides: Selected Fragmentary Plays I* (Warminster 1995) 195–203, 239.
- chs. 4–9: grief and mourning C5.12 Hopkins, *Death and Renewal* (C4.8) 217–32, esp. 220–6.
- chs. 4 & 6: mourning: hair, clothes, defilement C5.13 M. Alexiou, *The Ritual Lament in Greek Tradition* (Cambridge 1974) 16–7, 211 (cf. 6–7, 207 for tearing of hair and clothes).
- C5.14 R. Seaford, *Reciprocity and Ritual* (Oxford 1994) 86–8.
- chs. 4–5: display and extravagance at funeral C5.15 Alexiou, *Ritual Lament* (C5.13) 14–23, 211–2.
- C5.16 Seaford, *Reciprocity* (C5.14) 74–86.
- chs. 4–7: lamentation C5.17 Alexiou, *Ritual Lament* (C5.13) 4–23, 206–12.
- C5.18 Gail Holst-Warhaft, *Dangerous Voices: Women's Laments and Greek Literature* (London 1992): comparative material, esp. 1–39; other chapters focus on 5th-cent. and modern Greece.
- C5.19 R. Garland, *The Greek Way of Death* (London 1985) 29–31, 142.
- C5.20 Seaford, *Reciprocity* (C5.14) 74–89 (lamentation and other funerary practices).
- ch. 5: breast-feeding C5.21 Bradley, “Wet-Nursing” (C4.9).
- chs. 6, 11: prolonged mourning C5.22 Donna C. Kurtz and J. Boardman, *Greek Burial Customs* (London 1971) 147–8, 201 (one detail disputed in Alexiou *Lament* [C5.13] 209 n. 54), 360.
- C5.23 Garland, *Way of Death* (C5.19) 38–41, 146–7.
- C5.24 Seaford, *Reciprocity* (C5.14) 74–8 (restrictions on length).
- ch. 6: exhalations C5.25 V. Nutton, “The Seeds of Disease,” *Medical History* 27 (1983) 1–34, esp. 6 and 13 (reprinted in Nutton, *From Democedes to Harvey* [London 1988], same pagination) on *miasmata* (“bad air”) as the cause of disease.
- ch. 7: Theon C5.26 Puech “Prosopographie” (A3.3) 4886.
- chs. 8–9: Fortune (*tychê*) C5.27 Brenk, *Mist* (A1.18) 145–83, nub at 163; Plutarch confused.
- C5.28 Dillon, *Middle Platonists* (A1.19) 208–11: Plutarch incoherent.
- C5.29 Cf. Gertrud Herzog-Hansen, *RE* 7A.2 (1948) 1643–89 s.v. “Tyche,” esp. 1665–70 for a general survey.
- ch. 9: headless and short-tailed lines in Homer C5.30 W.F. Wyatt, *Metrical Lengthening in Homer* (Rome 1969) 201–32.
- ch. 10: beliefs about an afterlife C5.31 B. Latzarus, *Les Idées religieuses de Plutarque* (Paris 1920) 121–5 on Plutarch’s beliefs.
- C5.32 Hopkins, *Death and Renewal* (C4.8) 226–32 for comparative material.
- ch. 10: initiation into mysteries of Dionysus C5.33 R. Seaford (ed.), *Euripides Bacchae* (Warminster 1996) 39–44.
- C5.34 Cf. W. Burkert, *Ancient Mystery Cults* (Cambridge, Mass./London 1987) on mysteries of Dionysus in general.
- ch. 10: mysteries and assurance of life after death C5.35 R. Parker, *Miasma* (Oxford 1983) 286–90.
- ch. 10: miseries of old age C5.36 J.-N. Corvisier, “La Vieillesse en Grèce ancienne,” *Annales de démographie historique* (no volume no., 1985) 53–70 at 58–61, 67–70.
- ch. 11: funeral rites for children C5.37 Garland, *Way of Death* (C5.19) 77–86, 160–2.
- C5.38 Kurtz and Boardman, *Burial Customs* (C5.22) 189–90.
- ch. 11: visiting the tomb C5.39 Garland, *Way of Death* (C5.19) 104–20, 166–71.

## C6. *The Genre of the Consolatio*

By Plutarch’s day, the *consolatio* had become a literary genre, with recurrent *topoi*. Plutarch’s letter to his wife draws on this tradition, though it is by no means a routine example of the

type. There is also another *consolatio* attributed to him, the *Consolation to Apollonius*: this is generally regarded as spurious, though some think it may be an early work.

### (I) GENERAL

- C6.1 H.-Th. Johann, *Trauer und Trost: philosophische Tröstschriften über den Tod* (Munich 1968): methodical examination of standard *topoi*; nothing on Plutarch.
- C6.2 R. Kassel, *Untersuchungen zur griechischen und römischen Konsolationsliteratur* (Munich 1958); our *Consolation* is cited only for parallels to the *Consolation to Apollonius* 38, 52, 80, 89.
- C6.3 J. Hani (ed.), *Consolation à Apollonius* (Paris 1972: sometimes falsely stated to be identical with Hani's Budé edition [C6.10]) 11–4 (with further biblio.); comparison with our *Consolation* at 32–3; thematic index 202–5.
- C6.4 H. Martin and J.E. Phillips in Betz, *Ethical Writings* (C2.1) 397–412.
- C6.5 Hani, "Notice," in Budé *Moralia* vol. VIII (C1.5) at 179–82.
- C6.6 Lillo Redonet, "Consolatio" (C4.18).
- C6.7 J.H.D. Scourfield in *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (3d ed., 1996) s.v. "consolation": the most recent reference work.

### (II) ON THE CONSOLATION TO APOLLONIUS

- C6.8 Kassel, *Untersuchungen* (C6.2) 49–97.
- C6.9 Hani, *Consolation à Apollonios* (C6.3).
- C6.10 J. Hani, "Consolation à Apollonios," in Budé *Moralia* II (1985): introduction 3–39, text with facing French translation 40–89, notes 269–304.
- C6.11 Maria Cannatà Fera, "Plutarco e la *Consolatio ad Apollonium*," *Messana* 15 (1993) 121–53; n.v.; presumably identical with her article of the same title in *Anct. World* 25.2 (1994) 171–89.
- C6.12 Inés Caleró Secall, "Plutarco y Quinto de Esmirna: epístola e poesía, dos caminos para la *Consolatio*," in Conference 13 (Salamanca 1994/6) 167–76.

## D. Manuscripts and Textual Tradition

### D1. Textual Tradition: General

The starting point should be Irigoin's survey in the first volume of the Budé *Moralia* (D1.7).

- D1.1 N. Wilson, "Some Notable Manuscripts Misattributed or Imaginary: I," *GRBS* 16 (1975) 95–7; *Paris. gr.* 1672, the only complete MS. of Plutarch, should be dated to the second half of the 14th cent. or the beginning of the 15th; it is not the work of Planudes.
- D1.2 J. Irigoin, "Les MSS de Plutarque à 32 lignes et à 22 lignes," *Actes XIVe congrès internat. des ét. byzant.* 1971 (Bucarest 1974–76) 83–7: the former derive from a very early copy, the latter from one of a later period.
- D1.3 M. Manfredini, "Su alcune Aldine di Plutarco," *Annali Scuola normale Pisa* 14 (1984) 1–12.
- D1.4 A. Garzya, "La Tradizione manoscritta dei *Moralia*: linee generali," in Conference 2 (Salerno 1985/6) 9–38: a survey identifying areas requiring further research.
- D1.5 A. Garzya, "Planude e il testo dei *Moralia*," in Conference 2 (Salerno 1985/6) 39–54.
- D1.6 M. Manfredini, "Codici plutarchei continentis Vitae e *Moralia*," in Conference 2 (Salerno 1986/7) 103–23.
- D1.7 J. Irigoin in the Budé *Moralia* I.1 (A1.25) ccxxvii–ccxxiv: excellent and lucid account of the history of the text, from Plutarch's own MSS. to modern editions.
- D1.8 M. Manfredini, "Un famoso Codice di Plutarco: il *Paris. gr.* 1672," *Studi class. e orient.* 39 (1989) 127–31; cf. Wilson "Notable Manuscripts" (D1.1).

- D1.9 M. Manfredini, "Osservazioni su codici plutarchei," *AnnaliSNPisa* 20 (1990) 797–829 at 804 (*Advice*) and 820 (*Consolation*).
- D1.10 J. Irigoin, "Tradizione manoscritta e ecdotica plutarchea," in Conference 10 (Naples 1992) 11–27.
- D1.11 M. Manfredini, "Il Plutarco di Planude," *Studi class. e orient.* 42 (1992) 123–5.
- D1.12 M. Manfredini, "Nuove Osservazioni su codici plutarchei," *AnnaliSNPisa* 23 (1993) 999–1040 at 1011–3 and 1026–8.
- D1.13 F. Vendruscolo, "La 'Recensio Q' dei *Moralia*: Plutarco édito da Demetrios Triklinios?" *Bollettino dei classici* 3.13 (1992) 59–106.
- D1.14 M. Manfredini, "I Manoscritti plutarchei del Bessarione," *AnnaliSNPisa* 24 (1994) 31–48: lists and describes 26 MSS. of Plutarch (works or epitomes) given by Bessarion to S. Giorgio Maggiore in Venice in 1468.

## D2. Textual Tradition: Advice

- D2.1 W. Sieveking in Teubner *Moralia* vol. I (B1.1) xxxix–xli.
- D2.2 J. Hani and R. Klaerr, "Note sur la tradition manuscrite," in Budé *Moralia* vol. II (B1.4) vii–x.
- D2.3 G. Martano and A. Tirelli, "Il Testo" in *Corpus Plutarchi Moraliū* vol. 6 (B1.5) 25–54 with 109–20.

## D3. Textual Tradition: Consolation

- D3.1 W. Sieveking in Teubner *Moralia* vol. III (C1.1) xxiii–xxv.
- D3.2 B. Einarson and P. de Lacy, "The Manuscript Tradition of Plutarch *Moralia* 548A–612B," *CPhil.* 46 (1951) 93–110 at 93, 107–8, 110.
- D3.3 J. Hani, "Notice," in Budé *Moralia* vol. VIII (C1.5) at 183–7.
- D3.4 P. Impara and M. Manfredini, "Tradizione manoscritta," in *Corpus Plutarchi Moraliū* vol. 9 (C1.6) 41–6.

## E. Influence

This list could no doubt be expanded by specialists in the various modern literatures.

- E1 Hirzel, *Plutarch* (A1.3): as one of a series *Das Erbe der Alten*, 15 of its 23 chapters are concerned with Plutarch's influence and reputation. For Johann Fischart's 1578 translation of *Advice* see 115–16.
- E2 Ziegler, *Plutarchos* 1949 (A1.6a) 309–24 = 1951 (A1.6b) 947–62.
- E3 R. Aulotte, *Amyot et Plutarque: la tradition des Moralia au XVIe siècle* (Geneva 1965): for *Advice* see 54–69 and index at 393; for *Consolation*, 104–5 and index at 395. Appendices at 325–62 contain catalogues of all 15th- and 16th-cent. texts and translations of the *Moralia*.
- E4 R. Aulotte, "Une Version retrouvée de Jacques Grévin: les *Conjugalia praecepta* de Plutarque de Chéronée," in *Hommages à Marie Delcourt*, ed. R. Crahay and others (Brussels 1970) 352–60: the only copy of this 1558 translation, now in the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.
- E5 Russell, *Plutarch* (A1.15) 143–63.
- E6 N. Criniti, "Per una storia del plutarchismo occidentale," *NuovaRivStor* 63 (1979) 187–207.
- E7 R. Aulotte, "L'Impulsion lyonnaise dans la diffusion des *Oeuvres morales* de Plutarque au XVIe siècle," in A. Possenti and G. Mastrangelo (edd.), *Il Rinascimento a Lione* (Macerata 1988) 1.33–41, esp. 37–8 on an anonymous 1546 translation of *Advice*.
- E8 J. García López, "Diego Gracián de Alderete, traductor de los *Moralia*," in *Los Humanistas españoles: actas del IV simposio de filología* (Murcia 1987/90: no editor named) 155–64.

## Appendix: Conferences

The following list is offered as a guide to the numerous Plutarch conferences held in recent years, whether or not they contain material relevant to *Advice or Consolation*.

- Conference 1: Rome 1985/6** [= 1st Italian conference]: *Miscellanea Plutarchea*, Rome, Nov. 23, 1985, ed. F.E. Brenk and I. Gallo (Ferrara 1986).
- Conference 2: Salerno 1986/7**: *Sulla tradizione manoscritta dei Moralia di Plutarco*, Salerno, Dec. 4–5, 1986, ed. I. Gallo (Salerno 1987).
- Conference 3: Ferrara 1987/8** [= 2d Italian conference]: *Aspetti dello stoicismo e dell'epicureismo in Plutarco*, Ferrara, April 2–3, 1987, ed. I. Gallo (Ferrara 1988).
- Conference 4: Athens 1987/8** [= 1st international conference]: Athens, June 26–8, 1988: most papers published as *Illinois Classical Studies* 13.2 (1988), ed. M. Marcovich.
- Conference 5: Fuengirola 1988/90** [= 1st Spanish symposium]: *Estudios sobre Plutarco: obra e tradición*, Fuengirola, November 17–9, 1988, ed. A. Pérez Jiménez and G. del Cerro Calderón (Málaga 1990).
- Conference 6: Oxford 1989/92 or 94** [= 2d international conference]: Oxford, Sept. 3–7, 1989: full program and abstracts of papers published in *Ploutarchos* 6.1 (1989) 9–24; some papers published as P. Stadter (ed.), *Plutarch and the Historical Tradition* (London 1992), others as *Ancient World* 25.2 (1994) (*Philosophical and Historical Studies on Plutarch*).
- Conference 7: Palermo 1989/91** [= 3d Italian conference]: *Strutture formali dei Moralia di Plutarco*, Palermo, May 3–5, 1989, ed. G. d'Ippolito and I. Gallo (Naples 1991).
- Conference 8: Murcia 1990/1** [= 2d Spanish symposium]: *Estudios sobre Plutarco: paisaje y naturaleza*, April 28–30, 1990, ed. J. García López and E. Calderón Dorda (Madrid 1991).
- Conference 9: Genoa 1991/2** [= 4th Italian conference]: *Plutarco e le scienze*, Genoa/Bocca di Magra, April 22–5, 1991, ed. I. Gallo (Genoa 1992).
- Conference 10: Naples 1992**: *I Moralia di Plutarco tra filologia e filosofia*, April 10, 1992, ed. I. Gallo and R. Laurenti (Naples 1992).
- Conference 11: Oviedo 1992/4** [= 3d Spanish symposium]: *Estudios sobre Plutarco: ideas religiosas*, April 30–May 2, 1992, ed. M. García Valdés (Madrid 1994).
- Conference 12: Certosa 1993/5** [= 5th Italian conference = 3d international conference]: *Teoria e prassi politica nelle opere di Plutarco*, June 7–9, 1993, ed. I. Gallo and B. Scardigli (Naples 1995).
- Conference 13: Salamanca 1994/6** [= 4th Spanish symposium]: *Estudios sobre Plutarco: aspectos formales*, Salamanca, May 26–8 1994, ed. J.A. Fernández Delgado and F. Pordomingo Pardo (Madrid 1996).
- Conference 14: Dublin 1994/7**: *The Intellectual World of Plutarch*, Sept. 7–11, 1994: full program in *Ploutarchos* 11.1 (1994) 12–5; selected papers published as J. Mossman (ed.), *Plutarch and His Intellectual World* (London 1997) (A1.37).
- Conference 15: Ravello 1995** [= 6th Italian conference]: *Plutarco e la religione*, May 29–31, 1995, ed. I. Gallo (Naples 1995).
- Conference 16: San Diego 1995** [= session of the 127th meeting of the American Philological Association]: *The Heritage of Plutarch*, December 27–30, 1995, most papers to be published in *Ploutarchos*; program in *Ploutarchos* 12.1 (1995) 3–4.
- Conference 17: Zaragoza 1996/97** [= 5th Spanish symposium]: *Plutarco y la historia*, June 20–2, 1996, ed. C. Schrader, V. Ramón, and J. Vela (Zaragoza 1997).
- Conference 18: Leuven 1996** [= 4th international conference]: *Rhetorical Theory and Praxis in Plutarch*, July 3–6, 1996, not yet published: for the program see *Ploutarchos* 12.2 (1996) 6–9; report by M. Baldassare in *Ploutarchos* 13.2 (1997) 5–7.
- Conference 19: Milan 1997** [= 7th Italian conference]: *L'Eredità culturale di Plutarco dall'antichità al rinascimento*, May 28–30, 1997, not yet published: for the program see *Ploutarchos* 13.2 (1997) 8–10.
- Conference 20: Cadiz 1998** [= 6th Spanish symposium]: *Plutarch, Dionysos and Wine*, May 14–6, 1998: announced in *Ploutarchos* 13.2 (1997).

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JACKET ILLUSTRATION: Alcestis, the ideal wife, leans against her marriage bed which is displayed between the bedroom doors. Her guests include her sister-in-law (seated), and sister, and on the left three young women who arrange floral displays in three wedding vases. Epinetron (ca. B.C.E.). Athens, National Archaeological Museum 1629. Photo: TAP Service.

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